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Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to analysis the process of industrial change in the 
Lancashire coalfield during the post-war period. Industrial change refers to the 
processes of modernisation and rationalisation of the coal industry and the broader 
modernisation of the coalfield. As a regional study of a British coalfield in which 
industrial change was written large it sheds light on the under-researched process of 
the modernisation of a staple industry and the political imperatives which 
accompanied it. This study is unique because for the first time it undertakes a re- 
evaluation of industrial change in the coal industry through an appraisal of available 
historical sources. The thesis proceeds from the premise that industrial change was 
impelled by a longstanding socialist analysis of Britain's industrial dispensation and 
the post-war debate on Britain's perceived decline. It is argued that these two factors 
informed a desire for modernity in post-war Britain in which the coal industry was 
caught between the requirement to modernise and to provide a key role in wider 
economic modernisation. It is advanced that these factors saw the coal industry 
squeezed by government economic and political priorities in favour of the `multi-fuel' 
economy. From this the thesis develops the theme that industrial change in coal was 
underpinned by a high degree of acceptance amongst industrial and political opinion 
including organised labour in the industry. A major part of the thesis is then devoted 
to an assessment of how the different levels of the NUM in Lancashire and the Labour 
Party in the coalfield deliberated upon industrial change and articulated a response to 
it. This thesis is the first substantive attempt to examine reaction to industrial change 
in coal in this way. Finally, this study assesses the consequences of industrial change 
in the Lancashire coalfield through a discussion of attitudes toward coalfield 
modernisation. 
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PREFACE 
The roots of this thesis are traceable to a childhood spent growing up in 1960s `coal and 
cotton' Lancashire. I was conscious of the changes taking place around me in as much as 
what seemed to be old-fashioned was giving way to the new. Yet, I seem only able to 
recall times spent playing around empty cotton mills and derelict collieries. I can 
remember conversations between members of my own family, who had worked in coal and 
cotton, discussing the merits or otherwise of what was widely perceived as `progress' 
during the 1960s. I was also made aware that this was an important time because of the 
passing of staple industries which for hundreds of years had sustained the community in 
which I lived. 
Years later, after having been made redundant from a career in the insurance industry, I 
returned to full-time education and completed a History degree at the University of Central 
Lancashire, Preston in what proved to be a fruitful and vibrant environment for a `mature' 
student. During my third year I was faced with choosing a research topic for the final year 
honours dissertation. Under the guidance of my supervisor, Dr. Rex Pope, my thoughts 
turned to the Lancashire coalfield where I was able to make valuable contacts, uncover 
sources for research and gain an understanding of some of the main arguments in coal 
industry historiography and labour history. After completion it was `up the road' to 
Lancaster University supported by a university studentship to undertake an MA in 
Historical Research where I was fortunate enough to study in the History Department 
under the labour historian, Dr. Gordon Phillips. I benefited from the challenging rigours of 
the one-year MA course, the assistance of staff in the department and the stimulation of 
debate with other postgraduate students. Again, it was the Lancashire coalfield which 
attracted me as a topic for the substantive research dissertation. After leaving Lancaster I 
embarked on training for a career in teaching in further education after the failure of a 
number of attempts to secure funding for a Ph. D. I entered Bolton Institute to complete a 
PGCE in further education. This furnished me with an appreciation and introspective on 
some of the broader issues in further and higher education. While at Bolton Institute I 
made another bid for funding and was delighted when the British Academy agreed to 
provide this to support research for a D. Phil. in Politics at York University. Here I was able 
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to fmalise my ideas for a research topic with Professor David Howell whose expertise on 
labour and industrial history and politics has proved invaluable together with his detailed 
knowledge of the Lancashire coalfield. I believe the choice of research topic has allowed 
me to produce a thesis which is a contribution to an important but vastly under-researched 
aspect of the modem British experience. 
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INTRODUCTION 
i. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
This thesis looks at the process of industrial change in the Lancashire coalfield. It has been 
developed because of my belief that the structural decline of the staple industries has been 
one of the most important processes in the modern British experience. It was one which 
went largely unquestioned during the period with which this thesis is concerned. It 
therefore requires an historical and political re-evaluation. In examining industrial change 
the thesis takes as its focus a coalfield which has received relatively little attention in the 
huge amount of work devoted to the industry. Furthermore, the Lancashire coalfield was 
an important arena for the implementation of industrial change in the industry. The main 
focus of the thesis will be developments in the coal industry during the late 1950s and 
1960s when it underwent a programme of intense modernisation and rationalisation. A 
major source 'of interest will be colliery closures. The more recent closures of the 1980s 
and 1990s have pre-occupied commentators. By contrast, the closures of the late 1950s and 
1960s have produced less discussion. Central to the thesis will be an analysis of the role 
played in industrial change by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and Labour 
Party in the coalfield together with an examination of responses to industrial change by 
Labour, the union leadership and `rank-and-file'. In this respect the study establishes new 
ground by providing a detailed assessment through the evaluation of available historical 
evidence. Although the primary importance of the thesis is one of historical and political 
re-evaluation it will throw light on a number of political processes. It is directly concerned 
with the management of change under public ownership, examining relationships between 
government, the Coal Board and the NUM. More broadly, the thesis assesses the notion of 
modernisation in the context of post-war political imperatives. Post-war political, as well 
as economic, priorities will be seen as important to the direction and momentum of 
industrial change in coal as will the influence of socialist notions of modernity seen in 
post-war re-construction and later in economic modernisation and planning. 
The term industrial change includes the complementary processes of modernisation and 
rationalisation in the coal industry. Terms such as re-organisation and re-structuring are 
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inclusive metaphors for this twin process. In addition, modernisation in this thesis includes 
reference to two parallel processes. One is the modernisation of post-war Britain, which for 
the coal industry meant the challenge of alternative fuels such as nuclear energy, oil and 
natural gas. The other is the modernisation of the Lancashire coalfield including new 
investment and industrial diversification necessary to forestall the decline of the industry. 
The notion of modernisation carried with it both an economic and political dimension in 
determining industrial change in coal. The attraction of alternative fuels, with the shift 
away from a coal-based economy, was accompanied by political as well as economic 
priorities. The requirement to modernise the economy as a professed objective of socialism 
was also an important element which became a component of Labour's political agenda 
during the 1960s together with the need for economic modernisation to tackle perceived 
British decline. More specifically, modernisation was used in a number of ways as a 
manipulative political device in order to facilitate and legitimise the process of industrial 
change in coal. Modernisation encompassed a variety of issues so it meant different things 
to different groups at different times. For miners, modernisation during the 1960s meant 
the encroachment of alternative fuels, new colliery developments, the re-construction of 
others and the closure of many more. For the coalfield community it was expressed in a 
desire for economic and social opportunities through new investment in the coalfield to 
tackle the decline of coal. Examining the process of industrial change in this thesis 
involves an engagement with the `high narrative' of industrial change rather than with a 
detailed examination of coal's metamorphosis under public ownership. It is therefore 
substantially concerned with the political decisions, processes and responses which 
accompanied industrial change rather than highlighting changes to the labour process or 
industrial relations which have already received considerable treatment from 
commentators. 
A number of significant relationships are investigated in the thesis, notably the relationship 
between the NUM and the Coal Board and between the National Union of Mineworkers 
Lancashire Area (NUMLA) and the Labour Party in the coalfield. Coalfield politics were 
dominated by NUMLA-Labour Party hegemony. While Conservative governments held 
office for a large part of the period it is Labour which will be the focus of attention because 
of its authority in the coalfield. Equally, Labour Party involvement influences the 
chronological aspect of this work. The Labour governments of the 1960s were of the 
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utmost importance in the way they increased the pace of industrial change in coal. The 
return of Labour to power raised expectations amongst its political allies in the NUM over 
the scale and pace of industrial change. For this reason events up to 1965 and those 
between 1965 and 1972 form a distinct division in the chronology. In a general sense the 
choice of chronology is more arbitrary. 1945 is seen as marking the beginning of a more 
intense period of modernisation for the coal industry under post-war re-construction 
particularly with the advent of public ownership in 1947.1972 was the year of the first 
national strike in the industry since 1926. The choice of 1972 is therefore as much a way of 
defining the boundary of the industry's post-war experience as one heralding the return of 
more settled conditions after a period of severe decline and rationalisation during the 
1960s. 
Industrial change in the coal industry was undertaken with a high level of support across 
the industrial and political spectrum in Lancashire as elsewhere. In this respect, it might be 
more accurate to describe this thesis as the `non-politics' of industrial change in the sense 
that ideological differences were less influential in determining outcomes. Although such 
differences underpinned many of the cleavages which developed during the course of 
industrial change, issues of modernisation and rationalisation tended to subsume 
ideological divisions. Both the political left and right within the NUMLA accepted that 
there was a need for the coal industry to re-fashion itself into a modem viable industry in 
order to ensure its survival. The goal of modernity for the industry and the coalfield 
became of paramount importance during the late 1950s and 1960s. Questioning the process 
of industrial change only became a debate about its specific impacts and pace. Similarly, 
opposition to the process focused exclusively around the specific impact of industrial 
change particularly over colliery closures. The propriety of industrial change only became 
an issue as the ramifications of the process became clearer and as the contradictions which 
support for modernity produced became more evident. 
The key hypotheses in the thesis flow from a belief that the momentum for industrial 
change was carried forward by a desire for modernity which, in turn, informed government 
economic and political priorities. Industrial change was accompanied by such a high 
degree of industrial and political acceptance that it was pursued to an extent that pushed 
aside any question of the costs involved even as some of its failings became apparent. As 
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an absolute and total priority it succeeded in as much as it transformed the coal industry in 
Lancashire, but industrial change, and attitudes toward it, contributed to an appalling 
economic and social legacy for the coalfield. The thesis will thus consider the supposition 
that industrial and political opinion in the coalfield endorsed industrial change. An 
important objective of this examination will be to determine whether the relationships 
between the NUMLA and Regional Coal Board and between the NUMLA and Labour 
Party in the coalfield were important in facilitating industrial change. Furthermore, the 
thesis will test the assumption that the relationship between the NUMLA and Labour Party 
in the coalfield was significant in managing and containing opposition to industrial change 
through the strategies both adopted. In this respect, opposition to industrial change will be 
scrutinised as will the impact industrial change had on the character and strength of 
opposition. Finally, the thesis will assess the impact that the experience of industrial 
change had on political change and industrial militancy during the late 1960s in 
Lancashire. 
ii. THE LANCASHIRE COALFIELD 
The spatial characteristics of the coalfield reveal a high degree of diversity within a 
geographically confined area. There were two distinct coalfields in Lancashire. The larger, 
the South Lancashire coalfield, was wedged between the two conurbations of Merseyside 
and Manchester. A loop of the coalfield ran to the north and east of the Manchester 
conurbation and then into Cheshire and north Derbyshire. In the south of the Wirral 
peninsula there was an extension of the North Wales coalfield. For many years the South 
Lancashire coalfield was twinned with these disparate areas of coal mining activity in what 
was known as the `Cheshire coalfield'. For this reason reference was made to Lancashire 
and Cheshire as one coalfield area. Mining in Cheshire ceased by the mid-1930s. The 
smaller of the coalfields was in North East Lancashire centred on the Accrington and 
Burnley area. This area had a distinct mining tradition with a local economy dominated by 
textiles. Although the South Lancashire coalfield was close to the two major, cities it too 
developed a distinctive identity from that of the two major. cities. It also displayed 
considerable intra-coalfield diversity. The heart of the coalfield was in the central areas of 
South Lancashire in the Wigan and Leigh districts covering a nebula of townships and 
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villages highly dependant on the coal industry with the greatest concentration of 
employment in the pits. This area was known colloquially as the `Wigan coalfield'. The 
symbolic and administrative centre of the whole coalfield was Wigan, dubbed `coalopolis', 
or `king coal's throne'. ' It performed similar functions for the Lancashire coalfield as 
Barnsley, Chesterfield and Mansfield did as respective centres of the coal industry in the 
Yorkshire, Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire coalfields. The exception was that the 
Lancashire and Cheshire Miners' Federation (LCMF) headquarters was located in Bolton 
from 1914 to take advantage of the concentration of trade union offices in the town as a 
result of its textile predominance. To the east and west of the South Lancashire coalfield 
the coal industry rubbed shoulders with areas of mixed occupation. On the eastern fringes 
it met the Manchester conurbation. Here textiles and the engineering trades were important 
while `mill and pit' Lancashire gave way to the metropolitan values of Manchester 
dominated by its commercial interests. On the western fringes of the coalfield lay 
St. Helens with its distinctive industrial concerns dominated by the glass industry. 
Nevertheless St. Helens was an important mining district. It was the only expanding area 
for coal in Lancashire during the twentieth century in a coalfield which experienced 
decline for much of the period. The particular industrial and political affairs which gave 
St. Helens its characteristic political culture have in more recent years been eclipsed by 
those of Merseyside as a result of demographic, local government and urban change. The 
high degree of diversity in the coalfield influenced the development of industrial and 
Labour politics. 
iii. A POST-WAR POLITICAL PROFILE OF THE LANCASHIRE COALFIELD 
The strength of the case for the modernisation of the Lancashire coal industry was proven 
beyond doubt during the Second World War. It was one of the most dispute-prone periods 
in the coalfield's history because the industry was being asked to perform miracles of 
production while remaining in an antiquated condition exacerbated by wartime shortages. 
The situation became so serious that the promising political career of Gordon McDonald, 
Labour MP for Ince, was curtailed as he was rushed back from parliament to Lancashire in 
1942 to become Regional Coal Controller in an attempt to resolve the problems. 3 
Lancashire's wartime record became such a bone of contention that it led to conflict 
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between the NUMLA and the post-war Labour Government. It had become abundantly 
clear that the limited re-organisation of the inter-war Lancashire coal industry had failed to 
modernise the industry such that it cracked under - wartime exigencies. That led to a 
stinging attack from Manny Shinwell when he was the Minister of Fuel and Power. 4 This 
row, in part, contributed to clashes with his PPS, Bill Foster, Labour MP for Wigan. The 
conflict became just one aspect of a wider disagreement between Foster and Shinwell. 5 
However, these arguments led to a strengthening of the view that modernisation of the 
industry had to form the most important element of public ownership in Lancashire. 
The war years were also significant in Lancashire for the rising importance of the 
Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). Hitherto, it had found difficulty in establishing 
a foothold in the coalfield. Support had waxed and waned since the General Strike. 6 The 
problem facing the Communists was establishing a threshold against the increasing 
entrenchment of LCMF-Labour Party hegemony. The CPGB, as in other coalfield areas, 
had problems sowing the seeds of its theoretical and radical analysis against the- strong 
pragmatic appeal of the LCMF and Labour. The coalfield became a sepulchre for 
theoreticians coupled with organisational deficiencies in the party.? Communist successes 
during. the inter-war period had coincided with particular crises such as the 1926 General 
Strike and its aftermath, when they were able to match theory with specific action through 
industrial and political campaigns. However, the party found it impossible to offer an 
attractive appeal outside periods of crisis in competition with a LCMF strategy of 
industrial co-operation and Labour's social `reformism'. The high-water mark for the party 
came during the war when it was again able to translate its appeal into specific industrial 
and political issues helped by the troubled position of coal in Lancashire. In the political 
field, the Party was assisted by the popularity of its campaign for a second front in 
Europe. 8 Moreover, wartime sentiments provided a more accommodating atmosphere in 
which it could operate. The LCMF's support for the re-affiliation of the CPGB to Labour 
in 1943 was one example? Rising support in Lancashire brought party re-organisation in 
the coalfield which provided a more effective base from which to campaign. 1° The 
accession of leading Communist, Jim Hammond, to the post of full-time miners' agent for 
Wigan in 1942 was a major coup presaging the extension of its influence into key union 
branches. " Consistently an electoral irrelevance, the CPGB nevertheless made its presence 
felt within the coalfield. 
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The inability of the left to encroach upon NUM-Labour Party hegemony in political terms 
provided a good indication of just how far the union and Labour had advanced during the 
inter-war period. LCMF-Labour Party hegemony had been consolidated between the wars 
through the success of Labour at parliamentary and local government levels buttressed by 
LCMF support. Moreover, hegemony was achieved by successfully twinning a LCMF 
strategy of maximising co-operation with `progressive' elements among Lancashire coal 
owners and support for Labour's social `reformism'. However, it was the post-war period 
when hegemony reached a maturity that made it insurmountable. This process was assisted 
by what Howell describes as the emergence of a `Labour machine' in the coalfield . 
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Elements of this had become apparent during the inter-war period. Patronage of office in 
the LCMF and Labour Party was one feature. The career patterns of leading union officials 
followed an almost familiar seamless pattern. For most senior officials it was a case of 
working in every grade in the pit, getting elected as checkweighman, then as branch union 
official and thereafter either to election as a full-time miners' agent or to a seat on the 
union executive. Subsequently, most activists chose between a union career or one in 
Labour politics by obtaining the nomination for one of the coalfield's safe seats, often 
supported by a district miners' association. The union career, rather than political office, 
was the usual preference. At the local level, union and political- office often ran together. 
This succession of power through patronage became an established feature of coalfield 
politics. Leading union officials and Labour figures emerged from certain geographical 
areas of the coalfield through the support network of local branches, pits and district 
associations. For example, the Tyldesley `machine' helped support the early careers of two 
union secretaries: Pemberton, secretary from 1927 to 1945, and later Vincent from 1971. In 
Labour politics it helped launch the careers of two coalfield MPs during the inter-war 
period: Rowson at Farnworth and Tinker at Leigh. During the post-war period it assisted 
the political career of Fred Longworth, an ex-miner and union official and first Labour 
chairman of Lancashire County Council. 13 
At the top of the union the key post was the full-time secretary followed by the full-time 
district miners' agents who held the next most important offices. These were permanent 
positions after election. The union president was less influential, particularly after re- 
organisation in 1944 when the NUMLA president was chosen by annual delegate ballot. 
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The presidency was a figurehead role with no effective authority apart from agenda setting 
and representing the union. It was the longevity of office of the full-time secretary and 
miners' agents which were important in extending and consolidating patronage. The 
LCMF and NUMLA had only five secretaries between formation in 1889 and the 1984 
strike: Ashton, Pemberton, Hall, Gormley and Vincent. Succession of office was less a 
case of passing down the baton than passing down a Masonic bag of regalia in which the 
union's secrets of succession were held. In the same way, longevity of office for the full- 
time miner's agents allowed then to create fiefdoms in the coalfield from where they could 
extend power and influence. For example, Seth Blackledge was miners' agent for Wigan 
from 1917 until 1942, a post Jim Hammond then held until retirement in 1967.14 The 
formation of the NUMLA in 1944 reduced local autonomy with the dismantling of the 
district associations. Nevertheless, while centralising tendencies increased with the 
creation of the NUMLA the establishment of local panels of branches serving specific 
districts of the coalfield within the new union structures ensured that a tradition of localism 
was maintained in Lancashire. However, the Lancashire panels never assumed the same 
sort of political influence which they enjoyed in coalfield areas such as Yorkshire. " 
The development of the `machine' was replicated in Labour politics from the inter-war 
period. Miners' district associations were able to influence the selection and nomination of 
Labour candidates and give support to miners on trade councils while local Labour 
organisations could be `packed' with a majority of miners for crucial votes. Similarly, 
Labour Party representatives with union connections influenced local government. 
Labour's domination of local government frequently resulted in uncontested municipal 
elections from the late 1930s as the Tories and Liberals withdrew. Only the occasional 
independent or ratepayer candidate tested Labour's domination in many areas. Post 1945 
saw Labour making greater progress on Lancashire County Council, with mining and 
coalfield representation featuring more prominently. 16 At the parliamentary level 
succession was often reduced to a `rubber stamp' affair. For example, McDonald's 
nomination at Ince in 1929, following Walsh's death, hardly involved a credible contest, as 
did Brown's in 1942 in the same seat. It was a similar case in the same year when Foster 
replaced Parkinson at Wigan. '7 The union was able to exert tremendous influence within 
local trade councils and constituency Labour parties. Although places like Wigan were 
inaccurately described as NUM "pocket boroughs", miners were able to exert a high 
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degree of influence over local Labour politics until well into the 1960s. The selection of 
Alan Fitch, an ex-working miner, at Wigan in 1958, following the death of the sitting MP 
was secured with the support of the Wigan miners and the NUMLA. 18 The development of 
the labour `machine', together with an NUM-Labour stranglehold, led to allegations of 
`cronyism' and of mis-use of power particularly in local government during the post-war 
period. 19 
The strength of Labour's grip on the coalfield during the post-war years was even tighter 
than before 1939. Labour majorities were consistently high, while the Tories and Liberals 
found difficulty in finding candidates to contest seats. The Liberal candidature at St. Helens 
in 1950 was described as nothing more than a "courageous reconnaissance" 2° Labour 
hegemony was underpinned by a potent trinity: public ownership of the industry with a 
commitment to modernisation; Labour's wider programme for post-war re-construction; 
and the notion that Labour was the undisputed `natural' party of the coalfield. On the 
industrial front NUMLA efforts were aimed exclusively at pursuing co-operation with the 
Coal Board to ensure that public ownership was a success, having in tandem with the 
Labour Party invested so much political capital in its establishment. Edwin Hall, NUMLA 
General Secretary from 1945 until 1960, exploited the unbridled domination of NUM- 
Labour Party hegemony to wield power. His tenure of office was characterised by a high 
degree of central control through which he maintained an iron grip on the affairs of the 
union. 21 Sid Vincent's comment that Hall could pick up the phone and enforce compliance 
anywhere in the coalfield was some testimony to the power at his elbow. 22 It was some 
boast, too, for a union whose affairs had historically seen such a high level of local 
autonomy. 
Hegemony was further strengthened during the post-war period by an intensification of the 
perception that Labour represented `progress'. It was seen to be delivering on promises to 
the coalfield, having defeated the dark forces of private capital. During the 1950s the future 
seemed bright. The iniquities of the past were a distant nightmare. The coal industry was 
being re-invigorated through a modernisation- scheme under public ownership while coal 
remained in insatiable demand as the premier fuel against a background of post-war coal 
shortages and growing industrial demand as the economy reverted to peace-time 
conditions. Labour politicians interpreted these benign conditions in two ways. Firstly, this 
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state of affairs was seen as permanent. The post-war settlement in the Lancashire coalfield 
was expected to accompany `progress' into the future. Secondly, they saw this as the final 
chapter in the natural law of political progression in which the Labour Party was 
triumphant. The level of confidence they displayed seems extraordinary half a century 
later. In 1956, at an auspicious event to celebrate 50 years of unbroken Labour 
representation at Ince and Westhoughton, Harold Wilson and local Labour leaders 
confirmed that the people of the coalfield had entered into a "compact" with the Labour 
Party. Labour continued to carry the orb of `progress' before them on behalf of the 
coalfield. In return, it was expected that "their people" continued to support Labour. There 
was even talk of this "compact" in religious terms as Labour sought to "re-consecrate" the 
coalfield for generations to come. 23 This was NUM-Labour hegemony at its apotheosis 
without effective challenge. In another sense, hegemony was reinforced by a view held by 
both left and right that public ownership in the industry was a project which they should 
continue to support despite differences of opinion over specific issues. During the 1950s 
both the Communist and Labour parties agreed that modernisation of the industry in 
Lancashire under public ownership was absolutely essential. The only ripples of political 
disturbance during the 1950s and early 1960s emanated from the friction generated by 
Labour's own internal wrangles as it digested the lessons of post-war government and 
subsequent loss of power. One of the most damaging debates was over disarmament; a 
debate which set left against right, underpinning factional ideological tensions within the 
coalfield. Polarisation over disarmament also set elements of the `rank-and-file' on a 
collision course with leadership 24 
The confidence of the immediate post-war years was shattered from the late 1950s by a 
dramatic downturn in demand for coal. The coal industry in Lancashire became engulfed in 
the requirements imposed by rationalisation. This posed an unprecedented challenge for 
the NUMLA and Labour in the coalfield. The NUMLA was eager to maintain and extend 
its influence as the imminent decline of the industry brought a new urgency to this task. 
During the late 1950s, Hall and his executive wanted to see more NUMLA-sponsored 
Labour MPs in the coalfield in addition to the two at Ince and Wigan. Fitch was 
successfully supported into the Wigan seat. Gormley was destined for Burnley, to contest a 
by-election there caused by the retirement of the sitting MP. The NUMLA also had its 
attention fixed on St. Helens'. The stage was set for what became known as the `Driberg 
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Affair'. Hall asserted that St. Helens was a miners' seat. 25 Although a miner had not 
represented St. Helens. since 1910, miners had played a prominent political role in the 
constituency. St. Helens was an expanding area for mining with a more optimistic outlook 
for the industry; one reason why Hall coveted it. In 1958, the sitting Labour MP retired, 
opening the way for a by-election. Labour HQ in London wanted Tom Driberg for the 
nomination. Hall and the NUMLA executive objected because their preferred candidate 
was Tom O'Brien, a miner from the right who was president of St. Helens Labour Party 
and Trades Council. Hall's first problem was that although the St. Helen's party `machine' 
and the NUMLA executive backed O'Brien, he was not the unanimous choice of 
Lancashire miners. The vote for the miners' nomination among NUMLA branches was 
divided. It even split the St. Helens panel, with many on the left opting for Ted Woolley, a 
Trotskyist from the Manchester area. Hall's second problem was that divisions within 
St. Helens ran much deeper. Ideological opposition from the left to O'Brien saw Sutton 
Manor branch nominate a left-wing `rank-and-file' candidate against O'Brien. If that was 
not problematic enough there was a sectarian issue. There was a long-running debate over 
accusations of domination of the Labour Party and Trades Council by Roman Catholics 
which led to the resignation of a senior councillor and Labour Party official right in the 
middle of the nomination process. That provoked another rival nomination from outside 
the mining union on a sectarian ticket opposing O'Brien. Enter Tom Driberg. While 
Driberg could count on some trade union support in St. Helens, he mistakenly over- 
estimated the level of trade union support he could garner. Driberg's nomination and main. 
support in St. Helens came from the Labour clubs and constituency members. This 
provoked a separate row between the `political' wing of the party in support of Driberg 
against the majority of the `industrial' wing in St. Helens. 26 
One would have thought that given these circumstances the NUMLA leadership might 
have decided that it would be folly to pursue O'Brien's nomination and let Driberg take it, 
and in all probability the seat. It is some measure of the insistence of the NUMLA 
leadership in demanding this seat that it continued to support O'Brien. Hall did not want 
Driberg in St. Helens. The big guns of the NUMLA were turned on Driberg to demolish 
him even before short-listing. Hall felt that Driberg was unsuitable for an "industrial seat". 
He was condemned as an "intellectual" opportunist who was looking for a safe seat. The 
destruction of Driberg became for Hall a vitriolic assault. He despised Driberg by personal 
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inclination and political persuasion because of his intellect and as a representative of the 
left. Driberg's personality, style and sexuality lurked in the background of these attacks. 27 
As a result of the weight of these assaults, Driberg wisely decided that he did not like the 
taste of this particular Lancashire `hot pot' and withdrew his name before he reached the 
short list. Labour HQ was left with no choice other than to let Hall have full sway, given 
the influence of the NUMLA. The trouble for Hall was that in the process of demolishing 
Driberg he had fatally damaged his own choice, Tom O'Brien. The pro-Dribergists were so 
aggrieved that their strength and numbers swelled, with. addition of a nominal pro-Driberg 
element consisting of left-wing `rank-and-filist' miners and those supporting sectarian 
issues, all united against Hall's intervention in favour of O'Brien. Hall's attempts to stamp 
his authority on the seat had backfired. The outcome saw St. Helens Labour Party and 
Trades Council select a compromise candidate, Les Spriggs, a railwayman from the Fylde 
nominated by the NUR. Hall and the Lancashire executive were livid at the outcome they 
had so effectively orchestrated. They grudgingly endorsed Spriggs. 28 The affair 
demonstrated that the NUMLA leadership, dominated by the right, was -so confident of its 
authority and influence that it had reached the point of arrogance. The events of 1958 also 
carried with them a hint of desperation as the NUMLA sought to extend and maintain its 
grip on Labour politics in the coalfield at a time when the industry in Lancashire was about 
to disintegrate. 
The period of rationalisation was dominated two figures in the union: Joe Gormley from 
the right and Jim Hammond from the left. Each represented aspects of the union's attitude 
toward industrial change. They were ideological and personal opponents. However, the late 
1950s and 1960s were characterised by agreement on how the industry should respond to 
the challenges it faced. Both were reconciled to a view that modernisation represented 
`progress' toward a sustainable and viable coal industry in Lancashire. They believed a 
Labour government would be best able to carry this through. Gormley's rise within the 
union was meteoric. He assumed the post of secretary in 1961 at the relatively young age 
of 42, on Hall's retirement. Although Gormley had spent his early career in the Lancashire 
pits, including a spell as a union branch official, he had never sought a union career. His 
ambition was for a career with the Labour Party. 29 Gormley only turned his attention 
toward union high office when his political career had been blocked by his rejection for the 
nomination to contest Burnley in 1959. He never saw himself first and foremost as a union 
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leader, although paradoxically that was the role he etched out with great success. Gormley 
was a complex character. He could be blunt, mercurial and frequently pugilistic. 30 He was 
certainly a practical man. His combination of cunning and shrewdness, together with his 
ability to assume deceptive moods to suit the moment constituted a deadly combination. 
Socialism for Gormley was definitely not about `means'; it was only about `ends'. This 
was important in determining how Gormley interpreted `working class' progress. In many 
ways Gormley espoused the antithesis of socialism by laying great emphasis on the ability 
of the individual to obtain improvement through the strength that trade unionism 
provided. 31 Trade unionism and Labour politics were about searching for opportunities and 
exploiting them for the benefit of `the lads', as he liked to call miners. This aspect of his 
character and political philosophy went some way to explaining why he became accused of 
playing fast and loose. The integrity question tended to follow him around. It certainly 
gave succour to his personal and political enemies. 32 On the other hand, as a union 
official, Gormley's greatest asset was his ability to work in a business-like way with his 
enemies. 
One aspect of Gormley's character was his ambition. 33 He was able to use his connections 
within the `right wing' union leadership and Labour `machine' to good effect. This 
sometimes got the better of him. He was. so eager for a career in Labour politics that he 
slipped up badly in front of the Burnley selection committee. There were cogent reasons 
why Gormley was not selected. Dan Jones, an engineering union official and labour 
colleges tutor from South Wales was the preferred candidate, because he was seen as a 
better choice to handle the growing crisis in the textile industry and the modernisation of 
the area. Furthermore, it was unlikely that a miner would be selected because of 
internecine quarrels within Burnley Labour Party and Trades Council. In Gormley's 
favour, was the fact that although he was a miner supported by Burnley miners, he was an 
outsider to the area. However, Gormley transformed a reasonable chance of nomination 
into a complete disaster by arguing in favour of multilateralism. Disarmament was not the 
committee's first priority in selecting a candidate. Rather, its main concern was finding a 
good 'candidate who was strong on economic and industrial issues and who was acceptable 
to a majority of interests in organised labour in Burnley. Burnley was not, as Gormley 
suggested, a "hotbed " of unilateralism. Jones was not chosen primarily because he was a 
unilateralist. The subsequent row within Burnley Labour Party and Trades Council was 
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over the snubbing of a miner by the selection committee, which ignited local arguments. It 
was not, as Gormley later suggested, as a result of his multilateralism. 34 
While Joe Gormley got the top job in the union in 1961, Hammond was seen as the second 
most important figure in the coalfield as the most prominent and one of the longest serving 
full-time miners' agents. He had unsuccessfully contested the position of secretary in 1945, 
losing to Hall. Pemberton had ensured that the succession went to Hall in order to keep the 
left out. Hammond's election in 1942 for the post of full-time miners' agent saw him 
record an emphatic win over the two candidates of the right. Hammond was a popular 
figure, not necessarily for his ideology. His main territorial base was in the Wigan area 
from where he hailed. 35 The area was hardly known for its militant politics. What 
Hammond could offer was a formidable and respected negotiator, meticulous on detail, and 
capable of tackling management in a highly effective way. He was also no mean orator and 
one of the union's more cerebral officials. As a pit lad, he was `blacklisted' by Wigan Coal 
Company for his agitation. Hammond, as an embittered young activist, whiled away his 
days in Wigan Library among the history and politics books. He was going to get his 
revenge by being smarter than the opposition. 36 As an ideal recruit for the CPGB, he 
became a leading figure in the region until his resignation in 1956. Thereafter, he retained 
his left wing views, but worked for the return of a Labour government. 37 Hammond, laid a 
great deal of emphasis on "working class struggle" in which discipline and leadership were 
important. He believed that that `working class' education, self-respect and solidarity were 
the key to political advance. 38 Jack Dunn, Communist leader of the Kent miners, entered 
the `Jim and Joe' debate after Gormley had published his memoirs in 1982 with a stout 
defence of an old comrade. He observed: 
"I knew both well - Jim was all that Joe wasn't, a dedicated committed socialist, 
well-read analytical, erudite, who didn't have to rely on gut reaction. He had a 
profound understanding of society and didn't need a ghost writer for his 
speeches". 39 
For all his talents Hammond had a number of flaws. There were two Jim Hammonds. 
There was the highly capable union official and party comrade whom Bernard Crick once 
interviewed. Crick felt he had met "a shrewd old activist". 40 The other Jim Hammond was 
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touched with the Quixotic. He was a man in danger of intoxicating on his own rhetoric. His 
conference speeches were fantastic voyages that swatted everything under the capitalist 
sun. He liked to present the broadest picture to miners in terms of the issues facing the 
industry, in which he took the moral high ground of debate - worthy but not practical. 
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The problem for Hammond was that rhetoric and reality rarely matched. He often appeared 
on the oblique side through his exaggerated claims. This did not go down well with 
phlegmatic officials and miners. Hammond's other drawback was his officiousness, made 
worse by the fact that he saw himself as the `secretary who never was', having been twice 
thwarted for the post in 1945 and again in 1961. Hammond always liked to think of 
himself as a `working class' strategist and theorist. He referred to his job as "his hobby". 42 
As Sid Vincent said of him, he managed to retain his popularity and respect but "never got 
anywhere" (did not achieve higher union office) in an eminently practical business. 43 
There is a tendency to contrast both the personal and political differences between 
Gormley and Hammond. Emphasising the differences between the two became part of 
Gormley's own attempt to create and perpetuate the `Gormley myth' so well expressed in 
his memoirs 44 Moreover, it is easy to slip into a view of coalfield politics of the period 
which emphasises the differences between the two leading figures and strands of opinion 
they represented. This view became typified by the events of 1960-61 over the ballot- 
rigging affair, when matters came to a head. Gormley and Hall were accused of rigging the 
ballot in favour of Gormley's bid for the post of NUMLA secretary against Hammond. 
Hammond alleged that Gormley had convinced Hall that his support for his chosen 
successor, Arthur Bubbins, should be switched to Gormley because Bubbins had no chance 
against Hammond, thus letting in Hammond and the left. They then allegedly `cooked' the 
ballot result. The outcome saw Hammond and his supporters picketing the Bolton 
headquarters of the NUMLA. Hammond felt that the right had duped him again, as he had 
been in 1945 when Pemberton `arranged' Hall's succession. Gormley resigned the position 
and -ran a second ballot in which the Electoral Reform Society counted the votes. The 
outcome saw a similar result to the first ballot. These events saw union business in uproar, 
recriminations flying and trench warfare breaking out between the two camps, as it was 
widely believed there had at least been some `interference' with the first ballot. 45 It might 
be thought that this affair would have made it impossible to bring union officialdom back 
together again following the factionalism that ensued. Nonetheless while ideological 
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divisions were ever present, it is remarkable how the NUMLA maintained a high level of 
agreement over the issues facing the coal industry. This was particularly the case over the 
need to modernise the industry against the pressing demands of coal's rapidly deteriorating 
situation. This transcended all ideological disagreements. 
The differences between Gormley and Hammond were relegated by their united approach 
to the realities facing the industry. Although there were difference of emphasis over 
industrial change, on matters of substance they were as one, including maximising co- 
operation with the Coal Board over modernisation and rationalisation. Both the right, 
represented by Gormley, and the left, represented by Hammond, highlighted aspects of 
modernisation. Gormley focused on modernisation as a pre-condition to improve prospects 
for his members within a re-fashioned industry, as part of a wider aim-of `working class' 
advance. Hammond saw modernisation in this light too, but focused more on its role in 
rationalising the economy and society as part of the wider aim of social progress. Both 
these objectives became intertwined as Labour's agenda for government unfolded with an 
emphasis on modernisation and `planning'. Importantly, both believed that the problems of 
the industry could only be solved through modernity. This belief intensified as the coal 
industry faced severe rationalisation from the late 1950s, as alternative fuels encroached 
upon the industry's traditional dominance. It also increased their support for a return of a 
Labour government committed to modernisation of the industry in which coal would play 
an important part in a modern economy. The dilemma they both faced was that supporting 
modernisation inevitably meant a reduced role for coal by offering tacit support to the 
alternative fuels. They both felt able to square that particular circle by extending support 
for modernity to hold a belief in Labour's wider modernisation strategy. This included a 
commitment to oversee the consequences of industrial change in coal through 
modernisation of the coalfield, including a policy of industrial diversification. Support was 
further strengthened by a view that public ownership was the right framework in which 
industrial change in coal could be achieved effectively and without serious economic and 
social dislocation underwritten by future Labour government, working together with the 
Coal Board and NUM. This view accorded with the assessment of the Labour Party in the 
coalfield. The attractiveness of these arguments rested on the ability of the NUMLA and 
Labour to demonstrate the distinctiveness of the claims they made for a future Labour 
government. Modernisation and rationalisation of the coal industry in Lancashire meant 
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marking out a political space for Labour in which it was seen carrying forth the mantle of 
`progress', even though this involved the dismemberment of the industry in Lancashire. 
iv. THE CONTEXT OF INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 
There were two themes which influenced the context of industrial change in the coal 
industry during the period under consideration. One was represented by a socialist vision 
for the industry through the `progress' which planning, science and technology-could offer. 
The other was one linked to the role of the coal industry in the post-war-debate over 
Britain's decline. There were echoes of these themes in the evolution of Labour Party 
thinking on modernisation. By the 1960s both these strands became interwoven 
particularly, though not exclusively, through the development of Labour's plans for 
government. 
The socialist vision of a modernised coal industry was not particular to the post-1945 
period. As a political concept modernisation of coal was well established within the Labour 
Party during the 1920s when the party initiated a blueprint for modernisation based on a 
planned rationalisation of the industry as a second best to public ownership. This identified 
" the need for re-organisation because the industry that had developed geographical areas of 
expansion and decline. An overhaul of coal through compulsory `unification' was one 
element. Another was the planned movement of the young `mobile section' of mining 
labour to the `prosperous' coalfield underpinned by social planning. Finally, modernisation 
of the industry was to be spearheaded by the application of science and technology and 
scientific management and mining methods. 46 It was, however, during the 1930s : and the 
Second World War that Labour developed its plans for post-war modernisation and re- 
construction including the coal industry. 47 Labour's assessment of the experience of the 
inter-war years was important in shaping the future course of coal industry modernisation. 
twinned with its reading of British economic history. It entered into a discourse which 
examined the outcomes of industrialisation. It was believed that Britain had failed to 
advance because she had been left behind in the `second industrial revolution' through an 
inability to develop new industries. The coal industry came to symbolise the chaos of a 
dark past under private capital characterised by industrial decline, strife and depression. An 
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assessment of the industry in this way was implicit recognition of the need for modernity 
in the economy more generally in which science and technology, directed and funded by 
government, would sweep away the "ancient misery" and replace it with "a new, happier 
and more contented order". 8 It was clear that there was a desire to see a modernised and 
rationalised coal industry. In another sense, because the industry was seen as instrumental 
in producing working class misery there was a willingness to examine alternatives to coal 
as a source of fuel and power. Image and opinion on coal came together in a most profound 
way in favour of modernity which adversely affected attitudes toward the post-war 
industry. 
Labour's preparations for post-war re-construction emphasised the need for economic and 
social planning in which government would harness resources as it had done during 
wartime enunciated in the concept of "bold socialist planning adapted to the creative tasks 
of peace" 49 A central role was accorded to coal under public ownership in planning for 
future economic needs. Again, this was based on an assessment of recent British economic 
history which held that the failure of "unplanned" and "unregulated capitalism" arose, in 
part, from its inability to exploit science and technology. In the post-war order this would 
be replaced by the central role of government in planning and deploying the resources of 
the scientific community. S0 Modernisation thus assumed a prominent role in plans for re- 
construction. In addition, wartime experience reinforced the desire for industrial 
modernisation because Britain was unfavourably compared with the "US economic giant". 
It was believed the US model demonstrated that the application of science and technology 
led to dynamic growth in contrast to Britain saddled with her industrial past and older 
failed industries. The pressing need was to support new efficient and expanding 
industries. 51 Thus the coal industry assumed a key twin role. in the blueprint for post-war 
re-construction. Firstly, through the application of modernisation and planning to revitalise 
the coal industry itself and secondly in order for a modernised coal industry to support the 
new economic expansion envisioned. 52 
It is notable that the impetus for the new order for coal was driven by ideas borrowed from 
abroad; some from the US mining industry but predominantly from the inter-war 
experience of European coal producers, particularly Holland, which influenced the future 
shape of the British coal industry. 53 Similarly, during the immediate post-war period 
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Britain looked to the Monnet Plan in France for inspiration in industrial planning in heavy 
industry. 54 It was tacit admission that Britain was so sullied by her industrial past that 
indigenous solutions were tainted. The key to modernity in the coal industry, as in 
modernisation generally, always seemed to lie elsewhere. 
The yearning for a modernity increased as Labour's modernisation blueprint took shape 
post-1945. Its unfolding was punctuated by the economic and political challenges of the 
post-war period. On these occasions it is significant that there was a re-doubling of 
modernisation efforts. The first of these came with the monetary crises of 1947 and 1948 
and the dislocation caused by the severe winter of 1947 which provoked calls for a more 
robust re-statement of socialist strategy based around a co-ordinated and systematic 
application of economic planning. These calls from the `Keep Left' group criticised 
government policy on modernisation because it had not gone far enough. Existing 
initiatives were dismissed as "piecemeal socialism" in which the Labour Government had 
only undertaken "repair jobs" to a system requiring major overhaul. The coal industry was 
one sector cited as being in crisis because its dilapidation held back the whole economy. It 
exemplified the need for more forward and systematic planning to ensure it was rapidly 
modernised. 55 Another aspect of the experience of modernisation under Labour came with 
calls for an intensification of efforts aimed at deploying the scientific community and 
harnessing science and technology to modernise the economy. There was urgency in the 
requirement to embrace new scientific discovery and technology, for example, in the 
development of atomic power. 56 Planning and science were to be twinned to provide the 
quick fix political solution to economic problems. 
These sentiments informed a deeper political crisis for Labour during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s when the party underwent a period of introspection following its third general 
election defeat in 1959. Labour focused more sharply on the theme of modernity; one 
which had been of increasing importance since the defeat of 1955. What emerged from 
Labour's internal debates was significant in shaping industrial change. Many of the 
recurring themes of the previous thirty years came together. Again, there was a belief that 
"science and socialism.... are dependent and inseparable" coupled with a view that 
Britain's economic history had been influenced in a negative way by a "flying start" in the 
first industrial revolution unmatched by' effective participation in subsequent scientific and 
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technological advance. It was argued that the "workshop of the world" had now to become 
its "laboratory" and that socialists had to recognise that the "Coal age epoch is closed". 57 
Paradoxically, while the coal industry was to be modernised it was at the same time seen as 
a symbol of obsolescence. 
The centrality of the scientific revolution in the post-war world was linked to the growing 
influence of the `decline debate'. There was a belief that Britain had fallen behind her main 
competitors during the 1950s in economic and scientific progress. There was a pressing 
need to make up for the "lost dynamic" through economic and social planning. Three 
outcomes of these assertions were government preparedness to oversee scientific and 
technical planning; to become involved in the control and rationalisation of industry 
through economic planning; and a national fuel policy as a recognition of the central 
58 importance attached to energy in economic planning. 
At the same time, anxiety over loss of political power saw Labour immersed in a debate 
about its own relevance. It believed loss of power was linked to socialism having become 
unfashionable. It saw its own malaise as a reflection of Britain's `stagnation'. The task of 
the 1960s was to enthuse a new generation of voters with Labour's embrace of 
modernity. 59 Grasping modernity and using it effectively offered political salvation. 
Labour thus saw modernity as the litmus test of its own political relevance. Increasingly, 
Labour's internal debates were linked to the broader theme of Britain's declining economic 
and political status. Labour looked to France, Germany, Japan Scandinavia and the USA as 
examples of economic growth; as sources of new ideas; as exemplars of the planning 
`model'; and as successful export nations. What Labour perceived as the `new direction' 
for the 1960s meant Britain catching up with her competitors by government taking a. 
60 leading role in research and development and planning. 
The outcome of these debates saw Labour committed to a modernisation agenda. However, 
the problem for Labour was that the basis for these formulations was a desire to break a 
political impasse rather than a coherent and considered outline of Britain's future economic 
progress. They were . 
intended to bring harmony to Labour's internal wrangles. With the 
Conservatives shifting significantly toward a similar agenda, all roads led to Harold 
Wilson's oft mis-quoted `White Heat' speech at Scarborough in 1963. As Edgerton notes, 
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these debates, culminating in Wilson's dash for modernity, were primarily about "finding a 
political language to supersede divisions between `traditionalists' and `revisionists' " as 
much as they were about modernity itself. 61 As a result, Labour's modernisation plans 
were ill conceived. The plans were based on an assessment of past experience rather than 
on a clear appraisal of future needs with a tendency toward partiality; even of political 
gimmickry. Labour's emphasis on the "prestige sectors" such as - "atomic energy, 
aerospace, computerisation, and research and development" was its manifestation. 62 Alec 
Douglas-Home, concluded, Wilson had become for Labour nothing more than "a slick 
salesman of a synthetic science" for whom "their vocabulary" belongs "to the thirties and 
their planning is a hangover from times of post-war shortage and rationing". 63 Under' 
critical gaze many of Wilson's detractors were dismissive of the `rhetoric' of modernity in 
the absence of clarity from Labour on how it was going to be achieved TM 
One of the thorniest problems was how Labour was going to take the unions with them on 
the journey to the promised land in terms of their attitude toward modernisation. 65 At the 
highest levels in the trade union movement the omens were propitious, based on Labour's 
experience of `industrial modernisation' during the late 1940s. 66 Persuading the `rank-and- 
file' proved to. be a more difficult task which compounded Labour's troubles in 
government particularly during its second term after 1966.67 There was always every 
likelihood that Labour would face difficulties over modernisation because of the dilemma 
it created for the labour movement in reconciling its embrace of modernisation with its 
commitment to defending member's interests. In opposition these issues were inadequately 
debated with the exception of the one key issue of prices and incomes policy. 68 
Industrial change in the context of Labour's long-term objectives for modernisation was 
consistently highly problematic. Sure enough, there was a momentum created both by a 
longstanding socialist vision and Labour's political priorities, but it consistently lacked an 
essential credibility. Modernity was always an exercise in solving something, whether it 
was economic crisis or political impasse. Moreover, for Labour, modernity. was, as Francis 
suggests, always about seeking to "recast both the economy and society along lines that 
were rational and functional: to replace private economic chaos with public economic 
order". 69 This, as Tomlinson notes, sprang from Labour's reading of past experience in 
which aspects of modernity arose out of nothing more than "an instinctive dislike of the 
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'anarchy' of the market" which required remedy. The post-war world thus became littered 
with the failure of this or that modernisation initiative. Although there was a genuine desire 
for modernity by Labour there was never any question of it amounting to a set of 
guidelines for the future shape of the economy and society, just a toolkit of useful political 
responses. 
The second strand in the context of industrial change was the more general debate over 
Britain's 'decline'. By the late 1950s and 1960s it was of some significance in labour's 
approaches to modernity. Post-war industrial change saw the final throes of the decline of 
the staple industries which had played such a vital part in the emergence of British pre- 
eminence. The post-war period coincided with increasing concerns over Britain's lost 
status across the political spectrum. This debate raged with a fierce intensity as Britain 
stumbled from one 'crisis' to another during the late twentieth century against a backdrop 
of plummeting economic performance, industrial militancy and the unravelling of the post- 
war political consensus. The 'decline debate' has i volhved economists and economic and 
business historians while political scientists have joined the debate through an examination 
of the political economics of 'decline' and a perspective involving a critique of the British 
state, its institutions and political processes. It is not the intention to join debate here. 
However. there arc a number of aspects which have some relevance to the context of the 
industrial change in the coal industry. 
The first point concerns the character of the debate and the terms in which it has taken 
place. This has essentially been a polemic engaging views from the political left. right and 
centre, often uniting both left and right on specific aspects of the 'debate' 70 As Tomlinson, 
a leading exponent in the 'decline debate'. has suggested, it has not been concerned with 
empirical evaluation. Similarly, the experience of specific sectors or regions has been 
largely ignored . 
71 This thesis seeks to remedy this deficiency. The 'decline debate' has also 
been restricted by its domination by British establishment concerns. n 'Decline' can, Ike 
'modernisation', mean different things to different people at different times. The terrain of 
the 'decline debate' has been pre-occupied over a long period by business and 'high' 
political anxieties that Britain was falling behind her competitors. It is traceable at least as 
far back as the late nineteenth century when anxieties were raised over Britain's economic 
eclipse 73 For example. Chamberlain's "weary titan" ranks as one of the abiding 
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establishment sentiments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries . 
'4 The debate 
periodically ignited during the twentieth century when it became a popular political device 
for both Conservative and Labour governments around which political agendas and 
initiatives gathered and flourished. However. as Cannadinc observes, absolute decline or 
perceptions of decline were less important than "relative decline" over a long period of 
time. s This has been the predominant experience of Britain's staple industries. Moreover. 
domination of the 'decline debate' by establishment concerns constitutes treatment of an 
important subject which is both partial and patrician. What is required, and what this work 
is directly concerned with. is a more specific debate which concentrates on the role of 
economic sectors, of management and labour attitudes within them, and of the regions and 
communities most keenly affected by the impact of decline. 
There are two substantive aspects of the 'decline debate' of importance to industrial 
change in the coal industry. The first concerns the role of organised labour. One key 
argument in the debate, favoured by the political right, sees trade unions as an obstacle 
which has prevented Britain from matching the economic dynamism of her competitors. It 
has been advanced that trade unions were a force for 'stagnation' acting as an impediment 
to modernisation. The unions were one important group singled out for criticism 'in 
period' by Shanks in 1961 in his influential work The Stagnant Society. 76 Subsequently. 
trade unions have become the favourite whipping-boy for a generation of right-wing 
academics, commentators and polemicists. Barnett has identified the trade unions amongst 
his long list of bogeys in which he has accused them of aiding 'stagnation' by their 
opposition to 'change'. " The important claim made in this work will be the antithesis of 
these arguments. Organised labour in the coal industry was willing to participate fully in a 
programme of modernisation which had detrimental implications for trade union members. 
The second perspective on the 'decline debate' for the coal industry was the way in which 
the staple industries became central to the notion of Britain having fallen behind. The 
Labour Party had consistently articulated one clement of the 'decline debate' by advancing 
a variation on the 'early start' thesis proposed by a number of 'decline debate' 
protagonists. This argued that the first 'industrial revolution' had left Britain with a 
preponderance of older industries which compromised economic performance. Britain's 
competitors had stolen a march by immediately entering subsequent phases of economic 
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growth in newer more dynamic scientifically and technological advanced economic 
sectors. The antidote was to relegate the older sectors in favour of supporting 
modernisation with an emphasis on the new sectors. This was a view which gained 
considerable political support during the 1950s and 1960s. As Gamble notes. it was not 
only Labour who were involved as they battled with the Conservatives for the 
'modernisation mantle' 7 It was labour, however, who emerged to offer a more emphatic 
approach to modernisation. One important area which highlighted the different approaches 
was planning. Although the Conservatives were at their most 'interventionist' during this 
period labour paid more attention to planning as the key to modernisation by advocating 
indicative economic planning. There was also the sense, certainly from the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, that the initiative on modernisation lay with Labour with the Tories left in the 
slipstream. " The high level of political support for modernisation has meant that the 
'decline debate' has characterised the staple industries since the 1950s as outmoded and 
old-fashioned sectors associated with economic retardation thereby demanding justification 
for their continued existence. 
The coal industry in common with the other staples was at the centre of the push for 
modernity. Both labour's vision of modernity and coal's negative position within the 
'decline debate' meant that it was marooned as the We of modernisation licked around it. 
As a key industrial sector in the drive for economic modernisation it faced the prospect of 
having to renew itself through a programme of modernisation and rationalisation to ensure 
it maintained its position and relevance. At the same time, coal faced the challenge of 
modernity in the shape of new fuels as it competed with them in a battle which came to 
symbolise "Britain's economic sickness and her hopes for a cure". i0 However, the coal 
industry occupied a special place against the onrush of modernity. It was a sector in which 
the NUM held traditional and strong links with the Labour Party. This was reinforced by a 
mutual desire to make a success of public ownership in coal. Consequently, the dimensions 
and perceptions of 'decline' and responses to modernity in the sector became much more 
nuanced. The coal industry was thus perceived by government, the Coal Board and 
organised labour as a sector in 'transition'. undergoing change to a modernised industry, 
rather than one in absolute decline. 
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v. METIIODOI. OCICAT, ISSUES 
The methodological issues which impinge upon this thesis fall into three categories: 
conceptual, procedural and practical. The conceptual issues relate to the notion of 
industrial change. In taking industrial change as the exclusive heading the thesis obviates 
other important processes of change taking place in the coal industry and in the Lancashire 
coalfield. Economic and social change was clearly of importance in altering perspectives. 
Structural change has been seen to be important in loosening allegiances and tics to the 
coal industry from the inter-war period, with an intensification after the Second World 
War. This was manifested through the industry's persistent problems of labour recruitment 
and retention. It might therefore be argued that industrial change was facilitated by 
fundamental economic and social changes taking place within mining communities. 
Moreover, it might be suggested that modcrnisation and rationalisation merely gave 
expression to a desire for modernity within the coalfield in an industry which was seen as 
outdated and outmoded. Thus, changing economic and social perspectives might have been 
important in helping to undermine opposition to industrial change. While it is not the 
intention in this thesis to dismiss the impact of economic and social change, a high 
premium is placed on the unique importance of industrial change as a more essential 
agency of transformation in the Lancashire coalf cid during the post-war period. 
If there is a conceptual problem associated with the notion of industrial change then it lies 
with one of its main components: modernisation. This concerns the motivation for 
modernisation. The political desire for modernisation was substantially based on an 
analysis of the past rather than on producing an objective blueprint for the future. In the 
case of the coal industry the engine driving modernisation from within the Labour Party 
and the NUM was based on righting the wrongs of the past by expunging the evils of 
private capital caused by the dispensation of the industrial revolution. Because the past 
hung like a millstone around the necks of the political generation of the post-war period 
there is a danger of reading too much into the modcrnisation agenda. In a broader sense, it 
could be argued that this was one reason why post-war modernisation did not meet with 
the expectations of its visionaries. It certainly led to misjudgements in the coal industry. 
Therefore, as a conceptual notion some caution is required with 'modernisation' because it 
was never an aU-embracing political concept over which there was widespread agreement. 
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Nor was it practised in a uniform way. In the coal industry it came to symbolise a desire 
for a more competitive and productive industry which managed its affairs for the benefit of 
all including its workforce. That conclusion was reached as a result of an assessment of the 
past experience of the industry not through any accurate assessment of its future needs or 
role. 
The procedural methodological issues concern three areas: the problems associated with 
researching and writing contemporary history; political assumptions; and the issues raised 
by an analysis of industrial change which focuses on the `leadership' and `rank-and-file'. 
The problem with contemporary history is one of proximity. Proximity can be can be more 
of an obstacle to historical enquiry than distance because it interferes with that most 
desirable. of situations - objective judgement. On one level there is the problem that the 
recent past is one that we might have lived through. It is inevitable that we might, have pre- 
conceived views on the events and developments of the period in question even if these are 
partial and occluded. 81 In another sense, tackling the recent past of the coal industry is a 
problematic exercise because of a tendency to judge events `in period' by the yardstick of 
the subsequent experience of the industry. Viewing the industry's experience through the 
prism of the last 30 years is likely to prove. inimical to an accurate assessment of the period 
under consideration. This issue becomes problematic when passing historical judgement. 
Clearly, this thesis will make them. This requires respect for the unique qualities of the 
period in which these events occurred. 
Historical judgements are linked to political assumptions. One assumption is to ascribe 
intent to historical actors in the process of industrial change. Taking a teleological view of 
industrial change might be one direction this would take. While there was a vision for the 
coal industry there was never any question of pre-determination or indeed any sense of 
destiny. One recent work on the British experience of post-war modernisation has 
suggested that it was one characterised by "ad hocery". 82 There were certainly elements of 
this in industrial change in coal. On the other hand, it will be argued in this thesis that 
industrial change followed a clear set of economic and political priorities. It was influenced 
too by interventions intended to alter the pace of change or in order to use the coal industry 
to alter the direction of economic and social forces more generally. However, this was not 
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programmed change, it constituted a set of ill conceived and not particularly well thought 
out political initiatives and responses about which judgements can be made. 
Another perspective on this theme is that industrial change was inevitable in the sense that 
the post-war economic challenges faced by the industry meant that its decline was 
guaranteed. The `inevitability question' lurks in many corners of this thesis. Indeed, it has 
been the predominant notion shaping our perception of industrial change in coal. Economic 
considerations were clearly important in determining outcomes for coal. Yet, as this thesis 
will show, it was political agendas and strategies and the choices of political actors which 
were as significant in altering the development of the coal industry as much as economic 
ones. 
This thesis lays a great deal of stress on the relationship between the NUM and the Labour 
Party in affecting the direction of industrial change. An important issue here is just how 
much influence the NUM had on the Labour Party by the late 1950s and 1960s. Certainly 
at the national level the NUM was becoming less important in Labour Party considerations 
by the time Labour returned to office in 1964; a process itself hastened by the decline of 
the industry. The NUM had less influence over fuel and coal industry policy. Gone were 
the days when a Labour minister of power had only to speak the language of the miners to 
succeed. At the regional level, however, where much of this thesis is focused, the NUM 
and the Labour Party continued to operate closely; loyalty to Labour maintained cohesion. 
Differences within the NUM and the Labour in the coalfield over the direction of industrial 
change were rare. In fact, industrial change per se as an issue was never debated. There 
was an assumption that it was a process which should receive unquestioning support. It 
was only debated as an issue in terms of its consequences. Tensions arose only as problems 
deepened over the impact and pace of industrial change. This was the case during the late 
1960s in Lancashire when the united front on industrial change between the NUM and 
Labour Party began to fragment. For the most part, it is safe to assume that on the question 
of industrial change the NUM and Labour Party operated in tandem in the Lancashire 
coalfield. 
The final procedural issue concerns the analysis of reaction and response to- industrial 
change which looks at the question through the aperture of `union leadership' and the 
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`rank-and-file'. This has been one of the perennially thorniest questions in labour history 
because of misgivings over the assumption of a clear dichotomy between the two in both a 
typological and substantive sense. 83 In this thesis, a distinction is made in the typological 
sense in as much as it is used to organise the material. In the substantive sense, it is 
accepted that there is no clear distinction between `leadership' and `rank-and-file' either by 
typology or by reference to behaviour. However, the term `rank-and-file' is taken in this 
thesis to include union branch and more senior full-time officials. This reflects an 
appreciation of `rank-and-filism' which could be more accurately described as factionalism 
based on historical and more contemporary cleavages that have emerged in the Lancashire 
coalfield and elsewhere. It is not the intention to make general statements about theories or 
models of `leadership' and `rank-and-file' behaviour in this thesis. 
The practical methodological issues affecting this thesis centre on the use of available 
primary historical evidence. The primary sources used have been derived from four main 
groups of material: those from the Public Record Office derived from central government 
particularly the Ministry of Power and Coal Board; those from the Lancashire Record 
Office which mainly include the historical records of the National Coal Board North 
Western Division (NCBNWD); the records of the NUMLA; and finally all other primary 
sources including the press. Clearly, because these sources were not created to aid 
historical research there is an issue over their efficacy, integrity and provenance. They are 
the detritus of government, public bodies and organised labour. As such they are imperfect 
in the sense that they contain deficiencies, limitations and gaps of coverage. 84 Some of the 
gaps in source material have been unavoidable because they arise from the statutory 
regulations covering the closure of public records. Other records are unavailable because 
they have not been released yet by the departments concerned or have not been catalogued. 
NUM material at the branch level remains extremely scarce in the public domain. These 
records would have been useful in advancing or supporting arguments in the thesis. 
Government and departmental records from the late 1960s would have helped in 
identifying the extent of the debate within the Labour Government over coal industry 
contraction. Branch union records would have been useful shedding further light on 
debates over specific colliery closures. Inevitably too, there has been a degree of selectivity 
involved in identifying and deploying these sources simply because of the constraints of 
space and time in undertaking a research project. They were chosen because they offered 
38 
the best available record of the process of industrial change in the Lancashire coalfield 
during the period. They have been relevant and effective in advancing the arguments made. 
A second point on source material concerns its prioritisation in preference to others. One 
important innovative methodological contribution this thesis makes is to bring together 
source material from the governance and management of the coal industry with, that from 
organised labour. This has been done in the belief that it offers the chance of a more 
complete appraisal of industrial change in the industry in terms of the decisions made and 
reaction to them rather than relying solely on sources from one side of the industry. In fact, 
it would be difficult to offer a fair judgement on the process of industrial change without 
such representation. It also stems from a more profound- belief that business/economic 
historians and labour historians have been too sectarian in their choice of methodological 
approaches. In addition, on the occasions where the two approaches have been combined 
the results have been less than adequate in terms of a complete appraisal from both sides of 
the industry. Two separate works analogous to this thesis by Singleton, charting the demise 
of the Lancashire cotton industry during the post-war period, and Gouvrish, on the post- 
war decline and re-organisation of the railways, combined both sets of sources. These 
works, undertaken by business historians, were excellent in their examination of the 
economic and business failures of the respective industries but did not fully assess the 
reaction of organised labour because they said little about `rank-and-file' responses. 85 This 
thesis attempts to obviate these inadequacies by deploying both sets of source material 
from which an appraisal of the role and responses of government, the Coal Board, union 
leadership and `rank-and-file' ensues. 
The remaining practical methodological issues arising from the use of the primary 
documents involves the evaluation of sources through an assessment of their `internal 
integrity'. Clearly, a thesis which is heavily reliant on documentary evidence is highly- 
dependent on what is written and more particularly the context in which it is written. What 
is sometimes of greater importance is what is not written down in the divisional coal 
boardroom or the union meeting hall. Likewise, minutes of meetings and conferences are 
very often compromise statements of debates which have been something much more than 
`lively' discussions. They frequently fail to convey the enmity or passion of debate. In a 
different way, a number of sources can demonstrate bias. Certainly press sources can 
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exhibit this characteristic. Local press reports from the coalfield during the post-war period 
are scarcer on coal industry matters than during the heyday of the Lancashire coalfield in 
the early twentieth century. They tend to be briefer and more factual in content. However, 
while they are likely to be less constrained by bias it is conceded that they can give a 
journalistic or political slant on articles about the industry. In this sense, the press 
represents a second class historical source but in another it provides the first rough draft of 
history. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
COAL: THE INDUSTRY; THE COMMUNITY; THE REGION -A 
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
0 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a review of the existing literature relevant to this thesis. For the 
purposes of this examination it is divided into three sections, each dealing with an aspect of 
extant studies. The first section on industry assesses a number of studies of the experience 
of the post-war British coal industry and coal and fuel policy. The studies of the coal 
industry chosen for scrutiny have been those which have specifically looked at the industry 
under public ownership or have tackled the issue of industrial change in coal. The section 
on community provides a survey of a small number of studies which have analysed `the 
coalfield community' under the impact of post-war modernisation and rationalisation. 
Finally, the section on the region is concerned with a review of those works on the 
Lancashire coalfield that have focused on characteristics of the coalfield which have some 
resonance to themes highlighted in this thesis. 
1.2 THE INDUSTRY 
Studies of the British coal industry have tended to focus on the challenges facing the 
industry under public ownership, industrial relations, changes to the labour process and the 
political influence of the NUM. There has been relatively little engagement with the 
broader issues of industrial change through post-war modernisation and rationalisation of 
the industry. The `standard' work on the history of the British coal industry from 1946 to 
1982 by Ashworth included treatment of industrial change. While not an official historyof 
the NCB this monumental study was "supported and initiated" by the Coal Board. ' As 
Kirby, a leading coal industry historian and the book's reviewer noted, while not 
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representative of the "view from Hobart House" (Coal Board headquarters) it was 
"broadly sympathetic" to the NCB in its stewardship of the industry; of coal's 
transformation under public ownership and the challenges it faced? Within what Kirby 
describes as Ashworth's "grand themes" some prominence was given to industrial change. 
Ashworth noted that the nationalised industry was born with such high expectations held 
by the Labour Party and NUM that failure was unthinkable. It had to be made to work. Part 
of the process of making a success of nationalisation was industrial change. Both Ashworth 
and Kirby agreed that the NCB's handling of industrial change, particularly the programme 
of contraction, was "cautious" and was complemented by a commitment to social 
amelioration. Notably, both agreed that industrial change was met by a high degree of 
acceptance or acquiescence by labour in the industry. This, it was argued, was because of 
the availability of intra- and inter-coalfield manpower transfer schemes; "national labour 
market buoyancy" and because of a commitment by government and the NCB to meet the 
social obligations of industrial change. 3 
The work has rightly been acclaimed as the definitive business history of the coal industry 
during the post-war period. However, as Kirby noted, it offered "little" which was "new or 
surprising". Industrial change is one such aspect. A more questioning approach would 
have been welcome particularly in the treatment of modernisation and rationalisation, with 
analysis of the debates and decisions taken over industrial change especially as the NCB 
was itself rife with major disagreements under public ownership. 5 
Undoubtedly, in producing the `broad historical sweep' and constrained by what Fishman 
described as "reasons of space and time" there was a danger of losing sight of the 
particular. One `particular' would have been a stronger regional focus, bearing in mind that 
the Coal Board invested much in a divisional strategy with autonomy to match. As 
Fishman noted, our knowledge of the NCB's divisions under public ownership remains 
inadequate. 6 In this respect, the methodological approach of the work relied heavily on 
sources from the highest level of government and the Coal Board: Cabinet, Ministry of 
Fuel and Power and other government departments. These catered to a study which 
substantially appraised the post-war period through the activities and decisions of the 
leading organs of the industry. Importantly, there is little use of trade union sources either 
at national or regional levels. Consequently, there is no detailed insight into how industrial 
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change was received and what detailed reaction and response it generated in the coalfields. 
It is representative of a `top down' history. 
Another briefer but similar interpretation to Ashworth's came from Berkovitch. 7 This study 
reviewed and reflected upon the record of the industry under public ownership with a 
chronological focus to 1972. Like Ashworth, Berkovitch saw the experience of the 
nationalised coal industry as one in which the NCB was forced to contend with, and 
respond to, an array of exogenous demands and pressures. Berkovitch's central argument 
was that attempts to modernise and re-structure the coal industry during the 1950s and 
1960s were wrecked by plummeting demand for coal and government ambivalence 
towards the industry in what was spuriously referred to as an "integrated" fuel policy. 8 
As an `insider' Berkovitch was sympathetic to the industry. This precluded an assessment 
which was too challenging or critical of the record of the Coal Board. However, to his 
credit, he offered a critique of the adverse way in which coal was affected by government 
fuel policy during the 1960s. In this regard, unlike Ashworth, Berkovitch was mindful of 
the ramifications of fuel policy on communities which depended on coal. However, 
Berkovitch contrasted the colliery closure programme under public ownership with 
closures under private control, which he argued resulted in the "virtual murder of villages". 
Berkovitch further maintained that the economic and social cushioning of coal industry 
rationalisation during the post-war period was "aeons removed" from the experience of the 
inter-war period. Certainly Berkovitch was right to make this point, but this argument 
tends to underline his sympathetic treatment of industrial change in coal. It was an 
argument frequently cited as a defence by government, the NCB and NUM leadership 
against critics of post-war industrial change in coal and its consequences. 9 This approach 
points up the weaknesses in Berkovitch's work. There is a tendency to see the outcomes of 
industrial change for mineworkers and coalfield communities as an integral part of the 
process of contraction set in train by the challenges facing the coal industry. This avoided a 
detailed examination of how government, the NCB or the NUM influenced the process of 
industrial change. Crucially, while energy policy is discussed, there is no assessment of 
how contraction was `managed' by these institutions or the influence which Labour's 
policy agenda on energy and economic modernisation had on the process of industrial 
change. 10 Significantly, while Berkovitch argued that attempts at modernisation of the 
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industry were undermined by falling demand for coal he did not acknowledge that it was 
the modernisation agenda itself which did so much to marginalise coal and emphasise 
alternative fuels. This helped bring about the collapse in coal consumption from the 1950s 
and in turn led to a hastening of the modernisation process for coal. 
Three major works completed during the 1950s by Baldwin, Haynes and Saxena, and one 
during the early 1960s by W. H. Scott et al typified how academic interest in the coal 
industry focused on the state of industrial relations under public ownership. " Industrial 
change was only tackled in as much as it brought alterations to work practices, systems of 
remuneration and technological change. For example, W. H. Scott et al produced a detailed 
study of industrial relations in the industry using specific collieries in the Lancashire 
coalfield as case studies. However, the work ignored the broader context of industrial 
change in coal against which industrial relations were conducted during the early 1960s 
with a modernisation and rationalisation programme in full swing, encompassing new 
colliery construction, re-construction and wholesale colliery closures involving large-scale 
re-deployment and some redundancy. 12 
Exceptionally, Haynes briefly touched upon the implications of post-war modernisation 
and planning for coal. His work carried the prediction that colliery closures would produce 
insecurity and tensions. He also believed that post-war planning for the coal industry was 
overly ambitious and optimistic based on the continuance of demand for coal against a 
background of persistent fuel shortages. 13 Of the three studies conducted during the 1950s 
only Baldwin's assessed the wider issues of industrial change in coal through a rare study 
of colliery closure and manpower transfer. Baldwin's study of the Scottish coalfield 
demonstrated that opposition to closure did not come from the Scottish NUM but from 
local union branches and the coalfield community. The Scottish NUM were in absolute 
agreement with the Coal Board that `uneconomic' collieries, mainly in the Clyde Valley, 
should close in order to facilitate col fiery modernisation schemes and new constructions in 
other areas of Scotland. Moreover, Baldwin expressed surprise that the Scottish NUM's 
support for industrial change extended to its agreement to the "mass transfer of 
communities" subject only to "social guarantees". While Baldwin praised the NCB for its 
enlightened handling of transfers he indicated that the move of miners and their families 
52 
from Lanarkshire to other Scottish and English coalfields confronted transferees with 
immense economic and social problems. 14 
Important though Baldwin's case study was, it failed to address a number of key questions. 
While he indicated that opposition to closures was growing in Scotland, he did not show 
that supine acceptance resulted from anything more than confidence that guarantees of 
consultation in the transfer process and social measures would be met. Baldwin failed to 
show why the Scottish NUM leadership believed so strongly that closure and transfer was 
"absolutely essential". Was it that the push for modernisation had a higher priority for the 
leadership than members' immediate interests or did it believe that industrial change was 
the only feasible way of "protecting the mens' interests"? , because, as Baldwin inferred, 
the Scottish NUM leadership were oblivious to the problems manpower transfers created. 
The fundamental question which any study of the politics of industrial change in coal must 
address is what were the aspirations and motivations of the NUM leadership. 15 
A more recent study which tackled industrial change in coal during the post-war period, 
including the colliery closure programme of the late 1950s and 1960s, was a brief but 
valuable article by Turner. 16 Turner, unlike Baldwin, analysed reaction " and response to 
industrial change by the NUM. He correctly identified the period as a critical one for coal 
in which it met stiff competition from other fuels, particularly oil. As Turner noted, 
closures between vesting date and the late 1950s had been relatively light but fell 
inordinately in a number of declining coalfields; a trend which continued into the 1960s. 
Politically, Turner noted the operation of a bipartisan approach to coal by post-war 
governments. However, it was Labour who initiated industrial change because it was seen 
as integral to public ownership of the industry. Turner argued that industrial change saw a 
high degree of acquiescence from the NUM even though it opposed the rundown of the 
industry. Industrial action against colliery closures was, according to Turner, "never on the 
agenda". Like other commentators he considered the important question of why there was 
so little opposition to severe contraction in coal during the 1950s and 1960s. Reasons 
offered included relative economic buoyancy; specifically the availability of new economic 
opportunities in modern industries and the variation in experience of industrial change 
between different coalfields which undermined unity of action. 17 
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Turner argued that divisiveness among the `rank-and-file' in coal was a hallmark of 
contraction. For example, he noted the different experiences of industrial change between 
ages and grades of mineworker. He especially referred to older miners, who existed in a 
state of demoralisation, and the "young and fit" who either prospered within the 
modernised industry, or were more readily able to leave for new economic sectors. In 
considering the nature of opposition to colliery closures during the post-war period Turner 
leaves us with the helpful assertion that "Pit closures".... are a.... "divisive phenomena". 18 
Turner indicated that it was the return of a Labour Government in 1964 and its relationship 
with the NUM which was the most important element of industrial change in coal during 
the post-war period. As he observed, the NUM "invested enormous faith in the Labour 
Government" to assist coal and reverse its rundown. However, in government, Labour 
increased the pace of contraction because it "adhered to free-market considerations as 
regards a national energy policy" in which it endorsed a `multi-fuel' economy based 
largely on a policy of cheap oil. Despite this, the NUM continued with its acquiescence 
and co-operation in industrial change because of its "loyalty to Labour" and because it 
"shared Labour's vision of a smaller more compact, competitive coal industry". 
Furthermore, Turner argued that the prevailing hegemony of "free-market ideas" and of 
"co-operation" under public ownership with government and the NCB resulted in its 
"permeation of the NUM". According to Turner, opposition to "hegemony" was weak but 
growing on the fringes of the NUM through attempts to create a "counter-hegemony" 
within the union against advocates of "capitalist logic". 19 
Turner's study established the main developments in the process of industrial change in 
coal including reaction and response. 20 Its main weakness was its brevity and lack of 
supporting empirical evidence. Moreover, as a study written in the aftermath of the 1984 
strike it attempted to produce an overall perspective on post-war colliery closures 
comprising the closures of the 1950s and 1960s, when there was little opposition to 
closure, and those of the 1980s under the Thatcher government with its palpable reaction. 
It remains doubtful whether a view of post-war colliery closures can be effectively 
constructed in this way, because these periods of rationalisation in coal arose out of quite 
different industrial and political circumstances: 
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A further weakness was the chronological perspective. Turner identified the 1957-1963 
period as one of severe contraction in coal as the industry felt the impact of major shifts in 
policy. While this period did correspond to a critical change of sentiment toward coal, 
followed by a heavy closure programme, Turner did not mention the importance of the 
1959 Revised Plan for Coal which initiated a major scheme of colliery closures. Similarly, 
while Turner noted Labour's increase in the pace of contraction after coming to power in 
1964 he failed to appraise Labour's adoption of an accelerated colliery closure programme 
in November 1965. Furthermore, while Turner indicated that Labour's shift on fuel policy 
emanated from its acceptance of a free market for energy underpinned by cheap oil, he did 
not discuss the significance of Labour's relegation of coal within its modernisation agenda 
nor the role of energy in Labour's economic planning. 21 Finally, is Turner's interpretation 
of capitalist "hegemony" and the development of a NUM "counter-hegemony" an over 
simplified representation of what were more complex nuances on both sides of the industry 
under industrial change? 
In a similar approach, Allen considered industrial change in coal within his study of 
industrial relations under public ownership ZZ The work was a polemic from an avowedly 
Marxist perspective. Allen's thesis on industrial change in coal was based on his belief that 
successive post-war governments, the NCB and the NUM leadership deluded miners. He 
argued that during the immediate post-war period mineworkers were conditioned into 
believing that they had a stake in the future of the industry; that they were participating in 
the post-war reconstruction of the Britain and that industrial change was integral to this 
process. Later, from the 1950s, following the fall in coal consumption, Allen observed that 
miners were convinced of the need for industrial change because of the pressing 
requirement to modernise the industry to compete against alternative fuels. He further 
argued that miners accepted these prescriptions because they were forced to believe that in 
public ownership they had entered into a binding compact with both the Coal Board and 
the Labour Party. Miners were expected to show a depth of gratitude for nationalisation 
and more general post-war economic and social `progress'. Allen argued in favour of an 
`hegemonic project' which ensured that miners were unable to "stand aside" from a 
sustained propaganda campaign pursued by all post-war governments and the NCB which 
convinced them of the need for industrial change. 23 
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Allen believed that under industrial change mineworkers were deceived both by 
Conservative and Labour governments. Firstly, during the late 1950s, the Conservatives 
encouraged trade unions and miners to believe that colliery closures were only a short-term 
response to the fall in coal consumption rather than marking a shift of policy in favour of 
oil. However, Allen reserved his greatest opprobrium for Labour. Until 1964 the Tories 
could take the blame for coal contraction. In opposition, Labour promised a co-ordinated 
national fuel policy with coal as the predominant fuel. In government, Labour moved 
decisively against coal by backing alternative fuels and increasing the pace of coal 
contraction. As Allen noted, Labour pursued a slash and burn policy toward the coal 
industry as its "administrative axe swung wide and wildly across the low productivity 
coalfields of Britain" sweeping aside mining communities 24 He argued that the NUM's 
position throughout industrial change was one of "collaboration" with the NCB to the 
extent that it actively co-operated with the Coal Board in the "application" and "execution" 
of industrial change. For Allen, there was no basic difference within the NUM between the 
political left and right as both Communist and Labour supporters among NUM officials 
accepted the "prerogative of management" on colliery closures. The only matter on which 
the NUM intervened was over the "social hardship" caused by industrial change. 
According to Allen, there was also an overwhelming belief among NUM officials that 
industrial change was necessary in order to make the industry more "efficient" to compete 
with alternative fuels. Co-operation continued under Labour, even though it was clear that 
Labour had reneged on promises made in opposition. 25 
The strength of Allen's work was the boldness of his claims and the way in which he 
highlighted aspects of industrial change which have received little attention from 
commentators. The main weakness was the lack of detailed empirical research to support 
his claims. In one sense this is an important aspect of the work because, as it is written as a 
polemic, it invites detailed historical enquiry to validate or negate the claims. In this 
respect, a central plank of Allen's thesis is that the `rank-and-file' accepted industrial 
change because they were deceived and manipulated by capitalist hegemony. As Allen put 
it: "Miners were never free to stand aside".... "to assess what they were being told about 
themselves and their work". 26 
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Allen was correct to highlight deception and manipulation by government, the NCB and 
the NUM leadership over industrial change but the notion that mineworkers were unable to 
articulate a view of the process with any degree of autonomy is simplistic. Similarly, the 
idea that government and the NCB were united in their pursuit of industrial change 
requires scrutiny. For example, Allen argued that the NCB chairman, Lord Robens, acted 
in a double role; on the one hand sympathetic to mineworkers and the industry while at the 
same time doing the government's bidding on industrial change. 27 Allen's account left no 
room for disagreement or schism within government or the NCB, or between the two, 
simply because in his interpretation they were both party to the `hegemonic project'. 
Finally, Allen's thesis obviated other explanations for industrial change in coal. For 
example, while Allen was right to argue that post-war government's favoured alternative 
sources of energy, there was not the straightforward switch to other fuels which he 
suggested. Similarly, there was no perspective from Allen on how the post-war vision of 
modernity underpinned industrial change in coal or the way in which economic and 
political priorities impinged. Bearing in mind that Labour's role in industrial change in 
coal was a clear target for Allen's polemic-it does behove some examination of its political 
agenda on modernisation. 
In a comparable but more precisely theoretically located way, Krieger, offered an analysis 
of colliery closures during the post-war period within the neo-Marxist conceptual 
framework of capitalist legitimation and rationality crises proposed by Habermas and 
Offe. 28 Krieger argued that the crises afflicting post-war British capitalism led to a 
fundamental contradiction for government between "economic objectives" and "social 
responsibilities" highlighted by his case study of colliery closures in North East England 
during the late 1950s and 1960s. He rejected the view that post-war policy on industrial 
change in coal resulted from the "paradoxical and haphazard" but arose instead from the 
"contradictions of capitalism". Krieger was certainly correct to argue that economic 
priorities operated against coal for most of the post-war period, yet it is difficult to accept 
that industrial change in coal followed the pre-determined programme which accorded 
with the model established by the neo-Marxist theorists. 9 
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The drawback with Krieger's analysis became clear as he attempted to link the model to 
the empirical evidence. The evidence itself, like Allen's, is hardly overwhelming or 
conclusive. However, the major deficiency is Krieger's choice of the events of 1967-68 to 
support his claims. Krieger suggested that Labour, having embarked upon severe 
contraction in coal as an economic policy objective, was forced to compromise because of 
the social implications of colliery closures as the Government came under pressure from its 
allies in the NUM. Krieger attempted to show a government wracked by contradictions and 
conflict. However, he precluded the possibility that Labour's decision to defer a number of 
colliery closures in September 1967 was nothing more than a momentary response to 
short-term pressures developing against the Government in a particularly bad year. Indeed, 
as with all government responses under such circumstances, it might be argued that Labour 
was merely responding to temporal political expedients in acting as it did. In any case, 
Wilson's deferment of closures was a measure which only affected a relatively small 
number of collieries for a short period. It did not, and was not intended to, impede the 
thrust of Government policy on further coal contraction during the late 1960s. 
What Krieger characterised as fundamental disagreements within government over coal 
contraction might have been nothing more than arguments about the `management' of 
contraction and the economic and political strategies which accompanied them. Similarly, 
while Labour was aware of the need to pay attention to its social responsibilities on 
closures, Krieger did not produce any evidence to show that this was ever allowed to 
interfere with its priorities. Moreover, while Krieger argued that Labour was facing a crisis 
created by contradictions which emerged between its economic and social objectives was it 
not more a case that it was seeing its poorly conceived modernisation agenda running into 
serious trouble through the tensions raised over coal contraction? 
An aspect of work on the post-war coal industry which has been largely absent are studies 
of fuel policy. However, one prominent work by Robertson offered -an important 
perspective. His work assessed the events of the first three months of 1947 and subsequent 
fuel crises during the late 1940s and early 1950s. As his study revealed, their significance 
for policy extended beyond the "bleak midwinter of 1947"; the subject of Robertson's 
study. 30 The Labour government was faced with a serious fuel crisis caused by a severe 
winter and increased demand for fuel as a result of the economy reverting to peace-time 
58 
production. The coal industry was unable to cope with this demand at a time when it had 
just passed into public ownership exacerbated by labour shortages, industrial unrest and 
early re-organisation of the industry. The crisis of 1947 was for Labour much more than 
just an industrial crisis, it was a political crisis which tested its claims on economic 
management and questioned its ability to effect outcomes through post-war reconstruction 
and economic planning. 31 
At the centre of the crisis was the lacklustre performance of the coal industry. It was the 
last occasion during the twentieth century when a British government had to rely solely on 
coal in such a crisis without other energy sources at its disposal. Robertson's work 
identified the events of the late 1940s and 1950s as marking the first decisive shift away 
from coal in fuel consumption. Importantly, this shift was not entirely determined by 
economic considerations - it also carried with it a political imperative. Both oil and nuclear 
energy emerged from the fuel crises of the late 1940s and early 1950s as two alternative 
fuels in which there was a future. These events saw sentiment move toward oil by both 
government and consumers, while oil producers were keen to exploit fears over coal 
shortages. Thereafter, Robertson referred to the "headlong rush" for oil during the 1950s. 
Robertson concluded that the events of the immediate post-war years produced a critical 
influence on government thinking on fuel which for the first time tilted opinion away from 
an exclusive reliance on coal and prepared the way for the advent of a `multi-fuel' 
economy. 32 
One direction in which the shift from coal was taking was toward nuclear energy. As Hall 
notes in his examination of the emergence of nuclear energy in Britain, post-war 
politicians, particularly Labour politicians, were in thrall to the vision of modernity which 
the atomic age promised: "as the saviour of the world from energy shortages" and as a 
"clean source of power" in an industry in which "men in white coats replaced the hazards 
faced each day by the miner ". As one Labour minister put it, nuclear energy promised 
"the greatest breakthrough of all time". In one respect, as Hall observes, a small cabal of 
scientists oversaw the emergence of nuclear energy in Britain. On the other hand, it was 
propelled by a political establishment mesmerised by the notion of modernity during the 
immediate post-war period in which nuclear energy fulfilled a central role until it became 
tarnished as costly and ill conceived. 33 
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The importance of the studies by Hall and Robertson lay in the significance they both 
attached to the beginnings of a shift in sentiment against coal during the immediate post- 
war period. This arose from both economic and political imperatives seen through the 
development of nuclear power but increasingly, and more ominously for coal, through the 
growth of the oil economy. 
1.3 THE COMMUNITY 
Within the range of works dealing with the coal industry is a genre which have examined 
the `mining community'. - This tradition has produced studies of the post-war period 
focusing on the impact of coal industry contraction and its implications for mining 
communities. These have been largely undertaken by sociologists attempting to understand 
social change in such circumstances. An exception was Baldwin's case study of the 
Cannock coalfield in South Staffordshire and the Warwickshire coalfield during the early 
1950s as part of his review of the coal industry under public ownership. The themes 
present in the study echoed predominant notions of mining communities in post-war 
Britain. Typically, a view prevailed which argued that the young were rejecting mining as 
a career in `traditional' coal mining areas as new economic and social opportunities 
beckoned. Importantly, based on his research findings, Baldwin pointed to a more complex 
and highly localised pattern of recruitment and retention based on local employment 
patterns and travel-to-work opportunities. He contrasted the situation in the Cannock 
coalfield with that in Warwickshire. In Cannock, with relatively little new economic 
activity and transport impediments preventing access to new economic opportunities in 
adjacent areas of North Staffordshire and Birmingham there was more reluctance to leave 
the pits. By contrast, in Warwickshire, the engineering and car industries proved to be 
highly attractive. Baldwin found that the greater the distance mining communities were 
from centres of economic growth the greater was the reluctance to leave mining. The 
problem for coal was that manpower was in the `wrong place' as exemplified by the case 
of the West Midlands. Cannock was a declining coalfield with an excess of mineworkers, 
while Warwickshire was an expanding coalfield with an acute shortage of trained and 
skilled miners. Baldwin's study thus highlighted the manpower dilemma with mining 
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communities in expanding areas for coal suffering from a perceived recruitment and 
retention crisis, particularly of young miners, while those in declining areas experienced a 
surplus of labour. As demonstrated by the West Midlands, these features were even 
apparent within the same NCB division. 34 
From the 1950s the manpower question assumed a political dimension because it was 
absolutely crucial to plans to modernise the industry. There was a need to ensure that 
manpower transfers balanced the need for contraction with the requirement that the right 
level of skilled and trained manpower was available in expanding coalfields to sustain the 
drive for modernisation propelled by government and the Coal Board. Baldwin's study did 
not expand on this dilemma nor prefigure its political import for government, the NCB and 
NUM. 
The problems created for mining communities through coal contraction during . 
the late 
1960s and early 1970s were the themes of separate studies of colliery closures by Bulmer 
and Sewel. Bulmer's case study of social change in Spennymoor, County Durham, made 
some highly significant claims. He found great reluctance to transfer from `traditional' 
mining communities after colliery closure to other parts of the Durham coalfield or to other 
coalfields. The reasons offered included a general pessimism about the future of coal; 
intra-coalfield loyalties and community attachments and the costs of transfer. An important 
aspect of Bulmer's study included a detailed examination of the process of a colliery 
closure. Closure did not create friction within the colliery he examined because Bulmer 
believed that this was a `family pit' in which there was a good working relationship, 
underpinned by social and familial ties. The main source of tension was involvement in 
closure by NCB divisional management who were seen as remote and bureaucratic and 
who, it was argued, handled closure badly through a lack of consultation to the extent of 
ignoring agreed procedures. However, although tensions were raised by the manner of 
closure, Bulmer noted that a majority of miners accepted "the inevitability of closure". 
Furthermore, although bitterness over closure was most pronounced among older 
mineworkers, it was this group who were most eager to leave the modernised industry. 
Tensions were thus generated not by closure per se but rather over the manner and terms of r: E 
closure. 35 
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One of the most interesting findings concerned the experience of mineworkers after they 
the left the industry. Bulmer found that a majority of ex-mineworkers wished to avoid re- 
training for a new job; most secured work after leaving mining not through the "formal and 
institutionalised" mechanisms but through informal social networks. However, the most 
important aspect of the closure for Bulmer was the non-involvement of the NUM who 
hardly figured in what it regarded as a fait accompli. 36 But, Bulmer's examination omitted 
an assessment of the role of the local Labour Party in closure nor did it examine whether or 
not the close relationship between the NUM and Labour was significant in the process. 
Bulmer offered an insightful analysis of a mining community under the impact of colliery 
closure. However, there are two fundamental issues which arose from Bulmer's study. In 
the first instance, the assumption throughout is one of a closely-knit homogeneous and 
isolated pit community coming to terms with the end of its useful life. Bulmer was clear 
that he was looking at a "shared consciousness of common work experience, which was 
threatened by closure". 37 Undoubtedly, mineworkers through social, cultural and familial 
ties viewed the destruction of coal as analogous to the dismemberment of their community. 
Apprehension and sadness would certainly have stalked the pit communities of west 
Durham during the 1960s. But, is it realistic to assume that there was a "shared 
consciousness" within what is offered as an archetypal pit community - itself a contested 
concept? Indeed, some sections of the community may have welcomed the end of deep 
mining and yearned for modernity. Others would have been pre-occupied grappling with 
the insecurity set in train by contraction and the blighted lives, demoralisation and 
uncertainty omnipresent against a background of rising unemployment and de-population. 
These are characteristics associated with declining pit communities. Would it not be more 
realistic to talk of the fragmentation of the community and the divisiveness surrounding 
closure and transfer of mineworkers rather than "shared consciousness" in the face of 
contraction in coal? 
A second issue with Bulmer's study concerned the process of colliery closure. While 
Bulmer offered a valuable understanding of colliery closure, the study did not offer a 
perspective on decisions and events leading up to closure involving the NCB, NUM, the 
`rank-and-file' and local community. Closure of any work unit, including a colliery, is a 
highly `political' event. Management and trade union attitudes are of great importance. 
62 
There is frequently a period of `softening up' prior to closure with management, and often 
the union involved in explaining the efficacy of closure. There might be a great deal of 
cajoling, deception and manipulation taking place; even of hardening of management 
attitudes to enforce compliance. Certainly, this study failed to show how the NCB and 
NUM attempted to persuade mineworkers of the need for industrial change, specifically in 
this case, why a colliery needed to close to ensure modernisation of the industry in other 
parts of the Durham coalfield. Neither is it clear whether "shared consciousness", either 
among mineworkers or the local community, translated into any form of reaction to 
colliery closures or the manner of closure. 
A different perspective in the study of social change came from Sewel who examined a 
specific colliery closure in a mining community suffering contraction in coal during the 
late 1960s in the Dulais Valley of South Wales. 38 In contrast to Bulmer, the important issue 
for Sewel was the fact that closure failed to ignite community interest beyond those 
mineworkers directly involved in it. He found that community attitudes toward industrial 
change were divided between those who were glad to see mining disappear, because 
modernisation was felt to be long overdue, and those who believed that mining had a 
continuing role to play in maintaining community cohesion. Again, unlike Bulmer, Sewel 
assessed local political reaction to closure and found that this was absent aside from the 
initial involvement of both the CPGB and Plaid Cymru who were accused by mineworkers 
of political opportunism in using the occasion to garner support. Initiatives to save the 
colliery came almost exclusively from the NUM lodge who appropriated the assistance of 
a reluctant local Labour Party. The latter had hitherto shown no interest in attempts to save 
the colliery. However, while Sewel noted that the `campaign' to save the colliery rested on 
the important NUM-Labour Party nexus, there was no organised protest or confrontation. 
Rather, the `campaign' waged by the NUM was manifested in a two-pronged industrial and 
political strategy. On the one hand, this involved the NUM seeking to maximise co- 
operation with the NCB to make the colliery viable, while on the other, it utilised the 
"special relationship" with the Labour Party to- pursue the political case to save the 
threatened colliery. Sewel made the significant claim that the "special relationship" was 
highly problematic in resolving issues of industrial change in coal because the Labour 
Party was increasingly unlikely to "reflect the interests of miners" both nationally and 
locally during the late 1960s. Similarly, Sewel argued that the NUM were unwilling to 
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apply too much pressure on the Labour Party because of the existence of the "special 
relationship". The relationship depended on NUM political support for Labour in spite of 
severe contraction in coal, while the NUM were reliant on Labour's goodwill despite 
Labour's disinclination to assist the industry. This was, according to a Sewel, a major 
source of "bitterness" for the NUM Lodge and `rank-and-file' miners involved in trying to 
keep the colliery open. 39 
The most valuable contribution of Sewel's work was his fording that the strategy of the 
South Wales NUM during the late 1960s was exclusively one of attempting to tackle the 
consequences of closure in terms of the "run-down and transfer" of manpower while not 
opposing colliery closures in principle. In fact, Labour's relegation of coal and its eclipse 
by alternative fuels tended the NUM toward greater levels of co-operation with the NCB 
and government. As Sewel rightly noted, the problem with NUM co-operation in attempts 
to make threatened collieries viable was that it underlined the weakness of its strategy on 
closures. In these circumstances the NUM, having accepted Labour's economic and 
political priorities on fuel and NCB assertions, had no choice other than to accede to 
closure if the best efforts of mineworkers failed to attain agreed targets 40 
As Sewel further noted, the issue between the NUM, NCB and the Government was not 
about closure but the `management' of closure. In this respect, Sewel made the significant 
discovery that questions of manpower transfer and redundancy assumed an industrial and 
political importance of greater prominence than closure per se with the strength to produce 
industrial action, albeit of a limited nature. Again, it is clear from Sewel's study that it was 
not as much colliery closure which irritated mineworkers as the character of closure and 
closure outcomes 41 Transfer arrangements were not handled well, while travel-to-work 
distances increased together with reduced status and earnings for many. Redundancy fell 
inordinately upon older and `disabled' miners, many of whom "felt that they had been 
pushed out of the industry" by the NCB in the quest for modernisation with its focus on a 
younger workforce. 2 As Sewel found, for those leaving the industry opportunities were 
few 43 Finally, new economic development through a policy of industrial diversification 
failed to provide adequate levels of new employment despite government assurances on the 
modernisation of declining coalfields 44 
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Bulmer and Sewel provided contrasting perspectives of `traditional' mining communities 
under the impact of coal contraction during the 1960s. Sewel's account did not suffer to the 
same extent as Bulmer's from assumptions about the archetypal pit community and tended 
to highlight aspects of division and indifference which the decline of coal produced. 
Similarly, Sewel gave a fuller account of the relationship between the NUM, NCB and 
Labour Party during colliery closure. Finally, Sewel provided a useful account of the issues 
which produced tensions for the `rank-and-file' and an accurate assessment of the 
challenges they faced as a result of coal contraction. 
If there was a weakness with Sewel's account it stemmed from his assessment of the 
changing relationship between mineworkers and the Labour Party during the 1960s. 
According to Sewel, this arose out of the embourgeoisment of Labour politicians who, it 
was argued, were increasingly distant from the interests of mineworkers 45 While it is true 
that Labour politicians were less likely to have come from the ranks of the `sons of toil' 
this remains an inadequate explanation of why Labour looked less favourably on the coal 
industry during the 1960s. There were wider issues of energy policy and economic 
modernisation to consider. The failure of the Mining Group of Labour MPs to effectively 
defend the interests of coal was less a case of embourgeoisment than a reflection of their 
impotence in tackling the Government as a result of Labour's relegation of coal in energy 
policy. Sewel's work could have done more to link his study to wider policy considerations 
and how these emerged from Labour's modernisation agenda. 
1.4 THE REGION 
Within the huge volume of literature on the British coal industry the Lancashire coalfield 
has been one major coalfield which has exercised academic minds least. It has remained an 
enigma in which its essential characteristics sit uncomfortably with traditional coalfield 
stereotypes. Nevertheless, the history of the coalfield provides a number of pointers which, 
while certainly not exclusive to Lancashire, are important in understanding its particular 
contours and features. One has been the treatment of `rank-and-filism' in Lancashire; the 
other has been an attempt to come to terms with diversity within the coalfield. 
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`Rank-and-filism' featured prominently in Challinor's study of the Lancashire and 
Cheshire miners during the nineteenth century. 46 Challinor saw 'rank-and-filist' tendencies 
emerging around a variety of cleavages such as religiosity and ethnicity. Other 
commentators such as Scott and Griffiths have also highlighted this feature. 47 However, an 
issue which arises from these accounts is the difficulty in defining centrifugal tendencies in 
Lancashire mining unionism as particularly `rank-and-filist'. They are more accurately 
characterised as occurrences of `factionalism' which arose from the relative autonomy, 
durability and strength of district mining unionism and district miners' associations in late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century Lancashire. A peculiarity of `rank-and-filism' or 
`factionalism' in Lancashire has been its incidence based around intra-coalfield 
territoriality. `Factionalist' tendencies were also characterised by the participation and 
leadership of senior union officials at district and branch level. Even following the 
disintegration of district unionism the `district' remained a powerful identity through 
which mining unionism continued to operate. Furthermore, the organisational and 
institutional strength of the district associations ensured that long after the formation of the 
LCMF in 1889 the `districts' retained considerable autonomy and influence on the 
industrial and Labour politics of the coalfield. `Factionalism' based on personality and 
territoriality was thus a re-occurring feature of the coalfield throughout twentieth century. 
There are even echoes of this in more recent times as assessments, such as Howell's, 
dealing with the events surrounding the 1984 strike testify. 48 
Another issue confronting attempts to provide assessments of the Lancashire coalfield is 
the persistence of views stressing Lancashire's putative uniqueness as a British coalfield 
based on explanations of its urban morphology and absence of occupational concentration 
in coal mining. 9 Such perspectives have proved inadequate in assessments of a coalfield 
with such a high degree of economic and demographic diversity. While Lancashire did 
contain large industrial towns with a mixed occupational base, many areas of the coalfield, 
especially the central areas of South Lancashire contained high occupational 
concentrations in coal mining until the late 1950s and early 1960s. 50 Such approaches have 
been influenced by notions of the stereotypical or traditional mining community and 
flavoured by sociological concepts such as the Kerr-Siegel hypothesis of the `isolated 
mass'. Lancashire contained many communities with characteristics of the `typical' mining 
village. In any event, the validity of the `isolated mass' hypothesis in terms of the 
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occupational and residential concentration of mineworkers as a model for-analysing mining 
communities has been challenged. 51 There is a need to move on from this model to what 
Gilbert describes as the "diversity of settings in which miners lived'. . In a number of 
British coalfields, including Lancashire, this requires an appreciation of the significance of 
the `commuting miner' and the import of travel-to-work issues on prospects for industrial 
change. 
Arising out of the Lancashire case, with suchdiverse influences on its industrial and 
Labour politics, it has been possible to identify specific sub-regions of the coalfield which 
it has been suggested displayed certain distinctive features. Wellisz, in a study of strike 
behaviour during the immediate post-war period used Lancashire as the case study to point 
to variations in strike propensity which he argued were influenced by the particular 
character of the sub-regions. For example, he indicated that North East Lancashire, with its 
predominance in textiles, was quite distinctive from the Wigan district with its traditional 
reliance on coal, or St. Helens and Manchester with their respective and various industrial 
and commercial interests. Wellisz's findings, although hardly conclusively, were of some 
significance in the more general debate over strike propensity in the industry. In another 
respect, while Wellisz failed to elaborate on the import of his findings, he argued that intra- 
coalfield diversity was an important factor in determining industrial outcomes through 
local economic specialisation; the distinctive culture of individual collieries and what he 
referred to as the "differences in the character of the communities". Clearly, while 
Wellisz's study was incomplete it did, in the Lancashire case, demonstrate a high degree of 
intra-coalfield diversity in a coalfield which commentators have tended to perceive as 
largely homogenous. The lesson to take from this work is that any study of industrial 
change in the post-war Lancashire coalfield has to recognise the importance of these 
variations. 53 
1.5 CONCLUSION 
It is clear from this review that while commentators have to some degree engaged with the 
question of post-war industrial change in coal it has remained one of the most neglected 
areas in what has been one of Britain's most scrutinised industries. This thesis seeks to 
67 
redress that deficiency. Moreover, given that within the enormous quantity of work 
devoted to the coal industry, in which the treatment of organised labour has made up a 
large proportion, it seems remarkable that the reaction of organised labour to the 
unprecedented modernisation and rationalisation of the post-war industry has not attracted 
more scholarly attention. The position adopted by the NUM and how it responded to 
industrial change in coal is thus a terra incognita which this thesis seeks to explore. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE BRITISH COAL INDUSTRY 1945-1972: `CHALLENGES' 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores political attitudes to the `revolution' in energy supply and 
consumption in post-war Britain when the coal industry found itself increasingly 
marginalised. This process originated during the immediate aftermath of the Second World 
War when government was confronted with the inability of coal to meet fuel demands. It 
was expected that high demand for coal would persist indefinitely. 'These were sentiments 
echoed inter alia in the influential Ridley Report published in 1952.2 From the late 1950s 
the situation changed dramatically with a collapse in demand for coal mainly as a result of 
increasing competition from oil. 3 Prior to the collapse in coal consumption government 
efforts were directed at maintaining adequate coal supplies and fuel efficiency. 
Government was also prominent in developing alternative sources of energy through the 
expansion of nuclear power and the oil consumption, such were the anxieties over coal 
shortages. As this chapter will demonstrate, government economic and political priorities 
saw intervention increase in favour of alternative fuels throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
thus exacerbating coal's difficulties. 
The late 1950s witnessed a complete reversal in the fortunes of coal. Government concerns 
began to focus on the assistance it could offer to the coal indsutry. However, it is argued in 
this chapter that government assistance consistently obviated long-term support. Instead, it 
concentrated on short-term assistance prompted only by the need to meet economic and 
political expedients or immediate objectives with particular reference to the important 
market for power coal. Government policy favoured the alternative fuels because they 
accorded with wider economic and political priorities. Nuclear power offered an attractive 
long-term solution to energy requirements, a clean, modern and efficient image and the 
edge it gave to scientific advance in a post-war Britain while the expansion of oil offered a 
modern and relatively clean fuel as well as a cheap and plentiful alternative to coal. By 
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contrast both Conservative and Labour governments increasingly sought to relegate coal 
during the 1950s and 1960s. For Labour, demands for a national fuel policy emerged from 
within organised labour, particularly from the NUM, following the collapse in coal 
consumption. 
For the NUM, a national fuel policy with coal as the dominant fuel became the touchstone 
of a government's commitment to the industry. However, in government, Labour 
confined coal's relegation in fuel policy through its endorsement of alternative fuels, 
particularly oil, as part of its economic modernisation and planning agenda. Labour's 
strategy on coal became one of `managing' its decline and maintaining a policy of short- 
term assistance. Finally, this chapter will show that the `challenges' facing coal highlighted 
key relationships which were important in determining outcomes for the industry. These 
included the relationship between the Labour Party and NUM and between the NCB and 
NUM. 
2.2. NUCLEAR ENERGY 
The civil nuclear energy programme emerged from Britain's military involvement with 
nuclear weapons during the post-war period. The growth of nuclear energy was maintained 
through government interest in the weapons spin-offs which would accrue. 5 In addition, 
interest was sustained by a belief that the rapid growth in electricity demand could not be 
met by coal. The decision to proceed with the first generation Magnox power stations, 
following publication of the 1955 White Paper on Nuclear Power, confirmed it as the long- 
term solution to energy needs .6 
Government interest was maintained by close attention to 
the claim of the scientific community that nuclear energy was the power source of the 
future. Government shared a vision of modernity in which nuclear energy was seen as the 
solution to immediate and future energy needs as the cutting edge of technological advance 
underpinning post-war modernisation. 
Nevertheless, concerns were expressed at the beginning of nuclear energy development 
over capital costs and competition from a buoyant and expanding oil market in power 
generation. This put the scale of the civil programme in doubt 7 However, Conservative 
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governments persisted in the belief that the programme was worth pursuing. This 
conviction remained undiminished despite Labour's attacks over the cost and delays to the 
programme. Labour's attempts to make political capital obscured the high degree of 
political support enjoyed by the nuclear programme across the political spectrum. Labour, 
in particular, signalled its continuing support by focusing on the value of nuclear energy in 
garnering a pool of highly talented scientists, to boost the `scientific revolution' which 
Labour believed was central to the modernisation of Britain. 8 
This political support fostered a resurgence of interest in nuclear power during the early 
1960s as technological advance brought the prospect of a second generation of nuclear 
reactors - the Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactors (AGRs) - which offered reduced operating 
costs in electricity generation. 9 Fred Lee, later Minister of Power in the 1964 Labour 
Government, described the AGRs as the "jackpot" for power generation. 10 While there 
was a great deal of enthusiasm expressed about the AGRs, like the Magnox reactors they 
raised questions about capital cost at the development stage. Sir Christopher Hinton, 
CEGB chairman, blamed "adverse economic and commercial changes" for bringing the 
vision of modernity into conflict with economic `realities'. 11 However, sentiment toward 
the AGRs became more favourable as cost concerns subsided. Construction costs 
compared well with the new generation coal and oil-fired stations, while the projected 
costs of the remaining Magnox installations were reassessed downwards. '2 Moreover, 
personnel changes within the CEGB had produced a new cohort of managers who, as 
Williams notes, were "nearly all bright boys with a nuclear background and training, very 
close to the Authority (UKAEA) in their thinking". 13 The CEGB were influential in 
promoting nuclear power but it was government which continued to share the compelling 
vision of `men in white coats' pioneering Britain's modernisation through a new, clean and, 
efficient form of power generation in contrast to coal. '4 
The dying embers of the Conservative administration produced the second White Paper on 
Nuclear Power in 1964. This was a much more cautious document than the 1955 White 
Paper but only in terms of acknowledging the costs of the AGR and reserving judgement 
on whether to proceed with the AGR or the American designed water-moderated reactor. 
The AGR enjoyed lower operating costs but higher capital costs than the American 
design. ls Furthermore, there was scepticism about whether the AGR could maintain its cost 
75 
advantages against the new generation of coal-fired stations. 16 However, despite these 
continuing misgivings, a view prevailed that the momentum behind the AGR was less 
about producing cheap electricity than about pushing nuclear research and development to 
its limits. The objective was advancing British economic modernisation by bringing 
benefits to other sectors of the economy and giving Britain a technological lead at a time 
when her economic, military and political leadership was waning. 17 
This was the major factor in maintaining interest in nuclear energy by the incoming Labour 
Government in 1964. It was instrumental in Labour's endorsement of the AGR. The 
second generation British reactors were symbols of the dynamic modem technologically 
based economy which Labour envisioned. Accordingly, the expected generating capacity 
of the AGRs was increased from 5 to 8,000 MW by Lee and Frank Cousins, the Minister 
of Technology. Political enthusiasm for the nuclear programme overcame continuing 
unease over projected capital costs and worries over the ability of the new technology to 
`deliver'; encapsulated in Labour's second White Paper on Fuel Policy in 1967.18 
The keynote Selsdon conference on fuel policy in May 1967 confirmed acceptance of the 
AGR. Clearly the AGR was an important element in Labour's long-term policy despite its 
acknowledgement of oil and natural gas as the leading fuels of the future. 19 Labour was 
once again prompted to disregard misgivings over nuclear energy. As Lord Robens, the 
NCB chairmen, caustically remarked, the Government "were not wise enough to take their 
own advice". 20 The Selsdon conference revealed powerful economic and political reasons 
for the retention of nuclear energy within Labour's `multi-fuel', economy unrelated to 
questions of electricity generation. The need to produce a scientific and technological 
increment was a prime consideration. In addition, there was both the potential for a 
valuable export trade and the prospect of producing plutonium for use in fast breeder 
reactors which both the UKAEA and Government wanted to see as the next stage of the 
nuclear programme - all of which accorded with Labour's scientific and technological 
vision. 21 
In the space of ten years the proportion of nuclear generated electricity had risen to 
fourteen per cent by 1967, making significant inroads into coal's remaining major market 
in power generation. 22 It was estimated that by 1970 nuclear power would have displaced 
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14 million tons of coal at the power stations resulting in the loss of 28,000 mining jobs. 23 
However, although the threat posed by nuclear power during the 1960s was potent, it 
remained a distant though growing menace. As a delegate at the 1964 NUM annual 
conference noted "nuclear power is only knocking at the front door of the energy supply 
house".... " but it is up and coming" 24 
Nuclear power thus remained a continuing threat to coal because of its ability to enthuse its 
supporters and the political establishment. From its beginnings as the short-term solution to 
Britain's energy problems it was believed that it also provided the longer-term answer to 
future energy needs as a source of cheap and abundant electricity. Later, the AGRS were 
expected to have a life span until the end of the century to meet the forecast rise in 
electricity demand. The promise of nuclear energy and the icon of modernity it represented 
for post-war Britain proved beguiling for the political establishment. The enthusiasm it 
generated ensured that the civil nuclear programme was sustained in the face of its failure 
to stand up to scrutiny on grounds of cost and feasibility. 25 
2.3 OIL AND POWER GENERATION 
Oil posed a far more serious threat to coal as a primary source of energy than nuclear 
power. Oil's direct competition with coal included its use in transportation, heating and 
lighting as well as power generation. Unlike the civil nuclear programme, the growth of the 
oil industry occurred outside the direct remit of government through the expansion of 
private oil companies, albeit under the auspices of government policy. Similarly, 
government economic and political priorities were important in influencing the success of 
oil relative to coal during the post-war period. 
The enormous growth in the oil industry was a post-war phenomenon. 26 In Britain, 
political considerations entered into oil's expansion. There were political concerns from 
both the `left' and `right' over the level of crude oil imports during the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War. For the `left', this meant domination of the oil market 
by the "stranglehold" of "monopoly capital" in which oil imports were controlled by a 
small number of international oil companies. Concerns were also expressed by both the 
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`left' and `right' over the strain this placed on foreign currency reserves since transactions 
were settled in dollars, given the desire to "avoid dollar dependency" while oil imports had 
an adverse effect on Britain's mounting balance of payments difficulties. Finally, there 
were strategic concerns over the security of supply of imported oi1.27 
These political concerns did not prevent a massive expansion of oil consumption during 
the post-war period overseen by the large private oil companies. It was, however, the role 
played by government which gave a fillip to this growth through the encouragement of 
home refining and reduction of duty on heavy oil to prevent the drain on foreign reserves 
and the balance of payments. 28 Similarly, threats to security of supply boosted oil 
expansion through the commercial consequences of oil `crises' which persuaded oil 
companies to re-locate installations to Britain from abroad. 9 In addition, the Suez crisis in 
1956 saw the expansion of oil "beyond normal capacity" to act as a baulk against future 
interruptions of supply while it encouraged oil companies to seek oil concessions in new 
regions and increase supertanker size still further. 30 
Importantly, oil was given a huge boost by coal's inability to meet growing post-war fuel 
demands. 31 Government intervention in favour of oil occurred against a background of coal 
shortages. The oil companies were only to eager to meet the shortfall under the aegis of 
government encouragement. 32 Post-war governments entered into discussions with British 
Petroleum (BP) to expand home refining as an expression of government "grave concern" 
over the impact of imported crude oil on foreign reserves and the balance of payments. 
BP's expansion of home refining proceeded in tandem with a government objective of 
"displacing dollar oil with sterling" which produced what Bamberg describes as "an 
apparently happy coincidence of private and commercial objectives and Government 
policies". 33 Aside from government strategy on oil there were manifold benefits to the oil 
companies in home refining, notably the economies of scale in refining downstream. This, 
together with some alacrity in developing an effective marketing and distribution system, 
facilitated a huge expansion in post-war refining capacity which trebled in just eight years 
34 between 1947 and 1955. 
Another factor facilitating expansion was the Middle-Eastern oil bonanza. The region 
achieved domination of world oil supply in a very short space of time. In just eight years 
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from 1947 to 1955 Middle-Eastern production nearly quadrupled. Britain received 15 per 
cent of Middle-Eastern output by 1955. Both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia quickly assumed the 
role of leading world producers with the UK as a major market. British interests in the 
Middle-East extended beyond the oil market - although this was considerable. During the 
1950s British oil interests dominated the Middle-Eastern trade controlling 34 per cent of 
the region's output in 1955 with BP's entire output coming from Middle-Eastern wells. 
Underpinning Britain's formidable commercial presence was its military and political 
involvement `east of Suez' including a treaty with Kuwait in which economic relations 
carried the advantage of operating within the Sterling area. 35 
There were, accordingly, many powerful reasons why Conservative Governments favoured 
oil expansion during the 1950s. Furthermore, the Government held a 51 per cent stake in 
British Petroleum, which in turn controlled 80 per cent of the British oil market, while both 
BP and Royal Dutch-Shell operated from London headquarters. 36 The oil company lobby 
became influential during the 1950s as it sought to exploit Government anxieties over 
forecasts of increased demand for fuel set against post-war experience of coal shortages. 
The oil companies believed that oil was the only viable alternative to coal until nuclear 
energy could be deployed in power generation. During the mid-1950s the oil lobby 
maintained by B. P. Ltd-Shell Mex Ltd assiduously cultivated an effective influence through 
the Ministry of Fuel and Power by articulating the concerns of British industry over coal 
supply after persuading industrialists of the comparative cost advantages of converting to 
oil. The lobby, with powerful commercial and industrial interests in tow, carried 
considerable weight with Conservative Governments whose fuel policy was predicated on 
three fundamental principles: the need to maintain fuel supply; the need to obtain the 
lowest cost; and the freedom of consumer choice in fuel. Although coal-to-oil conversions 
were a matter for private choice the oil lobby was able to influence government against 
providing further protection for coal or imposing sanctions against oil. Additionally, both 
central and local government could directly influence choice of fuels for public buildings 
and installations since `fuel efficiency' was a major pre-occupation of government during 
the 1950s. Coal-to-oil conversion was especially cost effective in commercial and public 
buildings. 37 
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Coal had the consolation that despite the loss of traditional customers to oil it still retained 
the lion's share of the power generation market which by the 1950s was its largest 
customer. Satisfaction was short-lived because the big prize for oil companies was 
displacing coal at the power stations. During discussions in 1954 between the Ministry of 
Fuel and Power, BY Ltd-Shell Mex Ltd and the BEA it was evident that the BEA was 
eager to proceed with oil-fuelling. This was based on the cost advantages of heavy oil and 
the reliability of supply to power stations near large oil refineries whose development was 
expanding apace. 38 These opportunities, plus technological advances in oil-fired power 
generation, allowed the BEA to proceed with a programme of oil-fired power station 
construction with the intention of burning both coal and oil, with oil having primacy of 
fuelling This marked the start of a policy of dual-fuelling. 39 At this stage, the 
Government's position was one of oil supplementing coal in power generation rather than 
displacing it 4° 
Throughout the 1950s there was a gathering- momentum in favour of oil. By 1959, while 
reservations remained over oil dependency, the sheer growth in the size of the British oil 
economy decisively tipped the balance in favour of oil. The Government described oil as 
"essential to the national economy" because of Britain's key role in the international oil 
trade; the reciprocal trade in oil through re-export of refined products from expansion of 
home refining and the reciprocal trade developing in exports to oil producing countries 
particularly in the Middle-East where the Government wished to retain an interest. 1 
Moreover, oil expansion was linked to improvements in living standards through the 
growth of private car ownership and road transport. Oil, like nuclear power, fulfilled a 
vision of modernity as a new and efficient fuel. There were further considerations in the 
fiscal contribution of oil and the growth of the petro-chemical industry. By the late 1950s 
there were clear economic and political advantages for government to support continued 
expansion of the oil economy. 42 In a very short space of time Britain had become 
inexorably tied to the international oil trade. Above all, oil was able to sustain a ready 
supply of cheap fue1.43 The scale of this dependency created a major challenge for coal. 
Coal's eclipse by oil was reflected in the power trade. From tentative beginnings in 
1954, power generation from oil grew throughout the 1950s, although in absolute terms coal 
continued to enjoy an overwhelming domination of the sector. The collapse in coal 
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consumption from the late 1950s was a huge blow to the coal industry. The Conservative 
Government came under pressure to intervene to provide help for coal by modifying the 
relative supply position in favour of coal against oil. Initially, the Government stuck to its 
guiding policy on fuel: "to leave to the consumer the choice between competing fuels" 44 
The Government's ideological commitment to free choice in fuel at the best price meant 
that under pressure to act in favour of coal it only relented to the extent of offering short- 
term amelioration by placing an embargo on coal imports; limiting the small amount of 
Soviet oil imports; restricting open cast mining and imposing additional tax on heavy oil. 
These measures of relief were only undertaken in order to soften the blow of a massive 
colliery closure programme and only involved coal consumption at the margins. 45 
Pressures on government also provided an opportunity to influence the market in favour of 
coal relative to oil in power generation through the flexibility created by dual-fuelling. 
Government intervention resulted in a number of oil-fired power projects being cut back, 
coal-to-oil conversions being deferred and an alteration in the ratio of coal and oil being 
used in the power stations. 6 Wil Paynter, the NUM General Secretary, accused the 
Government of taking these measures as a political expedient to shift policy in favour of 
coal during the run-up to the 1959 general election. 47 These peripheral measures in favour 
of coal allowed the government to influence outcomes for fuel without risking collateral 
political damage by leaving itself open to accusations that it had given the "wrong signals" 
against oil interests which "might prejudice interests at home and abroad". Similarly, it 
helped deflect pressure on the Government from an increasingly pro-oil CEGB and 
assuaged residual anxieties over oil dependency. 48 
As a measure of the political importance this issue assumed, decisions on dual-fuelling 
went as far as the Prime Minister and Minister of Power. The NCB took full advantage of 
political interest at the highest level to secure a deceleration in the coal-to-oil power station 
conversion programme and an increase in the ratio of coal-to-oil consumption at the power 
stations. Although these measures did not greatly affect the amount of coal going into 
power generation or avert the fall in coal consumption, they did signal government 
willingness to intervene to stabilise the situation for coal in power. 49 Following the 
collapse in consumption during the late 1950s, the early 1960s saw some stabilisation, 
particularly in the power sector, assisted by a few severe winters. Although overall coal 
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consumption had fallen between 1956 and 1959, power coal consumption increased 
relative to consumption by industrial consumers between 1959 and 1963. After 1964, as 
coal consumption underwent further dramatic decline, its dependency on the power sector 
continued to increase to nearly 50 per cent of coal output by the early 1970s. 5° 
Despite these welcome developments for coal, government intervention in favour of coal 
in power was at best short-term and ad hoc. The early 1960s were characterised by the 
`special preferences' for coal in power generation. According to Lord Robens, it was the 
"NCB's political and commercial campaigning" for the power market which had stopped 
the rot. The NCB scored further successes. For example, Richard Wood, the Minister of 
Power, agreed to the development of two large new generation coal-fired power stations. sl 
Undoubtedly the NCB was able to bring influence to bear where it mattered. But, it was 
more a case of the Conservative Government responding to short-term exigencies which 
favourably influenced coal's relative position than any desire to move decisively in favour 
of coal. For instance, the new generation of coal-fired stations attaining generating 
capacities of up to 2,000 MW were proving attractive in contrast to the floundering nuclear 
programme and delays in installing oil-fired capacity. The new coal-fired stations were 
attractive in as much as they had the potential to exploit low cost poor quality coal from 
the expanding coalfields of the East Midlands and Yorkshire. 52 These developments were 
also linked to continuing concerns over oil dependency. 
Another consideration in favour of short-term help for coal came with the modernisation 
and rationalisation programme in the coal industry which confronted the Government with 
colliery closures and loss of mining jobs during the early 1960s. With memories of the 
inter-war period still fresh in the political psyche the prospect of devastated industrial areas 
sensitized the political establishment bearing in mind that it was coalfields such as South 
Wales, Scotland, North East England and West Cumberland which were experiencing 
large-scale and rapid contraction. Accordingly, policy discussions involved the Prime 
Minister, Harold Macmillan, who had represented a North-East constituency between the 
wars and was said to have been `moved' by what he had witnessed. 53 Policy toward coal 
was thus later described as the desire to "avoid a complete loss of confidence in the 
industry" and prevent a "higher rate of displacement of miners than would have been 
politically acceptable" 54 
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While the Government operated under the diktats of political expediency, an. obstacle arose 
against even limited intervention in favour of coal. This came from the CEGB 55 The 
`special preference' was problematic because it depended on voluntary acceptance by the 
CEGB operating under managerial prerogatives reflecting an increasing preference for oil. 
This led to an uneasy relationship with the NCB during the early 1960s. Emboldened by 
the `special preference' the NCB attempted to provide the coal industry with a greater 
degree of stability by negotiating fixed long-term supply contracts with the CEGB for the 
power stations. The CEGB resisted because it was wedded to a future in nuclear and oil 
power generation. The Government compounded the coal industry's frustrations because it 
supported the CEGB. 56 Two Conservative Ministers of Power, Wood and Errol, were keen 
to help coal for short-term economic and political reasons but refused to provide the long- 
term assistance which guaranteed contracts with the CEGB would have secured. Moreover, 
Labour governments of the late 1960s continued to resist this guarantee for coal because 
the rapidly changing energy market demanded flexibility on fuel. A further indication that 
sympathies were against coal was an objection by both Conservative and Labour 
Governments to guarantee the levels of power coal demanded by the NCB. In fact, the 
Labour Government believed this was too high and reduced it because of the need to 
"sustain UK refinery expansion at a desirable level' given that UK refining capacity was 
expected to nearly double between 1962 and the 1970s. 57 
While both Conservative and Labour Governments provided short-term assistance to coal 
through the `special preference', the NCB suffered another damaging blow because the 
`special preference' was a flimsy device dependent on the fragile and lukewarm 
relationship between the CEGB and NCB. Agreements on coal-fuelling collapsed 
completely in 1964. The CEGB only burned coal because the NCB had agreed to rebate 
coal prices. As a result of delays in commissioning oil-fired capacity the CEGB agreed to 
take more coal, but, only at a higher level of rebate. This was rejected by the NCB 
resulting in a disagreement which hastened the demise, of the short-term agreement scheme 
until its resurrection under Labour. 58 
Short-term assistance for coal was certainly undermined by the CEGB's reluctance to burn 
coal but it was government which allowed the CEGB autonomy on this matter unless it felt 
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constrained to intervene because of political opportunism. CEGB antipathy toward coal 
was based on the higher-capital costs of coal-fired power stations and the cost efficiency of 
oil-fuelling. 59 By the early 1960s oil fuelling was still marginal. In 1964 power stations 
burned 88 per cent coal or coke against only 11 per cent oi1.60 However, it was projections 
for longer-term fuelling by the CEGB which did most to damage coal. While the CEGB 
obtained coal at much lower cost than oil, particularly from the low-cost coalfields of the 
East Midlands and Yorkshire, oil competed extremely well against coal in terms of burning 
efficiency. This factor was potentially disastrous for coal in the long-term. 61 During the 
early 1960s only coal-fired power stations of over 500 MW were able to compete with the 
modern oil or dual-fired stations. 62 
The perceived saviour for coal were the new generation coal-fired power stations with 
capacities of 2,000 MW, although they faced major obstacles. Similarly, there were other 
cogent reasons why the CEGB maintained implacable opposition to coal-fuelling 
generally. The new coal-fired stations had to be big to compete. The project at Drax in 
Yorkshire was the largest coal-fired station in Europe, indeed it was so big, at 3,000 MW, 
it had to be scaled down for technical reasons to accommodate two stations of 2,000 MW 
each. 63 These developments incurred inordinate demands. They were costly and complex 
to build while there were only a limited number of sites available to accommodate them. 
To maximise their potential they had, with a few notable exceptions, to be built on or 
adjacent to the low-cost coalfields of the East Midlands and Yorkshire. They placed severe 
demands on available land and access to road and rail networks while they required huge 
amounts of water for cooling which restricted location to major rivers and posed a serious 
`disamenity' to local residents . 
64 Even coal-fired stations of 250 MW presented formidable 
problems let alone building up to 2,000 MW. 65 In its desperation to secure the future for 
coal in power generation the NCB put a great deal of misplaced faith in these projects. 
These large blots on the landscape stand as monuments to coal's last desperate throw of the 
dice in the `power game'; one which it was destined to lose. 
While the promise held by the coal-fired power stations was tarnished the CEGB had 
already turned against coal-fuelling. As Lord Robens noted: "There was no scrap of 
evidence at any time that the CEGB wished to remain with coal" 66 . While the larger coal- 
fired stations held some advantage because of their ability to compete with oil and nuclear 
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power at higher generating capacities, the existing generating system was awash with older 
coal-fired power stations of much lower capacity which were costly to operate and 
maintain. They were unable to compete against the new much more efficient oil-fired 
power stations being built or projected. Furthermore, the Ministry of Power and the CEGB 
encouraged more intense use of the newer oil-fired stations than the coal-fired stations. It 
was only increasing demand which kept the older stations in commission until more 
modem stations could be built. Building more low capacity coal-fired stations was also out 
of the question on economic and technical grounds. 67 Added to which, the CEGB was 
looking for more efficient ways of managing demand which the new oil and dual-fired 
power stations offered. 68 The CEGB wanted to begin closing the older low capacity coal- 
fired stations at the earliest opportunity. The future was in oil and nuclear generation. This 
was bad news for a coal industry tied to the poisoned chalice of new large coal-fired power 
stations and an uncertain future for power coal contracts right across Britain. 
The hopes of coal during the mid-1960s were pinned on a change of government. The 
return of Labour in 1964 brought the' much awaited Fuel White Paper in 1965. This was a 
gross disappointment because it did not bring the desired long-term relief for coal. Instead, 
it produced only an enhancement of existing short-term measures for coal in power 
generation. This was not prompted by any shift in government policy toward coal but in 
order to maintain power supplies because of continuing delays in installing oil-fired 
capacity. Again, the NCB was able to exploit a temporary opportunity to obtain more 
favourable terms from the CEGB for power coal. These were hardly of any long-term 
significance. 69 Richard Marsh's term as Minister of Power between 1966 and 1968 saw 
Labour move decisively against coal in favour of oil. The `special preference' for coal at 
power stations was continued but subject to annual review. More ominously for coal, 
Labour produced a more explicit commitment to oil generation, asserting that "the case for 
oil-fired power stations might be overwhelming" because of cost and siting advantages. 
There was only a rather vague Government declaration to assist coal in power contracts 
because of the "heavy contraction of coal" 70 
Indeed, it was only the intervention of political expedients for Labour, as concerns 
mounted over the contraction of coal, which prompted the passing of the 1967 Coal 
Industry Act. This, inter alia, formalised coal's `special preference' in the power sector in 
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which the Government agreed to subsidise the CEGB to bum coal -instead of oil. 71 
However, these were short-term measures brought about by mounting political pressure 
resulting from rising tensions with the NUM over the impact of the colliery closure 
programme. 72 Furthermore, these moves coincided with renewed concerns over security of 
oil supplies as a result of war in the Middle-East together with economic and political 
difficulties faced by Labour during 1967.73 
In any event Labour acknowledged that the oil economy was central to energy 
considerations. The 1965 Fuel White Paper noted that "it is the national interest to accept a 
rapid growth in the use of oil". The fact that by 1964 the UK economy was oil dependent 
to the tune of one-third of primary fuel could scarcely be ignored. 74 The NUM recognised 
this as a fact of political life. Paynter warned mineworkers that whoever was in power in 
Whitehall "oil competition will not be relaxed in the near future".... in.... "a climate of free 
competition". 75 Paynter was right. Oil dominated energy policy despite Labour's publicly 
stated commitment that coal would continue to supply the `base-load' of energy needs. 6 
Two further developments convinced Labour of the centrality of oil. One was the 
knowledge that for the foreseeable future global oil supplies were plentiful. 77 Second, oil 
was becoming cheaper. 
A glut of oil on the markets during the late 1950s and early 1960s saw prices plummet to 
the extent that the oil companies were accused of `dumping' in an attempt to expand 
market share. In addition, changes in the organisation of distribution and production saw 
the growth of the `independents' in the oil market to break the domination of the major 
international oil companies. By the mid-1960s there were over 40 oil companies operating 
in Britain, Europe and the USA. 78 More competition helped force prices down still further 
while it tempered accusations of collusion with `monopoly capital' by Labour as it sought 
to defend its acceptance of the oil economy. 79 
For the remainder of the 1960s the policy of offering short-term alleviation to coal in the 
power sector continued together with CEGB resistance to coal-fuelling. There were 
indications of an even less favourable climate for coal during the late 1960s although one 
positive development was a Government decision to give the NCB some veto over CEGB 
plans for power station conversion to oil or dual-fuelling. 80 The NCB was for the first time 
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able to bring some influence to bear in determining the future size of the market for power 
coal. However, any gains for coal were outweighed by Labour's concession to CEGB 
demands to proceed rapidly with oil and nuclear generation and de-commission coal-fired 
stations. 81 That the thrust of policy was operating in favour of oil and nuclear energy 
became apparent during the late 1960s. For example, the delay in reaching a decision on 
the second phase of the Drax project confirmed suspicions of a more negative turn against 
coal in power generation by the Government who argued that it was responding to pressure 
from the CEGB by prioritising nuclear power in future projects. 82 
It was only toward the end of the decade that Labour under its last Minister of Power, 
Harold Lever, relented slightly on coal. The NUM suggested that it was Lever's 
preparedness to prevail in favour of coal which tilted opinion back toward coal. 83 Robens's 
fondness for Lever tends to support this view because Roberts had an uneasy and often 
fractious relationship with other Labour Ministers of Power: Lee, Marsh, Gunter and 
Mason. Another possible explanation was increasing disagreement within Government 
over fuel and coal contraction policy given its inertia over power station decisions as 
pressure mounted from the NUM; as anxieties over security of oil supplies returned - 
vindicated during the early 1970s with the "oil price shocks" - and a general election 
neared. 84 Either way, this was a response both to NUM pressure and in order to meet short- 
term economic and political objectives rather than signaling any alteration in Government 
policy through a longer-term commitment to coal. 
Despite a momentary shift toward coal at the end of the 1960s, events tended to pull the 
Government in a different direction. Although it re-affirmed its commitment to continue 
the ban on coal imports and maintain duty on heavy oil, the end of the decade saw a 
reduction in the level of support under the `special preference'. 85 This was linked to 
anxieties caused by an unofficial strike in the industry in 1969. The dispute occurred at an 
opportune time for the CEGB to press the Government - worried over interruptions to coal 
supplies - for an increase in the speed of the power station conversion programme. The 
strike raised the spectre of coal shortages while increased militancy within the NUM raised 
anxieties still further. Consequently, Labour - in its last year in office - and the subsequent 
Conservative administration operated under the threat and `reality' of large-scale industrial 
action in coal. As a result, government altered dual-fuelling and conversion in favour of oil 
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as coal contracts for power became conditional on the continuance of supplies 
uninterrupted by the threat of industrial action. One result was an increasing gulf between 
the NCB and NUM over oil conversion in power generation. 86 
A common approach between the NCB and NUM had helped secure some modicum of 
support for the industry to retain coal at the power stations. From the late 1960s the NUM 
argued against NCB willingness to enter into dual-fuelling contracts as a way of keeping 
coal in the power market. The NUM believed this amounted to appeasement under which 
coal contracts were being given away jeopardizing a key sector of business, and with it, the 
whole future of the industry. This schism allowed government and the CEGB to exploit 
divisions in favour of alternative fuels in power generation. 87 
By the early 1960s oil was master. In the space of less than twenty years it had become 
Britain's chief primary energy source. The extent of the incursions oil had made into the 
market for coal was recognised by the NUM. Paynter noted that from 1957 they were "in a 
completely new situation where the market conditions were completely reversed". 88 The 
expansion of oil remained the greatest threat to coal during the post-war period. On the one 
hand, growth was the inevitable consequence of private commercial expansion. On the 
other, while governments did not "adopt a coherent and identifiable policy on oil" until the 
1970s, they nevertheless played a leading role in facilitating growth. 89 Both Conservative 
and Labour governments offered only ad hoc or short-term relief to coal. Moreover, 
government preferences were increasingly turning toward alternative fuels in a diversifying 
energy market. This reached a crescendo under Labour. The `fight' for the power sector 
was indicative of a wider battle to retain a viable coal industry. The desire to maintain coal 
against its competitors became the basis for the calls for a national fuel policy in which 
there was a demand for a longer-term solution to the plight of the coal industry. 
2.4 TOWARD A NATIONAL FUEL POLICY 
The `fuel' debate which raged during this period led to the emergence of demands for a 
national fuel policy among organized labour and the Labour Party. For them it represented 
progress only because Conservative policies represented "fragmented objectives" whereas 
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a national fuel policy claimed to represent a coherent fuel policy even though its exact 
framework remained imprecise. 90 The position was further complicated by sharp 
differences over the relative merits of competing fuels. The course of the debate raised 
fundamental questions about the future of coal. For the NUM, there was a desire to see a 
national fuel policy in which coal played the dominant role. The NUM led a campaign on 
this basis in which it placed a great deal of faith in the return of a Labour Government to 
deliver. It was to be disappointed because fuel considerations had changed so much by the 
time Labour returned to office. In office Labour was pledged to a `multi-fuel' economy in 
which coal competed with alternative fuels. This was a cataclysmic development for the 
NUM. 
A national fuel policy first came to prominence in 1933 when the MFGB proposed the 
idea, arguing that oil interests would -become increasingly influential at the expense of 
coal. The MFGB saw the emergence of "monopoly capital" in which oil interests 
threatened the future of coal. The response, according to MFGB, should be "defence of 
coal and miners' interests". 91 With a more powerful threat to coal emerging during the 
1950s, this was a theme to which the political left returned. The late 1950s saw both the 
Labour Party and trade union movement formulating a national fuel policy. 92 Pivotal to 
these moves was the NUM's insistence that coal remained central to fuel policy. While 
there was some willingness to see alternative fuels accommodated within policy, the 
debate failed to engage with the notion of a fully integrated plan for fuel. At the same time, 
many on the left saw the future for energy in nuclear power while the concept of the 
`peaceful atom' versus the `profligate atom' divided the left. 93 Others believed coal's 
predicament resulted from the failure of Labour's public sector policy because the 
nationalised fuel and power industries lacked an overall strategy to deliberate between 
competing sectors. 94 There was thus a debate over what form a national fuel policy should 
take. However, the dominant argument was `defence' of coal within a national fuel policy 
with the NUM in the vanguard arguing that coal should remain the paramount fuel. The 
NUM's campaign bolstered a parallel campaign waged by the NCB to promote coal 
against the alternative fuels thus producing a high degree of mutual interest between the 
two bodies. 
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The NUM believed that the Conservatives would not produce a fuel policy, let alone one 
which would prove acceptable to the union. Paynter, NUM General Secretary from 
1959, virtually disregarded the Conservative Government because he believed it was 
unlikely to assist coal since it favoured competitive economic interests in the oil industry. 95 
For the NUM, the only objective was a Labour government committed to a national fuel 
policy with coal at its heart. In opposition Labour gave succour to the NUM. Harold 
Wilson promised to defend coal because of the need to prevent the disintegration of pit 
communities and consequent social hardship; the balance of payments advantages of 
retaining an indigenous primary fuel and the strategic vulnerability of dependence on oil. 
However, Wilson was less than unequivocal in his support for coal because, as he noted, 
while it was a government responsibility not to let coal wither completely, its future role 
and size would be determined by a changing market for fuel. 96 
In spite of this equivocation the NUM remained committed to the return of a Labour 
government from whom they expected a national fuel policy with coal dominant. With 
both the NCB and NUM campaigning for coal, attention turned to attaching specific 
commitments to an incoming Labour government on fuel. This included growing calls for 
a government subsidy for coal and re-structuring the industry's finances. 97 Another aspect 
involved both the NCB and NUM seeking specific assurances from Labour over the future 
size of the industry. Size was to be determined by a certain level of output based on the 
break-even point at which the coal industry would be profitable. 98 The NUM saw this as 
the touchstone of Labour's commitment to coal. The underwriting of coal based on 200 
million tons output thus became a mantra for the NUM while it confronted Labour with a 
dilemma when it returned to office in 1964. In opposition this commitment carried with it 
clear political advantages. To the changed world of 1964 it was a millstone. 99 
Fuel policy became intertwined with Labour's wider commitment to a modernisation 
agenda. Nuclear energy, oil and later natural gas were perceived as modem efficient fuels 
which offered more in presentational terms than the old fashioned coal industry. Linked to 
this was Labour's pledge to economic modernisation and indicative planning in which fuel 
was just one strand expected to deliver cheap and efficient energy to the rest of the 
economy. Similarly, economic planning called for the optimal use of resources which 
meant transfer from `unproductive' to `productive' sectors of the economy. Coal was on 
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the wrong side of this equation. Finally, economic arguments were prominent. The 
competitiveness of oil, and later natural gas, proved irresistible, not least to a Government 
experiencing considerable economic difficulties. ' 00 
Shortly after Labour's return to office Fred Lee, the Minister of Power, met the NUM. The 
union was given an assurance that commitments made in opposition would be honoured. 
Lee reaffirmed Labour's pledge to produce a integrated national fuel policy in which coal 
would continue to play the central role in supplying the `base load' of energy requirements. 
In the short-term this meant an output level of 200 million tons would be maintained. Lee, 
however, made one proviso, telling the NUM that the new fuel policy still had to be 
finalised by the Government. This `commitment' was the nearest coal ever came to a 
guarantee on its future size and viability. '0' During Labour's first administration questions 
of coal's future role became conflated with its pressing financial predicament. The 
Government denied that financial re-structuring of the industry was linked to downgrading 
its commitment to future size. Equally, it rejected demands for the `subsidisation' of coal 
on the grounds that it might be "setting a precedent". While financial re-structuring 
provided another short-term palliative for coal, the all-important commitment to future size 
remained elusive. ' 02 
The NUM tried again in early 1965 to secure a more formal guarantee through demands 
for a Government statement of its commitment to a coal industry based on 200 million 
tons. This prompted a bombshell from Lee who admitted that the Government was unable 
to provide such a guarantee because the scale of oil expansion precluded a Government 
commitment in a rapidly changing energy market even if this meant breaking pledges 
made in opposition and upsetting the NUM. 103 
The NUM was shocked by this decision. The union's expressions of "grave concern" 
underlined its disbelief that this was Labour policy. It believed Labour had reneged on its 
commitments to the extent that it had put coal in a downward tailspin from which it was 
unlikely to recover. The state of disbelief can be gauged by the widespread view that Lee 
had been "got at" by Ministry of Power officials who had an antipathy toward coal. In 
pressing Lee for a public commitment, the NUM discovered that Labour was considering 
downgrading coal output to 160-180 million tons. 104 Although the NCB obtained firmer 
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assurances from Lee, there remained a great deal of evasiveness. Only under pressure to 
respond to growing accusations of betrayal was Lee forced to make an unconvincing 
Commons statement in an attempt to sooth matters in which he was only able to offer 
short-term assistance to the industry. '05 
Lee's reticence came as the Government formulated its long-awaited fuel policy. It did not 
wish to create further hostages to fortune. Accordingly, anxieties over Labour's 
commitment to coal were confirmed with the 1965 White Paper on Fuel Policy. The 
document was final proof of the negative signals Lee had been giving out about coal for 
most of 1965. The White Paper was a huge disappointment to the industry. Policy had 
emerged with coal still. important but with a much-reduced role. To deflate expectations 
further there was a commitment to capital and financial reconstruction but with an 
endorsement of the cabinet's decision not to offer a subsidy. However, the big shock was 
confirmation of coal output at 170-180 million tons by 1970 on the back of further 
expansion of oil. The size of the industry would be determined by its continued ability to 
modernise, mechanise, and improve productivity. An undertaking by the Government to 
ameliorate the social costs of coal contraction offered little consolation because it only 
served to reinforce the scale of rundown required to meet fuel policy. Similarly, the 
promise of a "streamlined" coal industry continuing to make a "major contribution to the 
strength of the national economy" had an ominous ring to it. 106 Thus 1965 marked the 
point of no return for coal, as Labour moved decisively against coal towards a `multi-fuel' 
economy. 
The mood of the NUM turned from shock to anger as accusations of treachery were 
levelled at the Government. Labour was sensitive to these accusations, believing that in the 
circumstances in which it had found the energy market the White Paper represented a good 
deal for coal. Moreover, the Government could claim that it had produced a coherent 
strategy for coal for the first time in which it continued to play a major role, rather than the 
fragmented chaos under the Tories which would have seen it driven to the margins. 107 Lee, 
in particular, rounded on his critics inside the industry who saw sinister forces gathering 
around coal. On a visit to the newly opened Parkside colliery in his Newton constituency in 
South Lancashire, he attacked those who made "grotesque suggestions that some 
machiavellian scheme was being plotted to get rid of coal'. 108. Similarly, senior 
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Government ministers tried to defuse the growing row with the NUM by offering 
assurances over the future of the industry at every opportunity. Ahead of the announcement 
on fuel policy, George Brown, the Minister of Economic Affairs, promised Lancashire 
miners "a tremendous future for solid fuel" in supplying the `base load' of Britain's future 
energy needs in a modernised and efficient industry. 109 Nevertheless, the new departure on 
fuel had, as Paynter noted, a "tremendous and dramatic effect upon our (the NUM's) 
expectations as far as Government policy was concerned"..... " it revealed completely new 
thinking" "0 
Assessing the changed circumstances for fuel proved exceedingly difficult for the NUM. 
Criticism of the Government was tempered during late 1965 and early 1966 by the need to 
see the return of a Labour government operating with a slender majority. All the same, the 
NUM leadership's muted response indicated that it struggled to come to terms with 
Labour's new direction on fuel. It was only as the impact on coal contraction became 
apparent that the full implications of Labour's fuel policy were recognised. Paynter's 
retirement speech in 1968 reflected bitterness at the destruction of the mining industry in 
his native South Wales. Yet, even at this stage, Paynter and others in the NUM leadership 
accepted that Labour's policy arose from having to operate within the `realities' of a free 
market for fuel in a `multi-fuel' economy. '11 
Paynter's reaction to the new fuel policy was circumspect bearing in mind he had spent the 
best part of the previous decade campaigning for a national fuel policy in which coal 
played the central role. He continued to blame the Tories for a situation Labour had 
inherited but stopped short of challenging the Government. Instead, he suggested that the 
Government was acting under the influence of poor advice from civil servants in the 
Ministry of Power who were directing policy. This view held a great deal of currency 
within the NUM as it fought to come to terms with the shift of policy. Many did not want 
to believe this was Labour policy. Furthermore, Paynter retreated on the major issues of 
`subsidisation' of coal and longer-term assistance for the industry. Significantly, he shrank 
from criticism of the Government for failing to deliver on the key demand for a guarantee 
on the future size of the industry. Paynter's judicious treatment of the Government was 
supported by a majority of NUM delegates albeit with more reservations, particularly as 
the scale of contraction in coal became clear. Only a small number of delegates on the left, 
93 
on the fringes of the NUM, attacked the Government over its betrayal and mobilised 
support for a lobby of parliament. 112 
With the print barely dry on one fuel white paper and with the debate still raging over what 
this dramatic shift in policy meant for coal, the 1966 Labour Government embarked on 
another review of fuel policy. This further increased tensions between the Government and 
the NUM. The discovery of North Sea gas promised to once again alter the course of fuel 
policy and necessitated a re-assessment of the Government's position. By 1967, natural gas 
had moved to centre-stage in Government fuel policy. The Selsdon Conference in May 
1967 concluded that maximisation of natural gas production ought to be the long-term 
objective of energy policy. 113 While the NCB and the NUM were initially dismissive about 
the potential of North Sea gas - in order to keep morale up in the industry - Government 
policy was set to turn another screw against coal coinciding with the appointment of 
Richard Marsh. as Minister of Power. "4 While Lee was ambivalent towards coal, Marsh's 
incumbency marked a turn for the worse as coal contraction produced a more fractious 
atmosphere, not helped by Marsh's ability to generate discord with leading figures from 
both the NCB and NUM. "" 
The 1967 White Paper on Fuel Policy marked the culmination of discussions within 
Government. Much had been decided at the Selsdon Conference and in a year of 
consultations prior to the conference. The blueprint for the long-term future of fuel policy 
and coal contraction had been decided. Further contraction was based on two principal 
arguments: the case for cheaper fuel and the need to support economic modernisation. The 
only issues for debate concerned the speed at which coal was to contract in order to allow 
for economic and social amelioration and what form short-term assistance for coal should 
take. One outcome was a continuation of short-term assistance for coal in power 
generation. Coal's future was determined, right down to the anticipated size of the industry 
at 150 million tons by 1970, and 100 million tons by 1980.116 Even Government concerns 
over the economic and social implications of further contraction in declining coalfields 
were contingent "on lines which would not disrupt the pattern of development of the 
energy sector". The only source of anxiety for Labour was the potential for rising tension 
with the NUM in which "outright opposition" might gain momentum. 117 
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Coal's future was now just a matter of the cautious and humane management of 
contraction. There was much speculation over further contraction during discussion of the 
second White Paper on Fuel Policy. This underlined growing NUM distrust of Government 
motives. "" By the time the 1967 White Paper was published it was already evident to the 
NUM what it meant for coal. Although the paper envisaged that coal would continue to 
supply the `base load' of primary fuel requirements it was clear it was being further 
marginalised. The output figure for 1970 of 152 million tons was not far above the 140 
million tons of fevered speculation following Selsdon. The White Paper used the language 
of contraction to describe the future of coal which was only expected to supply just under 
50 per cent of primary energy needs by 1970, with oil encroaching as the main provider. 
Coal was dealt with in terms of how the Government would manage coal's decline under 
what was euphemistically described as `Policy for Transition'. '19 
Although there was a great deal of anger within the NUM throughout 1967 and 1968 over 
coal having been jettisoned in this way, the union concentrated its efforts on tackling the 
Government over the outcomes of policy rather than its priorities. However, more 
dissonant voices emerged within the NUM demanding a more strident response than that 
adopted by the NUM leadership. For many on the left within the NUM the developments 
of 1967-68 marked a fundamental break in the bonds which tied the union to Labour, 
particularly as the impact of further contraction was being felt. Kane, from Yorkshire, 
argued for direct action against the Government, with only the Scottish delegates in 
support. Arguments against taking industrial action were based on a belief that this would 
be a fruitless gesture which would only inflict further damage on the industry. The calls 
from Kane presaged increased militancy led by the Yorkshire coalfield. Significantly, it 
was Yorkshire delegates who articulated an aggressive critique of the NUM leadership's 
`collaboration' with Government, prefacing a more potent challenge to the NUM 
leadership with Yorkshire in the vanguard. These were important developments ahead of 
unofficial industrial action in the Yorkshire coalfield in 1969 and again in 1970. For the 
majority within the NUM there was a mood of resigned acceptance of Government 
priorities on fuel and further coal contraction with the only `challenge' coming over the 
consequences of policy shift. 120 For the Government a long-term strategy to ensure the 
future viability of the coal industry was never an option despite publicly stated declarations 
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to the contrary. Labour had decided from its earliest days in office that coal would cease to 
occupy the dominant role in energy in favour of a `multi-fuel' economy. '21 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
As evidenced by this chapter, events during the immediate aftermath of the Second World 
shaped subsequent developments. Challenges to coal's domination originated in experience 
of post-war coal shortages in which it was felt coal would be unable to meet the demands 
placed upon it. Nuclear power was initially seen as the answer. The development of 
nuclear energy had a momentum of its own propelled by political enthusiasm for 
modernity and only impeded by questions of cost and feasibility. The massive expansion of 
the oil economy was largely initiated and pursued by large private oil companies. The scale 
and rapidity of its growth and importance to the economy meant that it could not be 
ignored. However, in the case of both nuclear energy and oil, government economic and 
political priorities intervened to support their development. As this chapter has shown, 
post-war governments were involved in affecting the direction of the energy sector in 
favour of alternative fuels in a reflection of their economic and political interests. 
Intervention in support of coal was never a long-term consideration. It was only undertaken 
in pursuit of momentary economic and political expedients and short-term objectives. In 
the case of Labour this included pressure from the NUM. 122 
It might be argued, as this chapter has suggested, that government attitudes and decisions 
were less important than-those of the CEGB or civil service. The CEGB were certainly 
influential in determining outcomes for coal in a negative way. The battle for the power 
sector was the essence of the more general battle for the coal industry. 123 The CEGB was 
mindful of the commercial opportunities and pitfalls in the conversion debate. But, what 
the CEGB thought or did was less important than a government perspective which 
reflected the CEGB's increasing preference for oil and nuclear power. Government, like 
the CEGB, was convinced of the need to move to other fuels. 
Another commonly expressed view is that post-war fuel policy was largely determined by 
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civil servants and technocrats or, in the case of nuclear energy, by the scientific 
community. Certainly, as Bromley notes; Richard Crossman has been notable for 
advancing a view which argued that the determination of fuel policy under Labour was the 
work of the civil service. 124 This was a view enthusiastically advanced by the NUM 
leadership. It is true that energy issues were not at the forefront of policy considerations at 
Cabinet level while officials within the Ministry of Power were influential in advising 
government on fuel policy through the specialist or technical knowledge they possessed . 
125 
However, government ministers were involved to a greater degree in initiating, influencing 
and executing the thrust of fuel policy. Under Labour, this was undertaken because fuel 
played such a vital part in wider government economic modernisation and planning policy 
considerations. Moreover, the triumvirate of Brown, Wilson and Lee, and later Marsh at 
Power, were closely involved in Labour's new direction on fuel and coal contraction in 
furtherance of these objectives. 
This chapter has indicated that the national fuel policy was important in marginalising coal. 
It was also instrumental in testing the relationship between Labour and the NUM. As a 
much-vaunted Labour policy objective it was eagerly anticipated by the NUM. It was a 
misplaced judgment based on a continuing belief in the centrality of coal carried forward 
from post-war conditions. By the time Labour returned to office in 1964 the energy market 
had altered considerably. Labour accepted a free market for fuel and accordingly 
responded to the situation as they found it. In this sense, it might be argued that Labour 
obtained the best possible deal for coal within fuel policy. However, it was its attitude 
toward coal within its wider agenda for economic modernisation and planning which 
affected the coal industry in a negative way. In addition, Labour felt able to `manage' 
criticism of its fuel policy because of strong and traditional links with the NUM. The NUM 
leadership's political support for Labour ensured that criticism of the Government was 
measured. There was never any question of the NUM leadership challenging the 
Government over its priorities on fuel, only on the outcomes. The Labour Governments 
only anxiety was that tensions within the NUM over fuel policy and further coal 
contraction might result in loss of control by the leadership to the left in specific coalfields. 
Another important relationship highlighted in this chapter was that between the NCB and 
NUM. An already close relationship was cemented as the `challenges' to coal intensified. 
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These brought a common response from both organisations expressed through attempts to 
compete with alternative fuels. Enabling coal to compete was an important aspect of the 
post-war modernisation and rationalisation of the industry which aimed to improve 
performance and reduce excess capacity. The `challenges' to coal thus had an important 
parallel in the `transformation' of the industry between 1945 and 1972. The 
`transformation' of coal during the post-war period is the subject of the following chapter. 
This should be seen as having a fundamental concurrence with developments detailed here. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE BRITISH COAL INDUSTRY 1945-1972, 
`TRANSFORMATION' 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is concerned with the transformation of the industry which ran parallel to the 
challenges faced by coal from alternative fuels. Modernisation had been a desired objective 
for many years but had been largely deferred under private control because the need to 
maximise output and profitability consistently overrode future development. After the 
Second World War, the position was radically altered under public ownership. The 
imperatives of private capital were superseded by the demands of state control. Public 
ownership brought with it the necessity to overhaul the industry to remedy the deficiencies 
and iniquities of private ownership. State control was the engine of modernisation under 
which an unprecedented scheme of improvement was formulated. However, it will be 
argued in this chapter that modernisation was again postponed by the requirements of post- 
war governments desperate to maximise coal production to obviate fuel crises. 
Additionally, implementing modernisation proved to be exceedingly difficult. But, this 
realisation increased, rather than reduced, the desire for change. This highlighted the range 
of interests gathered together to underwrite the process of change including all shades of 
political opinion and both sides of the industry. As this chapter will show, the key 
development in the implementation of the scheme was the collapse of coal consumption 
from the late 1950s. This hastened the completion of modernisation through the 
construction of new collieries and re-constructions and unleashed an intense and rapid 
process of rationalisation through colliery closures. 
It will be demonstrated in this chapter that the process of industrial change was remarkable 
for the support it enjoyed together with the coalition of interests it garnered. However, the 
process was not free of tensions. These were particularly manifest between government 
and the Coal Board. While there was no questioning of the priorities for change tensions 
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did emerge over its scale and rapidity. Throughout, the Coal Board performed the difficult 
task of managing change while simultaneously maintaining the continued co-operation of 
organised labour. Essentially, the process was the culmination of the long-awaited 
modernisation of the coal industry. It will be proposed that matters only took a turn for the 
worse with the return of a Labour Government in 1964. This development increased the 
level of tension within the coalition of interests. The source of these tensions was Labour's 
insistence on carrying through a further scheme of rationalisation known as the 
Accelerated Colliery Closure Programme (ACCP or ACP) in tandem with its departure on 
fuel policy. Tensions over the ACP emerged once again between government and the Coal 
Board. The ACP also precipitated tensions within both the Coal Board and the NUM. It 
will be shown that the ACP was different from the previous scheme of rationalisation in 
the industry. It was part of Labour's wider agenda for modernity. Furthermore, the extent 
and speed of contraction it necessitated was unprecedented. Significantly, it focused 
attention on attitudes to industrial change. On the one hand, it provoked opposition from 
important elements within the Coal Board and from the left and `rank-and-file' in a number 
of coalfields. On the other hand, opposition was less marked from the NUM leadership. 
Importantly, while the NUM leadership mounted opposition to the outcomes of the ACP it 
accepted the priorities of the scheme. The attitude toward the ACP served to underline the 
NUM's acceptance of industrial change throughout this period. This level of acceptance 
was underpinned by union willingness to embrace modernisation particularly when 
advocated by Labour. The NUM's traditional links to Labour helped facilitate this level of 
interest in industrial change. 
3.2 THE PLAN FOR COAL: MODERNISATION DEFERRED 
Even during the coal industry's Victorian growth the political economist W. S. Jevons had 
warned that the coal industry's future would not be assured without the technological and 
organisational skills required to exploit the resources. ' 50 years later, his son, H. S. Jevons, 
again speculated about the future of coal. Writing of an industry which had just peaked in 
terms of output and manpower, he was concerned about the weakness of British coal. Chief 
amongst these concerns was technical and organisational backwardness in which there was 
a plethora of small-scale pits with poor lay-out and lack of mechanisation. 2 British coal 
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owners had been convinced that growth; together with attendant competitive pressures, 
would continue. This meant all efforts were directed toward the maximisation of 
profitability through the prioritisation of current production rather than future 
development. This position persisted into the inter-war period. There was some 
improvement mainly through increasing mechanisation while statutory re-organisation 
after 1930 created large colliery companies prepared to invest in technical development. 
These companies laid plans for extensive improvements in a modernisation drive. Some 
post-nationalisation re-construction schemes had origins in those begun by the private 
companies. Still, prior to the Second World War improvement was patchy. 3 The severe 
decline of the industry between the wars saw private owners put current production first 
because of the need to survive in a competitive and declining industry. Again, wholesale 
modernisation was deferred and prolonged by wartime exigencies. In any case the scale of 
investment required to modernise the industry was beyond the reach of all but the largest 
and most highly capitalised companies. 
Post-war Britain thus inherited an under - capitalised, inefficient and technically backward 
industry in which inter-war modernisation had failed significantly to improve indices of 
performance. Furthermore, it had a chaotic structure; the product of hundreds of years of 
unplanned growth. Evidence testifies to the near derelict state of British pits; a view 
endorsed by commentators such as Harold Wilson. He, in common with others on the 
political left, believed the problems of the industry had to be tackled as a priority in post- 
war Britain as part of the delivery of the long-cherished objective of public ownership. It 
was felt that only under state control would the industry begin its long-awaited 
modernisation. 5 
An indication of what the post-war world might be like for coal came with the publication 
of the influential Reid Report in 1944. The Report represented an unambiguous and 
comprehensive exposition of the technical backwardness of the industry together with 
remedies. The scale of improvement required to modernise the industry was only eclipsed 
by its damning indictment of private ownership. Virtually no aspect of mining was spared 
from its remit. The Report was a blueprint for the post-war modernisation of coal. It used 
the explicit language of industrial change under which the coal industry would be 
dramatically transformed. There was a huge chasm between what Reid saw as a modem, 
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efficient and competitive industry and the parlous state of the industry at the end of the 
war. It was obvious that achieving the scale of transformation envisioned by Reid would be 
a tall order requiring huge levels of investment only the state could provide. This meant the 
construction of new collieries and the reconstruction and concentration of others. It also 
meant that a massive rump of the industry would be declared redundant because of 
technical reasons or economic unfeasibility. Reid, was the harbinger of a re-invigorated 
two-tier future for Britain's coal industry. A small number of coalfields were expected to 
have a future as modern technically advanced producers while others were expected to 
wither. This principle extended right down to expectations for individual pits; even to 
underground districts of the same colliery. 6 
While the Reid Report represented the blueprint, the key document in the implementation 
of industrial change was the 1950 Plan for Coal. The Plan launched an extensive 
investment programme of new pit constructions, re-constructions and concentrations. It 
required the technical re-construction of 250 collieries along with the development of new 
pits from where 80 per cent of output was to be mined by the early 1960s. It was expected 
that a further 250 collieries would remain largely unchanged with only minor 
improvements. These pits were expected to contribute the remainder of the output. In terms 
of rationalisation it was anticipated that 350-400 collieries would close, amalgamate or 
undergo concentration. The two-tier aspect of Reid was very much in evidence in the Plan. 
It established which coalfields were to expand and those expected to decline. Lancashire 
was seen as a declining coalfield under this regime in term of manpower and output 7 
With the framework of public ownership in place and with the blueprint and plan for 
rationalisation formulated, it seemed the long-awaited scheme to bring the coal industry 
into the twentieth century had begun in earnest. It was not to be. Once again, 
modernisation was deferred. The current demands placed on the industry intruded. As 
Jackson notes, the post-war agenda was one of "coal at any price", 8 which meant that 
modernisation was pushed to the periphery of concerns in favour of attaining production 
because of continuing worries over fuel shortages. In addition, as the Coal Board 
proceeded with the initial stages of the 1950 Plan it ran into difficulties. By 1956, in the 
document: Investing in Coal, the NCB admitted that the scale of the Plan had been 
ambitious given the level of resources which were required to rejuvenate the industry. The 
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response from the NCB, and endorsed by the Government, was not a deceleration in 
modernisation but a re-doubling of efforts including new investment earmarked for new 
pits and re-constructions. As a result, new pits and re-constructions were accorded even 
greater urgency, while `excess capacity' was put under closer scrutiny. 9 
The main development precipitating coal industry modernisation and rationalisation was 
the collapse in coal consumption from the late 1950s. This ended a period of "coal at any 
price" to be replaced by an imperative to increase the speed of the modernisation and to 
reduce `excess capacity' for coal to compete in a rapidly declining market. The 1959 
Revised Plan for Coal, accordingly, established an unparalleled rationalisation programme. 
The Revised Plan required the size of the industry to be determined by reduced output and 
lower manpower which would achieve higher levels of productivity by 1965. This was to 
be achieved by concentrating output in new or reconstructed pits. Furthermore, a re- 
assessment of capital investment meant an even greater concentration of resources on new 
and re-constructed pits at the expense of those which had hitherto been `borderline' for 
closure. Lancashire saw the highest rate of manpower run-down of the coalfields. Each 
division, area and colliery was expected at least to break even. Although rationalisation 
had been taking place since vesting day it was conceded that pits had been "kept going" 
which should "otherwise have closed" to meet fuel demands. 1959, thus marked the real 
start of modernisation and rationalisation in the industry. In a short space of time coal 
underwent a period of major upheaval. Such was the severity of closures under the Revised 
Plan that assurances were given that there would be minimal redundancy. For the Revised 
Plan work it depended on miners transferring from closures to new or re-constructed pits or 
to other coalfields. In this manner, social costs could be minimised through a gradual co- 
ordinated and planned transfer of resources. 
In spite of the false starts, an extraordinary level of industrial and political support 
impelled the modernisation agenda. This `grand coalition' was like a juggernaut driving 
modernisation throughout the period. Inevitably there were tensions, though these did not 
impede the direction of modernisation, only the extent and pace of change. The Labour 
Party had been at the forefront of formulating plans for the modernisation of the industry 
as part of nationalisation. Labour viewed the Reid Report as one of the most important 
documents in the industry's history; a "standard" against which the post-war modernisation 
117 
of the industry should be measured. 1° Indeed, Labour saw the Miners' Charter, drawn up 
with the NUM as one which should include modernisation as one of its chief tenets. " The 
CPGB demanded the delivery of major capital investment from government in order to 
modernise coal. The Party criticised the pace of modernisation because it was not 
proceeding fast enough. 12 
For organised labour in coal, modernisation was the achievement of a much desired 
objective. There were rumblings of discontent within the NUM focusing on the scale of 
run-down envisaged. 13 A NUM leadership completely sold on the idea of modernisation 
assuaged such concerns. Homer, the NUM General Secretary, reminded colleagues of the 
golden future that awaited them in the modernised pits. 14 In the Lancashire coalfield, the 
NUMLA president, Charles Tyrer, accepted that the re-organisation of the industry would 
consign coalfields like Lancashire to the margins. However, Tyrer implored miners in 
Lancashire to grasp modernisation with both hands. He argued that the sunlit uplands of 
the future belonged to those who embraced a modern, efficient and technically advanced 
industry in contrast "to the dark days of the past". He further noted that in partnership with 
Labour, under public ownership they would be able to participate in the decisions affecting 
their future as a result of industrial change. 15 
Two additional elements of the `grand coalition' were `progressive management' in the 
industry and Conservative governments. The Reid Committee was composed of a number 
of figures associated with the management of the industry who were keen to. proceed with 
the overhaul of coa1.16 A new cadre of `progressive management' emerged throughout the 
inter- war and wartime period. They conceded there had been deficiencies under private 
control which a new breed of well-educated professionally trained managers would be able 
to rectify working together with government and `advanced' sections of the trade union 
movement toward a modernised industry. Many of these managers came from new colliery 
companies formed after compulsory re-organisation in 1930. Some went on to occupy key 
positions in the NCB, working alongside former NUM officials. Sir Humphrey Browne of 
Manchester Collieries, later to become Lord Roben's deputy, exemplified this new 
generation of management. 17 
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Conservative governments also became avid `modernisers'. They were as willing as the 
rest to climb aboard the modernisation `juggernaut'. They argued that the idea of a modern 
and efficient coal industry was vital for economic modernisation. The level of its 
commitment can be seen by the decision in 1956 to continue to underwrite the 
modernisation of the industry just as it this was beginning to falter. This commitment 
involved a doubling of investment to facilitate modernisation. Bolstering the programme in 
this way amounted to one of the greatest single acts of faith in coal industry modernisation 
during the post-war period. 18 
There were tensions within the `grand coalition', but these were about the scale and pace of 
change rather than its direction. One main source of conflict was between government and 
the Coal Board. Both post-war Conservative and Labour governments pressed for a 
greater degree and faster pace of change. 19 For example, during the formulation of the 
1950 Plan, the Labour Government felt that the Coal Board was too cautious in its 
prescriptions for change, believing that the Plan should introduce a more radical re- 
organisation, including wholesale transfers of manpower from declining coalfields such as 
Lancashire, to the expanding coalfields of the East Midlands and Yorkshire. The 
Government was confident of its ability to achieve this complex operation because it felt 
able to convince the NUM. The Coal Board, which had the task of implementing change, 
was not convinced. It believed that this radical plan would produce such high levels of 
dislocation and dissatisfaction that miners would leave the industry in droves thus 
jeopardising attempts at re-structuring. Coal Board concerns centred on its ability to obtain 
the agreement of the NUM which had made it clear that it had reservations even about the 
more limited change envisaged in the 1950 Plan. 20 
The Government thought the Coal Board's caution was unwarranted. It argued miners 
should feel re-assured because the time-scale involved for re-structuring would allow for 
the absorption of `excess manpower' in new and re-constructed pits while new industrial 
development brought into declining mining areas would create new opportunities for the 
remainder. Government optimism was predicated on a belief in a continued expanding 
market for coal and confidence about its ability to create an industrial renaissance in 
declining coalfields. The Coal Board won this particular argument because it made it clear 
to the Government that it would be unable to obtain union agreement to such a radical 
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venture. 21 Coal Board strategy on industrial change was therefore always developed on the 
understanding that it could push change only as far and as fast as it was able to obtain 
union agreement. By contrast, it was post-war governments who consistently demanded 
that change should proceed much further and faster. This created problems for the Coal 
Board throughout the 1950s because government placed two mutually exclusive demands 
upon it. On the one hand the Coal Board was under pressure to maximise output to 
forestall fuel crises, while on the other, it was under pressure to proceed with a rapid 
overhaul of the industry. Little wonder that many colliery re-construction schemes quickly 
ran into difficulty. 
There was another clash between the Government and the Coal Board during the early 
1960s as the 1959 rationalisation programme proceeded. This time the issue for 
government was how quickly the industry could reduce `excess capacity'. The continued 
poor performance of the coal industry, exacerbated by competition from other fuels, 
created an impetus for the Government to demand a more rapid rationalisation than that 
contained in the 1959 Revised Plan. The `Review of the Revised Plan', conducted during 
1961-63, thus required further manpower and output reductions beyond those contained in 
the 1959 programme. The NCB felt this was pushing NUM compliance too far. Unlike the 
disagreements over the 1950 Plan the Government prevailed, but, once again, Coal Board 
anxieties centred on the sudden acceleration in contraction upsetting the NUM 22 
The Coal Board's sensitivity at this time stemmed from tension with the NUM over the 
Board's abandonment of two major new `showpiece' pits in the Scottish Area: Glenochil 
and Rothes. This highlighted the tensions which arose between the Board and the NUM 
when modernisation was pushed too far. It also illustrated the level of support 
modernisation enjoyed within the NUM. The spectacular failure of two projects at the 
cornerstone of modernisation saw the Scottish TUC demanding an inquiry into the closures 
and calling for the resignation of the Coal Board chairman. The NUM Scottish Area 
considered taking industrial action. Modernisation clearly had its limitations. Robens 
readily accepted that there had been mistakes. Glenochil, was, according to Robens, a 
"colossal waste of public money" 23 However, as developments in the early 1950s had 
indicated, such failures, rather than raising questions about the direction of modernisation 
served to the strengthen resolve within the NCB and NUM for modernisation to succeed. 
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These `mistakes' certainly saw the NUM seething, particularly as 5,000 jobs disappeared 
with the Rothes closure. But, the NUM, even in the Scottish coalfield, was less concerned 
about what these and other failures said about modernisation. Rather, concerns focused on 
the economic and social consequences of failure. In no way did they result in any 
substantive questioning by the NUM of industrial change either in Scotland or elsewhere. 
The belief in the efficacy of industrial change remained undiminished. Unwelcome though 
these closures were they were seen as the necessary casualties of the modernisation drive. 24 
Undoubtedly for the NUM, modernisation of the industry had been desired for many years. 
Public ownership offered the opportunity for it to come to fruition through the resources of 
the state and the dynamism engendered through widespread industrial and political 
support. The modernisation agenda was only postponed by the intrusion of competing 
demands placed on the industry during the immediate post-war period. It is clear that it was 
government in the vanguard of industrial change. The NCB was a willing partner too, 
although only in as much as it could rely on organised labour to comply with the scale and 
rapidity of change. Leading sections of the NUM remained implacably in favour of 
modernisation. Any reservations were expressed about outcomes rather than about the 
validity of the project. 
The character of industrial change underwent a dramatic shift from the late 1950s with a 
change of emphasis from the new pits and re-constructions to closing collieries. The 1959 
Plan marked the point at which the tempo of modernisation increased with many projects 
reaching completion during the 1960s. The main pre-occupation was increasingly turning 
to colliery closures. Modernisation and rationalisation thus came together in a more 
profound way during the 1960s. They were not separate processes. Both were intended to 
operate together in a scheme of overall `transition' which envisaged the transfer of 
resources from the declining and unproductive to the expanding and efficient. Once again, 
though this process had a broad measure of support, the problems of `transition' 
highlighted tensions between government and the Coal Board. It also brought the NCB and 
the NUM closer together through the evolution of industrial change. 
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3.3 RATIONALISATION: MODERNISATION COMPLETED. 
The purpose of rationalisation was to concentrate resources in operations which would 
increase the competitive efficiency of coal. This had been an objective since vesting date 
but competition from other fuels renewed efforts to achieve this goal. In the short-term the 
aim was to increase productivity and break even. In the longer-term a smaller, modern, 
more efficient industry was expected to achieve profitability. This meant concentrating 
production in new collieries and re-constructions and closing the remainder. The early 
1950s saw the Coal Board committed to rationalisation under the 1950 Plan. This involved 
placing an emphasis on individual pits. As the NCB contended "there is no industry, there 
are only 900 pits". 25 From this basic premise the Board identified collieries as either 
"improving" or "declining" in terms of output and productivity amongst those designated 
by the 1950 Plan as new collieries, major re-constructions, minor re-constructions, and 
`short-life' collieries likely to close by 1965. The `short-life' pits were more heavily 
concentrated in the declining regions of Scotland, South Wales, the North-East, and North- 
West where they comprised half of all pits. During the early 1950s the Board earmarked 
collieries likely to face closure based on their inability to undergo technical improvement 
and to match commercial criteria. 26 
An increasing focus on commercial , criteria was given another 
twist by the 1959 Revised 
Plan which required much stricter adherence to the principle that each pit, area, and 
division should move toward profitability. 27 Thus, while the period since vesting date had 
seen pit closures due to `exhaustion' of reserves, 28 pits now faced closure based upon a 
whole host of market-led criteria. 29 As the NCB noted, such criteria had been at the heart 
of the Board's operations since vesting date when it was deemed each' pit should be 
profitable. However, government anxieties over post-war fuel shortages meant these 
collieries remained open. Unprofitable pits which should have closed frequently received 
new investment in the hope that they could be `turned around' because they were high coal 
producers. As the demand for coal fell during the late 1950s so commercial criteria once 
again predominated in determining outcomes for individual collieries. 30 Although there 
had always been the rather controversial and poorly defined concept of an `uneconomic 
pit' the term was taken to include the widest possible definition from the late 1950s. As a 
result, many pits had their feasibility threshold slashed resulting in the threat of closure. 
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Collieries carrying high coal reserves which would have remained open by the criteria of 
the early 1950s were suddenly candidates for closure. 31 
The process of rationalisation created dilemmas for the NCB. Again, its problems mounted 
as government questioned the scale and rapidity of rationalisation. From the beginning of 
the process the Coal Board believed that the best way forward was a cautious and gradual 
one in which pits were only closed as jobs became available in new and re-constructed pits. 
In this way, there would be fewer `dislocations' of manpower. Pit closures were 
correspondingly phased in or deferred to achieve this objective. This strategy was pursued 
not just to reduce the social impact of pit closures. It was based on a hard-headed 
commercial need to synchronise the transfer of miners from redundant to productive pits. 32 
Synchronising transfer was an extremely difficult task given that the progress of new or re- 
constructed pits was often delayed. Likewise, ^ as the scale of rationalisation became 
apparent during the early 1960s the industry saw an exodus of mineworkers as anxieties 
over the future of coal mounted. The `gradualist' approach contributed to a collapse in 
morale because local `green labour' recruitment embargoes agreed to facilitate pit closures 
resulted in local manpower crises across the coalfields. This included a shortage of the 
skilled and experienced labour desperately needed in the modernised collieries. 
By the early 1960s the progress of industrial change was threatened by these trends as 
many colliery modernisation schemes approached completion and still awaited a full 
manpower build-up to swing into production. The earmarking of many pit closures by the 
Coal Board as `manpower reservoirs' to serve the needs of the new and re-constructed 
collieries was only a palliative in the context of government demands to speed up the 
completion of modernised pits and quickly close those due for closure. Conversely, the 
Board's problems were complicated by the occurrence of high levels of localised 
unemployment in many coalfields not seen since the inter-war period due to an absence of 
alternative job opportunities. 33 
The acceleration of rationalisation under the `Review of the Revised Plan' at the 
Government's behest had been far from welcome by the Coal Board because of the 
operational problems it created and through fear of antagonising the NUM. As a result the 
Government agreed to some slackening of the pace of closures. There thus developed the 
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rather damaging situation of pits winning deferments only to be closed at a later date. It 
also produced the unsavoury spectacle of pits winning reprieves from the Board but the 
Ministry of Power asking for substitutes after the Board had entered into negotiations with 
the unions for the closure of specific pits. 34T his kind of bartering, with pits put into a state 
of limbo, further increased levels of uncertainty thus hastening `manpower drift'. 
By 1963, increasing competitive pressures on coal and a deepening financial crisis within 
the industry brought a new urgency to the task of rationalisation such that the Government 
again made further demands on the Board by pressing for more closures. Richard Wood, 
the Minister of Power, asked Lord Robens, the Coal Board chairman, to produce a "secret 
reserve list of closures". The `secret list' was important in determining the character of 
future rationalisation because the collieries Wood was asking Robens to consider for 
closure included a substantial number not hitherto considered. They were collieries which 
had some future, at least in the medium term. Importantly, for the Board, they were pits in 
which mineworkers and the NUM had been assured there would be some future. For 
Robens, this request was too much. He categorically refused to ratchet up the scale of 
closures. Robens was anxious about the likely dislocation to the progress of the Plan by the 
scale of what was being suggested. He was even more concerned about an adverse union 
reaction, explaining that "the present programme was the biggest the Board could negotiate 
with the unions in a peaceful manner", and was "drawn up on the basis of what it (the Coal 
Board) considered to be industrially possible to achieve". On this occasion, the Coal Board 
successfully rebuffed attempts to increase the scale of contraction. Robens's success was 
assisted by forecasts indicating more widespread social hardship as a result of further 
closures. Because the new colliery and re-construction schemes were nearing completion 
the opportunities for absorption of mineworkers from further colliery closures was likely to 
diminish. 35 The suggestion by the Conservative Government of a new phase of 
contraction was the harbinger of the ACP under the subsequent Labour administration. 
The challenge facing the Coal Board during the early 1960s was balancing the manpower 
needs of modernisation with the reductions from rationalisation. One of the Board's 
priorities was to convince miners that they had a future in mining. The Board co-opted the 
unions in this task. Despite the closure of many pits, the unions were, like the Board, keen 
to emphasis the re-generative aspects of industrial change as a means of retaining a modern 
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and viable coal industry. The Board used the discourse of modernity to project a modem 
image for the industry aimed at dispelling the notion that it was dying. It emphasised the 
more modem aspects of its operations through a variety of media. These were attempts to 
`steal the white coat' from the nuclear power industry with an emphasis on new 
technology; new collieries; research and development; and the projection of the Board as a 
progressive employer. During the late 1950s the Coal Board chairman, Sir James Bowman, 
offered modernisation as delivering a coal industry that would be the most "progressive in 
the world". This message was delivered against a symbolic backdrop of new gleaming 
colliery constructions of concrete and glass looking more like atomic research 
establishments than collieries. The new concrete encased Koepe Friction winding gear 
stood in stark contrast tö images of traditional headgear. These were symbolic 
representations of the notion of re-birth. Images of miners leaving the pit wearing suits and 
carrying briefcases to their cars in the colliery car park were intended to be contrasted with 
the more traditional images of miners leaving a pit cage. Reports of the new pits carried 
reference to the latest technology including remote controlled underground operations. 
Technology was seen as the key to re-invigorating a traditional industry. There was, too, a 
clear emphasis on youth through education, career development and training. 36 At the 
same time, the strong cultural traditions of the industry were invoked as sustaining 
elements in a changing world. The stamp of official approval buttressed the images of 
modernity through visits to the new and re-constructed collieries by figures from royalty, 
government, entertainment and sport. 37 Lord Roberts's vision was an industry without 
equal in technological development in which continuous mining techniques were practised 
employing the latest remote-controlled operations in underground cathedrals of 
cybernetics. 38 Technological developments had the primary objective of improving the 
industry's performance but they became a lucrative addition to the Board's strategy of 
creating a modem image for the industry. 
These strategies were equalled by the Board's attempts to create incentives for miners to 
remain in the industry. The Board was reducing overall manpower levels but was anxious 
to retain enough skilled and trained labour to `man-up' its modernised collieries. The 
retention of this so-called "virile labour" became a Board priority. It also meant that there 
was a focus on a younger workforce at the expense of older and `disabled' miners. 39 The 
Board, together with the NUM, wanted to provide incentives by promising miners better 
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rates of pay and conditions at these collieries particularly within the new power-loading 
teams. 40 These mineworkers were seen as the key to future success. The Board thus 
attempted to demonstrate that the painful process of colliery closures was a necessary pre- 
requisite to the emergence of a smaller streamlined but modern and efficient industry in 
which miners would enjoy long-term job security. Judging by the rush to leave the 
industry, which saw a net outflow of nearly 410,000 workers between 1960 and 1965, the 
Board was less successful at convincing mineworkers to stay in coal than they were at 
altering public perceptions of the industry. Even accounting for `planned' outflow through 
the rationalisation programme this ranked as one of the largest concentrated losses of 
manpower in the industry's history. 41 The best efforts of the Board and the NUM to stem 
this tide proved fruitless as leading officials from both sides of the industry worked 
together to ensure that the momentum of industrial change was maintained throughout the 
early 1960s. 
3.4 THE DELUGE: LABOUR'S ACCELERATED COLLIERY CLOSURE 
PROGRAMME 
The return of a Labour Government in 1964 marked a major shift in the circumstances of 
industrial change in the coal industry. Although there had been tensions between 
Government and the NCB over industrial change they were as nothing compared with the 
tensions which arose over the ACP. Moreover, for the first time, the ACP saw the 
emergence of serious cleavages within the `grand coalition' as tensions rose within both 
the NCB and NUM. Lord' Robens had warned the outgoing Conservative Government of 
the dangers of pushing coal industry rationalisation too far and too fast. This disagreement 
prefaced a more deleterious turn of events under Labour. The return of a Labour 
government was expected to herald some moderation in the pace of coal industry 
contraction. Additionally, the NCB believed that a difficult process of modernisation and 
rationalisation was nearing completion. A smaller, modern and technically advanced coal 
industry was emerging. Years of effort to produce an upward shift in productivity was 
finally beginning to bear fruit even in declining coalfields such as Lancashire. There were 
even the first signs of the industry moving into profitability. Lord Robens, the great 
helmsman of change, stood on the brink of delivering his brilliant vision for the industry. 
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He had earned many plaudits for his skilful handling of what had been a difficult phase for 
coal. In turn, Robens was able to point to a largely successful `transition' which had been 
achieved in record time without major social hardship or large-scale unemployment, and 
achieved without serious challenge from the NUM. 42 Robens was able to reflect with 
satisfaction that by the mid-1960s he had nearly completed his most difficult `stint'. Now, 
with a Labour Government in power, and with coal likely to be given priority in fuel 
policy, there would surely be a bright future for the industry. 
This benign scenario was shattered with the announcement of Labour's fuel policy. The 
reduced role for coal required an even smaller industry. The ACP represented a qualitative 
and quantitative change in the character of contraction from the previous rationalisation 
programme. In November 1965 it was announced that 120 `uneconomic pits' were to be 
closed in a period of 18-24 months, with at least 90 more during the three years from 1968 
to 1971. Manpower reductions envisaged the `displacement' of 64,000 mineworkers during 
the first phase and 60,000 during the second phase. 43 It was not necessarily the scale of the 
programme that was extraordinary, though this was extensive, but its speed. The level of 
contraction proposed was as great as anything which had taken place during previous 
rationalisation, but it was set to occur in less than two years in the first phase. By 
comparison during the six-year period from 1959 to 1965 233 collieries had closed with 
the net loss of 196,000 mining jobs but including `unplanned' manpower losses 44 The 
extent of the scheme indicated the underlying reason for its initiation. Although the Labour 
Government accepted that the industry was improving, it needed to be put on a fmancially 
sound basis sooner rather than later. Importantly, the reduced role for coal in fuel policy 
meant that a further severe contraction was required at a stroke rather than the `gradualist' 
approach seen in the earlier programme 45 
Unlike the previous scheme of rationalisation carried out- under the 1959 Revised Plan the 
ACP was much more about shaping the coal industry within Labour's wider programme of 
economic modernisation. George Brown, the Economic Affairs Minister, noted it was 
about Labour demonstrating its credentials in fashioning and implementing a major re- 
structuring process: a huge economic and social planning experiment. The chief architects 
of the ACP, the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, the Minister of Power, Fred Lee, and 
George Brown, were convinced of the propriety of the project. Brown, in particular, 
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positively relished the prospect, convincing his colleagues that with the right blend r 
economic and social policies further contraction could be properly 'managed' despit 
warnings to the contrary. 46 Lee, in opposition, had been a keen student of Labour's 
commitment to reversing Britain's relative economic decline through economic planning 
linked to the scientific and technological revolution. 47 Wilson's ideas for the coal industry 
had been clear for many years both as a young economist and later as a senior Labour 
politician. For its success, the ACP depended on the continued availability of re- 
employment prospects within the industry, together with the rapid creation of alternative 
employment in pit areas. In formulating the plans it was expected that most of the 
'displaced' mineworkers would be able to transfer within the industry. The remaining 
'surplus' was not anticipated to exceed ten per cent of those 'displaced', with the majority 
comprising elderly and 'disabled' miners together with some 'localised' unemployment 
which would require special attention within the framework of social ameliorative 
measures forming part of the scheme. 4' 
The Coal Board was involved in the consultation process during the planning for the ACP. 
It ranked amongst its chief sceptics. Robcns was aghast at the programme. His main 
concerns centred on the extent and speed of contraction and anxieties over a possible 
adverse union reaction. He had consistently argued that the industry could not take further 
contraction without significant economic and social dislocation in many pit areas because 
the absorption and transfer possibilities - so vital to the relative success of previous plans - 
had all but diminished. The types of colliery to be closed also caused concern because 
these included many previously expected to have a 'medium' or longer-term future. His 
sense of frustration was heightened because these were the pits that the Coal Board had 
exhorted to achieve improved performance in order to guarantee their future. Closure 
meant destroying the goodwill developed with NCB and NUM officials and the 'rank-and- 
file' at the affected collieries. Robens was petrified at the prospect of losing longstanding 
NUM support for industrial change. He constantly fretted about the ACP by seeking 
government reassurances and ensuring that he still retained NUM support. As a most 
unwilling convert to the scheme Robcns implored the Government to consider alternative, 
less ambitious strategies. Roben argued, with some justification, that the ACP was an 
unprecedented departure which was likely to have "tremendous political and social 
consequences" while there were certain to be political repercussions with the NUM. This 
128 
was an argument which Robens was destined to lose despite his sound judgernd 
Government policy was firmly set. Any qualms about the ACP were set aside as Labci 
believed it would provide a sufficiently well planned scheme of economic and social 
amelioration and was confident that it could cope with any political fall-out from U 
NUM. 49 
The disagreement between Robens and the Labour Government over the ACP was only the 
first instalment of more serious conflict. Roben felt aggrieved by the way the ACP had 
been pushed through. He distanced himself from the scheme both publicly and through his 
participation in the Select Committee on the Nationalised Industries. His growing criticism 
of the Government throughout 1966 and early 1967 brought him into conflict with the new 
Minister of Power, Richard Marsh, who, became incensed by Robens's attitude. Roberts's 
description of Labour policy as "brutal butchery" was one which Marsh found particularly 
galling. In spite of what both Marsh and Robens have claimed was a harmonious 
relationship it became highly fractious over the direction of Labour fuel and coal industry 
policy. In July 1966, Marsh, questioned Robens's loyalty to the Labour Government. 
Marsh sought approval for his removal from the chairmanship of the Coal Board from 
Harold Wilson "at the earliest opportunity" with a suggestion that he be moved to chair 
the National Steel Corporation. Robcns's clear disenchantment was such that he was 
considering offers in the private sector. There was certainly some venom in the manner by 
which Marsh wanted to get rid of Robens. Marsh considered Robens's attitude towards the 
ACP indicated the cooling of his passion for industrial change in coal; far from being the 
-great helmsman of modernisation it seemed he had not got the stomach for Labour's 
prescriptions. Roben had to go, leaving behind only true believers to carry forward the 
scheme. so 
The episode sheds some light on increasing divisions within the Coal Board on the 
question of further contraction. Marsh believed schisms were opening up within the Coal 
Board suggesting that Robens and his deputy, Derck Ezra, were at odds, as were several 
members of Roberts's team. Ezra, and his supporters on the Board. indicated that they were 
more amenable to the ACP as a swift elixir for the coal industry. 5' A divided Board made it 
easier for the Government to force through the ACP. Roben did not go on this occasion 
despite Wilson's agreement to Marsh's request. Why he remained is unclear from the 
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available evidence. 52 There are some strong indications nevertheless. While Marsh woul 
have liked Robcns to resign he acknowledged his part in managing a successful 
rationalisation programme. Robens's stock was riding high. He was a popular figure both 
with Labour MPs and more latterly with the NUM. Roben had initially been viewed with 
suspicion by sections of the NUM both as an industry outsider and because it was felt he 
would be manipulated by a Tory government. However, he had quickly gained respect 
from the NUM leadership and the 'rank-and-file' for his candour and integrity, but, most of 
all, for his readiness to speak out on behalf of the industry. The NUMLA leadership had 
been among the earliest to warm to Robcns. Elsewhere within the NUM there were 
continuing reservations particularly in the more left-wing dominated areas such as South 
Wales. However, reservations that did persist were more frequently expressed over his 
style of leadership. He was the one figure whom the Government needed to keep the NUM 
'on board' for what might be a rough few years as the ACP proceeded. 53 
Robens tendered his resignation in August 1967 after the results of the public enquiry into 
Aberfan. 54 Marsh rejected his resignation after much support was offered from Labour 
MPs and the NUM. His offer of resignation was widely regarded as an act of 'ritual self- 
immolation without logic and without benefit to anyone". " Evidence to-date suggests the 
first indications Robens was contemplating leaving came over Aberfan. However, the 
Government was plotting to get rid of him over his attitude to the ACP months before 
those tragic events on a Welsh hillside. Roben became for Labour a 'lightning rod' to 
oversee further contraction: to absorb criticism; to soothe and placate; to cajole and 
persuade; even to take the blame if things did go wrong. Though he became loathed over 
his attitude on the ACP the Labour Government came to realise that, at least pro tem, he 
remained its best hope as the chair of the Coal Board for a successful 'transition'. Although 
Roben remained as Coal Board chairman until after the fall of the Wilson Government, 
during which he oversaw further contraction, his relationship with the Government was 
never easy. Dealings with Ministers of Power, with the exception of Harold Lever, were 
especially difficult. Roben became increasingly dissonant and vexed over Government 
policy on fuel and pit closures. His introspection over coal contraction became more 
intense as the social consequences became more apparent. He was clearly keen to finish his 
'stint', but reluctantly stayed in order to act as a counterweight to Government policy. 56 
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Just how much the relationship between the Government and the NCB had altered through 
the tensions created by the ACP is evidenced by the events of 1967. Roberts's caution had 
been justified. With the NUM questioning the Government over further contraction and 
with sections of the union in open revolt it was clear that it had become a serious challenge 
to the Wilson Government. With Labour loyalists of the calibre of Joe Gormley talking 
about his fears that the policy might precipitate a re-alignment on the left of British 
politics, there were plenty of potential worries for Labour. " By 1967, some of Robens's 
prognostications were coming true. During 1966, the Government re-affirmed its 
commitment to the ACP in the face of evidence from the Coal Board that the pace of 
contraction was so rapid it was producing 'manpower dislocation'. The Government 
persisted in its belief that "special attention to areas of high redundancy" would see the 
programme through without serious problems. 38 Moreover, the Selsdon Conference in 
1967 endorsed further coal industry contraction as a policy objective. However. by 1967 
the Prime Minister conceded that closures were likely to produce difficulties for the 
Government during the winter of 1967-68. Wilson was anxious about forecasts for 
unemployment which, he felt, might be worsened by the rapid contraction of coal. In 
addition, there was a mounting tide of economic and political problems for the 
Government in 1967. Wilson was anxious to avoid creating more problems for the 
Government. Consequently, in the autumn of 1967, he headed off further potential 
problems by meeting the NUM and agreeing to a deferment of pit closures in areas where 
it was thought there might be an adverse effect on unemployment. 39 The intervention was 
clearly a tactical political move. Wilson was still adamant about the efficacy of the ACP to 
the extent that he decreed the deferments should not interfere with the overall objective of 
the scheme, but only delay it slightly. The pits obtained a reprieve of up to six months. 
The Wilson intervention illustrated the way in which the relationship between the 
Government and Coal Board had changed through the tensions created by the ACP while it 
underlined the Government's eagerness to push through the ACP. For Wilson. it was a 
political manoeuvre to buy time and maintain NUM support during a difficult patch for the 
Government. Although Robens was still needed by the Government he was a Flying 
Dutchman - the mere spectral captain of the coal industry destined to travel the corridors of 
power peddling his talc of woe for the remainder of his chairmanship. Wilson's 
consultation with him over pit closure deferment was nothing more than a courtesy call. 60 
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Roben had already been banished from the policy discussions. In any case, a deceleration 
of the process was one which Robens was not expected to oppose. 
The two figures of greatest interest in this episode were Ezra and Marsh whose views on 
the ACP converged. Marsh sought counsel on deferment, not from Robens, but from his 
deputy Derek Ezra. Both Ezra and Marsh opposed the deferment. This reinforced growing 
divisions within the Coal Board. Marsh wanted to elicit the support of Ezra since both 
agreed that the problems facing the industry needed to be solved through a coup dc main 
rather than a 'gradualist' approach. They believed a deferment sent out all the wrong 
signals because it was based on `political" rather than "economic" calculations. 
Furthermore, they argued deferment should be avoided even at the expense of increasing 
unemployment, or risking increased tensions with the NUM, because it created a backlog 
of closures and gave hope to those involved in attempting to save collieries thereby risking 
derailment of the programme. 61 As Robens later noted, Wilson's intervention was intended 
to please everybody but pleased no one. 62 In spite of deferment the Government continued 
to believe further contraction was the right policy and remained confident of its ability to 
handle the economic, social and political consequences of the ACP. Wilson's intervention 
did not seriously impede the progress of the programme and in all probability made matters 
worse. Marsh continued to lead the drive for coal contraction by seeking allies in the 
industry and finding them in a divided Coal Board. 
1967-68 also saw disagreement between the Government and NUM. Wilson's deferment 
was primarily aimed at soothing the NUM, but the union was left wondering what its value 
had been. Paynter described Wilson's proposal as a mere `postponement of execution". 
However, while senior NUM officials questioned the scale and speed of the ACP and the 
Government's claims that it would bring new investment to declining coalfields through a 
policy of industrial diversification. they accepted Wilson's request to keep faith with 
Government policy. 63 Although the programme produced tensions between the 
Government and NUM these did not amount to much more than attempts to warn of 
pushing contraction too fast and scepticism over Government promises of new investment. 
At the announcement of the ACP, Fred lee had asked the NUM to accept further coal 
contraction in the "national interest". He argued that the ACP was necessary to put the coal 
industry on a sound footing to achieve Government objectives on national economic 
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planning. 64 This amounted to an unprecedented contraction of the industry to accommodate 
wider Government objectives, but there was never any serious questioning from the NUM. 
Given the ACP came on top of rationalisation which was supposed to have delivered a 
streamlined and efficient industry, the NUM's response was pallid in the extreme. It was, 
as Minkin notes, best expressed as "ritualistic anger" with no questioning of the propriety 
of the programme. 65 Rather it focused on probing the outcomes in terms of Government 
commitments on manpower absorption, transfer, and industrial diversification. 
Furthermore, the NUM rejected direct action against Government policy, preferring 
dialogue to test Government assurances on the consequences of industrial change rather 
than challenging its priorities. Thus, increasingly vocal criticism of the Government by 
senior NUM officials throughout 1966 and 1967 was exclusively concerned with the 
Government's alleged failure to deliver on its ameliorative promises, while individual pit 
closures were issues for debate only at divisional and local levels. The NUM leadership 
had accepted the terms of the debate dictated by the Government. Under the ACP the coal 
industry was destined to become an even smaller and more efficient cog in the overall 
'plan' for the economy. This consistently went unchallenged by the NUM leadership. " 
The dominant attitude toward the ACP led to tensions within the NUM. There were calls 
from the left for a more robust response to Government policy. While criticism of the 
Government was not confined to the left more general opposition tended to concern itself 
with particular outcomes of the programme such as those emanating from specific 
coalfields rather than from a fundamental challenge to the principle of the scheme 67 
Indeed, as the full impact of the scheme unfolded attacks on the Government over 
inadequate provision for economic and social dislocation increased in frequency and 
intensity. 68 Prima facie the growing strength of opposition to the Government appeared to 
be a revolt uniting 'left' and 'right' political divisions within the NUM including senior 
officials considered to be Labour loyalists. In fact, the clash with the Government was one 
limited to the consequences of the policy rather than policy itself. 
There was a temporal aspect to the questioning of the ACP. Certainly the ferocity of 
opposition to the Government over pit closures increased markedly throughout 1967-68. 
By this time the effects of the ACP were being fully felt. There were signs too of a less 
favourable economic climate generally by the late 1960s. Senior figures in the NUM 
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realised the mood in the coalfields was moving against the Government. They began to pay 
closer attention to growing signs of belligerence as they worried that matters might start to 
pass outside the control of the leadership. Paynter was keen to be seen at a big miners 
march and rally in London in November 1967 in which he shook a fist at the Government 
but failed to give a clear endorsement of industrial action over pit closures. The miners on 
the rally were less reticent. 69 These events showed the leadership was beginning to lose 
control of sections of the NUM through the increasing dissonance of many officials and 
mineworkers in a number of coalfields. Nevertheless although the NUM leadership was 
anxious about 'rank-and-file' restiveness it continued to signal compliance with the 
prescriptions of the Government on further contraction. 
By 1968 it was clear there were sharp differences within the NUM over what form 
opposition to the programme should take. While the NUM leadership was angered by the 
outcome of the ACP in decimating the industry, it remained resolute in opposing action 
against the Government, agreeing instead to continue to restrain the impact of- coal 
contraction. 70 Not only was rejection of protest against Government policy based on a 
belief that it was futile or that it might be counterproductive to dialogue, there was also 
considerable support for the Government's policy of industrial diversification in declining 
coalfields. This was contrasted with Tory policy. On the other hand, continuing loyalty to 
Labour was in sharp contrast to those on the left who felt the Rubicon had been crossed. 
For them it was time for action. Kane of Yorkshire, supported by members of the Scottish 
Area, demanded direct action against the Government over its fuel and closure policy. A 
significant development from this growing schism was the way in which sections of the 
NUM turned their attacks directly onto both Marsh and Lord Robens who it was felt were 
blaming each other. Roberts was fulfilling the role assigned to him by the Government of 
absorbing criticism. In any event it was far too late for the Government to alter a 
programme that was intended to operate swiftly. By the late 1960s NUM efforts continued 
to focus exclusively on dealing with the outcomes of Government policy. On the other 
hand, the increasingly 'militant' coalfields such as Yorkshire were articulating a more 
fundamental critique of coal policy over a wide range of issues in which the ACP was seen 
as yet another sell-out by the NUN leadership? ' 
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By the end of the 1960s the programme was reaching a conclusion with a mounting toll of 
pit closures many of which were not included in the original 1965 schedule, such were the 
competitive pressures on the industry coupled with the effect of the new departure on fuel. 
The scheme was substantially completed by the time Labour left office. The ACP was 
highly successful in achieving the rapid run-down of the industry. The net manpower 
wastage rate was up by a third during the 1965-1971 period compared with 1959-1965. 
Similarly, the annual rate of colliery closures rose by nearly 50 per cent during 1965-1971 
compared with the earlier period of rationalisation. The first phase of the ACP saw the 
most intensive rate of run-down during the post-war period. Between 1965 and 1968 
collieries were closing at an annual rate of 58 per year against 39 for the 1959-1965 period, 
and 19 for the 1968 to 1971 period. The manpower run-down figures reflected a similar 
pattern. 72 
The most significant trend to emerge from the ACP was a fall in 'wastage' rates for men 
leaving the industry or transferring within it. The increasing lack of alternative sources of 
employment outside the pits, together with the reduction in transfer possibilities. was a 
major source of concern from the mid-1960s. The number of men leaving the industry and 
finding jobs in other employment sectors fell from an annual average rate of rate of 13 per 
cent of the workforce for the period 1959-1965 to 8 per cent for the period 1965-1971. 
Similarly, the number of men transferring within the industry fell from an annual average 
of 16 per cent of the workforce to 8 per cent during the same respective periods. These 
rates peaked around the time of major closure announcements in 1959-60 and 1965-66 as 
men joined the rush to leave the coal industry or transfer within it. Manpower 'wastage' to 
other employment sectors had played havoc with the Coal Board's plans during the 1959- 
1965 period but it constituted an important 'safety valve' against the build-up of 
unemployment. Likewise, social hardship was minimised through transfers of mineworkers 
within the coal industry to ease manpower dislocation resulting from rationalisation. The 
ACP saw a substantial reduction in the opportunity for both these possibilities 73 
The most important issue arising from the ACP was the reaction of the Coal Board and the 
NUM. Lord Robens recognised what the programme was about. His criticism incurred the 
ire of Government. He wrote in his memoirs that his opposition to the Government got him 
"two public warnings' . 74 To take this wrestling analogy further. it nearly got him a lifetime 
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ban. Allen has correctly identified Robens as one of the key figures in the process of 
industrial change in the coal industry, characterising this role as one of "diligently" 
executing Government policy whilst simultaneously acting as an "aggressive critic closer 
to the interests of the miners than their officials". 75 An examination of the historical record 
reveals that Robens was a significant critic of Government policy, at odds with Ministers 
and members of his own team, to the extent that there was an attempt to engineer his 
removal. Contrary to Allen's assertions, Robens was a most reluctant devotee of the ACP 
under Labour. In fact, his opposition should be seen in contrast to the character of 
opposition waged by the NUM leadership. It challenged the Government only on the 
specific outcomes of the scheme, not on its priorities, and it only did so as `rank-and-file' 
anger increased over the scale of contraction during the late 1960s. 
Why was there not more vigorous opposition to the ACP from the NUM leadership? There 
was, of course, considerable loyalty to a Labour Party returned to government after years 
out of office and initially operating with a slim parliamentary majority. Moreover, the main 
priority for the NUM was to obtain the best deal for coal within the new departures on fuel. 
This meant `fighting' for coal within the new arrangements and ensuring that government 
pledges on economic and social amelioration were honoured. The NUM accepted that the 
Mining Group of MPs at Westminster was not as influential with this Labour Government 
as it had been in the past. Finally, a substantial majority within the NUM were committed 
to Labour's prescriptions for change in the context of its plans for the modernity. In this 
scenario, coal industry contraction was seen as part of an overall plan to rationalise and 
modernise the British economy. It was accepted that the coal industry should be reduced in 
size to produce a smaller, more efficient and modernised industry with a policy of 
industrial diversification to bring new economic opportunities to coalfields experiencing 
contraction. During the early 1960's Alex Moffat, the Communist leader of the Scottish 
miners, argued he would prefer to have a pillar of coal with a new factory on top giving 
employment and hope to workers in pit areas than have a pillar of coal which miners could 
not work profitably. 76 In essence, Moffat defined the touchstone of belief in the need for 
industrial change in coal. This belief was shared across the ideological divide within the 
NUM including Joe Gormley, the Lancashire miners leader. 77 
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These were views which did not have to wait for Labour's ACP, they had been inherent in 
the NUM's acceptance of industrial change since vesting date. The NUM had, after all, 
been a willing participant in the `grand coalition' for modernisation. Furthermore, Labour 
in opposition had championed the notion of economic rejuvenation for declining coalfields 
underpinned by a framework of industrial and regional policies supported by economic 
planning. The NUM believed coal would form an integral part of Labour's plans for 
modernity. It was argued that this was better overseen by a Labour Government committed 
to effective economic and social planning than rely on the free market policies of the 
Tories. The NUM had embraced Labour's agenda of modernity. These scenarios had 
common acceptance within the NUM in varying degrees but there was a prevailing belief 
that it was Labour who should be trusted to carry forward the mantle of change. This was 
further reinforced through the traditional bonds of allegiance between the NUM and 
Labour. 
The NUM's -attitude made the task of implementing the ACP much easier. The Labour 
Government knew it would only be challenged by the NUM on the consequences of the 
programme, not on its conception. In any event, the success of the programme was 
predicated on the confident expectation that the Government could adequately manage the 
outcomes of the ACP and assuage any opposition to it. The only source of anxiety for 
Labour was the growing influence of the left within the NUM in certain coalfields 
developing in conjunction with increasing `rank-and-file' discontent as the programme 
progressed. However, by the time opposition from this quarter had become a significant 
threat the speed of the ACP had ensured its successful implementation was guaranteed in 
the absence of more sustained and widespread opposition from within the NUM. 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The transformation of the British coal industry between 1945 and 1972 involved a process 
of industrial change through modernisation and rationalisation. As this chapter has shown, 
modernisation was deferred for many years. It was the advent of public ownership which 
made modernisation possible during the post-war period but the intervention of other 
priorities impeded progress. The collapse in coal consumption from the late 1950s 
137 
provided the crucial impetus for change manifested in the Revised Plan for Coal in 1959. 
This chapter has highlighted the broad level of industrial and political agreement for 
industrial change in coal. There were tensions within the coalition of interests. One of the 
chief sources of tension was, between government and the Coal Board. However, such 
tensions rarely arose over fundamental disagreements about the need for industrial change, 
only over its scale and rapidity. 
Matters came to a head with the return of a Labour government in 1964. This marked a 
major shift in attitudes toward industrial change with the ACP emerging from Labour's 
new fuel policy. Only then did consensus about the priorities for industrial change begin to 
fragment. Significantly, opposition to the ACP was led from within the Coal Board by 
Lord Robens who argued the ACP was in a different category from previous rationalisation 
programmes because it reflected Labour's wider strategy for economic modernisation and 
planning. As Roberts acerbically noted, this was a government "in mortal danger of 
planning themselves out of office".? 8 Robens's attitude was all the more significant 
because he had a first class curriculum vitae as a `moderniser' par excellence. Before he 
became Coal Board chairman, as a senior Labour MP, he had told Lancashire cotton and 
coal workers not to fear the future, but to embrace it. Speaking as a Lancastrian himself he 
told them "bur" industrial tradition belonged to the past: "be ready to pioneer new 
industries and be ready to move out of the old and dying industries into new ones" 79 It was 
of course Labour who held the key to successful `transition' as guardians of its `natural' 
working class `constituency'. Yet, after having overseen the modernisation of the coal 
industry, Robens, became of one Labour's fiercest critics as it embarked upon its agenda 
for further change. He refused to accept that the ACP should constitute an end in itself. 
This was in contrast to the position adopted by the NUM. Leading officials had been 
amongst the most enthusiastic supporters of industrial change in coal. Under the ACP they 
too began to question further contraction. However, as this chapter has revealed, the NUM 
only challenged the Government on the outcomes of the programme. This questioning 
increased as `rank-and-file' dissent intensified over the scale of pit closures. It never 
amounted to a challenge over the concept of further contraction because a majority of the 
NUM leadership either agreed with, or acquiesced in, Labour's prescriptions for change. 80 
Opposition to industrial change which gathered momentum on the left of the NUM and 
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amongst the `rank-and-file' during the late 1960s was based around a range of issues which 
developed into a more profound critique of existing NUM leadership. For the most part, 
transformation of the coal industry during the post-war period was determined by 
imperatives for change enjoying support amongst a broad coalition of interests. The agenda 
for change established by the Labour Party was supported by the NUM. This pedigree and 
endorsement was crucial in ensuring its success. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INDUSTRIAL CHANGE IN THE LANCASHIRE COALFIELD: 
MODERNISATION, RATIONALISATION AND 
THE ACCELERATED COLLIERY CLOSURE PROGRAMME 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will argue that industrial change in Lancashire was accompanied by a high 
degree of consensus from both the NCBNWD and the NUMLA leadership, including 
acceptance of the need for colliery closures. This will be demonstrated through an 
examination of NUMLA attitudes on key aspects of industrial change and an analysis of 
the events surrounding four specific closures. This will show that the co-operation of the 
NUMLA leadership extended to include participation in decisions affecting closures and in 
arrangements for closure in order to underpin its support for modernisation. Likewise, it 
will be demonstrated that NUMLA leadership endorsement of the modernisation of coal 
can be measured by its reluctance to confront the NCBNWD over colliery closures and 
their outcomes. Furthermore, this chapter will advance the notion that it was how the 
NUMLA leadership sought to define industrial change in coal which influenced its 
overriding support for modernisation both through its attitude towards new colliery 
developments and re-constructions and the modernisation of work processes. Finally, 
through an assessment of the circumstances of colliery closures it will be argued that 
`rank-and-file' opposition to industrial change was fragmented and weak ' during the late 
1950s and early 1960s. 
4.2 THE PLAN FOR COAL: MODERNISATION AND RATIONALISATION 
If one coalfield exemplified a second tier coalfield in the Reid Report and the 1950 Plan 
for Coal it was Lancashire. From its position as one of Britain's premier coalfields during 
the nineteenth century it had been in decline for most of the twentieth century. By the 
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outbreak of the Second World War the coalfield had declined since its zenith during the 
1900s on all indices. No other major British coalfield had undergone a "comparable 
decline". ' Physically, the Lancashire coalfield had been well worked with many parts 
exhausted. Geological and mining problems were accumulating in profusion. Deep and 
costly mining operations combined with technically backward and under-capitalised pits. 
The small size of colliery companies and fragmented pattern of ownership meant that any 
hope of improvement remained a distant prospect. 2 The new larger colliery undertakings 
created by compulsory re-organisation of the industry after 1930 had only just begun to 
address the appalling state of the industry. The inter-war period had been the rock upon 
which any lingering hopes for the coalfield had been irrevocably smashed. Economic 
depression combined with a coal industry in rapid decline. Between 1915 and 1939 291 
collieries were closed leaving just over 100 by the Second World War with the loss of 
30,000 mining jobs. 3 The economic and social malaise of this period had produced a 
permanent surplus of 15,000 unemployed miners with most in the enervated central 
districts of South Lancashire. 
The coalfield fitted uncomfortably into the framework envisaged for the post-war coal 
industry. Both Reid and the 1950 Plan for Coal had concluded it would maintain a steady 
decline. By 1945 it was estimated that only 32 of the 104 collieries in the North-West 
region would remain by 1975 with employment down from nearly 50,000 to 18,000 during 
the same period. It was felt that the only future for the industry in Lancashire was to 
concentrate output on a few viable areas of the coalfield where economically accessible 
coal reserves remained. This meant only a restricted number of new collieries and re- 
constructed pits, which were able to undergo technical re-organisation, would remain with 
the rest facing an uncertain futures The only sources of optimism was the coalfield's 
proximity to one of the largest markets in Britain with rail access restricted from the 
expanding South Yorkshire and East Midlands coalfields. In addition, certain areas of the 
coalfield had the potential for expansion. 6 The future of the industry in Lancashire was in 
the south western area where relatively 'undisturbed reserves of coal existed. Private 
owners had pinned their hopes on expansion here as the coalfield had been gradually 
`moving' in a south westerly direction. 7 In addition, there was some potential to the west 
and north-west of the Manchester conurbation and in North East Lancashire. By contrast, 
the older more heavily worked central district of south Lancashire had little future. 8 
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During the immediate post-war period with high demand for coal and continuing worries 
over coal shortages pits that might otherwise have closed remained open. 9 Furthermore, 
the growing requirements of the power industry provided a lifeline. 10 However, the 
collapse in coal consumption from the late 1950s brought new problems for the Lancashire 
industry exacerbated by the structural decline and technological change experienced by its 
traditional customers. Similarly, power sales suffered from the encroachment of alternative 
fuels and the plethora of older, low capacity coal-fired power stations in the region which 
the electricity generators wanted to de-commission. " Lancashire's reliance on the sale of 
good quality coal for town gas production, domestic and industrial customers became a 
liability because what future there was for the British coal industry lay elsewhere in poorer 
quality coal for electricity generation. 
If industrial change in coal was to be a success it had to succeed in coalfields like 
Lancashire given the multifarious complexity of its problems. The coalfield could be seen 
as a model for industrial change during this period. The scale of its problems required the 
development of two new collieries and `major' colliery re-constructions with the 
remainder undergoing either `minor' re-construction or facing closure. The two new 
collieries were at Agecroft in the Manchester district and Parkside in the St. Helens 
district. 12 In addition there were thirteen major re-constructions. 13 By the mid-1960s it was 
expected that the new pits, together with the major re-constructions would supply the bulk 
of output with the remainder coming from the `minor' re-constructions. 14 It was clear at the 
outset that the two new pits would be the jewels in the crown of modernisation in 
Lancashire. Equally, hopes were high for the re-constructed `showpiece' collieries at Bold, 
Bradford, and Mosley Common where the majority of investment for re-construction was 
allocated. '5 Both the divisional board and the NUMLA were excited by these projects 
because it gave hope to a dying coalfield. 16 It was anticipated that the coal reserves at the 
new pits would sustain a viable industry in Lancashire until at least the end of the century. 
17 Indeed, Parkside was seen as one of the most promising new projects in the whole of the 
NCB's modernisation scheme. 18 The new pits and major re-constructions were expected to 
become `big hitters' in terms of production into which both capital and manpower were to 
be concentrated to ensure their success. 19 The priorities of industrial change in coal in 
Lancashire were completely sub-ordinated to the need to see these projects come to 
fruition. Modernisation meant that these collieries would replace many `short life' pits 2° 
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The large investment in the new pits was a measure of the importance the Coal Board 
attached to them. This was substantially increased without question when progress began 
to stall. 21 
An indication of how these projects monopolised the divisional board's priorities was 
provided by the manpower question. `Manning-up' these pits meant transferring trained 
manpower from `short life' pits. The importance the divisional board attached to the 
development of Parkside can be seen through the size of the manpower `pool' `allocated' 
for transfer to Parkside involving eighteen collieries covering much of south-west 
Lancashire. This was three times Parkside's expected `manned-up' workforce. 22 Similarly, 
at Agecroft, four collieries in the Manchester district were earmarked as manpower 
`reservoirs' scheduled to close to ensure that Agecroft had an excess of trained workers 
available. 23 Agecroft's actual workforce peaked well short of the 2,000 anticipated by the 
time it went into full production. 24 In fact, the conception of the new pits was based on low 
manpower requirements because they were to become capital-intensive pits sustaining high 
production targets. The planning for these projects indicated how anxious the board was to 
obtain the required level of trained manpower to prevent derailment of its modernisation 
plans. Consequently, well before the collapse in coal consumption increased the tempo of 
industrial change the divisional board had decided where closures might occur. The board 
stressed to the NUMLA the necessity of maintaining the pace of modernisation. For the 
NUMLA this meant having to accept pit closures to secure the future of the industry in 
Lancashire. Moreover, the attractions of better remuneration and conditions in the 
modernised collieries were further incentives to facilitate NUMLA co-operation 
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. 5 
There were many tasty morsels to dangle in front of the NUMLA to make looming pit 
closures more palatable. Likewise, modernisation allowed the divisional board to argue 
that rationalisation was not about `displacing' miners but about the renewal of the industry. 
The divisional board offered the NUMLA the prospect that many `displaced' miners would 
have a guaranteed future in one of the modernised pits. These were important arguments in 
winning NUMLA support for industrial change. Not that the NUMLA leadership needed 
much persuasion. It was convinced of the efficacy of modernisation in Lancashire, indeed 
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modernisation during the late 1950s and early 1960s helped maintain what was already an 
extremely cordial relationship between the NUMLA and the NCBNWD. The divisional 
chairman, Colonel Bolton, and the NUMLA secretary, Edwin Hall, enjoyed a working 
partnership. 26 There were differences over modernisation. Hall was considered by the 
divisional board to be less passionate about the pace of technological change particularly 
over the introduction of power loading. As a result, Hall was more ambivalent on questions 
of pit level concentration than the board would have wished. This position should be seen 
in contrast to Hall's successor Joe Gormley who saw modernisation as a device to force 
concessions from the NCB through improved terms and conditions for those remaining in 
the industry. This position helped consolidate Gormley's power base within the 
NUMLA. 27 Nevertheless industrial change proceeded in a benign atmosphere cosseted by a 
high degree of mutual understanding between leading officials of the NCBNWD and the 
NUMLA including the issue of closures. The relationship between Bolton, and Hall's 
respective successors, Anderton and Gormley, was not as close. Both were ambitious and 
successful men within the coal industry. They had differences over specific aspects of 
industrial change while Anderton's personal manner was more abrasive than the avuncular 
Bolton. However, throughout Anderton's chairmanship there was continuance of shared 
commitment to modernisation of the industry. In this, Anderton, through his experience 
and calling established himself as a major influence on modernisation. 28 
The level of support the NUMLA leadership gave to modernisation was highlighted by the 
position it adopted on some aspects of industrial change. One was its attitude towards 
localised adult `green labour' recruitment embargoes. In 1958, in order to facilitate pit 
closures, the divisional board agreed to impose recruitment bans in areas of the coalfield 
where pits were to close. In 1960, there was a recruitment crisis because pit closures were 
deterring new entrants. This crisis was most acute in the Manchester district which enjoyed 
better alternative employment prospects. Bradford colliery in east Manchester was 
suffering from acute recruitment problems. The colliery became the catalyst for the 
divisional board to argue successfully for the lifting of local recruitment embargoes across 
the coalfield. 9 It signalled the NUMLA's willingness to support the Board's endeavours to 
maintain the pace of modernisation while relegating concerns over pit closures. Leading 
figures in the NUMLA, such as Joe Gormley, were prominent in offering a high degree of 
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support over the Board's manpower requirements throughout the 1960s while failing to 
question pit closures. 30 
The divisional board appreciated the co-operation of the NUMLA in ensuring that the 
direction and pace of industrial change was maintained. 31 While there was a desire to 
minimise unemployment the board's primary objective was smooth manpower transfers 
from closures and concentrations to the new projects to maintain the modernisation drive. 
This called for some finely balanced judgements. 32 Timing was of the essence, as was 
reducing the possibility for confrontation over closures. This was achieved by giving the 
unions priority in the closure consultation process. In order to reduce the opportunity for 
confrontation over individual pit closures, announcements were made of tranches of 
closures. Similarly, the Coal Board made use of phased closures involving. rigorous 
concentration programmes leading to final closure or offered short-and longer-term 
reprieves. This helped introduce flexibility to the Board's strategy by facilitating 
manpower transfer synchronisation as well as the political expediency it offered in 
maintaining relations with the unions. 33 
The divisional board was mindful of other factors relevant to the closure process. One 
important aspect was the spatial perspective. This influenced the pattern of industrial 
change in Lancashire. Both sides of the industry accepted that the older heavily worked 
central district of the South Lancashire coalfield would bear the brunt of closures. 
Similarly, it was acknowledged that the Manchester district was to be the "test-bed" of 
modernisation with many closures facilitating renewal of an area containing major 
modernisation projects 34 In the two remaining districts of North-East Lancashire and 
St. Helens the board felt more constrained. North-East Lancashire was politically sensitive 
due to the special problems of the area. The divisional board was anxious not add to the 
unemployment problems of the sub-region because of the severe decline of textiles. The 
board was willing to close pits in this area but with more brakes on closures than elsewhere 
in the coalfield. 35 The board declared the St. Helens district virtually `off limits' to closures 
because it was the only expanding area of the coalfield. 36 Closures here might have had 
negative consequences for modernisation because it would have questioned the future of 
the coalfield thus increasing `manpower drift' and running the risk of damaging relations 
with the unions. 
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The main priority of the divisional board was to proceed with modernisation to ensure the 
future of Lancashire coal. Implicit in this was a recognition that modernisation would be 
sustained through colliery closures. The NUMLA leadership co-operated because they 
were as anxious as the board to ensure the success of modernisation. 37 The NUMLA 
accepted that to deliver a modernised industry it would have to make concessions and 
sacrifices such as lifting recruitment embargoes and pit closures. The divisional board 
recognised its' had a difficult task in driving through industrial change. It required the 
fullest co-operation from the NUMLA. This realisation influenced the character and 
pattern of pit closures as the divisional board wanted to ensure it did not damage relations 
with the NUMLA. This level of agreement was underpinned by the close working 
relationship between the divisional board and the NUMLA which had developed at the 
highest level since vesting date. 
4.3 THE ACCELERATED COLLIERY CLOSURE PROGRAMME 
By the mid-1960s each side of the coal industry in Lancashire justified its support for 
modernisation by claiming that a successful transition had been achieved. The huge scale 
of colliery closures under the 1959 programme had been completed. The two new 
collieries were fully operational and `manned-up' while the re-construction of collieries 
was all but finished. Both the divisional board and the NUMLA could draw comfort from 
the success of the modernisation of the industry in Lancashire providing the basis for its 
continued existence. 38 Gormley, joined Lord Robens, when he promised a great future for 
Lancashire miners in a modernised, technologically advanced coal industry. Both sides of 
the industry believed they had come through a difficult period which had been worthwhile 
to ensure the viability of the industry in Lancashire. 39 
Optimism was reinforced by a view that the ACP in Lancashire would not result in the 
scale of contraction envisaged in other coalfields. The initial announcement saw the 
closure of nine collieries plus four reprieved under the 1959 Plan. This was seen against 
the scale of the rationalisation during the 1959-1965 period which had closed 31 collieries 
and reduced the workforce from just over 44,000 to 25,500.40 There was thus some 
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justification for mineworkers to share this optimistic outlook. However, there were salient 
factors which made the ACP more significant in Lancashire. Though the number of 
collieries initially affected by the ACP was less than the 1959-1965 period it came on the 
back of six years of intensive decline. It was the cumulative effect of large numbers of pit 
closures which formed the background to further contraction in Lancashire. Importantly, 
transfer opportunities for miners were greatly reduced under the ACP because the new 
projects were fully manned. Aside from an upsurge in the rush to leave the industry after 
the 1965 announcement, the trend of `manpower drift' was beginning to ebb creating a 
surplus of miners seeking transfers within the industry as `absorption' possibilities 
diminished 41 The closures of the late 1960s saw Lancashire miners travelling further to 
retain a job in mining, often having to make several forced moves as pits closed while 
others had to move to other divisions for the first time in greater numbers 42 To compound 
problems, modernisation introduced the more widespread practice of shift work to a 
coalfield with a tradition of single shift working which exacerbated the difficulties 
involved in travelling to work. 43 To make matters worse, a large numbers of miners had 
transferred to new pits for lower wages and on lower grades to keep a job in coal. 
Furthermore, although major unemployment was not a significant feature during the 1959- 
1965 period this worsened considerably during the late 1960s 44 There was also a less 
benign general economic climate from the late 1960s while contraction had an inordinate 
impact on unskilled, older, and `disabled' mineworkers 45 
Furthermore, colliery closures developed a particular spatial pattern within the coalfield. 
The older central parts of South Lancashire were worst affected because of high 
occupational concentrations of mineworkers; an ageing workforce; and less alternative 
employment 46 In the `Wigan coalfield' - the industry's symbolic heartland in Lancashire - 
pit closures ripped the core out of the coalfield ending hundreds of years of mining 
tradition. In this area there were 24 closures in less than twenty years, with eighteen of 
those in the ten years following the 1959 Revised Plan. 47 By the mid-1960s for those in 
Lancashire caught in the headlights of Labour's further contraction there was every reason 
to fear the future rather than embrace it. These fears were increased by Government 
assertions that the coalfield was capable of sustaining further contraction without special 
ameliorative measures. 8 
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The modernisation of the coalfield had proceeded under the writ of an iron law resting on 
the success and guaranteed future of the new pits and re-constructions. The most important 
effect of the ACP in Lancashire was the way it shook the foundations of confidence in the 
future. The divisional board and the NUMLA had consistently assured mineworkers that 
the future of the coalfield would be best guaranteed through the continued success of 
modernisation. The ACP cut deeper into coal industry capacity than envisaged in 1965 
because of the increasing success of alternative fuels aided by the Government's new fuel 
policy. Under the ACP collieries closed which were expected to have a long-term future 49 
Six of the collieries: Astley Green, Bank Hall, Bradford, Clock Face, Mosley Common and 
Thorney Bank were the new modernised re-constructed collieries to which mineworkers 
had transferred with assurances that they carried the future of the industry in Lancashire. 
Three of the aforementioned collieries: Astley Green, Bradford and Mosley Common were 
important re-developments seen as crucial to the successful modernisation of the 
Manchester district. Moreover, they were large employers. Closure in 1968 and 1970 saw 
over 5,500 jobs disappear. Against this background the ACP made the post-1965 period an 
altogether different experience for Lancashire miners than rationalisation under the 1959 
Revised Plan. This was informed by disbelief at Labour's fuel and further coal contraction 
policy. The late 1960s was one marked by the final shattering of the dream of 
modernisation. Rising tensions and the search for scapegoats accompanied the growing 
realisation that much of the effort of the post-war period had been in vain. In Lancashire, 
the dimensions of industrial change had been such that by 1972 there was only a rump of a 
coal industry to feel aggrieved, consisting of the two new collieries and seven re- 
constructed pits. These survived the 1960s to see some measure of stability return for coal 
during the 1970s. 
4.4 AN ANATOMY OF CLOSURE: FOUR COLLIERY CLOSURES IN THE 
LANCASHIRE COALFIELD 
J. MAYPOLE COLLIERY 1959: A PIT FROM THE PAST 
Maypole colliery was situated four miles south east of Wigan in the vicinity of Abram 
township. The Coal Board was committed to closing Maypole as part of the Special 
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Review of `uneconomic' collieries in 1958. However, because this was a phased closure, 
occurring during the planning for the 1959 Revised Plan, it was re-scheduled as part of that 
programme. 50 The first phase of closure in March 1959 came less than a year after the 
commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of a major pit disaster at Maypole, 51 attended by 
the great and the good of Lancashire mining society. 52 The closure therefore came at a 
particularly poignant time for a pit still etched on the folk memory. By coincidence, the 
Board had decided to close one highly symbolic representation of the coalfield's past. 
The Coal Board closed Maypole because its operating results had been consistently poor 
since vesting date. The colliery's performance had been scrutinised as one of a number of 
under performing collieries in the division in the light of declining demand for coal. The 
divisional board offered a bleak prognosis for Maypole including low productivity and 
output, poor marketability and high production costs. 53 These factors were not unusual in 
the coalfield. The decisive factor for Maypole was its size and potential. It was a big pit in 
terms of output and manpower - the largest nationally within the `Special Review' - but, an 
old colliery situated within an exhausted part of the coalfield. Its overall contribution to 
divisional production and large coal reserves had ensured it had remained open since 
vesting date because of high demand for coal. But, in the context of declining demand its 
prospects were dim as the Coal Board argued that its reserves were not `economically' 
exploitable. It had become a loss leader while its size made it an attractive proposition for 
closure because it allowed costs to be cut at a stroke. 54 For the Board, Maypole had ceased 
to be a mining proposition. 55 In the circumstances of the dire position of the industry 
during the late 1950s Maypole's position had become untenable. 
The Coal Board had some reservations about closing Maypole, chiefly the vexatious issue 
of manpower. There was no question of wholesale redundancies which would have been 
politically unacceptable to the Board and the NUMLA. 56 Moreover, the Board needed to 
retain trained mineworkers to facilitate its modernisation plans elsewhere in the coalfield. 
They would have liked the majority of the trained mineworkers at Maypole to transfer to 
the new projects. However, Parkside - the preferred receiving pit - was still under 
construction and not yet ready to take a full complement of miners. The Board was 
therefore faced with a manpower Diaspora throughout re-constructed pits in the Wigan and 
St. Helens districts. The other option was for a transfer across the coalfield to Agecroft in 
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the Manchester district which would soon require a manpower build-up. 57 However, these 
potential transfers were problematic for the Board in terms of synchronising 
`displacement' and transfer. Traditionally, although there was a high degree of labour 
mobility within the coalfield, mineworkers from the central districts tended to travel within 
the Wigan district or to the adjacent expanding St. Helens district. On the other hand, 
latitudinal movement in both directions across the coalfield to the Manchester district 
created special problems because of impediments caused by distance, poor transport links 
and the costs and time involved particularly for those on shift work. 58 Furthermore, intra- 
coalfield cultural traditions including choice of residential location further conspired 
against latitudinal mobility. This invisible fracture running north-to-south through the 
middle of the South Lancashire coalfield created a dilemma for the Board. For this reason 
they were anxious not only to obtain the maximum co-operation of the NUMLA but also to 
acquire its active participation in ensuring the successful closure of Maypole in which 
manpower was effectively and smoothly transferred. 
Colonel Bolton met informally with Hall ahead of the formal negotiations for the closure 
of Maypole. He found Hall appreciative of the difficulties the divisional board was 
facing. 59 Hall accepted that Maypole would close and the men re-deployed. Bolton noted 
that "with Edwin Hall's co-operative understanding of the position and really sound plan 
for the re-deployment of the men, I feel sure that we will be able to see through the closure 
of Maypole". 60 Thus, Hall had effectively conceded closure before both sides of the 
industry entered into formal negotiations during December 1958. Hall's informal 
acceptance pre-dated negotiations at the national level in which the NUM agreed to co- 
operate with colliery closures, but, rejected the notion of closure `in principle'. 
Consequently, while the national position on closures eventually limited Hall's room for 
manoeuvre there is no question of him having been constrained prior to national talks. 
When formal negotiations did take place between the NUMLA and the divisional board on 
Maypole Hall's negotiating strategy reflected the national position. There was a desire to 
co-operate with the board, but the NUMLA asserted it was unable to approve the closure of 
Maypole `in principle' in order to solve the industry's problems. It felt the NCB could have 
done more in other areas of operations to reduce costs. The NUMLA put a number of 
alternative scenarios to the divisional board which were rejected. Despite the position 
adopted by the NUMLA it had all but surrendered Maypole because it accepted closure 
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based on guarantees offered by the divisional board. These guarantees included a 
continuation of the recruitment embargo with preference given to displaced Maypole 
miners to transfer to other pits in the coalfield and a commitment to work with the 
NUMLA to ensure transferees suffered no loss of earnings or reduction of grade. The 
NUMLA made a great claim that it had wrung a concession from the divisional board to 
phase-in closure throughout 1959. Yet, this was hardly significant because it had already 
been agreed at the national level as a way of easing the closures under the Special Review. 
Moreover, it accorded with the divisional board's requirement to ensure a planned transfer 
of mineworkers. 61 
The NUMLA's strategy was one of adopting the pretence of a principled position while 
effectively surrendering closure by agreeing to co-operate in exchange for substantive 
guarantees from the divisional board to make closure more acceptable. Hall's position 
prior to, and during, negotiations amounted to a NUMLA de facto acceptance of closure. 
The somewhat bizarre behaviour of leading officials after the event lends credence to this 
view. For example, Hammond, who had actively participated in negotiations, clung to the 
belief that the NUMLA had not conceded closure. Hammond corrected the Maypole 
delegate for suggesting that because they had agreed to co-operate in closure they had by 
implication surrendered the "principle of closure". 62 There were reasons for Hammond's 
prickly attitude. Firstly, in spite of this exercise in semantics, the NUMLA leadership knew 
that playing with words would not avoid the conclusion that the colliery would be closing 
because of its acquiescence. Secondly, it knew that by surrendering Maypole they had 
opened the floodgates for wholesale pit closures in Lancashire. During the negotiations 
over Maypole it became apparent what the scale of closures might be under the 1959 Plan. 
Indeed, Hammond, had cast himself in the role of a Cassandra. He indicated to the 
divisional board that if collieries such as Maypole were to close then it put many more in 
jeopardy. However, Hammond did not press the board over the rationale of closures, rather 
he moved the debate to one about the manner and outcome of closures - an entirely 
different strategy accompanied by an entirely different set of priorities. 63 
The position adopted by the NUMLA in response to the reaction to closure is further 
evidence of its retreat from an engagement with the divisional board over Maypole. The 
local council at Abram demanded a mass protest involving the local community, 
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mineworkers, and the unions. Labour dominated the authority with a strong and traditional 
representation by councillors with mining connections. 64 Abram Council wanted to form a 
"defence committee" against closure in the same way as a number of local authorities in 
other coalfields. 65 There was a desire to save `their' pit. The NUMLA was horrified at this 
prospect. Hall rejected the idea point-blank. He wanted the future of Maypole to be 
decided by mining `professionals' in which closure would be determined by Hall and 
Bolton head-to-head in the proverbial smoke-filled room. Hall felt that talk of "mass 
protests" was dangerous. 66 The NCBNWD echoed this view believing that pit closures 
brought out "interested amateurs" from the community. 67 Other leading officials rejected 
`outside' involvement in closure. Hammond, in particular, rejected direct action. He 
unequivocally supported Hall by asserting "we cannot barricade a pit off if the Board says 
it is going to close, but we will have to find all means at our disposal to change the Board's 
policy. The Union will have to decide the means" 68 With a rejection from the NUMLA, 
Abram Council appealed to the Labour MP for Ince, Tom Brown, only to see its overtures 
rejected. Brown, a former miner and leading NUMLA official, supported the line that 
closure should be a matter between unions and management. 69 
Abram Council made a similar plea to Alan Fitch, the new Labour MP for neighbouring 
Wigan, to save Maypole. Fitch, another ex-Lancashire miner, believed pit closure should 
be decided within the industry. Fitch maintained a fundamental belief in the ability of the 
Coal Board to plan for modernisation. He, argued that the problems of the industry, in 
which Maypole was a regrettable victim, were not the fault of the NCB but stemmed from 
Tory fuel policy. He told miners in Wigan district that the solution lay with the Coal Board 
working in conjunction with a Labour government committed to the planned development 
of the fuel industries. Fitch left pitmen in the Wigan area in no doubt what this perspective 
meant. He told them not think with the "mentality of a Luddite" because change would 
come, but it would be properly managed by a Labour government. In admitting Wigan 
district was a `dying area' for mining he argued that the future lay in having confidence in 
the NCB's ability to see through industrial change and in embracing new industrial growth 
which would mushroom under the planned economic and social policies of a Labour 
government. Finally, Fitch asked Wigan miners to be thankful that pit closures were taking 
place in such a benign regime rather than under private capital. 70 Fitch's intervention was 
influential in affecting outcomes on closures in the Wigan district generally and at 
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Maypole in particular. Miners believed that although they faced a fait accompli over 
closures they were offered some hope for the future with Labour. Thus, as far as Maypole 
was concerned there was no prospect that Fitch might have taken action to save the 
colliery. 
The other hope for Maypole lay within the NUMLA. The debate over closure indicated 
that NUMLA delegates were divided over what action they should take. The character of 
the debate demonstrated the extent to which the NUMLA was prepared to go to save the 
pit. It also highlighted the position taken by leading NUMLA officials on industrial 
change. They had accepted the closure of Maypole and by inference many more pits. The 
only remaining issue was how to handle the outcome of closures. A minority of delegates 
led by the `militant' colliery at Sandhole called for a firm stand against pit closures on the 
basis that if they did nothing it would be a clear signal to the divisional board of 
NUMLA's cart blanche acceptance of closures. In calling for the mobilisation of the entire 
labour movement against Tory inspired pit closures, Sandhole believed that closures would 
end with the return of a Labour Government with a more socialistic commitment to the 
coal industry. 7' 
The call to arms was vigorously rejected by leading NUMLA officials such as Joe 
Gormley who successfully argued that industrial action would weaken the NUMLA's case 
and risked jeopardising the transfer of miners from Maypole to other collieries. According 
to Gormley co-operation rather than confrontation was required in which miners should 
concentrate on making the coal industry competitive and efficient against its competitors. 
This amounted to an unequivocal endorsement of industrial change. It was a view accepted 
by a majority of the Lancashire executive and delegates. Hammond took a less supportive 
view of industrial change, only in as much as he felt that the NCB could have taken 
measures to avoid closing pits like Maypole such as reducing open-cast operations. 
Nevertheless by endorsing Gormley's call for co-operation, Hammond showed that he 
agreed with the tenets of industrial change. In concluding the debate within the NUMLA, 
Hall felt that the majority against taking industrial action was a boost for the union with a 
General Election looming. He believed it was necessary to support the return of a Labour 
Government with a fuel policy to save the coal industry. The NUMLA continued to reject 
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the closure of Maypole "in principle" but pledged to co-operate with the divisional board 
in effecting closure to ensure proper transfer of miners. 72 
With the union resigned to de facto closure there was one last hope for Maypole. This lay 
with the colliery's branch committee. Again, there was no possibility of saving the colliery 
from this quarter. The key figure at the colliery was the NUM branch secretary, Frank 
Pelly. He followed the NUMLA line by denying that it had surrendered the `principle' of 
closure but admitted they faced a fait accompli in which Maypole would close. 73 There 
was an added element to the closure. Pelly was the leading figure on the Wigan panel 
having periodically represented it on the Lancashire executive since 1950. Pelly was 
essentially a union man first and foremost, though he was also a leading Labour Party 
loyalist and moderate. He became Alan Fitch's champion in ensuring Wigan miners 
supported Fitch's selection leading to his successful nomination by Wigan Trades Council 
and Labour Party for the parliamentary seat. Pelly's `delivery' of the Wigan miners was 
crucial to Fitch's success. Fitch saw the Wigan miners as a vital weapon in his election war 
chest. 74 Thereafter, the support of the miners became an essential element in developing 
Fitch's fiefdom in Wigan. Fitch was the NUMLA's choice as a sponsored MP. He had 
been a nominee to whom Hall had given his full support. Fitch heaped praise on both Hall 
and Pelly because they had both been instrumental in securing his selection. 'S On the 
question of coal industry modernisation there was complete accord between Fitch and 
Pelly. Pelly was a close confidant of Hall and later became one of Gormley's principal 
lieutenants. He was very much in the same mould as Hall. Frank King, later to become 
NUMNWA president, described Pelly as a "well respected and well established union man 
of the old order". 76 Pelly was a clearly a well-regarded official in whom the NUMLA 
leadership and Labour had complete confidence. As the NCBNWD wryly observed, the 
level of resistance expected to closure was ordinarily a function of the extent to which 
branch union officials were able to retain personal influence, privilege and power. 77 It is 
not without- coincidence that Pelly later obtained the high profile position of full-time 
branch secretary at the new Parkside colliery after Maypole branch was dissolved 78 That 
Pelly, both by practice and persuasion, was unlikely to move to save Maypole was the final 
devastating blow. The neutralisation of the branch committee through personal and 
political patronage completed the panoply of rejection for attempts to save Maypole. Many 
miners at Maypole felt isolated as they faced a climate of "betrayal and resentment". 79 For 
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the majority, a mood of grim resignation descended prefacing the headlong dash for a job 
at another colliery. 
During the phased closure it was clear that NUMLA co-operation with the divisional board 
was limitless. While the NUMLA had a duty to ensure that mineworkers were transferred 
to new collieries on the same terms, the manner of their departure from Maypole was 
indicative of the union's willingness to facilitate closure. Pelly unilaterally arranged 
transfers of men to other collieries by canvassing union colleagues at other branches -a 
practice approved by the NUMLA leadership. 80 Little wonder the Coal Board praised the 
NUMLA for its "good understanding". 81 The union was so eager to co-operate with closure 
that this practice led to the transfer of men without proper negotiations or authorisation. 
Miners who had assumed they had secured a place at a receiving pit on the same terms 
found they had been re-employed on a lower grade and less money. This resulted in miners 
leaving the industry in disillusionment thus defeating the concept of a planned transfer of 
trained manpower. 82 
Another way in which the union co-operated with closure was the assistance it gave to the 
divisional board with manpower transfer in preference to securing the needs of 
mineworkers. A few fortunate transferees went to collieries in the St. Helens district, many 
of which remained open beyond the 1960s. 83 Others were less fortunate. They joined the 
ranks of the "industrial gypsies" destined to roam the Lancashire coalfield from colliery to 
colliery as receiving collieries were themselves closed. 84 The divisional board wanted a 
significant number of the `displacements' transferred across the coalfield to collieries in 
the Manchester district, including Agecroft, in order to ensure the manpower build-up there 
continued unabated. The NUMLA assisted the divisional board's attempts to transfer 
mineworkers to Agecroft to ensure that this important new project was not derailed despite 
the problems experienced by miners in making this difficult transfer. 85 
The closure of Maypole colliery was undertaken in circumstances in which the NUMLA 
had to operate within the limits established by national negotiations. Within these limits it 
could be argued that it negotiated the best possible deal for mineworkers at Maypole 
including an attractive portfolio of guarantees. On the other hand, as this assessment has 
shown, the fate of the colliery was sealed before formal negotiations took place. Moreover, 
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formal negotiations witnessed incredulity from the union by suggesting that it had not 
surrendered the `principle of closure' by agreeing to `co-operate with closure'. This 
position was made all the more risible by the NUMLA continuing to maintain this position 
as the demolition teams were gathering at Maypole. It had good reason to be defensive. 
Maypole was the first of many. The NUMLA had sent a powerful signal around the coal 
industry in Lancashire that it would not be opposing pit closures. The debate over Maypole 
within the union served to confirm this position through the rejection of industrial action to 
save the pit. The union's active participation in the management of Maypole's closure, 
together with its rejection of outside `interference', underlined its willingness to co- 
operate. The close links between the NUMLA and Labour in the coalfield were important 
in offsetting any adverse reaction from the NUM branch at Maypole. Through the 
benchmark established by Maypole the divisional board was aware that the NUMLA was 
prepared to support industrial change in Lancashire with few reservations. Significantly, as 
the case of Maypole illustrated, co-operation extended to include closure on `economic' 
grounds as well as `exhaustion'. Co-operation had a more profound aspect. The NUMLA 
and leadership and Labour in the coalfield chaffed at the Tories over fuel policy blaming 
the Government for the closure of Maypole. These attacks rarely extended to the Coal 
Board. The Board, in pursuing these policies was seen as acting for its Tory masters. There 
was, in this view, nothing wrong with modernising the industry and closing pits as long as 
this was the prerogative of a Labour government undertaking the scheme in a more 
effective and `humane' way. Consequently, the closure of pits which had expended their 
useful life was a certainty. For Maypole, and the other pits from the past, the powerful 
range of forces impelling modernisation meant that there was there was nothing else to 
expect other than extinction. 
ii. SANDHOLE COLLIERY 1962: A SACRIFICE TO MODERNISATION 
Sandhole colliery was situated between Swinton and Walkden, 5 miles south east of Bolton 
and 6 miles north west of Manchester in the Manchester district of the coalfield. Its closure 
in September 1962 came toward the end of a period in which closures under the 1959 
Revised Plan for Coal had seen nineteen of the 24 scheduled collieries close by mid-1962. 
Sandhole colliery was one of five collieries in Lancashire added to the original 1959 
Revised Plan under the `Review of the Revised Plan' undertaken during 1961-1963. The 
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four years following the 1959 Revised Plan marked one of the most intensive periods of 
colliery closure in the history of the coalfield. Sandhole's closure was much less one 
announcement than one achieved by stealth beginning in late 1960 and ending with final 
closure in 1962. 
Unlike Maypole and many of the pits closed under the 1959 Revised Plan, Sandhole was a 
controversial and contentious closure. The main source of conflict was its future as a 
mining proposition. The NUMLA including the branch committee at Sandhole contested 
closure. Sandhole represented a golden opportunity for the NUMLA to oppose a closure 
for the first time amid increasing dissatisfaction within the union over the scale and 
rapidity of closures. While arguments over closure centred on its future as a mining 
proposition the overriding reason was to release manpower to facilitate the modernisation 
programme. The fact that this became a necessity for the NUMLA as well as the divisional 
board saw the union in a spectacular retreat in its first test of resolve in confronting the 
board over closures. Sandhole was expected to have a future until at least 1974.86 Even by 
exigencies of the 1959 Plan, Sandhole was a reasonable mining prospect. 87 For the 
NUMLA and Sandhole miners there was no reason to expect the colliery would close, it 
was a receiving pit for transferees from other collieries and a `minor' re-construction 
having gained a reputation as an experimental pit for new equipment and techniques. 88 
The first indication that there might be trouble came in August 1960 when one of the mines 
(underground district) at Sandhole became the source of a dispute. Colliery management 
and the NUM branch committee clashed over a decision to begin concentration at 
Sandhole by closing the mine and re-deploying miners to other mines within the colliery. 
As branch union officials argued with management the real reason for closure became 
apparent. The move was less to do with the feasibility of the mine than about manpower. 
The Manchester district continued to suffer the most chronic recruitment and retention 
problems in the coalfield even after the ban on adult recruitment had been lifted. 89 The 
manpower situation at Sandhole was worsened as mineworkers left the industry because of 
worries over pit closures. Concentration was therefore more about effectively utilising 
available manpower than about technical feasibility. On this occasion, the branch was fully 
supported by senior NUMLA officials. They believed that the move at Sandhole was 
inappropriate and unfair. It was felt the management was forcing through a scheme of 
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concentration, with the support of the divisional board, which was unjustified on technical 
grounds. Sandhole branch committee harboured more sinister suspicions believing 
management reluctance to offer assurances on further concentration raised concerns over 
the future of the entire colliery. 90 
The divisional board was moving toward a decision during 1960-61 to close the whole 
colliery. It was beginning to incur heavy losses because of mining problems although this 
was not exceptional in the coalfield. The main reason for closure was manpower. The 
divisional board had, by early 1961, designated Sandhole as an extra manpower `reservoir' 
to `man-up' Agecroft. The board was concerned Agecroft might be unable to move into 
full production without a sufficient manpower complement thus jeopardising the whole 
modernisation scheme in Lancashire and with it the future of the coalfield. 91 Given the 
manpower crisis in Manchester district more collieries had to close to provide Agecroft 
with the necessary manpower. Existing closures earmarked as `manpower reservoirs' had 
proved insufficient. 92 As the new colliery at Agecroft neared completion so the arguments 
for full closure of Sandhole on "manpower grounds" gathered momentum. By 1962 
Sandhole's complete closure was seen as essential by the divisional board. 93 The board 
felt it was more effective to transfer the trained mineworkers at Sandhole to Agecroft with 
a "productive future" than have them drift away from Sandhole as it began to experience 
mining problems. A phased closure was preferred because it allowed men to be gradually 
transferred to Agecroft so that closure and manpower build-up was synchronised. The 
divisional board did have reservations over the Sandhole closure. The chief concern was 
that the NUMLA, particularly at branch level, would oppose closure based on an argument 
in favour of Sandhole as a mining proposition. The branch at Sandhode had a `militant' 
reputation and the pit had a poor industrial relations record. Accordingly, the board 
prepared for an adverse response. 94 
The industrial relations situation at Sandhole highlighted a concern that became a feature 
of closure. Colliery management had been at loggerheads with the branch committee over 
the implementation of power loading. This change was seen as vital if the remaining mines 
at Sandhole were to stay operational. The concentrated workings were those in which it 
was expected that power loading would operate most effectively. The board believed that 
politically motivated `militant' officials at Sandhole were orchestrating this issue, together 
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with other pit level issues, in collusion with other factions throughout the Manchester 
district 95 The two leading NUM officials at Sandhole: Joe Clarke and Ted Woolley were 
two prominent left-wingers within the NUMLA. Clarke, in the Labour Party, but on the 
left, also sat on the union executive as delegate for the panel which included Sandhole. 
Woolley was member of the Trotskyite Socialist Labour League96. The divisional board 
described dealings with branch officials at Sandhole thus: 
"The industrial relations situation has always been very poor. The NUM branch 
secretary is a Communist or fellow traveller who is more concerned with witch 
hunting to pillory management with responsibility than to do anything 
constructive to help the collier' 97 
The divisional board's solution to poor industrial relations at Sandhole was to threaten it 
with closure by concentrating it to the point where closure might become inevitable. It 
hoped that by holding the sword of Damocles over the colliery it might frighten the NUM 
branch committee into co-operating with the arrangements and terms for concentrating 
production and introducing new technology while simultaneously extracting `suitable' 
transferees for Agecroft. 98 
The board's strategy of letting the pit wither in the hope that it could force a more co- 
operative spirit while extracting transferees and retaining the option of keeping the pit open 
in some reduced capacity was highly problematic. The strategy was destined to have 
negative consequences because it inflamed rather than soothed pre-existing tensions. The 
branch committee became more aggrieved believing that the board was "softening them 
up" for closure while the state of uncertainty it created worsened the problem by increasing 
`manpower drift' 99 The final closure of the colliery announced under the `Review of the 
Revised Plan' in the spring of 1962 was the last word. However, matters had come to a 
head during the summer of 1961. These events effectively sealed the fate of the colliery 
before the pressure of the Review made Sandhole a candidate for closure. 100 
The summer of 1961 saw matters reach a critical point. The divisional board's strategy of 
concentration meant it was faced with a decision over whether to close further mines. It 
accepted that these mines were essential to the colliery's future viability. Closure meant 
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sounding the death knell for the colliery by leaving only those mines which had a doubtful 
future. The issues for the board included economic and technical feasibility and the 
continuing industrial relations problems, particularly those arising from technological 
change. However, it was the prospect of the manpower release through the closure of 
Sandhole which was paramount in these considerations. It was felt that the declining 
workforce at Sandhole should be released to Agecroft in order that this project could 
proceed to completion without delay. 10' 
The NUMLA regarded the closure of mines at Sandhole as crucial to its response to 
colliery closures not just at Sandhole but throughout the whole coalfield. During the 
`process' of closing Sandhole there was much support for the branch committee from the 
NUMLA executive and delegates from other collieries, especially in the Manchester 
district. There was a widespread belief that the divisional board was not only closing a 
colliery which should remain open but that they had gone about it in a shabby way. 102 The 
manner of closure was in part influenced by the accession of Anderton as divisional 
chairman. Anderton -a technocrat and `moderniser'- wanted to push through industrial 
change much more rapidly than his predecessor. Critically for Sandhole, he wanted the 
new collieries, such as Agecroft, and the re-constructions, operational without further 
delay. Anderton was much more the ambitious modern professional mining manager than 
his predecessor Colonel Bolton, who would have handled matters in a less insistent 
manner103. The branch committee at Sandhole was adamant that the question of further 
concentration should be fought at all costs. They argued that the issue should represent the 
point at which the NUMLA should not accept further colliery closures. The committee's 
assertion received full backing from the NUMLA leadership and branch delegates. 104 
By the summer of 1961 the NUMLA appeared to be saying in unison that pit closures 
should go no further. While the NUMLA seemed to be girding its loins for a fight the 
situation was in reality much more ambiguous. On the one hand, while the branch 
committee at Sandhole and its supporters wanted to make a stand, there were indications of 
greater reluctance from the union leadership. Leading union officials only lent their 
support because of the strength of feeling developing in the branches. Even that support 
was contingent, expressed through strong protests to the divisional board and a great deal 
of rhetoric. Gormley seemed to mean business when he pledged support for Sandhole and 
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made it clear to Anderton that the board was pushing its ambitions on rationalisation to the 
limit if they felt they could close Sandhole. Gormley told Anderton that Sandhole was the 
issue on which the NUMLA was prepared to engage in a "struggle" to fight the board's 
attempts to destroy the coal industry in Lancashire. '05 Similarly, Hammond dutifully 
appeared on the pit-bank at Sandhole promising personally to lead a crusade to keep the pit 
open. l°6 
Gormley had, however, already set clear limits on his commitment to fight for the colliery. 
Clarke from Sandhole, supported by delegates from the Manchester district, had called for 
a "a fight against Coal Board policy" at the 1961 NUMLA annual conference. Gormley, 
had rejected this demand in favour of the "constructive" approach of dialogue with the 
NCB. Again, he argued that industrial action might be counter-productive to transferring 
men to other collieries while a "negative attitude" might threaten the opportunity to 
demonstrate that Sandhole could become viable. He asked delegates to think of the future 
of the Lancashire coalfield with a "progressive outlook". This was a long way from 
fighting talk. It very nearly amounted to an endorsement of Coal Board policy. If the union 
leadership felt reluctantly constrained to take some form of action it was to tackle the 
divisional board over Sandhole as a mining proposition. Hammond, while sympathetic to 
the demands of delegates for the union to take action, took a more cautious line - what he 
called the "sane approach" - by asserting that the union had to be certain of 
its own case on 
the colliery as a mining proposition before taking the fight to the Board. It was at 
Hammond's suggestion, with delegate and the divisional board agreement, that the union 
engaged the services of an independent mining engineer to undertake a detailed report on 
Sandhole. This too constituted a conciliatory gesture from the union because the other 
option was to have demanded a joint NUM-NCB investigation, as was frequently the case 
in disputatious circumstances, thus giving the union some direct influence over the 
progress and outcome of the inquiry. 107 
That the NUMLA leadership was reluctant to sanction any form of action to save the 
colliery was evidenced in a dramatic way during formal negotiations with the divisional 
board over the future of Sandhole. The retreat in front of the board represented a 
monumental climb down. It was enough to surprise the divisional board who were 
anticipating some form of industrial action over the decision to effectively close the 
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colliery by abandoning further mines. In particular, Gormley's warnings to Anderton over 
Sandhole were taken seriously as a threat of imminent industrial action. In fact, they were 
hollow threats used as an opportunity for the new NUMLA secretary to show the new 
divisional chairman he was no pushover. The crucial meetings over the colliery's future 
took place in June 1961. Discussions centred on the future feasibility of Sandhole. The 
NUMLA delegation including members of the executive and branch officials accepted 
without reservation the divisional board's argument that the mines in question should 
close, thus preparing the way for a complete closure of the colliery. The only `concession' 
wrung from the board was an undertaking that the closure of the affected mines should be 
delayed until after the September wakes. Anderton could scarcely believe his good 
fortune. 108 After all the furore and threats of a showdown over Sandhole the NUMLA had 
made an unconditional surrender. Anderton was able to write to London that: "opposition 
to the phased closure of the colliery was less violent than indicated in the tone of the 
attached letter" (From Gormley)109 
The reason for the complete collapse of union opposition was clear. While the union had 
argued that the manpower issue was merely a pretext to close the pit, the divisional board 
indicated that a phased closure of Sandhole was essential to provide the potential future 
manpower requirements of Agecroft. The board convinced the NUMLA that without the 
trained manpower from Sandhole the whole Agecroft project would be delayed or 
jeopardised. Under these circumstances there was absolutely no possibility of the union 
fighting closure. The board knew that the union wanted the modernisation project to 
succeed as much as they did. The NUMLA in Lancashire fully appreciated the 
ramifications of the manpower issue. "" The arguments over economic and technical 
feasibility assumed secondary importance. This had always been their status. 
This retreat provoked conflict between the NUMLA leadership and the branch committee 
at Sandhole and others in the Manchester district. The union stood accused of reneging on 
a mandated resolution to oppose the closure agreed at the 1961 NUMLA annual 
conference supported by a leadership promise that Sandhole "would be backed up to the 
hilt". 111 At Sandhole there was a great deal of bitterness and frustration. This tended to 
obscure the fact that the union leadership, while uttering the language of opposition, had 
been looking for a way out of opposing closure since the 1961 annual conference. Gormley 
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took Clarke to task by suggesting that Clarke, as an executive committee member, had 
been privy to the union's discussions on Sandhole at the highest level. Gormley argued that 
it was not as though the `rank-and-file' at Sandhole had been ignored since the executive 
had sent its own investigating teams into Sandhole to assess the situation and talk to the 
men. Gormley felt that the idea of the independent inquiry was an appropriate measure 
which had the support of all parties including the miners at Sandhole. Similarly, 
Hammond, believed that it was not a case of the NUMLA "leaning over backwards" to 
accommodate the Coal Board. In his view, they had done more in Lancashire to oppose the 
closure of mines at Sandhole than cases in the "so-called left-wing areas" such as South 
Wales. 112 
The challenges and defences offered over the retreat on Sandhole demonstrated the 
widening chasm which had developed between the leadership and the Sandhole branch 
committee. While there were pre-existing ideological differences which increased tensions, 
the situation was aggravated by the increasing discomfort felt by the union leadership over 
the conduct of opposition to closure by the branch committee. Neither Gormley or 
Hammond liked the way the branch committee and others in the Manchester district had 
taken it upon themselves to make Sandhole a martyred pit with which to start a holy war 
against the divisional board. They believed that such action was dangerous and detrimental 
to the `progress' of modernisation. Similarly, they believed that the vehemence of 
`militant' branch officials at Sandhole in opposing closure was indicative of the general 
situation at the colliery in which they had made a hash of industrial relations. Although 
leading figures such as Gormley and Hammond had initially supported the Sandhole cause 
because they believed it to be just, their support was collapsing by the day throughout 
1961. For them, the only way forward became enunciated in Hammond's "sane 
approach". '13 
In the caustic atmosphere of accusations of betrayal the union leadership sought its 
excuses. Hammond struck an optimistic note suggesting the recent decision by the 
divisional board to close the mines might not be the "end of the road" for Sandhole. Few 
believed him. It had been tacit in discussing the closure of the mines at Sandhole that this 
would effectively mean the closure of the whole colliery. Another excuse presented itself 
with some opportune timing. In August 1961, some weeks after the union had conceded 
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Sandhole's effective closure, the report of the independent inquiry was published. It was 
balanced and judicious in its findings but came down on the side of the divisional board in 
its estimation that Sandhole had a bleak future as a mining proposition. For the union 
leadership it could not have arrived at a better time, as they stood accused over Sandhole. 
Its findings were seen as a vindication of the leadership's decision to discontinue 
opposition to closure over which they wanted to draw a veil. 114 For the Sandhole branch 
committee there was the option of making a lone stand against closure with support from 
Mosley Common and Bradford in the Manchester district. This was rejected as suicidal. 
There had been overtures from NUM branches in the Yorkshire coalfield, where action 
was taking place against closures, for the Manchester district to spearhead a fight against 
closures in Lancashire. Sandhole branch committee rejected such action with an 
overwhelming majority believing that the divisional board and the right-wing NUMLA 
leadership were looking for this kind of excuse to hasten closure. 115 Thereafter, opposition 
faded as quickly as the men were transferred in the phased closure throughout 1961 and 
1962. The bulk of the workforce who wished to stay in the industry went to Agecroft. The 
`Review of the Revised Plan' brought Sandhole's final demise in September 1962 with the 
remainder transferred just twelve months after the phased closure had begun. 116 
The transfers to Agecroft assumed an even greater importance for the NUMLA than the 
need to maintain manpower for the Agecroft thus making the union more amenable to the 
Sandhole closure. The divisional board promised improved terms for the men transferred 
to Agecroft. Central to these promises was the establishment of new power loading teams 
on better rates of pay. The board believed that in the Manchester district the NUMLA 
wanted to use new technology to extract concessions from them. The board turned this 
situation to its advantage by using new technology as a way of persuading the NUMLA 
leadership to accept closure of Sandhole by enticing them with improved terms and 
conditions for miners at Agecroft where better economic and technical conditions enabled 
the board to justify enhanced terms. The board thus saw an opportunity to exploit union 
ambitions on the power loading issue to induce the NUMLA leadership to ditch Sandhole 
in favour of Agecroft. 117 
The union leadership while seemingly prepared to fight the Sandhole closure was 
preparing the ground for retreat. The leadership came to the realisation that Sandhole had 
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to be sacrificed to maintain the Agecroft scheme. Arguments over the future of Sandhole 
as a mining proposition were increasingly superfluous to the debate. There is even some 
doubt whether the union leadership ever intended to make a serious issue over Sandhole as 
a mining proposition because of the cautious position it adopted on tackling the divisional 
board. As Clarke indicated, if the union was not prepared to make a firm stand on collieries 
like Sandhole where was it prepared to make a stand? 118 The leadership had only been 
reluctantly pushed into opposition by the strength of feeling at a number of important 
NUM branches. Ultimately, they embraced Gormley's call for a "progressive view" of the 
future of the coalfield. In doing so the leadership wholeheartedly endorsed industrial 
change. The NUMLA leadership saw this as the best way of maintaining coal in 
Lancashire. For the Coal Board, it was clear from the beginning that Sandhole was a pit 
which had to be sacrificed for the modernisation project. The question of feasibility and the 
technical issues were a vast feint. These concerns were seized upon by the divisional board 
as a convenient excuse to propel the Sandhole closure to sustain the manpower 
requirements of Agecroft. The union did not as much fall for this feint as energetically 
engage with it because it dreaded having to face what was the main thrust of the attack - 
manpower for Agecroft. A bemused Joe Clarke had asked what was Coal Board policy on 
Sandhole ? Did they want to close the pit because of "economic policy" or the "manpower 
question" ? It was the manpower question which became crucia1.119 The events of 1961 
leading to Sandhole's closure demonstrated the limits on how far the NUMLA was 
prepared to go in defending a pit against closure in circumstances where it was abundantly 
clear it had a case to contest it. The fact that the NUMLA leadership had made an ignoble 
retreat signified that it had embraced the objectives of industrial change - objectives it 
shared with the Coal Board. Sandhole colliery became a sacrifice to modernisation. 
iii. CLOCK FACE COLLIERY 1965: CLOSURE AND REVOLT 
Clock Face colliery was situated in an area of St. Helens of the same name some 2 and a 
half miles from St. Helens town centre. It was closed in March 1966 following the 
announcement in November 1965 of the ACP. 120 The circumstances are important because 
they highlighted the priorities of the `rank-and-file' toward closure. Furthermore, the 
closure illustrated the growing potentiality for problems from the cumulative effect of 
closures which increased tensions under the ACP. This growing frustration did not 
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manifest itself over the closure of Clock Face per se but rather over the manner of its 
closure. Like Sandhole, the events at Clock Face revealed the continuing reluctance of the 
NUM leadership to stem the rising tide of closures. Similarly, the attitude of the NUMLA 
leadership toward industrial action at Clock Face over closure indicated the extent to which 
it continued to seek co-operation rather than confrontation with the Board in implementing 
closures under this new phase. Finally, the closure at Clock Face revealed much about the 
Coal Board's priorities for modernisation. 
The colliery had been the subject of a major re-construction scheme during the 1950s but 
increasing financial and technical problems gave rise to such concern that it was placed on 
a possible closure list in 1958. However, because it was situated in an expanding area of 
the coalfield it avoided an earlier closure under the 1959 Revised Plan. The main reason 
for reprieve was a political decision by the Coal Board. It survived because of the 
divisional board's sensitivity about closing pits in the St. Helens district. The divisional 
board wanted to encourage the notion that Lancashire was not a dying coalfield. 121 The 
St. Helens district was an area of expansion with which to reinforce this idea. Closing 
Clock Face then would have sent the wrong signals about the future of the coalfield which 
risked poisoning relations with the NUMLA with- whom the divisional board desired 
maximum co-operation. Likewise, closure would have caused panic in terms of the 
`manpower drift' in the important St. Helens district with a new colliery at Parkside and 
five major re-constructions. 122 Operating Clock Face at a financial loss made no 
economic or technical sense given that the board was closing collieries elsewhere in 
similar circumstances. Prior to the ACP there were few closures in St. Helens district. 
Ravenhead colliery was included in the 1959 schedule but deferred until the ACP with a 
further reprieve as a second phase closure. Clock Face was the first colliery to close in 
St. Helens district with the exception of Lea Green in 1964.123 Lea Green had been 
scheduled for closure in 1959 but was reprieved until 1964 when it was closed because of 
the intrusion of another of the divisional board's priorities - the manpower requirements of 
Parkside. 124 
Clock Face remained open because of the political expedients of the divisional board. In 
one sense the ACP changed this position as its ambit reached to marginal collieries such as 
Clock Face. In another sense, Clock Face was closed under the ACP because it had 
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fulfilled its purpose. It could be dispensed with since the modernisation of the coalfield had 
been virtually completed. The board was less worried about upsetting the NUMLA over 
closures because the union had shown its willingness to accept closures without 
opposition. On the manpower question, the divisional board had successfully `manned-up' 
the new projects to the extent that `manpower drift' was a declining concern. There was 
thus a decreasing need to `stockpile' manpower for the new pits and re-constructions by 
keeping open a marginal pit like Clock Face. 
The decision to close Clock Face was accompanied by new tensions because, although the 
divisional board saw the above as positive developments, the changing priorities that 
resulted had negative consequences for mineworkers. For example, on the issue of 
manpower, there was less opportunity for the miners at Clock Face to move to the new 
Parkside colliery or to the re-constructed collieries in the district. The miners at Clock Face 
were confronted with a painful choice between either leaving the industry or depending on 
the divisional board and the NUMLA to arrange transfers to other collieries. During 
previous closures it become apparent that the problems of transferring men to existing pits 
was more difficult than transferring them to the two new collieries. It raised contentious 
questions about the status and remuneration of transferees and the `attitude' of existing 
workers towards the new `placements' at receiving collieries. For this reason the role of the 
divisional board and the NUMLA in assisting transfer became critical. 
The question of transfer of manpower led to one of the few instances of industrial action 
over closure. 125 Ostensibly, the dispute at Clock Face was a strike against closure. The 
dispute involved an initial two-day `stay-down' protest by nine mineworkers which 
developed into a sympathy strike involving the entire 700 workforce at Clock Face 
followed by a 'work-to-rule'. At its height, the action threatened to take in other pits in 
St. Helens district in support of Clock Face. Michael McDermott, the NUM branch, 
treasurer led the `Clock Face nine'. He was joined underground by the branch president 
and other branch officials. The branch secretary at Clock Face, Paddy Meeghan, co- 
ordinated the action on the surface. He paid tribute to his colleagues, describing the "nine 
lads" as "heroes" who had made a valiant stand against pit closures 2,000 feet underground 
sustained against freezing temperatures and the damp by a diet of tea, sandwiches, tobacco 
and a telephone link to surface. 126 The `heroes' of Clock Face were not protesting against 
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closure, they were protesting against the manner of closure. Specifically, they were 
protesting about the nature of their transfer from Clock Face to other pits. The men 
involved felt the divisional board was wrong to delay closure until March 1966 when the 
board wanted to synchronise transfer from Clock Face to the two receiving pits at Bold and 
Sutton Manor. The Clock Face men demanded immediate transfers. They believed the 
board was deliberately delaying closure in the hope that men would "drift away" during the 
winter leaving less men to transfer in March thus making placement a smoother and less 
troubled affair. Miners feared a lack of placements at the receiving pits thus forcing them 
out of the industry. Additionally, there were anxieties about reduced pay and status. 127 
What was characterised as a `rank-and-file' action against closure was an action over the 
terms of closure - the miners at Clock Face had already accepted the principle of closure. 
The dispute revealed much about the priorities of Lancashire miners during industrial 
change. These were influenced less by concerns over closures per se than about the manner 
of closure. However, the action showed the `rank-and-file' had concerns over closures 
which transcended questions of money and status. As one miner involved in the `stay- 
down' commented about the Board's policy: "we are trying to call their bluff'. 128 There 
was a growing sense among miners that the divisional board had a much-restricted scope 
for transfer. This increased fears and tensions. The Clock Face miners wanted to highlight 
their concerns through this protest. At the same time, the dispute was a public 
demonstration by the `rank-and-file' against the poverty of closure policy and the 
manpower transfers which accompanied it. The protest was primarily against the Coal 
Board rather than Labour Government policy. The progress of the dispute also brought into 
question the continuing attitude of the NUMLA leadership over closures. 
The NUMLA leadership demonstrated its willingness to co-operate with the divisional 
board over further contraction. In the case of the Clock Face closure it also introduced the 
suspicion that it was colluding with the divisional board in determining outcomes for 
closures and transfers. Events surrounding the `stay-down' dispute support this view. 
Clock Face did not have a reputation for militancy. The `stay-downers' were not politically 
motivated. There is no question of this dispute ab initio being a `rank-and-file' crusade 
against NUMLA leadership policy. That it did develop into an assault on the union 
leadership was a state of affairs brought about through the actions of the leadership. The 
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branch committee at Clock Face had assumed they would be fully supported by the 
leadership. When the closure was announced there were demands from St. Helens panel for 
an inquiry into the future of the colliery. Gormley initially intimated that he was unhappy 
about closure of a re-construction such as Clock Face in an expanding area of the coalfield. 
Thereafter, he shifted his position in favour of acceding to closure because he accepted the 
divisional board's argument that the future of the St. Helens district would be better served 
by re-deploying the trained manpower from Clock Face to Bold or Sutton Manor. 
This did not prevent Clock Face branch officials meeting with Gormley prior to the 
dispute. Having effectively surrendered the pit because of lack of support, the branch 
representatives still confidently expected Gormley's personal intervention to ensure the pit 
was closed immediately and the men transferred to receiving pits before the end of 1965. 
Gormley's rejection of this limited demand was instrumental in precipitating unilateral 
industrial action at Clock Face. Gormley felt the divisional board was right to have one 
closure date in March 1966 because he accepted the board's view that miners at Clock 
Face would not be unduly prejudiced in obtaining placements at receiving collieries. In one 
sense this view was based on a tradition of labour mobility in the St. Helens district where 
miners had been moving between Clock Face and the two receiving pits for years. 
Likewise, Gormley argued that during the 1959-1965 period the majority of transfers had 
been relatively smooth affairs. What both the divisional board and Gormley failed to 
appreciate was the decreasing opportunities for transfer, together with declining 
opportunities both inside and outside of the industry. The prospect of hundreds of miners 
turning up at Bold and Sutton Manor on a day in March filled the Clock Face miners with 
dread. Throughout the dispute the branch committee launched simultaneous attacks on 
both the union leadership and the divisional board. 129 The attitude taken by the union 
leadership towards events at Clock Face was more spectacularly illustrated during the 
aftermath of the dispute. 
The dispute was ended by the `stay-downers' after they had made their, protest. The 
divisional board indicated a willingness to talk to the Clock Face men in exchange for a 
full return to work and an end to threatened sympathy actions. The NUMLA executive was 
also keen to talk to the Clock Face men. The divisional board made a significant gesture 
toward the Clock Face miners by agreeing immediately to transfer an initial batch of 200 
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men to the receiving pits followed by a phased run-down during the winter of 1965-66 
without waiting for the final closure date. In addition, the board agreed to a non- 
victimisation policy against those involved in the Clock Face action. 130 That appeared to be 
the end of the matter. The issue, however, re-ignited in a dramatic fashion. This time, 
Gormley stood accused not only of co-operation with the divisional board, but of collusion. 
Gormley was livid over the events at Clock Face. He believed the dispute seriously 
undermined the NUMLA's relationship with the divisional board at a critical time. 131 
The tensions surrounding the closure of Clock Face re-emerged during early 1966 in two 
ways. Firstly, during the transfer of miners from Clock Face the divisional board was 
criticised for reneging on its non-victimisation policy because it `kept back' five of the 
`Clock Face Nine' with no guarantee of placement at receiving collieries. The inference 
was that the board wanted them out of the industry. Secondly, the board was accused of a 
fiasco over the inevitable problems created by trying to `place' the Clock Face men at the 
receiving collieries, with men turning up for non-existent jobs, lower pay and reduced 
grades. It was not only the divisional board which stood accused. St. Helens panel charged 
Gormley of connivance with the board by assisting closure; of acquiescing in the alleged 
victimisation of the `nine' and of being so eager to help the board that he became actively 
involved in the maladroit handling of transfers. There were disturbing allegations of Clock 
Face miners being assured of transfers to Sutton Manor by the NUMLA without 
management awareness, let alone authorisation. Gormley, issued a typically stout personal 
defence while re-iterating his belief that there had been a relatively smooth transfer 
situation during previous years. 132 Yet, it was certain that endorsing union participation in 
transfer and placement might sooner or later lead to problems especially when undertaken 
without proper liaison with the divisional board. These issues were becoming difficult 
enough without leaving this practice in the hands of union officials under Gormley's 
tutelage. This was a highly questionable arrangement given the already controversial 
nature of the Clock Face closure. In the event, Gormley's role was criticised not just from 
St. Helens panel but from across the coalfield. 133 Rising tension arose from a growing sense 
of insecurity felt by mineworkers. There was a widespread belief that the Clock Face affair 
had been badly handled. Gormley's role in the affair raised serious questions not only 
about his willingness to co-operate with the divisional board but also over his personal 
integrity. 
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One notable feature of the Clock Face affair was the level of support Gormley received 
from Hammond who skilfully rallied the `rank-and-file' behind the leadership. This level 
of support ensured the leadership prevailed over the Clock Face protest. Unlike Gormley, 
the affair left Hammond's personal authority untainted, although he too was angered by 
these events leading to an emasculation of the Clock Face protest through his intervention. 
Hammond saw the Clock Face dispute not as a blow against closure policy but a blow 
directed at the union's authority. Hitherto, Hammond, like Gormley, had felt that closure 
and transfers had been arranged relatively amicably. Hammond felt direct action ruined the 
union's chances of `successful' negotiations with the divisional board over closures. He 
believed it was union leadership's prerogative to negotiate and, if necessary, protest. 
Hammond stressed the need for discipline in the movement -a legacy of his Communist 
Party involvement. He was particularly critical of allegations of victimisation, describing 
the Clock Face men as those who "hungered for martyrdom". Hammond invoked these 
arguments to marginalise the Clock Face protest. At the same time he cannily cast himself 
in the role of peacemaker. At his insistence, the St. Helens panel agreed to co-operate in the 
orderly transfer of the remaining workforce at Clock Face. 134 This came too late for miners 
who were forced to leave the industry during the imbroglio of closure. Through these 
manoeuvres, Hammond gathered a majority of the `rank-and-file' behind him to win a 
debate to "drop this talk of victimisation". Nevertheless, accusations of victimisation 
persisted together with continuing allegations of shoddy treatment by both the divisional 
board and the NUMLA in arranging transfers from Clock Face. In winning over a majority 
of the union, Hammond obtained high levels of support from those branches where closure 
and transfer had been handled in a smooth and open-handed way. Hammond's practised 
manipulation of the sentiments expressed by these branches was effective in strangulating 
the Clock Face protest. 135 
The Clock Face affair raised some highly relevant questions about the character of closures 
in Lancashire under the ACP. Clock Face should, by the conventional wisdom of the time, 
have been closed prior to 1965 but was retained by the divisional board because of the 
expedients determined by its broader modernisation agenda. With the ACP came the need 
to jettison collieries like Clock Face. The completion of modernisation of coal in 
Lancashire meant pits like Clock Face could be closed without risk of collateral damage to 
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the board's strategy. At Clock Face, the dynamics of industrial change were of sufficient 
concern to miners to produce a negative response to closure. Although it was not a protest 
against closure per se it was a response from an increasingly fearful workforce about 
decreasing transfer opportunities. The outcome of the Clock Face affair indicated that 
although there was anxiety over the ACP, the level of resistance to change was a function 
of the circumstances of closure and transfer at individual pits. This situation was evidenced 
by Hammond's ability to isolate the Clock Face `cause'. This did not bode well for 
collective action against the ACP. The Clock Affair also demonstrated that the NUMLA 
leadership did not appreciate increasing concerns expressed by the `rank-and-file' over 
further contraction. Both Gormley and Hammond continued to pursue maximum co- 
operation with the divisional board. In this, Gormley seriously overstepped the mark, 
bringing opprobrium for his alleged chicanery. On the other hand, Hammond emerged to 
placate the situation. Still, both men continued to believe these protests were counter- 
productive to the proper execution of closure and transfer of manpower. Both men 
seriously misjudged the moment. They shared a lack of sensitivity toward miners facing 
onerous outcomes from closure. It could be argued that the NUMLA leadership had not yet 
come to terms with the dynamics of industrial change under the ACP. During the debate 
over Clock Face the NUMLA leadership reiterated the point that hitherto there had been 
relatively few problems arranging transfers. 136 The portents from Clock Face were not 
good for the remaining closures under the programme. Henceforth closures would become 
increasingly fraught. The question is whether the leadership would have reacted differently 
had it appreciated this rapidly changing situation. There is a strong case to suggest that it 
would not have acted differently given the level of co-operation it offered the divisional 
board over closures during 1959-1965 under rationalisation. By the same token, there was 
nothing in the experience of further closures under the ACP to suggest there would have 
been a different response. 
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iv. MOSLEY COMMON COLLIERY 1968: A MODERNISATION TOO FAR 
Mosley Common colliery was situated at a hamlet of the same name near the township of 
Tyldesley and the villages of Boothstown and Ellenbrook approximately 3 miles east of 
Leigh, 5 miles south of Bolton, and 7 miles west of Manchester in the Manchester district 
of the coalfield. Although the colliery was closed in 1968 under the ACP its problems had 
straddled the post-war period. If one colliery symbolised industrial change in the coalfield - 
for all the wrong reasons - it was Mosley Common. While there were successes in the 
coalfield, Mosley Common stood as a beacon of failure underlining the limits of 
modernisation. The history of the colliery up to closure assumed legendary proportions 
throughout the coalfield and beyond. One widely held view, expressed by both NCBNWD 
and NUMLA officials including Gormley, was that Mosley Common `failed' because of 
"human factors". 137 Clearly the failure had `human' influences, yet it substantially resulted 
from an ill-conceived decision to proceed with modernisation undertaken during the 
earliest days of public ownership. For this reason, the failure as a modernisation project 
was primarily a `physical' one rather than a `human' one. Matters were seriously and 
fatally compounded by an overwhelming desire to ensure this re-construction project 
succeeded at all costs -a view held by both the divisional board and the NUMLA. In 
another way, the frustrating complexity of problems thrown up by the failings at Mosley 
Common tested NUMLA co-operation to the limits at all levels within the union. Co- 
operation prevailed because failure was something which could not be countenanced on 
either side of the industry as it would have questioned the whole future of industrial change 
in the coalfield. As the divisional board affirmed, the desired success of the three major re- 
constructions in the Manchester district in general, and Mosley Common in particular, 
marked the district out as the crucible of industrial change in Lancashire. 138 Ultimately, all 
efforts ended in failure because attempts to revive the faltering Mosley Common project 
were themselves impaled on the `flawed concept' that was Mosley Common colliery; this 
was a modernisation too far. 
Prior to the decision to proceed with the new projects at Agecroft and Parkside the Mosley 
Common scheme was the most important in the coalfield. It was certainly its grandest re- 
construction. As a `showpiece' colliery of the post-war era it owed its beginnings to major 
improvements undertaken during the 1930s by Manchester Collieries Ltd. 139 Following 
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nationalisation the colliery was designated as a major re-construction. 140 Even at this early 
stage there were major differences over the efficacy of re-development on the selected 
basis. The point of disagreement within the NCB was over the scale of re-construction. 
There was widespread agreement that improvements to Mosley Common should proceed 
but a substantial body of opinion felt that the grand re-construction planned was too 
ambitious. The national and divisional boards were amongst the most enthusiastic about 
the massive re-development of Mosley Common to produce a `mnulti-shaft combined 
mine". The NUMLA executive, which saw a project on this scale as symbolising a real 
investment in the future of the coalfield, joined them. It involved an extension of the 
existing one pit colliery into a four-pit colliery together with extensive underground 
tunnelling to access new reserves, intensive mechanisation and substantial surface re- 
construction. 
Misgivings about the scheme were most pronounced at area, but more especially colliery, 
level where a majority of the older coalfield `hands' now in NCB colliery management 
believed the scale of re-development too ambitious and doomed to failure. In this, the 
NUM branch and colliery consultative committee joined them. Colliery management later 
argued that the project had been less about the re-development of a single production unit 
than about the development of a cluster of pits without adequate integration, planning or 
operational control. The complexity of operations between the four pits necessitated two 
distinct management teams responsible for a pair of pits each with separate union branches 
at Boothstown and Mosley Common. One senior official NCBNWD was transferred 
because of his opposition to the proposed scheme. He believed that a less ambitious single 
pit re-construction was more appropriate with a greater chance of success. This 
disagreement became the basis of a schism within the NCB from the very start. It was a 
conflict which overshadowed the re-development of the colliery in such a way as to 
complicate an increasingly complex set of difficulties accompanying re-construction. The 
initial battle lines had been drawn over the colliery's future before re-construction had 
begun. On the one hand, there were those who saw in Mosley Common the grand vision of 
a large modem development acting as an affirmation of the coalfield's future. As a 
NCBNWD official noted, Lancashire was desperate to secure a "big producer" in the days 
before the Agecroft and Parkside projects. On the other hand, there were those who 
believed the scheme was a fanciful folly which would very quickly run into trouble. 141 
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By 1961, as the colliery experienced serious problems the foreboding seemed justified. 
Management spoke of the colliery as a "flawed conception" in which: "mining conditions 
were not conducive to profitability nor good labour relations" . 
142 As the re-construction 
proceeded it began to stall. The Coal Board was asking Mosley Common to achieve two 
mutually incompatible objectives by demanding it become a big coal producer and that 
modernisation proceed unabated. The result was a colliery struggling to reconcile current 
production needs with re-construction work. Eventually, re-construction was relegated in 
favour of maximising output. Later, with the collapse in coal consumption, the focus of 
efforts shifted away from production toward re-construction. Re-construction had been so 
handicapped by production needs that it was well behind schedule by the late 1950s. There 
then followed a dash to bring modernisation back on schedule within a short space of 
ße. 143 This ensured the late 1950s and early 1960s were an extremely fevered and 
fractious few years for all concerned. 
The modernisation of Mosley Common put uncompromising demands on both sides of the 
industry. By the late 1950s those demands were beginning to place severe strains on both 
management and union officials and the 3,000 workforce. While re-construction was in 
trouble, industrial relations and `morale' were near to collapse. " The scale and 
complexity of the issues involved were manifold. At the centre was a continuance of 
tensions within management. This was seen through the pressure applied from divisional 
and area management on colliery management. It was believed the pace of modernisation 
had been lacking due to management inertia at colliery level resulting in an inability to 
`hit' production targets. Similarly, colliery management was blamed for anaemic 
productivity while it was clear that as a loss leader the colliery was becoming a source of 
embarrassment from national level downwards. One particularly injurious accusation made 
at divisional level was that colliery management had not proceeded with concentration fast 
enough and in a rigorous enough way to exploit the most productive faces. This accusation 
questioned the professionalism of colliery officials. One noticeable feature of the colliery - 
which the NUMLA was quick to point out - was the high turnover of NCBNWD officials. 
By the late 1950s the colliery had become a bed of nails for any career-minded mining 
professional. Tensions within management were underpinned by continuing disagreements 
over the most effective method of re-development. 145 These tensions were just one element 
in the increasingly ugly mood that enveloped the colliery. Management at odds hardly 
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augured well for the success of other crucial relationships. It was the issues arising out of 
the modernisation of the colliery which served to make management-union relationships so 
baneful. 
Analysis of the colliery's failure requires the dismissal of a number of myths and 
misconceptions about the nature of failure. By the late 1950s labour relations had 
plummeted. Area management believed labour relations had been poor since 
nationalisation. 146 Management laid the blame for poor labour relations on the workforce 
and local NUM branches. It was argued the colliery was dominated by a highly motivated 
group of militant activists hell-bent on undermining management authority and 
circumventing `established' conciliation procedures. There was also a belief that the 
colliery had a legacy of poor industrial relations in which management attempted to 
portray it as having an exceptionally bad record by the standards of the relatively quiescent 
Lancashire coalfield. As one NCBNWD area official noted, the three key collieries in the 
Manchester district: Bradford, Mosley Common, and Sandhole were coming under the 
influence of: "a Communist, Trotski-ist fellow traveller element -I am not sure I can tell 
the difference". 147 Management believed groups at these collieries were in liaison with 
each other and with militants on the Yorkshire NUM's Number Two Area Panel 
(Doncaster) who, having orchestrated industrial militancy in the Yorkshire coalfield, were 
keen to `export' it over the Pennines. 148 However, management exaggerated the degree of 
cohesion between these groupings and failed to appreciate differences over ideology, 
strategy, and objective. There is no evidence to suggest Mosley Common was part of a 
broader left-wing conspiracy to undermine the NCBNWD and the NUMLA. 
On the issue of militant activism, the Communist Party targeted Mosley Common and 
other collieries in the Manchester district because they were important post-war 
developments. The Party, embarrassed by its lack of success in the coalfield, had been 
encouraging activity throughout the 1940s and 1950s. Mosley Common was the subject of 
a sustained recruitment and propaganda campaign during this period. 149 The NUM 
secretary at Mosley Common, Mick Weaver, had emerged as a party stalwart in 
Lancashire, having been `groomed' for work as an industrial "propagandist" in the coal 
industry. 150 His presence at Mosley Common, together with his notable band of 
"henchmen" - as the divisional board referred to them - increased the pitch of industrial 
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tension. 151 Added to which, on a personal level, Weaver was an incendiary of a man who 
launched an unrelenting campaign to harangue management over a plethora of pit level 
issues. 152 Weaver, further incurred the wrath of management by resorting to pre- 
nationalisation procedures of `consulting' management through the most direct method 
available - the `pit deputation'- rather than using agreed consultative machinery -a fact 
Weaver attributed to his debarment from consultative meetings by management because of 
his recalcitrant attitude. 153 
Undoubtedly, in Weaver, the management had a `hot potato' to handle, such that many 
area and colliery officials felt threatened by his presence. This led management to argue 
Mosley Common's difficulties arose directly from the `Weaver problem'. However, there 
are number of points on Weaver's authority and influence which are germane. That 
Weaver had a `reputation' across the coalfield there is no doubt. His effective and 
formidable reputation with management earned him much support amongst miners to the 
extent that he maintained his position as secretary at Mosley Common. Similarly, Weaver 
had enough support to represent the panel serving the two union branches of the colliery on 
the NUMLA executive. On the other hand, Weaver's influence was more limited and of a 
passing temporal character than management alleged:. Weaver's influence reached its 
zenith during the late 1950s and early 1960s when the problems arising from re- 
construction came to a head. His influence waned after the early 1960s. At the height of his 
influence in 1960 Weaver unsuccessfully contested the vice-presidency of the NUMLA. 
As a measure of Weaver's influence at its peak, the voting patterns of the election 
demonstrated his influence was restricted to a few branches in a tight geographical area 
around Boothstown, Mosley Common and Tyldesley. Weaver made an indifferent showing 
at putative `militant' branches elsewhere in the coalfield. Moreover, even Weaver's 
support within Mosley Common was limited. The bulk of his support came from the two 
pits under the control of his Mosley Common branch but his support within the two pits 
under the control of Boothstown branch was mixed - hardly a ringing endorsement of this 
`militant' thorn in management's side. '54 
The `Weaver problem' was plausible in explaining why Mosley Common did not work. 
Weaver was clearly a figure of considerable influence at Mosley Common where he made 
his presence felt over a range of pit level issues. However, the importance of this factor in 
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explaining `failure' at Mosley Common was greatly exaggerated. It was area and colliery 
management under pressure to improve performance which invoked the presence of 
Weaver as a convenient excuse to explain why persistent labour problems continued to 
undermine the colliery's performance. Weaver's aggression certainly unsettled 
management. Yet, it was rare for Weaver to take up an issue unless it had been the source 
of a justifiable complaint. '55 It was just that there were so many issues to complain about at 
Mosley Common. In the same way, management sought a more general excuse in the way 
in which it attempted to create a `myth of militancy' about the colliery. 
Area and colliery management also sought to explain under-performance through the 
general industrial relations record of the colliery. They argued Mosley Common was the 
most disputatious colliery in the coalfield. Management presented the colliery as an 
`exceptional' case in Lancashire. However, its dispute record was not unique in the 
coalfield. There were a number of large-scale, high profile and protracted disputes, but the 
pattern was one of a colliery beset by many minor stoppages arising from routine pit level 
problems resulting directly or indirectly from aspects of re-development work -a situation 
worsened, in aggregate, by the colliery's size. 156 Management missed this point in its 
attempts to present a picture of a disputatious pit infested with militant miners close to 
anarchy and break down. Management did not stop there. It attempted to demonstrate that 
Mosley Common had an historical record as a `militant' colliery. This was complete 
mythology. During the inter-war period it had a relatively quiescent industrial relations 
record. Prior to 1923, Mosley Common, was one of the Earl of Ellesmere's pits. These 
were the collieries of land owning Lancashire characterised by paternalism, deference and 
docility; held forth by contemporaries as exemplars of industrial quiescence in an 
otherwise troubled industry. The colliery only accumulated any kind of industrial relations 
`record' after it passed into corporate ownership during the 1920s. '57 This is supported by 
the testimony of miners who worked at the colliery for most of the twentieth century. They 
confirmed the almost `sleepy' nature of industrial activism before the Second World 
War. '58 Mosley Common's industrial relations record, and its reputation for `militancy' 
were post-war phenomena produced by a specific confluence of events and processes 
arising from modernisation and re-construction. 
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Another indication that the `myth of militancy' was a cloak to cover the difficulties 
management were experiencing in re-developing Mosley Common can be gauged by 
scepticism at divisional level over claims that performance had been undermined by 
`militancy'. While divisional management was sympathetic over the `Weaver problem' it 
0 believed `militancy' was used as a fig leaf by area and colliery management to cover its 
inadequacies. This resulted in more sniping down the levels of management over the 
colliery's persistent poor performance, again raising tensions over the efficacy of the 
Mosley Common project. 159 At area, and more particularly colliery level, harassed officials 
seized upon the `Weaver problem' and the `myth of militancy' as excuses to articulate a 
response to divisional management criticism. Having dismissed the myths and 
misconceptions offered for `failure' attention now focuses on the root of the colliery's 
problems which eventually led to its closure. 
At the development stage the physical dimensions of the colliery were such that it was 
described as "a monster". Underground, miners had to endure substantial travelling 
distances to access faces even by the standards of the Lancashire coalfield. Distances were 
traversed on the steepest gradients in the coalfield. Excessive and difficult underground 
travelling times were in addition to lengthy surface travel -from over a wide area. 160 
Although, these circumstances were not unique in Lancashire they were on a larger and 
more complex scale than elsewhere. It was not an `attractive' environment in which 
management-workforce co-operation could flourish. Undertaking difficult re-development 
work while at the same time attempting to maximise production worsened the situation. 
These circumstances were exacerbated by another aspect of the modernisation drive - the 
introduction of double-shift work to a workforce largely accustomed to working a single 
5.161 
Against this background, re-development was at the root of problems at Mosley Common. 
Re-construction work during the late 1950s and early 1960s saw a huge number of 
operational difficulties emerge. There were frequent problems with equipment: 
breakdowns, faults and shortages. In addition, the scale of the re-construction work meant 
there were insufficient workers available to undertake re-development tasks -a situation 
worsened by miners being taken off re-development tasks for re-assignment to production 
work. Re-assignment caused aggravation because it meant re-negotiating terms and left re- 
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development teams chronically undermanned. There were also questions of status and 
demarcation to confront. On top of these problems, re-development necessitated wholesale 
re-organisation to concentrate production on the most productive faces for the installation 
of power loading. The sheer task of managing a colliery with four pits and sixteen major 
faces was difficult enough without having to manage organisational and technological 
change on this scale. In order to implement technological change management introduced 
much resented alterations to working practices including double-shift work -a matter of 
huge contention. At the same time, management had to re-negotiate the terms for using 
power loading in an already difficult atmosphere. 162 
A number of issues emerged from the problems associated with re-construction. Industrial 
relations and the dispute record of the colliery became a function of the difficulties 
described. The dispute record did not result directly from the activities of the `militants' 
although this factor raised the profile of these issues. Rising pit level tensions were 
manifested in a dispute pattern dominated by short, small-scale labour disputes during the 
main period of re-construction between the late 1950s and early 1960s - see Appendix to 
this Chapter. This is with reference to disputes resulting in the loss of less than 100 
working days, between 1955 and 1961.163 Furthermore, the post-war trend of disputes at 
Mosley Common peaked during this period when the re-development work was at its 
height. 'TM 
Within this pattern certain groups of workers emerged as particularly troubled. Power 
loaders and fillers were especially afflicted. However, it was the craftsmen who found 
themselves in the eye of the storm. They formed the fulcrum around which modernisation 
of the colliery became dependent. They were a group of aggrieved workers who became 
influential in colliery politics. The craftsmen complained about a lack of management 
support; frequent arbitrary re-assignment to production tasks; being taken off task to meet 
training requirements; and a shortage of skilled men resulting in excessive week-end work. 
As the craftsmen put it, they were being "flogged to death" by management to make 
Mosley Common "work". The rising tension within this group reflected more widespread 
dissatisfaction among craftsmen during the early 1960s in Lancashire over issues of 
differentials and status to such a degree that they were involved in industrial action at 
Mosley Common and elsewhere. At Mosley Common, the `uprising' of the craftsmen 
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came to symbolise the problems associated with faltering attempts to re-develop the 
colliery. 165 
Pit level issues which gave rise to problems at Mosley Common might be said to have had 
one single cause - management. Evidence abounds of poor management control, planning 
and practice. 166 However, this was not the complete explanation of Mosley Common's 
problems. It would be just as erroneous to say that Mosley Common's failure resulted from 
`bad management' as it would to say that it resulted from poor workforce discipline and 
union militancy. Weaver, that indefatigable hammer of management, later admitted that in 
all his years of barking at management he did not believe the colliery's problems stemmed 
from individual or collective management deficiencies. Rather it was a result of asking 
management to perform an impossible task. 167 Weaver was right. The colliery was a 
misconception from the start. The great obstacle at Mosley Common was that feelings ran 
so high on either side of the industry it became difficult to diagnose the problem accurately 
or with impartiality. In the highly charged atmosphere that became Mosley Common 
entrenched positions developed on both sides as each blamed the other for the colliery's 
failings. A state of mutual distrust pervaded all aspects of operations imbuing a level of 
malevolence that militated against any prospect of improving its feeble productivity, 
disappointing output and huge financial losses. 168 
The task of reviving the colliery's fortunes had first to address the state of collapsed 
management control, poor labour relations and morale. This takes the discussion to the 
crucial role played by the NUMLA. It revealed much about the extent to which the union 
was eager to see the modernisation agenda succeed in Lancashire in a colliery where 
management had all but given up. Equally, for the NCB, particularly at the national and 
divisional levels, there was a need to ensure Mosley Common did not fail. The size of the 
difficulties facing Mosley Common meant it was first considered for closure in 1958. This 
threat was lifted because it was believed modernisation had not reached a sufficient level 
for the colliery to "prove itself'. A belief that more investment, more mechanisation, and 
more re-development would improve results impelled the case against closure. 
Importantly, it was felt that the raison d'etre of the colliery still persisted. It continued to 
be a highly visible symbol of modernisation in the coalfield -a key part of a future which 
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would otherwise have been bleak before the Agecroft and Parkside projects came to 
fruition. 169 
The reprieve lasted only as long as four extremely bad years for the colliery. The second 
closure threat in 1961-1962 was more serious. This time divisional patience was at 
breaking point, while grave and continuing problems produced more intense scrutiny from 
London. A divided divisional board faced a dilemma. The losses incurred by the colliery 
were described as "uneconomic and irretrievable" while operational and labour problems 
had worsened. Crucially, the re-development work had not borne fruit. For many at 
divisional and area levels the preferred solution was to cut their losses and close the 
colliery in 1961 or 1962. Anderton emerged as a leading advocate for closure. However, 
another view held that re-development work had come too far. It was argued it should be 
seen through to a conclusion that was close, after which the colliery would "prove 
itself'. 170 
With splits within divisional management it was the intervention of the Ministry of Power 
and the NCB in London which saved Mosley Common. Both Lord Robens and his deputy, 
Humphrey-Browne, were aware of the situation at Mosley Common. Robens wanted to 
give the colliery an opportunity to "prove itself' through a trial period. Humphrey-Browne 
was even more supportive of Mosley Common. He knew the colliery well, having been a 
director of Manchester Collieries Ltd and later, as production director of the NCBNWD, 
was involved in the formulation of the Mosley Common `grand scheme'. There was an 
element of personal prestige at stake. Aside from this factor, why did officials at the 
highest level act in such a decisive way to save Lancashire's infamous white elephant? In 
one sense they were persuaded that the colliery should be given the opportunity to `prove 
itself after modernisation was completed. They felt the original vision of a `super-pit' in 
this `dying coalfield' was so critical to their commitment to its resurrection that they 
should see modernisation through to its conclusion. However, the main factor persuading 
them to keep the colliery open was the position adopted by the NUMLA on the future of 
Mosley Common. 171 
The intervention of the Coal Board at the highest levels resulted from both national and 
divisional officials becoming increasingly impressed by the willingness of the NUMLA to 
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support moves to keep it open by tackling its problems. Up to 1961, the NUMLA 
executive and senior officials had been observers of the colliery's stuttering performance. 
In 1961, at the suggestion of Jim Hammond, the NUMLA and divisional board agreed to 
convene a Joint Investigation Committee (JIC) to assess and deliberate on the gamut of pit 
level problems afflicting the colliery. The NUMLA felt saving Mosley Common was a 
major priority because, like the NCBNWD, they saw its success as absolutely vital to 
modernisation in Lancashire. As a measure of the gravity with which the union viewed the 
situation its side of the JIC was led by three senior figures: Joe Gormley, Jim Hammond, 
and Sid Vincent. Hammond and Vincent led the NUMLA contingent of the joint teams 
sent into the colliery with the role of `trouble-shooters' at large. 172 The formation of the 
JIC was a defining moment in the history of the colliery. Yet, the union's willingness to 
join with the divisional board in ensuring that the vision of Mosley Common still burned 
brightly against all the warnings to the contrary proved to be its final undoing. The need to 
press ahead with further modernisation stretched divisional board - NUMLA relations to 
breaking point, ensuring that all attempts to revive the colliery failed. 
The JIC did sterling work tackling the immediate causes of Mosley Common's difficulties. 
Such was the shock of the closure threat that a mood of businesslike co-operation 
descended under the auspices of the JIC. Among its achievements it could number the 
managed and agreed re-deployment of mineworkers; the further concentration of workings 
with relatively little rancour and the planned deployment of a `dedicated' central team of 
craftsmen with an adequate corral of materials and equipment. These were tangible 
achievements in a colliery that had failed so miserably to deliver even these basic 
operational requirements. Significantly, the JIC was successful in providing an arena in 
which pit-level grievances could be discussed and resolved in a co-operative atmosphere. 
In this, Weaver recognised the 7IC as a legitimate forum while the union leadership was 
able to keep a close eye on the colliery. Both Hammond and Gormley were omnipresent, 
while Gormley had in Vincent `his' man in the colliery. Vincent was to become Gormley's 
heir apparent. For the management, there was initial delight in the co-option of the union at 
the highest level to help solve Mosley Common's problems. 
The JIC presided over an interregnum of relative peace. The industrial relations climate 
improved to the point where there was a reduction in the number of smaller-scale disputes 
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after 1961, though the colliery was troubled by larger-scale disputes during 1962-1964 - see 
Appendix to this Chapter. Not only was there improvement in industrial relations, the long- 
awaited improvement in performance finally arrived with signs of increased productivity; 
better financial results and the attainment of production targets. 173 The improvement, 
however, was less a function of the splendid work of the JIC - though that was important - 
than the fact it coincided with the end of the most disruptive period of re-construction and 
re-organisation. Nevertheless, for those who had kept faith with the vision of Mosley 
Common these welcome features were something of a vindication. 174 This period of 
relative tranquillity proved to be short-lived as the seeds of destruction once again 
germinated. This time the crisis at Mosley Common became apparent within the JIC over 
the modernisation of work processes. 
Smouldering beneath the undergrowth of the JIC's deliberations were a number of issues 
which would ignite Mosley Common once again. This time difficulties sprang from the 
divisional board's expectations of further co-operation from the NUMLA at the highest 
level in the modernisation of the colliery. The NUMLA had already shown its willingness 
to participate in the removal of obstacles to the modernisation of Mosley Common. There 
was no reason for the divisional board to doubt the NUMLA would assist in further 
modernisation by co-operating in controversial changes to work practices. Gormley's view 
on Mosley Common was clear : it was a `human' problem. Gormley repeatedly argued for 
maximum co-operation between the management and the workforce in which "mutual 
distrust" was put aside. 175 This was the sort of language the divisional board wanted to hear 
in terms of `modernising' work processes. Fatally, it continued to ignore the `flawed 
concept' thesis of Mosley Common. Gormley, like Board officials, was mesmerised by the 
vision of Mosley Common. Solve the `human' factor at Mosley Common and the results 
would follow ran the argument. However, it was patently obvious that the problems of 
Mosley Common arose from basic difficulties of attempting to modernise a highly 
problematic colliery firstly as a `physical' entity and then later as a `human' entity. The 
success of the JIC had been mainly in bringing improvements to `physical' and 
organisational aspects of the colliery. Improvements to labour relations had largely resulted 
from the end of major re-development and re-organisation work together with the efforts of 
the JIC. The problem for those who continued to believe in Mosley Common was that they 
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could not bring themselves to accept that the difficulties faced by the colliery resulted from 
the modernisation scheme because they were so wedded to achieving its success. 
This attitude had damaging consequences for Mosley Common. On the one hand, it 
appeared that the divisional board and the NUMLA were in complete agreement over the 
causes and cure for the colliery. On the other, it produced a `crisis of expectation' which 
eventually destroyed Mosley Common. Gormley became known for his public attacks on 
the `militants' at Mosley Common. In fact, his position was to condemn both management 
and workforce in circumstances where he felt a "lack of co-operation" had a detrimental 
effect on the colliery's performance. Gormley's visceral attacks on management, mainly at 
area level, have received less attention than his assaults on the `militants'. Gormley clashed 
with Weaver over a range of issues - the two were ideologically poles apart - yet, he rarely 
made such attacks within the JIC, frequently defending Weaver against management 
criticism. 176 Nevertheless, the NCB, certainly at divisional level, believed Gormley was a 
staunch ally in the modernisation drive. His direct involvement in the 7IC further 
encouraged the divisional board to believe he was the central figure who would assist in 
the further delivery of modernisation at the colliery on a wide range of difficult work 
process issues. 
There were ominous developments through the work of the JIC which formed the 
backdrop to further modernisation. Colliery level tensions were transferred upwards to 
divisional board-NUMLA level through the JIC. Area management became less 
enthusiastic about the JIC than either divisional or colliery management. Again, this led to 
differences between area and division. Division saw union co-operation as vital in keeping 
the vision of Mosley Common alive, while at colliery level hard-pressed officials 
welcomed the assistance of the JIC in taking them directly out of the firing line. 
Resentment at area level became palpable because it was felt the JIC circumvented many 
of its functions; acting as sort of `star chamber' making decisions which would ordinarily 
have been made at area level. In addition to rancour over union co-option in the 
management of the colliery, there was a belief that Gormley was using the JIC for personal 
aggrandisement; claiming the credit for measures to save the colliery which were not 
entirely his own. This was the source of a personal clash between Tom Knowles - the area 
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manager - and Gormley. These tensions underpinned continuing disagreement over aspects 
of modernisation. 177 
Growing tensions within the JIC were accompanied by the persistence of difficult issues. 
This provoked the `crisis of expectation' as the divisional board expected the NUMLA to 
give positive backing to further modernisation. Amongst these was the board's insistence 
that the colliery's problems should be scrutinised through the imposition of the study 
method -a form of work assessment. The study method had been an issue which had 
exercised management and the union since the late 1950s having been debated nationally. 
The Coal Board wished to deploy it to pave the way for changes in technology, working 
practices and methods of payment. In this way, it was linked to the vexed question of the 
introduction of power loading and of shift work. It was thus a crucial aspect of 
modernisation. The Coal Board saw Mosley Common as a colliery in which the study 
method should be applied given its special problems. However, imposing the study method 
in the extremely strained atmosphere of Mosley Common was an option too far. It became 
a favourite hobby- horse for Weaver and the branch committee at Mosley Common as they 
vehemently opposed it. 178 Although the JIC assuaged many of the grievances arising from 
application of the study method its imposition increased tensions within the JIC itself. 
Gormley and Knowles angrily clashed over imposition. Both colliery and area 
management began to distrust Gormley and Hammond because they believed both had 
become sympathetic to Weaver on this and other pit level issues. In particular, they felt 
that Hammond had become the eminence grise of Mosley Common through his close 
involvement with the JIC from where it was believed he was orchestrating pit level 
tensions. Hammond -a one time associate of Weaver in the CPGB - felt that Weaver was 
often justified on issues with which he confronted management. However, Hammond was 
not using the opportunity to pursue an `agenda' over changes to work practices. He 
supported modernisation, but had to strike a balance between appeasing the `rank-and-file' 
and accepting the tenets of the modernisation dictated by the divisional board. 179 In fact, 
these suspicions arose from management frustration over continuing difficulties in 
implementing further modernisation in which they not only faced `rank-and-file' 
opposition but were beginning to experience equivocation, if not outright opposition, from 
more senior figures within the NUMLA. The divisional board had expected the NUMLA 
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leadership to accept changes to work practices with few reservations with the JIC 
providing the medium through which implementation could be achieved. 
Disagreements over the imposition of the study method presaged what became the key 
issue upon which Mosley Common's fate finally turned - the introduction of treble-shift or 
multi-shift work. On this issue the `crisis of expectation' finally and irrevocably blew wide 
open destroying any hope of continued co-operation with the NUMLA on which the future 
of the colliery depended. Introduction of double-shifts had caused enough problems before 
the imposition of multi-shift work. 180 The Coal Board saw multi-shift as the cornerstone of 
its modernisation of the industry; the issue on which much of the rest of modernisation 
would be determined including the all-important question of technological change and 
changes to methods of remuneration. The objective was continuous mining using power 
loading to full capacity. Anderton was a zealous disciple, arguing it was the major change 
required to secure the future of the industry in Lancashire. With multi-shift, further 
mechanisation could be achieved to deliver the increased output and productivity in the 
capital-intensive pits of the future. Anderton indicated portentously he wanted maximum 
co-operation from the NUMLA on multi-shift noting there had traditionally been 
opposition to shift work in Lancashire in a coalfield where it had not been the norm. 181 The 
introduction of multi-shift was thus not an issue restricted to debate at Mosley Common, it 
was already an issue of some import at the national and regional levels. 
Mosley Common was earmarked as a colliery in which multi-shift was to be introduced as 
the finale to its modernisation, together with the full implementation of new technology. 
The divisional board assumed it would be able to introduce multi-shift with the assistance 
of the JIC and the active co-operation of the NUMLA's senior officials. The exercise once 
again produced a crisis at Mosley Common. Widespread objections were raised. At branch 
level there was strong opposition to introduction with the significant support of Sid 
Vincent through the work of the JIC. Vincent became a leading opponent of multi-shift at 
Mosley Common with the backing of both Gormley and Hammond. The arguments against 
multi-shift did not emerge from bloody-minded `militant' rejection of the system. Rather, 
they were based on the circumstances of the colliery's `flawed conception'. Weaver was 
consistent on this point. The branch committee had already rejected more intensive double- 
shift working. They envisaged an operational and logistical nightmare in implementing 
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multi-shift. There were practical problems because the residential disposition of the 
workforce meant there were obstacles concerned with both surface and underground travel 
with consequent social hardship. Furthermore, objections were raised because of 
operational problems involved in rotating different grades at the four pits which had caused 
trouble under double-shift working. Additionally, there was the unprecedented practice of 
using lower grades of mineworkers in shift work. It was felt double-shift work had been a 
disaster at the colliery, compounding its operational problems. Moreover, parts of the 
colliery had been working a `skeletal' three-shift system for some time. This had given rise 
to a range of problems thus raising anxieties further. As Vincent concluded, they would be 
opposing multi-shift because "it wouldn't work". The branch committee argued that these 
issues were of such an intractable nature they outweighed questions of whether it should 
accept extra payments for working multi-shift. There was thus a fundamental objection to 
multi-shift at Mosley Common. Importantly, these sentiments gained support not just from 
Vincent through the JIC but also from both Gormley and Hammond. While management 
anticipated objections at branch level, they were surprised at reaction from more senior 
levels in the union. Gormley and Hammond emerged as strong critics of management 
through the JIC over the introduction of multi-shift at Mosley Common. 182 
Gormley and Hammond were dismayed at the imposition of such a contentious issue as 
multi-shift to a colliery with a recent record of strained relations which was just beginning 
to emerge from years of difficulties. In addition, they argued there were difficult wage re- 
negotiations to confront with the introduction of multi-shift, while the concept of putting 
the entire colliery on multi-shift rather than particular productive sections - which would 
have been the norm - stretched co-operation to the limit. 
'83 Again, it was evidence of 
pushing modernisation too far, this time on issues of work practices, accompanied by 
objections at all levels of the NUMLA. The `crisis of expectation' had now arrived, as the 
divisional board believed it was losing crucial support from those whom it expected would 
back modernisation without question. This realisation marked the point at which there was 
gathering momentum in favour of closing the colliery at both national and divisional levels 
at a time when performance was improving. However, there was one final scenario for the 
colliery. This involved a switch of emphasis by both Hammond and Gormley on the 
question of multi-shift. 
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While the branch committee at Mosley Common anticipated continuing support from 
Gormley and Hammond, both had been engaged in a process of steadily consolidating and 
modifying their position on multi-shift throughout 1964-1965. They came to the view that 
the introduction of this pivot of modernisation was inevitable. Gormley argued that multi- 
shift had been practised in other coalfields and was of increasing application throughout 
the industry. It was not entirely unknown in Lancashire as some pits had always practised 
it, though they were relatively few. Nationally, Lancashire had been in the forefront of 
debates on the more general application of multi-shift in which Hammond had been an 
important participant. The wider debate increasingly turned from questions of `should it be 
accepted generally' to one of `at what price should it be accepted'. In Lancashire, this 
debate raged throughout the second half of 1964. While the branch committee at Mosley 
Common stuck to non-acceptance supported by a minority of NUMLA branches, there was 
an increasing preparedness to move the debate toward acceptance on the right terms. This 
was a perspective which both Gormley and Hammond began to advance in earnest in 
moves to isolate the branch committee over multi-shift. Still, it was accepted that 
implementation at Mosley Common would be difficult, if not impossible. Gormley urged 
Weaver to accept multi-shift with increased pay, to no avail. Weaver upped the tone of 
debate by calling for industrial action over multi-shift. '84 
Crucially for Mosley Common, the continuing debate over acceptance of multi-shift 
produced a complete collapse of confidence in the future of the colliery by NCB 
management at all levels - the first time the NCB had been united on anything connected 
with Mosley Common. The `crisis of expectation' shattered any hope that the colliery had 
"turned the corner", raising doubts over its future. This, combined with a growing 
weariness with the colliery, finally broke management faith. The breach of faith coincided 
with a recrudescence of labour troubles during 1964 partly precipitated by attempts to 
introduce multi-shift, although the reduced trend of smaller-scale disputes continued - see 
Appendix to this Chapter. ' 85 
The collapse of confidence within the NCB was demonstrated in March 1965 at a routine 
meeting of the JIC. The language used by the area manager was apocalyptic. He 
announced that the future of the colliery depended on the successful unopposed 
implementation of multi-shift work despite continuing objections from Mosley Common 
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branch. While Hammond continued to give qualified support to the branch, it was Vincent 
- the close ally of Gormley - who once again emerged as a champion of the branch cause at 
the meeting. Mosley Common's fate was effectively sealed in March 1965 before the ACP 
announcement and some two years before it eventually closed. 
The ACP did not close the colliery but put it under scrutiny. ' 86 Mosley Common's 
remaining two years were spent against a background of persistent rumours about closure. 
Through the JIC, management at all levels made it clear the colliery's future was in the 
balance. All the old arguments about labour troubles, militancy and under-performance re- 
surfaced while the difficulties associated with the implementation of the National Power 
Loading Agreement added a new dimension to management concerns. 187 Contrary to 
management assertions Mosley Common's performance during its final years did not 
initially deteriorate from its more recent improvement, although performance did 
deteriorate appreciably between 1966 and 1967 when closure beckoned. 188 There is even 
counter-factual evidence to suggest that Mosley Common was continuing to improve 
during the mid-1960s. For example, in early 1966, the colliery became the first in the 
division to attain the coveted one million-ton production target. NCBNWD officials were 
publicly talking about the "coming of age" of the "ultra modern pit" which had surmounted 
its early difficulties, admitting publicly for the first time that these were caused by the 
"cumulative effects of re-construction work and modernisation". There was one important 
proviso to their optimism. They indicated that for the colliery to have a future there was an 
urgent need to implement changes to working practices. 189 Clearly, multi-shift was the 
main focus of management attention. 
Labour's prescriptions on further contraction put Mosley Common under the spotlight 
because of its financial position. Yet, although there was deterioration in financial results 
during 1965-66, financial losses at the colliery were more of an historical and accumulated 
nature than of a current or continuing kind. 190 In any case, if the main reason for closing 
the colliery was poor financial or operating performance then it could have closed at any 
time since 1947. Furthermore, despite management claims of a deteriorating industrial 
relations climate at Mosley Common, the final years of the colliery were ones of relatively 
low dispute-proneness - see Appendix to this Chapter. It was more a case of management 
nervousness increasing again as a result of new tensions. 
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Given these facts, the divisional board was fabricating a set of negative factors for the 
colliery pursuant to closure. While it could point to operational and technical problems 
these were hardly insuperable given the recent record of the colliery in overcoming them. 
Likewise, the divisional board gave the colliery a set of unattainable objectives to achieve, 
including the clearly contradictory one of remedying "a shortfall in output". The board was 
turning the screw on Mosley Common in order to precipitate its closure. 191 The reason was 
the board's continuing anxiety over its inability to implement further modernisation. The 
divisional board faced opposition, or lack of wholehearted support, over implementation of 
multi-shift. This was the main reason for Mosley Common's final demise. Gormley had 
accurately warned Weaver that failure to implement multi-shift would see collieries close. 
192 The colliery was proposed for closure in 1967 but earned a deferment through a trial 
period agreed by Gormley once again to `prove itself against impossible targets. However, 
it was the intervention of Harold Wilson over closures which earned the colliery a reprieve 
until its final closure in February 1968.193 
The events surrounding closure were the stuff of high emotion and drama. Amid the 
gnashing of teeth at its passing there were protests, eleventh hour interventions, and calls 
by Weaver for industrial action and a public inquiry. 194 They all amounted to nothing. The 
dye was cast, and it had been for some time. Events leading up to closure saw some of the 
most acrimonious exchanges in the turbulent history of the colliery in which blame was 
apportioned and scapegoats sought. In particular, Gormley, writing later in his memoirs, 
found an excuse for the colliery's failure in his celebrated attack on the militant wreckers 
of Mosley Common who he alleged closed the colliery. This attack was all the more 
piquant given Gormley's frustration over his failure to persuade Weaver to accept multi- 
shift. This had strained relations within the JIC and between Weaver and Gormley. 195 
However, it was Gormley, Hammond and Vincent who played an equal part in 
precipitating closure. Their opposition to changes to work practices was instrumental in 
bringing about the collapse of confidence within the NCB over Mosley Common's future. 
The fact that both Gormley and Hammond modified their position on multi-shift more 
generally was not enough to reduce the divisional board's anxieties over Mosley Common 
one iota. They failed to deliver the branch committee in support of their modified position, 
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while it was clear that all three men continued to harbour grave doubts about the efficacy 
of introducing multi-shift in the circumstances of Mosley Common. For the divisional 
board, obstacles to the introduction of this vital piece of modernisation was the final blow 
hastening closure. 
The concept of the Mosley Common project was accompanied by serious misgivings from 
the beginning to a degree which undermined management cohesion throughout the life of 
the colliery. These differences ran long and deep. Fundamental management disagreement 
permeated decision-making and manifested itself in poor planning,. lack of control and 
obfuscated communication. Although management was divided at all levels the higher 
echelons of management remained more convinced of modernisation on the scale and 
complexity undertaken. The NUMLA, who saw the colliery as ' one of the premier 
modernisation projects, supported them. The growing problems and under-performance of 
the colliery were a direct result of this misplaced judgement. The increasing list of 
problems included an upsurge in pit level tensions and dispute-proneness. This was used 
by sections of management to blame to `militancy' and a legacy of poor industrial relations 
as a cover for the colliery's failings. The faith placed in the colliery's future at the most 
senior levels of the NCB saved it from earlier closure. But, the overriding reason for 
survival was confidence in the NUMLA leadership to assist modernisation through its 
participation in the JIC. This faith was severely tested in the `crisis of expectation' as the 
NUMLA leadership's enthusiasm to overcome obstacles to the colliery's modernisation 
was not present to the same degree when it came to modernising work practices. This 
factor was the main reason for closure, not financial or operational problems, militancy or 
poor industrial relations. 
There are a number of issues which emerge from the analysis of the situation at Mosley 
Common. Firstly, the role played by the NUMLA leadership on the JIC and its part in 
provoking the `crisis of expectation'. Given the reluctance of the leadership to oppose the 
divisional board on colliery closures more generally, why did it engage the board in a more 
definite way at Mosley Common on work practices? These issues were of relevance 
beyond Mosley Common. They were of major importance to the future of the whole coal 
industry. For the senior officials at the centre of the multi-shift debate at Mosley Common 
these issues were about securing the future of the industry. Mosley Common was just one 
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rather important arena in which the battle for the industry's future took place. For 
Gormley, Hammond and Vincent colliery closures were an irrelevance because they were 
about a battle for the industry's past. The battle over the problems of Mosley Common was 
about securing the industry of the present. But, the battle over work practices was a battle 
for the industry's future. This was the only issue of importance on which they felt it was 
worth fighting. This explains why Gormley and Vincent supported Weaver - an ideological 
opponent - through the work of the JIC on work practices. Support on pit level questions 
was about working toward a broader agenda than the narrow concerns of Weaver and 
Mosley Common. The shift of emphasis on multi-shift was indicative of the way the 
debate was being steered toward securing the terms of the coal industry of tomorrow. 
Mosley Common's `moment' was passing as priorities switched toward focusing on work 
process issues, such as multi-shift, to obtain the best deal inside the modernised industry 
after the completion of industrial change. In this respect Mosley Common was less 
important by the mid-1960s as attention turned from this `failed' modernisation project to 
securing the best terms within the two new collieries and the `successful' re-constructions. 
A second question concerns the extent to which problems at Mosley Common were 
exceptional. There were `successful' re-constructions elsewhere in Lancashire which 
survived. Equally, the problems which afflicted Mosley Common's modernisation were 
not sui generis. It was not unusual as a `failed' re-construction either in Lancashire or 
elsewhere. Less than half the major re-constructions in the coalfield survived the 1960s. 
Other re-constructions, such as those in St. Helens district - which was less troubled and a 
more `attractive' mining area - experienced similar difficulties to those at Mosley 
Common. 196 The argument that the problems of Mosley Common were not exceptional 
was one advanced by some sections of management. However, as others conceded, Mosley 
Common's difficulties were of a different order, certainly in Lancashire. They were 
certainly on a different scale from other re-constructions. 197 The complexity, extent, and 
sheer profusion of problems had NCBNWD officials fleeing to leave. 
It was not only the complexity and physical scale of the colliery which gave rise to 
problems. The colliery's difficulties were unusual because of an absence of managerial 
agreement on the most basic operational issues arising from fundament disagreements over 
re-development. This situation compounded an operational and logistical nightmare of the 
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first order. In formulating their revised position on multi-shift both Gormley and 
Hammond acknowledged the situation at Mosley Common was `different'. The Mosley 
Common project was so `flawed' it ate into every facet of its existence. While sections of 
management denied the problems were exceptional, they were keen to stress its uniqueness 
in terms of its `militancy' and poor industrial relations. The only aspect of its `militancy' 
and the industrial relations record that was exceptional was the matrix of problems which 
gave rise to it. During the extirpation of emotion accompanying closure the most profound 
question being asked was: "Who Killed Mosley Common" ? 198 Mosley Common died at its 
own hands - verdict: suicide - Mosley Common was a modernisation too far. 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the investigation of rationalisation and the ACP in the Lancashire coalfield 
that there was an overwhelming acceptance of industrial change by both the NCBNWD 
and the NUMLA. This acceptance extended to the need for the rationalisation of the 
industry. The ACP brought rising tensions. In Lancashire, this had both a specific 
dimension, related to the character and operation of industrial change, and specific 
outcomes, related to the priorities of the industry which remained. 
The analysis of specific closures has demonstrated that the NUMLA leadership accepted 
the Coal Board's strategy for closures. The compelling case for modernisation was 
instrumental in the NUMLA leadership's acceptance of the Maypole closure which paved 
the way for many more. Recognition by the union of the need to maintain the momentum 
of change was illustrated by the position it took on manpower issues generally, and on the 
manpower issues arising out of the Sandhole closure in particular. Not only was the 
NUMLA leadership willing to accept closures, it actively participated in them, such was its 
desire to assist the modernisation of the industry. This position was demonstrated on 
different occasions, under both rationalisation and the ACP, at Maypole, Sandhole and 
Clock Face. At Clock Face, the advent of the ACP and the increasing problems this 
heralded for industrial change in Lancashire was not sufficient to prompt leadership 
opposition to further closures. 
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`Rank-and-file' opposition to closures was specific, sporadic, and fragmented. It arose 
from the invidious character or specific outcomes of closure. Collective opposition to 
closure was absent as NUMLA branches responded to the particular circumstances of 
closure at their own colliery. This was an important feature of the Clock Face affair where 
the union leadership was able to re-assert its authority by gathering the support of branches 
where closure had been untroubled. Only where organisational links existed through union 
panels or where political links existed between colliery branches was there any hint of 
collective action such as that associated with the Sandhole closure. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the divisional board closed collieries because of 
`militancy' or a poor industrial relations record per se. It was clearly an excuse at Mosley 
Common, while elsewhere collieries were closed irrespective of their industrial relations 
record. However, at Clock Face and Sandhole opposition to the divisional board's plans 
and the existence of a `militant' branch at Sandhole were important elements in closure. 
Alleged `militancy' or a poor industrial relations record was thus a significant second order 
issue in closure considerations. This became an issue too for the NUMLA leadership who 
saw `militancy' and industrial action as `unhelpful' to industrial change. 
The evidence from these closures points to little involvement from `outside' the industry, 
either through the intervention of parliamentary representatives, local authorities or 
coalfield communities. The potential exception was at Maypole where `outside' 
involvement was rejected. At Maypole the relationship between the NUMLA and the 
Labour Party was influential in affecting closure. 
The closure of Mosley Common arose from a different set of circumstances from the 
others considered. The problems of the colliery arose out of the need to propel 
modernisation and from the nature of opposition to the process. It was only due to the 
willingness of the NUMLA leadership to participate in saving the colliery that it was not 
closed before 1968. In that sense, although the situation at Mosley Common was different, 
like the others, it was a casualty of the modernisation agenda. The significance of the 
`failure' of Mosley Common lay in the contrasting responses of the NUMLA leadership 
toward modernisation of the colliery with its more general response to rationalisation in 
Lancashire. While there was never any question of the NUMLA leadership opposing 
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closures it was readily involved in opposition to changes to work practices. This contrast 
spoke volumes about the priorities of the NUMLA leadership in its support of 
modernisation. The conflict over work practices at Mosley Common was part of a wider 
engagement by the union to ensure that it was able to appropriate the most attractive terms 
within the new industry emerging from the ashes of the old. These sentiments also played 
an important part in the closure of Sandhole on questions of technological change. The 
main pre-occupation of the union was in making a claim on the industry which remained 
after industrial change had been completed. The union was not interested in saving 
collieries except in so far as they were current symbols of the modernisation process. 
If one person encapsulated this philosophy it was Joe Gormley. He used the occasion of 
industrial change to ensure that the union staked a claim in the industry of the future, thus 
signalling his tacit acceptance of industrial change. However, Gormley was not alone, 
although he owed much to industrial change as the device with which to stamp his personal 
authority on the Lancashire union. This chapter has concentrated on the closure of four 
collieries in the coalfield focusing on the involvement of the NCBNWD and NUMLA in 
industrial change. The following two chapters will assess the NUMLA's more general 
response to industrial change in the absence of opposition from the leadership. They will 
also highlight the wider response to industrial change in the coalfield through a variety of 
actors. 
206 
4.6 APPENDIX: MOSLEY COMMON COLLIERY: INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES 
YEAR NUMBER OF 
DISPUTES 
UNDER 100 
WORKING DAYS 
LOST 
NUMBER OF 
DISPUTES OVER 
100 WORKING 
DAYS LOST 
TOTAL 
DISPUTES 
1945 3 4 7 
1946 2 1 3 
1947 5 5 10 
1948 2 2 4 
1949 7 0 7 
1950 13 4 17 
1951 6 2 8 
1952 7 0 7 
1953 3 1 4 
1954 4 1 5 
1X15, 
..... >.;.: 
{ 12 7 1ýI 
1956 lI 4 15 
1957 14 17 
1958 14 l_ 15 
19 
1960 
16 
ALL 
1962 8 7 15 
1963 4 1 5 
1964 8 6 14 
1965 5 1 6 
1966 8 1 9 
1967 0 0 0 
1968 0 0 0 
TOTAL 171 57 218 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
REACTION AND RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIAL CHANGE IN THE 
LANCASHIRE COALFIELD: MODERNISATION 
AND RATIONALISATION TO 1965 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter considers reaction and response to industrial change through an examination 
of the position adopted by the NUMLA leadership; how the NUMLA leadership together 
with the Labour Party successfully managed opposition to industrial change and through an 
assessment of the response of the `rank-and-file'. The previous chapter established that the 
leadership accepted the priorities for industrial change. It remains to consider the 
characteristics of the leadership's response to colliery closures and its involvement with the 
fuel policy debate. This chapter assesses how the NUMLA leadership successfully 
managed opposition to industrial change. Here, it will be shown how the relationship 
between the NUMLA and the Labour Party was influential in managing opposition. This 
relationship was decisive in pressing the case for industrial change by encouraging a policy 
of industrial diversification while mutual dependency between the NUMLA and Labour 
allowed the NUMLA to use industrial change to promote Labour's ambitions. In doing so 
it raised expectations about what Labour would do for the coal industry and coalfield in 
government. 
This chapter will also examine the nature of opposition to industrial change. It will reveal 
that there was a broad level of agreement within the NUMLA in favour of modernisation. 
However, there was criticism of industrial change from `militant activists' within the 
NUMLA and through a growing sense of `rank-and-file' frustration and resentment over 
specific outcomes of industrial change. Both the divisional board and the NUMLA 
leadership ignored these sentiments. It will be proposed in this chapter that the resentment 
felt by the `rank-and-file' did not translate into increased protest because industrial change 
tended toward division rather than solidarity among the `rank-and-file'. This suited the 
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NUMLA leadership. However, the growing sense of grievance over the outcomes of 
industrial change was never fully extinguished. The NUMLA leadership was thus saddled 
with taking the union into the late 1960s with a combination of resentment together with 
high expectation of a Labour government. 
5.2 THE NATIONAL UNION OF MINEWORKERS LANCASHIRE AREA 
LEADERSHIP'S RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 
Although the NUMLA leadership accepted the priorities of industrial change it appeared to 
offer a series of `challenges' to the divisional board over a number of issues. The NUMLA 
leadership tackled the divisional board over the manner of industrial change, particularly 
the mode of colliery closures. Gormley and Hammond criticised the board over the reasons 
it gave for closure and over lack of consultation. For example, in 1958 they questioned the 
divisional board's handling of the Garswood Hall closure. Hammond was "incensed" that 
the board had closed the pit "with a phone call". Both claimed they had intended to fight 
the board's "sudden decision to close the colliery". 1 There was certainly a lack of 
consultation. However, there was never any intention to oppose closure. Because the 
NUMLA leadership had not objected to previous closures under similar circumstances it 
had effectively given the `green light' to the divisional board to proceed with more 
closures. 2 Objections had not been raised to closures during the 1950s because the 
NUMLA saw these as essential to meet the manpower requirements of the new and re- 
constructed collieries. What Gormley and Hammond found objectionable about Garswood 
Hall was the insufficient time they had to `prepare' the workforce for shutdown because of 
a premature closure announcement. They would have preferred closure under the 1959 
Revised Plan so they could promise the workforce a transfer to the new Parkside colliery, 
then under development. 3 They questioned the board over the manner and timing of 
closure only in as much as it impinged on their ability to `manage' the `rank-and-file'. 
Again, in 1959, Hammond reproached the divisional board over the "impromptu" closure 
of Welch Whittle colliery. Hammond had no intention of opposing closure. Instead, he 
produced a timely display of histrionics because closure was proving problematic for 
manpower transfers 4 He had known Welch Whittle was likely to close since the crucial 
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discussions over Maypole in December 1958.5 Likewise, Hammond warned the divisional 
board not to fabricate excuses for closure under pressure to reduce excess capacity 
quickly. 6 This was another empty threat because throughout rationalisation the board 
bandied reasons for closure such as "exhaustion" or "uneconomic" in an interchangeable 
and indeterminate way, on a routine basis. "Exhaustion" or "geological problems" were 
often cited instead of poor financial results or performance, while the term "uneconomic" 
was a catch-all for under performance or lack of future potential. The abandon by which 
the divisional board did this without challenge was remarkable. It was a clear case of 
Hammond high on rhetoric and low on action. 
One of the few instances where a `challenge' was mounted was obviously a pretence. In 
1962 the Cleworth Hall closure came at a time of rising tension over the `Review of the 
Revised Plan' following the Sandhole closure. The outcome at Cleworth Hall was similar 
to the Sandhole climbdown only it was a volte-face. Gormley threatened Anderton with 
industrial action over Cleworth Hall in the absence of an inquiry into closure. He 
questioned the divisional board's decision to close the pit because of "exhaustion" 
believing the board wanted to close a `long-life' colliery prematurely as a result of pressure 
to reduce excess capacity under the `Review of the Revised Plan' using current under 
performance as an excuse. 7 Shortly afterwards, Gormley accepted closure without 
reservation. The reason for this dramatic change was the board's promise that the Cleworth 
Hall miners would receive better pay and conditions if they transferred to another colliery. 8 
Anderton knew that Gormley would accept this titbit. Like Sandhole, Gormley saw 
advantages in improved pay and conditions that would accrue from re-deployment to 
modernised pits. It provided Gormley with the opportunity to show he had wrung major 
concessions from the board as a condition for agreeing closure. As it transpired, only a 
small proportion of the Cleworth Hall men were able to enjoy transfer to Agecroft where it 
had been inferred they would go. The majority were scattered around the Manchester 
district to collieries with an uncertain future with many immediately forced to accept 
reduced status and pay to keep a job in mining? The Cleworth Hall closure demonstrated 
that any `challenge' the leadership mounted was not worth the paper it was written on; in 
this case it was a cruel illusion. 
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The leadership taking a principled stand to give the impression it was taking action over 
industrial change was amply illustrated over the open cast mining question. In this case the 
NUMLA and Labour used union opposition to mobilise mineworkers against the 
Conservative Government's fuel policy and to gamer support for Labour's national fuel 
policy. Open cast mining was an emotive issue during rationalisation. For mineworkers to 
face closures in deep mining while open cast developments proceeded gave vent to strong 
feelings. Open cast was a physically proximate and highly visible bogey for miners. It 
involved private contractors using high volume extraction techniques reinforcing the 
perception that miners' traditional skills were redundant. Having originated during the 
exigencies of the Second World War, both the Coal Board and post-war governments had 
become lukewarm about open cast. However, low operational costs and exceptional 
profitability offered advantages over high cost low profit deep mining in coalfields such as 
Lancashire while it offered a baulk against vagaries of production, price fluctuation and 
industrial action in deep mining. Miners were aware of their disadvantaged position in 
relation to open cast. The Coal Board's hollow claim that open cast provided job 
amelioration in areas of decline in deep mining only added to strength of feeling. Finally, 
there were inchoate environmental concerns over open cast expressed through local 
authority pressure for reductions to the `disamenity' it created. 10 As a result, open cast was 
a significant political issue for mineworkers by the late 1950s. 
In Lancashire opposition to open cast appeared to be a leadership priority as colliery 
closures loomed. Two of the largest open cast sites in Lancashire had a combined 
production equal to the output of the coalfield's most productive collieries 11 In addition, 
there were plans by the Ministry of Fuel and Power to develop new sites in Lancashire. 12 
The NUMLA made it clear to the divisional board that these developments were misguided 
while collieries were closing. The NUMLA appeared to challenge the priorities for 
industrial change. Hammond emerged as a leading critic of open cast opining the NUMLA 
should oppose closures in the absence of the abandonment of all open cast sites and an 
embargo on new developments. Hammond's assertion held widespread support. As one 
union delegate noted, open cast "would be a fight to the bitter end" . 
13 Open cast was one 
issue on which the NUMLA leadership had considerable `rank-and-file' support to take 
industrial action had it chosen to do so. For example, Cronton colliery voted in favour of 
taking strike action against the Conservative Government with the support of St. Helens 
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panel and several important colliery branches in other districts of the coalfleld. 14 Calls for 
industrial action were precipitated by closure announcements during the late 1950s 
particularly at Maypole. ls As the primary cause of injustice it was open cast which 
galvanised support for action rather than pit closures. 
Yet the NUMLA leadership rejected calls for industrial action. Strike action was rejected 
because it might damage relations with the NCB. 16 Hammond stressed the need for 
negotiations with the Coal Board rather than strike action but only after he had whipped up 
a whirlwind of excitement that his trenchant stand might signal his endorsement of strike 
action. '7 Certain factors justified leadership rejection of industrial action. The teeth of 
protest over open cast had been drawn by agreements to halt the opening of new sites and 
cutback production both in legislation and through negotiations with the NUM at the 
national level. '8 The Government and the Coal Board saw these measures as necessary to 
obtain NUM agreement to colliery closures. The open cast issue was thus one of 
decreasing importance from the late 1950s. There was also a complication with taking 
direct action since the TGWU had organised 12,000 workers in the open cast industry. 19 
Nevertheless, the leadership failed to reflect the strength of `rank-and-file' feeling. Its 
position was one of creating the impression it was in sympathy with the `rank and file' 
while avoiding confrontation with the Coal Board. 
The NUMLA leadership skilfully took possession of protests over open cast. It channelled 
anger into a campaign against the Conservative's perceived deficiencies on fuel while 
reinforcing support for Labour's fuel policy. Initially however, Hammond, in positioning 
himself at the forefront of the open cast debate created the intriguing prospect of schism 
within the NUMLA leadership. A split between Hammond and both Gormley and Hall was 
avoided as Hammond quickly fell into line. He recognised the predominant leadership 
view that there was more advantage in manipulating open cast for its political value than in 
a risky adventure with direct action. Hammond thus became like the grand old Duke of 
York marching his troops to the top of the hill only to have to march them down again. 20 In 
any case, Hammond was guilty of hyperbole on open cast because the leadership 
calculated that the threat posed by open cast was of marginal consequence seen against the 
scale of contraction in deep mining being considered. 21 
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The significance of the open cast debate was the way it gave the union an opportunity to 
demonstrate its congruity on an issue of symbolic importance to mineworkers: At the same 
time, the leadership used open cast as a means of deflecting attention from its acceptance 
of colliery closures. This helped maintain its credibility and integrity during a difficult 
period. The acceptance of closures needed to be sold to the `rank and file' by stressing its 
more positive aspects. The national agreement to reduce open cast production was used by 
the NUMLA leadership to respond to criticism of its acceptance of closures in Lancashire. 
The leadership claimed that it had forced major concessions on open cast. It linked the 
national agreement on reduced open cast output to possible cutbacks at Lancashire sites. It 
carried the open cast `victory' like a major trophy. It was a sham. 22 There was absolutely 
no linkage between the national and regional positions. As the divisional board indicated, 
it did not exercise direct control over open cast site designation or operations since this was 
the responsibility of the Ministry of Fuel and Power and the Coal Board. In any event, the 
initial agreement on reduced open cast production was negligible. The main `concession' 
was the embargo on future site development, enacted in legislation. This did most to 
reduce output because the `health' of the open cast industry depended on the steady 
development of new sites as existing sites reached exhaustion. 23 
The open cast debate presented other opportunities for the NUMLA leadership to exploit. 
In this the Labour Party joined the NUMLA. Both wished to encourage the notion that the 
pariah of open cast was not the creation of the Coal Board but was part of the bankrupt fuel 
policy of a Tory government bent on destroying deep mining. NUMLA branch delegates 
leading the call for industrial action over open cast believed the continuance of open cast in 
the face of deep mining closures constituted an attack by the Tories on miners as part of a 
wider assault on the labour movement. The belief that open cast should be the casus belli 
for war with the Tory Government was music to the ears of the leadership 24 Not that it was 
about to join battle. Rather, such assertions were an opportunity to bash the Tories over 
fuel and support a national fuel policy under a future Labour government. 25 Taking the 
attack directly to the Conservative government was popular with both the NUMLA 
leadership and Labour. Both were consistently alert to opportunities to divert `rank-and- 
file' criticism from the Coal Board to the Government throughout the period of 
rationalisation. They did this in order to maintain partnership with the Coal Board over 
industrial change and to support the idea that the NCB would be more effectively managed 
237 
under Labour. Gormley and Hall exploited these opportunities during the run-up to the 
1959 general election. 26 
There were clear political advantages for Labour in the appropriation of the bandwagon of 
protest accompanying open cast. For example, Alan Fitch, the newly elected NUMLA- 
sponsored Wigan MP, headed a high-profile campaign against the development of new 
open cast sites in Lancashire in which he energetically enlisted the support of Labour 
controlled local authorities with mining connections. Fitch exploited concerns over open 
cast during his by-election campaign in Wigan in 1958. Like the union leadership, Fitch 
readily claimed victories when proposed developments were rejected. Again, ý such claims 
were humbug, this time from Labour because new site developments were halted as both 
the Government and the Coal Board were in the throes of a general retreat on open cast as 
part of wider policy considerations. 27 
The open cast debate of the late 1950s was of major importance to industrial change in the 
coalfield provoking strength of feeling like no other issue. However, the NUMLA 
leadership and Labour blatantly manipulated it to divert attention from their acceptance of 
colliery closures. Moreover, the open cast issue was used to service Labour's future policy 
formulations and electoral ambitions. In these respects, it came to typify the reaction of the 
NUMLA leadership and Labour toward industrial change. 
Following on from the open cast debate the NUMLA leadership was involved in 
`challenging' industrial change through the position it adopted on fuel policy as it entered 
the more general fuel debate. It was involved with coal industry issues such as efficiency, 
marketing, production and coal utilisation which became elements of Labour's national 
fuel policy. Linked to this the NUMLA leadership participated in more specific debates 
over coal-to-oil conversions. As the open cast question receded into the distance its place 
was taken by the `fuel debate' as a priority for the leadership particularly as the scale of 
coal contraction became apparent. The NUMLA leadership used the debate to highlight the 
Tories reluctance to assist coal in favour of oil. 28 There was a perception that the terms of 
clean air legislation had been loaded against coal to favour oil conversion 29 It was further 
argued that the Tories were responsible for the biggest challenge to coal by attempting to 
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"procure a pro-oil policy". 30 Hammond twinned the threats posed by open cast and coal- 
to-oil conversion. 31 
The union leadership directed frustration over coal contraction at the Tory Government to 
divert attention from its acceptance of closures. Like open cast, it allowed it to attack the 
Tories on fuel while maximising support for Labour's fuel policy. Gormley's involvement 
on the NUM executive was an important conduit in developing Labour's policy ambitions 
within the NUMLA. 32 This involved the union in the wider debate over the modernisation 
of coal together with the leading role it played in campaigning for coal fuelling in the 
public and local authority sector in the North West. Faced with the broader issues 
confronting coal the leadership supported modernisation to make coal fit to compete with 
oil. It attempted to persuade government that a modernised coal industry could compete 
with oil in power generation. 33 Additionally, the NUMLA leadership tried to persuade the 
Coal Board and Government to offer more support for research into smokeless products. 34 
In this the NUMLA leadership was strident in its criticism of Coal Board failure to update 
scientific research to make coal more attractive. 35 
These involvements shaped leadership attitudes toward industrial change. As calls for a 
more vigorous response to the closure programme grew so leadership attitudes hardened. 
Gormley led union rejection of calls for industrial action over closures, arguing it was 
pointless calling for strike action if the industry was unable to compete. According to 
Gormley's philosophy of industrial change, stemming the destruction of coal in Lancashire 
required a response which would make coal "an efficient and competitive industry in the 
field of fuel". 36 Leading NUMLA officials shared Gormley's assertions that the industry 
had to "prove itself' as a commercial entity. On the one hand this meant increasing the 
commercial potential for coal. On the other, it meant continuing to support the divisional 
board over industrial change by improving the performance of the Lancashire coal 
industry. Thus, industrial change for the leadership was about successfully piloting a 
business through a testing period of transition. The union leadership never wavered on this 
general proposition. This was an important reason why it avoided confrontation with the 
divisional board over closures believing industrial action would upset the partnership it 
sought with the board to improve coal's ability `to compete'. 
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A direct result of the union's involvement in `making the industry fit to compete' was its 
participation in the campaign to persuade the public sector and local authorities in the 
region to retain coal fuelling or to re-convert to coal from oil. Like the open cast issue, the 
conversion debate was used by the union leadership to divert attention from its attitude 
toward industrial change. The NUMLA leadership embraced the campaign because, like 
open cast, oil conversion was an emotive issue for the `rank-and-file'. Equally, oil 
conversion was of utmost importance to the NUM at the national level which needed to be 
reflected in the coalfields. There was also the matter of the `Tory press' making hay out of 
Labour controlled councils and institutions with mining connections converting buildings 
to oil feedstock. 37 Clearly, there was a need for a response from the NUMLA. 38 
Notwithstanding the need to respond, the leadership exploited the oil conversion issue in a 
similar way to open cast. One aspect was the inordinate attention it devoted to oil 
conversion. The NUMLA leadership was involved in detailed and long running debates 
over individual conversion cases such as the conversion of Wigan public baths. The debate 
surrounding this conversion and other public buildings in Wigan became a cause celebre 
involving the union, local authorities, MPs, the public, and representatives of ad hoc 
colliery branch committees. It was used as a platform on which to focus attention to the oil 
conversion practices of local authorities throughout the coalfield. Hammond in particular 
became actively involved in the protests. While there were strong feelings amongst 
mineworkers, the involvement of the NUMLA leadership reached farcical levels at a time 
when the coal industry in Lancashire was melting away. 39 
In claiming that the battle for every ton of coal was a battle for every job in Lancashire 
coal, the union leadership recorded some notable successes in reversing the trend toward 
oil conversion using its influence with Labour authorities through NUMLA connections 4° 
The union had more success than the divisional board 41 However, like open cast, oil 
conversion involved coal production at the margins. 42 Demand from this sector was of no 
consequence in determining closure outcomes because the proportion was so small: three 
per cent of Lancashire coal was supplied to the sector, eight per cent if coking coal is 
included. 3 Colliery coal sales to the sector, including those of closure cases, rarely topped 
seven per cent and were more typically much less 44 There was thus no correlation between 
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the threat posed by decline in demand for coal in this sector and the extent to which the 
campaign was propelled by the union leadership. 
Why did the union leadership accord this storm in a teacup the priority it did while 
neglecting colliery closures? This was one sector of the coal market the union could 
directly influence through its connections with Labour controlled authorities. It allowed the 
leadership to become adept at pursuing the issue to divert attention from its role in 
industrial change. The leadership set up Labour controlled authorities like fairground Aunt 
Sallys; to criticise them as a means of deflecting frustration over coal contraction. Labour 
controlled authorities were the perfect foil because challenging them ran only a minimal 
risk of resistance. By the late 1950s and early 1960s the NUMLA was still influential on 
Labour controlled authorities in the coalfield while the mining vote could not be ignored. 
Local councils were unlikely to cause the NUMLA leadership concern. 
There was some resistance and resentment from councillors without mining connections to 
the way in which the NUMLA threw its weight around on this issue. However, the largely 
supine response to NUMLA cavilling was a good indication of who was still perceived as 
having the power in the coalfield 45 Similarly, the torpidity of coalfield local authorities in 
effecting smokeless zoning was more evidence of the influence the NUMLA still wielded 
through its connections on local councils. The fact that Lancashire coal was largely 
unsuitable for conversion to smokeless products was a factor which increased this 
pressure 46 The union leadership found it could let these ceaselessly absurd conversion 
arguments proceed while they occasionally stirred the pot with an attack on the local 
authority concerned. At the same time, the union leadership avoided its more onerous 
responsibilities on closures. 
The issue also helped the union leadership block attempts by Labour controlled authorities 
to intervene in closures. During the Maypole closure, Hall, in rejecting local authority 
involvement, issued the barbed challenge to Abram Council that it would be more help 
saving the pit if it burned coal than interfering in an issue that was none of its business 47 
The NUMLA leadership was thus able to dissuade local authority involvement in pit 
closures because of the challenge they faced over oil conversion. Furthermore, like the 
open cast issue, the leadership saw the opportunity of symbolic gesturing on an issue of 
241 
importance to the `rank-and-file'. After all, although the NUMLA claimed vindication for 
involvement in this campaign through the successes in brought, the responsibility for 
marketing coal rested with the NCBNWD not the NUMLA. It was an issue of negligible 
effect on coal contraction. The NUMLA leadership had little justification for its close 
involvement. It did so only because of the tactical advantages which accrued. 
The NUMLA leadership was involved in any venture as long as it did not have to tackle 
the Coal Board over its priorities for industrial change. The specific criticisms levelled at 
the NCB were of no importance because the NUMLA had already accepted the thrust of 
Coal Board strategy as the price of retaining a viable modernised industry in Lancashire. 
`Challenges' arose because of leadership sensitivity over the scale of closures. These 
`challenges' were merely diversionary exercises intended to give the appearance that the 
leadership was taking up a particular cause on behalf of the `rank-and-file'. Additionally, 
the leadership appropriated and exploited these issues to fulfil Labour's aspirations. 
Finally, the `challenges' the leadership made over fuel policy constituted nothing more 
than intervention in the debate over the efficient management of the industry including its 
modernisation and rationalisation. 
5.3 THE NATIONAL UNION OF MINEWORKERS LANCASHIRE AREA. THE 
LABOUR PARTY AND THE MANAGEMENT OF INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 
One important feature of rationalisation was the ability of the NUMLA leadership to 
respond to successive waves of criticism and protest over industrial change. It did this by 
learning to improve the effectiveness and presentation of the case for industrial change. 
Furthermore, this was achieved by developing its relationship with Labour through a 
mutual interest in promoting Labour's fuel policy and in the modernisation of the coalfield 
through industrial diversification. Both were used to powerful effect in pursuing Labour's 
electoral ambitions during the late 1950s and early 1960s. It is possible to understand these 
developments by examining a number of situations which arose under rationalisation. The 
first concerns three specific events: those surrounding parliamentary elections in Wigan; 
the response to protests over colliery closures; and specific happenings at Bradford 
colliery. The success of improvements to presentation can be seen in the case of the 
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threatened closure of Ellerbeck colliery and the way in which new forms of debate were 
utilised. Finally, leadership promotion of Labour's ideas on industrial diversification 
utilised the union's relationship with Labour to pursue the case for the modernisation of the 
coalfield. 
The first situation was the 1958 Wigan parliamentary by-election and 1959 general 
election campaigns 48 The result of the two elections were never in doubt in a seat in which 
mining interests still predominated. Wigan had delivered increasingly healthy majorities 
for Labour candidates sponsored by the NUMLA for almost half a century. For Alan Fitch, 
the NUMLA's candidate, there was little effective opposition from the Tories or Liberals 49 
The importance of the two election campaigns lay in the intervention of the Communist 
Party candidate, Mick Weaver. In two otherwise lacklustre campaigns the pre-eminent 
issue became a vituperative conflict between the two candidates over the future of the coal 
industry in Lancashire. During the 1958 campaign Weaver accused Labour of 
collaborating with the Tory Government to destroy Lancashire coal. 5° The ferocity of 
Weaver's attacks intensified during the 1959 campaign into angry exchanges with Fitch on 
the hustings. The closing stages of the 1959 campaign were ignited by Weaver's 
accusations of Fitch having lied to Wigan miners in 1958 over the extent of coal 
contraction and of complacency over the issue during his first year in the Commons s1 
Weaver widened his attack to include the NUMLA leadership. He accused it of having 
known of the scale of closure, of concealing it from miners and of collaboration with the 
divisional board in effecting closures. 52 
As Fitch insisted, these attacks were part of a strategy of political capitalisation by a no- 
hope candidate. 53 Certainly, the issue was less prominent during the 1964 and 1966 general 
elections. 54 By then, Weaver realised there was less political mileage in closures because 
industrial change had all but run its course, in the Wigan area at least. By the mid-1960s 
the debate had moved on to the ramifications of closures while Weaver was a less 
challenging figure as a result of his co-option in attempts to solve the Mosley Common 
conundrum. The climate during the 1964 general election was thus described as "fair with 
occasional outbreaks of thunder". The NUMLA leadership still made its ritualistic 
condemnation of Weaver for having opposed the "miners' choice" at the polls. 55 By 1966 
Weaver's challenge was an irrelevance as both the question of industrial change in the 
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Wigan area as well as Weaver's own personal political star were fading fast. However, the 
significance of Weaver's interventions in Wigan was the way it provoked reaction from the 
NUMLA and Labour together with its influence on the direction of the debate over 
industrial change. 
The NUMLA objected to Weaver's candidature because Fitch was the `official' miners' 
candidate sponsored by the union. This produced vitriolic condemnation and censure of 
Weaver from the majority of the NUMLA executive, the union leadership, and the 
victorious Fitch. 56 However, it was not the transgression of the union rulebook which was 
the source of outrage. It was Weaver's persistent public accusations of collaboration by 
Labour and the NUMLA in closures. The intensity and range of attacks levelled at Weaver 
were disproportionate to the threat he posed to the union leadership and Labour's electoral 
ambitions in Wigan. The fact that the whole panoply of the NUMLA and Labour Party was 
brought crashing down on him was indicative of sensitivity to the accusation. Weaver had 
effectively touched the raw nerve of the NUMLA and Labour through his interventions. 
Similarly, he had brought out the agenda of both the NUMLA and Labour for industrial 
change. Weaver forced Fitch to concede that the coal industry was all but dead in the 
Wigan area and admit that the future of coal lay in a modernised industry elsewhere in 
Lancashire. 57 
The problem for Weaver in forcing out this admission was that it allowed Fitch to expound 
Labour's vision for the future in a coherent and highly effective way. Fitch was able to 
offer mineworkers the prospect that industrial change would be overseen competently and 
humanely by the Coal Board together with a policy of industrial diversification delivered 
by a future Labour administration. 58 Fitch's appeal to miners to embrace modernity and 
place their faith in a smaller modernised coal industry together with new industrial growth 
was not unattractive to a majority of mineworkers. Fitch offered what appeared to be a 
credible, sustainable, and viable future beyond large-scale mining. This was in contrast to 
the continued lack of clarity on industrial change offered by the Communists, further 
obscured by Weaver's dire prognostications of an industry laid waste in Lancashire. 59 
Added to the strength of this appeal was the ability of the NUMLA leadership and Labour 
to exploit the hegemony they enjoyed in the Wigan area to propagate this message through 
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NUM branches. The galvanisation of support for Labour's view of industrial change 
helped reinforce its huge electoral advantage. 60 Fitch believed he had cemented his 
relationship with the Wigan miners through this time-honoured network. 61 Mineworkers 
were convinced that despite the scale of contraction the Coal Board's effective 
management of industrial change together with Labour's industrial diversification policies 
assured their future. 
Fitch's message connected well with prevailing sentiments in two different ways. For an 
older generation of miners, modernisation of both the coal industry and the coalfield was 
about righting the wrongs of the past. Labour's promise to tackle the legacy of private 
capitalism was one which struck a cord because extinguishing the iniquities of the past was 
an assertion of the `triumph of Labour'. Furthermore, Fitch successfully presented 
modernisation as a continuation of the coalfield's Labour tradition of moderate reformism 
and progressive improvement. He skilfully invoked the past in service of the present to 
justify industrial change. The intention was to re-assure this section of his constituency. 
For a younger generation Fitch's vision accorded well. The onset of large-scale closures 
produced a crisis in the recruitment and retention of younger mineworkers. Fitch's promise 
of a modern and viable industry together with better opportunities outside of coal was 
applauded. 62 These messages delivered to two different sections of the mining community 
demanding different outcomes proved to be incredibly attractive in combination. 
The intervention of opposition in Wigan allowed the union leadership and Labour to 
reinforce acceptance of industrial change. Nevertheless, as the events described above 
indicated, they had become increasingly sensitive over closures. This was again 
demonstrated during the late 1950s and early 1960s over `rank-and-file' attempts to 
undermine the authority of the NUMLA leadership on the issue. As it became obvious that 
the NUMLA would not be opposing closures, small but active `rank-and-file' groupings 
made links to elements in other coalfields intent on opposing closures while opposing the 
official line in Lancashire. The most prominent included Bradford, Mosley Common and 
Sandhole collieries. 
Two related events involving `rank-and-file' activity are notable. The first involved 
Bradford and Sandhole participating in a mass lobby in London on 8th January 1959 in 
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protest against the closures announced under the `Special Review' of collieries. The protest 
was taken to Westminster, the Coal Board and NUM headquarters. Left-wing delegates 
from Scotland, South Wales and Kent led the protest. It was fundamentally a left-wing 
`rank-and-file' show opposing closures and NUM policy while acting as a rallying point in 
an attempt to mobilise the whole labour movement. This was the start of a campaign 
mainly waged from Scotland and South Wales against closures. 63 Joe Clarke and members 
of the Sandhole branch committee led the Lancashire group. They were joined by members 
of Bradford branch committee and `rank-and-file `activists' against the wishes of the 
Bradford branch president TM 
On their return they were pilloried by a leadership triumvirate: Hall, Hammond and 
Gormley. They were charged with participating in an unofficial demonstration backed by 
groups without sanction from the NUMLA which had brought the union into disrepute. 
The NUMLA executive had asked for a boycott in favour of Lancashire's participation in 
an official lobby organised for 290' January. Clarke, as the most senior figure involved with 
a seat on the executive, was the obvious scapegoat. Unlike the others, Clarke, was 
particularly vulnerable since he remained inside the Labour Party rather than outside it. 
Hall, in sinister `Stalinesque' fashion, `outed' Clarke at a full delegate conference complete 
with press photographs of him standing in front of the NUM's London building holding up 
a banner proclaiming `Lancashire Miners Demonstrate Outside their National 
Headquarters'. 65 
The second event concerned developments at Bradford branch. A Trotskyite faction had 
participated in the 80' January action against the wishes of their branch leadership. The 
faction had also issued a paper attacking the policy of the branch leadership and by 
inference the NUMLA. By 1960 Bradford branch was in turmoil with the branch 
leadership facing a revolt through attempts by this faction to usurp them. In addition, both 
Sandhole and Bradford offered platforms to left-wing officials from other coalfields to 
espouse their views on closures. At the same time, the Bradford faction attached its name 
to the publication of the left-wing `rank-and-file' newspaper The Miner and contributed 
articles attacking NUM and NUMLA policy. 66 The NUMLA leadership responded in 
characteristic fashion by moving to censure Sandhole branch and suspending Bradford 
branch for six months pending the withdrawal of its name from The Miner -a decision 
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initially upheld by delegates. The inference was that suspension would be permanent if that 
undertaking were not implemented resulting in the re-constitution of the branch overseen 
by the NUMLA executive. 67 
The significance of these events was two-fold. Firstly, the leadership was acutely sensitive 
about closures. Hall, Hammond and Gormley were unsettled by the thought of the Coal 
Board and NUM in London believing the NUMLA was unable to exert maximum control 
over its branches on industrial change even though the branches involved constituted a 
maverick minority. The fact that these protests put the NUMLA in the media spotlight 
added to leadership embarrassment. Secondly, and of greater significance, the NUMLA 
leadership was surprised by reaction to these events across the coalfield. While there was 
little support for the protests - even less for a Trotskyite faction who organised a coup 
within its own branch - they provoked a call for more extensive and open debate on 
industrial change. Sympathy for those caught in the January 80' protest inquisition was not 
restricted to the `militant' branches of Manchester district but included branches in 
St. Helens district, most notably Cronton and Sutton Manor. They offered support believing 
that to crush protest of this kind was to "stifle rank and file democracy" within the union. 
This view attracted widespread support. 68 Similar voices had been raised by delegates over 
reaction to Weaver's interventions in Wigan . 
69 Likewise, the suspension of Bradford 
branch caused disquiet amongst delegates. Suspension was seen as an action of the last 
resort 70 There was abhorrence at events within Bradford branch but the debate it initiated 
over industrial change was seen as a welcome development. 
NUMLA leadership over-reaction was the key element in promoting a mood of 
acquiescence toward such protests among delegates. In turn, this mood saw calls for 
dialogue with Bradford rather than confrontation. While there was some evidence of 
collusion between the militant groupings in the three Manchester branches - something the 
leadership exaggerated - there is no evidence of a concerted and co-ordinated `rank-and- 
file' revolt over closures. Delegates recognised that these groups were a small and 
disparate minority. It was felt that the leadership was looking for an excuse to crush the 
Bradford faction. 71 
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The diffident attitude of delegates toward tackling opposition to industrial change within 
the NUMLA was not lost on the leadership who were forced to revoke its suspension of 
Bradford branch by a delegate vote after Bradford successfully argued it had withdrawn its 
association from The Miner. Paradoxically, this decision assisted the re-assertion of 
stability at Bradford because it prevented the showdown the Bradford faction was inviting 
and the leadership was seeking, although the result was a branch committee irrevocably 
altered in favour of the left. 72 These events did not affect the attitude of the union 
leadership toward industrial change but the mixed reaction of branches was noted. The 
union leadership had substantially induced this mood because sensitivity over closures 
made it over-react to `rank-and-file' criticism. 
The outcome of these episodes had much to do with a tradition of autonomy, factionalism 
and `rank-and-file' tendencies within the union given a more contemporaneous edge by 
calls for greater democracy within the NUMLA. This came in reaction to the overweening 
authority exerted by the Bolton headquarters of the union. The conferences in which 
Lancashire miners transacted business were hardly festivals of full and frank debate. 
Although enlivened by the occasional challenge to the leadership they were more 
frequently highly structured demonstrations of deferential loyalty by delegates to the 
leadership based on the patronage they enjoyed or hoped to secure. The domination by the 
political `right' under the iron fist of the few successive secretaries and their coteries 
ensured compliance. 73 The minority of delegates who challenged the `county' line, such as 
Clarke, found out the hard way. Weaver was on extended licence because of his role at 
Mosley Common. The character of NUMLA authority was questioned throughout these 
events but protest was shaped by the way industrial change was being handled by the 
leadership. The leadership interpreted these murmurings of dissatisfaction as a need to 
improve the presentation of the case for industrial change rather than opening up a 
substantive debate over policy. Senior officials such as Gormley and Hammond displayed 
some sagacity in recognising that the NUMLA leadership had to examine more effective 
methods of presentation and re-double its efforts at explaining the necessity for industrial 
change. In this, there was an added urgency during the early 1960s as the scale of closures 
produced increased tension. The size of the closure programme outside the Wigan district, 
where most closures were expected, came as shock for many in the coalfield bringing 
accusations of complacency by the leadership. 4 
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In another sense, the accession of Gormley to the post of secretary in 1961 brought a new 
style of leadership. Hall rarely felt obliged to explain himself to the `rank-and-file' beyond 
the stultifying confines of delegate conferences whereas Gormley evinced a prodigious 
talent for more direct appeals to mineworkers. Similarly, although Hammond's abilities lay 
more in setting the broader agenda, delivering the big set piece speeches to conferences, or 
as a skilful negotiator picking through complex minutia with management, he too 
demonstrated an ability to make popular appeals. The outcome witnessed both Gormley 
and Hammond at large in the coalfield addressing miners on the pit bank, in welfare clubs 
and in `black face' meetings in a reflection of the leadership style of Lord Robens - the 
new broom at the Coal Board. This `populist' shift in tactics bore fruit for a leadership 
facing an increasingly challenging time during the early 1960s. 
An example of how this change of style proved beneficial came in 1962 when the union 
was faced with protest in the Chorley area. A protest had been organised jointly between 
members of Chorley Labour Party and Ellerbeck Miners Association over redundancies in 
the staple industries 75 It had been provoked by rumours that Ellerbeck colliery might 
close. Tensions were heightened by a number of factors. The closure of Welch Whittle in 
the same area in 1960 had resulted in manpower transfer problems. 6 Moreover, in an area 
on the extremities of the South Lancashire coalfield transfers required a 30-mile daily 
round trip to retain a job in coal. However, the main source of anger was rising 
unemployment, exacerbated by the 1962 recession. Concerns were expressed that the 
closure of Ellerbeck would leave only Chisnall Hall colliery in an area heavily dependent 
on coal and cotton. Finally, it was felt that Ellerbeck was a profitable colliery with good 
potential and an excellent industrial relations record. 77 
For the NUMLA the protest carried with it worrying aspects. Foremost, it was about the 
ramifications of closure rather than about a specific closure issue - an altogether tougher 
nettle for the union leadership to grasp. Secondly, it involved the Labour Party in Chorley, 
outside the tight control of the Party in the Wigan area. Thirdly, it was in an area of the 
coalfield which had a reputation for taking an autonomous line on many organisational and 
substantive issues in union politics 78 Protest was not usually expected from this area but 
when it did occur it was taken very seriously indeed. 
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For these reasons it received the combined attention of the NUMLA leadership and Labour 
in Lancashire. Both Fitch, as a leading mining and regional MP, and Gormley were 
dispatched to help the local MP, Clifford Kenyon, explain policy on industrial change. This 
was the sort of Daniel in the lion's den role that Gormley relished. To a packed audience of 
hundreds of miners, Gormley, as the keynote speaker, positively gorged himself on the 
feast provided by this hostile audience. This was Gormley giving one of his most effective 
performances as he juggled from the rostrum. His response to attacks on Coal Board and 
NUM policy from branch officials and `rank-and-file' miners was a combination of 
deflection, ruse and promise. Attacks on the Coal Board were parried toward the Tory 
Government as Gormley defended Lord Roben's "humanitarian" and "socialistic" handling 
of rationalisation. 79 
Gormley had the innate knack of touching the most basic instincts in his audiences as well 
as utilising more guileful aspects of his character. He recognised that although there were 
wider issues of local de-industrialisation which had been expressed by Chorley Labour 
Party, Ellerbeck miners were primarily interested in the future of their colliery. Gormley 
pitched his responses accordingly, detaching and isolating the Ellerbeck case from the 
wider issues which he left to Fitch to handle. Gormley emphasised the performance and 
potentialities of the colliery, indicating that he would be seeking co-operation with the 
divisional board to develop new reserves in the area giving a strong hint the colliery would 
have a future backed by his personal authority. This played well with the audience because 
it gave them hope, but it was an illusion. It was another example of Gormley claiming the 
credit for an initiative, but this time for one that never existed. No such undertakings were 
ever entered into to develop Ellerbeck. 80 Finally, Gormley joined with Fitch in promising 
an economic renaissance in which a future Labour government would bring new industry 
to the area. It was a convincing double act worked to cunning perfection to steal the show. 
Ellerbeck was closed within three years of Gormley's guarantee followed by neighbouring 
Chisnall Hall in 1967 thereby ending a long mining tradition in this corner of the coalfield 
81 
Although miners left the meeting still harbouring reservations about the future, Gormley's 
performance in the thick of hostility, with Fitch in support, had at least piloted the 
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leadership around a potentially awkward obstacle. A strong defence of the Coal Board's 
handling of industrial change, guarantees on the colliery's future, and the promise of 
industrial diversification delivered personally from two leading figures in the NUMLA and 
the Labour Party appeared convincing. The events at Chorley typified the energetic manner 
by which Gormley managed protests over industrial change in engagements with the `rank- 
and-file'. Although many did not agree with everything Gormley said, or necessarily 
believed him, there was admiration for the way he launched himself on these occasions; for 
his gusto and not infrequently his chutzpah. In each engagement ruse and promises were 
varied to suit the situation. Gormley was brilliant at offering just the right incentive at the 
right moment even if it did not contain a grain of truth. It enabled him to successfully deal 
with challenges or questioning of industrial change. He was equally at home offering 
miners incentives to accept industrial change through better wages and conditions in the 
modernised pits as he was in offering guarantees and promises to those under threat of 
closure. 
In seeking to improve the presentation of its case the NUMLA discovered the value of 
special and weekend conferences to discuss particular aspects of industrial change and the 
wider issues involved. 82 It was Hammond's idea to call a weekend conference for the first 
time in Lancashire in December 1963. This was in the style of a `jolly' at a top Blackpool 
hotel where the focus was on social contact much in the same way as annual conferences in 
Blackpool and other resorts. There was a deliberate attempt to keep the format as informal 
as possible. The inauguration of these meetings in Lancashire had nothing to do with 
attempts to improve democracy within the union. It was about Hammond "educating" the 
`rank-and-file'. 83 They were a leadership device to propagate the necessity for industrial 
change. This was achieved by reaching a wider range of mineworkers either through direct 
`rank-and-file' participation or through the chance to spread the word more effectively. 
The "educating" process perceived by Hammond involved persuading participants of the 
need for industrial change by presenting the facts facing the industry from a range of 
speakers from both sides of the industry and from Labour. Hammond indicated that they 
were not intended to be "pep talks" though this is precisely what they were. 84 
The December 1963 conference arose from a specific challenge from Ted Woolley, now 
installed as branch secretary at Brackley colliery with a seat on the union executive. The 
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issue was the imminent closure of Brackley which Hammond used as the occasion to call 
the first weekend conference. They were Hammond's forte. He was able to display his 
guest speakers - on this occasion Wil Paynter and James Anderton - to reinforce his 
assertions. Importantly, it was an opportunity too for Hammond to cajole participants, 
including a few old comrades, as he engaged them in the issues facing the industry. In this, 
Hammond demonstrated a gift for emollience. Gormley played a secondary role at this 
gathering because applying balm was an essential element of proceedings rather than the 
inflammation that Gormley's prominence would have produced for the left. 85 
At the conference, Hammond gave a favourable assessment of industrial change to-date. 
This was the cue for Paynter to provide a vindication of industrial change in which he 
developed another important theme of the conference - the possibility of a change of 
government. He established what he expected from Labour. This included a national fuel 
policy with a leading role for coal together with socialist economic and social planning. 
Anderton and Gormley called for continuing performance improvement and union co- 
operation hinting that the industry was on the threshold of a period of consolidation and 
stability. Participants were so impressed with this interpretation of industrial change that 
they pledged themselves to continued co-operation in modernisation and rationalisation. 
Similarly, they were captivated by the thought that the process of change was nearly 
completed and a change of government might be imminent. Participants were implored to 
put the recent period -of rationalisation behind them and prepare for the future under 
Labour. 86 
The conference was notable for its assemblage of leading `militant' sceptics. Clarke and 
Woolley - both at Brackley - and Weaver were joined by Trotskyite, Joe Ryan of Bradford 
colliery, and the Communist, Jimmy Dowd -a rising figure on the left from Gormley's 
`home' colliery of Bold. Both Hammond and Paynter asked this plurality of left wing 
opinion what they wanted for the future of the coal industry. They were asked to consider 
what it was that united rather than divided them. Was it not, as Paynter argued, a socialist 
vision? Did this universal objective not transcend all their trivial differences? Was this not 
the vision of a modernised coal industry playing its part within a national fuel policy which 
they most desired? Within this introspection the `militants' were asked to consider their 
reaction to "pit closures that inevitably arise" from this process. For both Hammond and 
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Paynter modernisation could only be delivered at a price. Closures were a sacrifice which 
was necessary to ensure the achievement of socialist objectives. 87 Hammond was an 
advocate of socialist unity on the political left on questions of industrial change. His belief 
in the need for `left unity' had increased rather than diminished throughout industrial 
change. Hammond further interpreted his call as the need for modernisation to proceed 
under a socialist government. 88 
The `militants' were left floundering in the slipstream of being faced with the reality of 
their own political philosophy. Their response was a re-affirmation of a commitment to a 
socialist vision. There was more to this moment of truth than Paynter administering a 
socialist re-baptism on the shores of the Irish Sea. Primarily, though these individuals had 
consistently argued against the specific outcomes of industrial change they were forced to 
admit that as socialists they were as committed to the modernisation of coal under 
socialism as were Hammond and Paynter. They were persuaded it was hopeless fighting 
against what they fundamentally believed in. Moreover, they all agreed with Paynter's 
invocation of the experience of the industry's past in order to justify its current 
metamorphosis. As Paynter put it, their "forefathers" had demanded a modernised industry 
under socialism. 89 
The dilemma facing the `militants' was compounded by the fact that throughout 
rationalisation they had failed to produce a constructively coherent alternative to one of 
modernising the coal industry together with the industrial diversification of the coalfield. 
They found it as difficult articulating a response at this conference as Weaver did when 
Fitch bolstered his massive electoral advantage through a punishing and persuasive counter 
attack in Wigan in 1959. Their weakness resulted from more than just translucence on the 
issues. It also arose from the diversity of positions they represented on the political left. 
Their lack of clarity combined with their disparity to undermine their ability to produce a 
credible alternative. They never came remotely close to producing a common platform 
which could challenge the leadership on industrial change with the transparency on the 
issues or the unity of purpose required. These were among the reasons why they singularly 
failed to pose a serious threat to the NUMLA leadership. 
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This fragmentation was underlined when, after declaring unanimity on socialist objectives, 
Woolley voiced the only discordant note. He departed from the others by sticking rigidly to 
Trotskyite principles that the industry should be placed under workers' control free from 
capitalist domination to ensure that industrial change was overseen by those whose 
interests it directly affected. This was far cry indeed from his colleague, Joe Clarke, and 
Dowd and Weaver who expressed views concurrent with those of Hammond and Paynter 
through a discussion of industrial change under state control. Weaver in particular was 
most responsive on this occasion as he reacted positively to Paynter -a fellow Communist 
- and Hammond -a former comrade. In another way, this reflected a more pliant Weaver 
who had emerged from the events at Mosley Common; all the more significant given that 
he would once again be fighting Labour at the ballot box within the year. 90 
For Hammond and Paynter the exercise was wholly intentional and quite clever. The bait 
was the possibility of a Labour government working for coal under socialism. 
Nevertheless, for the `militants' their commitment to industrial change was more profound 
than the more momentary expectation of Labour delivering socialist objectives in 
government. Hammond and Paynter proved convincing with their dazzling description of 
life under Labour but it was by reminding the `militants' of their shared commitment to a 
socialist vision which proved so effective. 
In no way did this conference - important though it was - permanently silence the 
dissenting voices. This was demonstrated in March 1965 when Hammond and Ryan 
clashed over an unofficial dispute at Bradford colliery. Hammond attacked Ryan and his 
supporters for "politicising" a routine wages dispute in order to provide the arena for a 
challenge to the leadership's stewardship of changes to work practices. Hammond 
conceded that his desire for `left unity' on industrial change remained a distant dream 
which was being destroyed by "the phials of hatred amongst members of the left". 91 The 
difficulty for the leadership was that although the 1963 `fireside chat' at Blackpool helped 
assuage the challenge from the left on the immediate issue of closures it was a risky 
strategy. It raised the stakes because there was already a great deal of expectation riding on 
a Labour victory. Holding out the prospect of what Labour `might' do in office helped 
placate the sceptics within the NUMLA but risked heightening expectations still further. 92 
Moreover, Hammond and Paynter's tour de force only increased the frustration felt by the 
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`militants'. They had to accept the hopelessness of questioning industrial change while 
carrying the burden of reconciling their socialism with industrial change knowing this 
meant contraction in Lancashire. Finally, as the eruption at Bradford colliery in 1965 
indicated, the issues arising from modernisation of work practices continued to produce an 
insidious erosion of goodwill toward industrial change on the left. 
Another way the NUMLA leadership sought to manage industrial change was over the 
question of industrial diversification in the coalfield. 93 Again, this was an objective about 
which there was a great deal of expectation from a future Labour government. The 
significance of industrial diversification was the enthusiastic way it was proposed and 
supported by the NUMLA. Industrial diversification, together with a modernised coal 
industry, became the twin pillars upon which the union's propinquity with Labour was 
founded. It was an agenda which meshed well with Labour's modernisation plans. The 
impetus for this policy came from the NUMLA leadership. During the debate over 
Weaver's intervention in Wigan in 1959, Hall explained the union's position on closures 
by drawing attention to Lancashire's more recent economic history. He argued that even 
during the 1930s the situation was not exclusively one of industrial decline. It was also 
about new industrial growth based on industries such as "paint and plastics". Hall 
suggested a parallel with the current situation but this time with a Labour government 
promoting new industrial growth. 94 Hall was clearly an advanced student of modem 
economic history: it was an admission that coal would cease to be a major employer and 
that it was necessary to help ex- mineworkers by supporting new industrial growth. 
In another sense, Hall's assertion of his "paint and plastics" philosophy was less generous. 
His support was primarily about the requirement to provide the NUMLA leadership with a 
defence against criticism of its role in closures. Hall's successor, Joe Gormley, also 
recognised that industrial diversification provided the union with an indemnity to 
underwrite its acceptance of industrial change. At the 1965 NUM annual conference he 
famously quoted Arthur Homer, remarking that: 
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"I don't wish to represent pitmen just for the sake of keeping them in the pits. If 
they can be found more congenial jobs outside the pits, we had better stand and 
deliver and what the hell have we to fight for them for? '. 95 
The only difference between Hall and Gormley on industrial diversification was Gormley's 
insistence that maintaining the pace of modernisation through adequate manpower 
recruitment and retention was more important than supporting miners into new industries. 
96 This occasionally conflicted with his endorsement of industrial diversification. 
However, for both, industrial diversification was an insurance policy which provided first 
class cover for the leadership. It was a long-term commitment which pushed into the 
distance the day when some explanation of the outcome might be required. Against a 
background of relative economic buoyancy industrial diversification would provide the 
new jobs to take up those lost in coal. It was inconceivable that industrial change could 
proceed without a commitment to industrial diversification. It promised a golden scenario 
because it suited everyone. The Coal Board was happy because new industrial growth 
minimised the social costs involved in industrial change. The NUMLA knew it would play 
well with mineworkers because it made closures more acceptable. Finally, there was a 
bonus for both the NUMLA and Labour because it helped promote them as forward 
looking institutions with, a modem image particularly as a younger generation of miners 
were increasingly turned away from both by their rather staid image. 
While industrial diversification had unqualified support within' the union it was Labour in 
the coalfield who supported its implementation. This revealed much about the priorities of 
Labour in industrial change. The main figure involved was Alan Fitch because he was a 
NUMLA-sponsored MP; he was prominent on the Lancashire and Cheshire Regional 
Council of Labour and represented a district of the coalfield most acutely affected by 
closures. As chairman of the Mining Group of MPs at Westminster, Fitch's interests in 
industrial diversification extended beyond the Lancashire coalfield. 97 The other interested 
coalfield MP was Tom Brown, the NUMLA-sponsored MP at Ince: a constituency 
adjacent to Wigan in which many closures had taken place. Brown, like Fitch, never 
questioned closures in his constituency. Closures were only debated in terms of their 
ramifications, including the need to attract new industry to the coalfield. 98 The remaining 
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coalfield Labour MPs had individual interests determined by their various trade union links 
or previous occupations. However, they too concerned themselves solely with the 
implications of industrial change rather than its priorities. 99 
Industrial diversification became an issue of widespread interest throughout the coalfield. 
The late 1950s and early 1960s period was important not just because of the end of large- 
scale mining; it was also a time when the coalfield decisively declared for change. One 
highly symbolic event was the opening, in May 1959, of H. J. Heinz's huge modern food 
processing and canning plant at Kitt Green near Wigan. The event saw a gathering of 
leading coalfield figures. In this gleaming Temple of modernity senior NUMLA and Labour 
leaders toured in wonderment. Fitch and Brown announced that the opening of the factory 
marked the "beginning of new industry in the area". Fitch bristled with excitement at this 
development. 100 The fact that the NUMLA and Labour went to such lengths to welcome 
new industry, in contrast to their lack of response to colliery closures, was a good measure 
of their commitment to modernisation. 
This commitment was affirmed throughout the early 1960s as Labour-dominated local 
authorities with mining connections announced that both coal and cotton were in 
irrevocable decline and the future belonged to new industrial growth. Labour, through its 
domination of coalfield local authorities, saw industrial diversification as the only issue 
worth discussing, and rarely became involved in attempts to save collieries from closure. 101 
Support for modernisation saw encouragement of mineworkers to believe their future lay 
outside the industry. Local authorities vied for new industry while industrialists were 
encouraged to secure personnel from within mining communities. 102 For example, Metal 
Box Ltd opened two plants for the manufacture of food cans during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s. These projects were the most important after the Heinz development. The 
company offered free transport to workers in the coalfield to visit one of the factories 
under the banner: "For the men of today (and tomorrow): Automation in Action", a clear 
inference these developments represented the economic future of the area. 103 Coalfield 
local authorities together with the Government and private sector actively encouraged a 
discourse of modernity in which coal and cotton were seen as outmoded and dying 
industries with the future belonging to new industry and infrastructure. 104 There was thus a 
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widely held belief that a new Lancashire was suddenly about to rise phoenix like from the 
ashes of the old. 
This mood was reflected at Westminster where both Fitch and Brown failed to raise the 
question of colliery closures. Their involvement was exclusively with the implications of 
coal contraction in order to cause maximum embarrassment to the Tories and promote 
Labour's alternatives. 105 In any event, new industrial growth was taking place in spite of 
initiatives by the union and Labour not necessarily because of it. Industrial diversification 
in the coalfield is explored in more detail in the final chapter. Suffice to say, the debate 
was an attempt by the NUMLA and Labour to use the issue as a shop window for Labour's 
policies rather than to seek tangible solutions. 
For the `rank-and-file' industrial diversification was of increasing importance during the 
early 1960s, as the impact of closures became apparent and the election clock ticked 
toward a change of government. The situation in the Chorley area has been mentioned. 
There were similar concerns elsewhere in the coalfield. For example, Bold colliery called 
for action by the NUMLA and coalfield MPs to forestall growing unemployment in areas 
of the coalfield affected by closures. Localised unemployment was of increasing political 
importance. In the Leigh and Westhoughton constituencies it was a prominent issue during 
the 1964 general election. Such concerns were not addressed directly by the NUMLA 
leadership and Labour. Instead they appropriated expressions of concern to highlight the 
effectiveness of Labour's industrial and regional policies and to focus on Government 
deficiencies. During the 1964 general election both Tom Price and Harold Boardman, in 
defending their respective Westhoughton and Leigh seats, took full advantage of these 
concerns. Typically, Boardman accused the Tories of using "hansom cab solutions for the 
jet age". He promised nothing short of "space age solutions" from Labour for the 1960s. '°6 
Industrial diversification was popular because it reflected a desire for modernisation in the 
coalfield in the wake of rationalisation. It afforded a high degree of mutuality between the 
NUMLA leadership, Labour and the `rank-and-file'. However, the strategy of relying on 
industrial diversification carried with it a number of dangers, more so given the way it was 
pursued as a promotional device to advance Labour's ambitions. The problem with 
exclusively promoting industrial diversification while accepting colliery closures was the 
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mismatch it created between the rhetoric and reality of modernisation. There was no 
guarantee new industrial growth would occur to the level required to match contraction of 
coal. Industrial diversification was pursued in anticipation of what Labour might deliver in 
power. Given these circumstances it raises the question of how serious the NUMLA and 
Labour were over industrial diversification beyond the twin objectives of providing a 
safeguard for the union leadership and an electoral enticement for Labour? This question is 
particularly relevant given the dreadful experience of the coalfield since the 1960s which 
has led to questioning of the probity of those involved in supporting such a policy. '°7 
While there was a high degree of political self-interest there was also genuine support for 
notions of modernity at the time. Timing was significant. Leading elements in the NUMLA 
and Labour in the coalfield were swept up in the modernisation agenda of a re-invigorated 
Labour Party emerging from the internal debates of the early 1960s following the 1959 
general election defeat. Gaitskell, and later Wilson, marched to the drumbeat of 
modernisation. They had many followers in the coalfield. Fitch, as a leading party loyalist, 
was in the vanguard of support for Labour's modernisation plans. He believed this vision 
was achievable, credible and relevant to the needs of a contracting coalfield however 
narrowly he chose to apply it during the early 1960s. Leading figures in the coalfield thus 
held forth a vision of modernity which they wished to share with coalfield communities. log 
Fitch had been on the dole during the 1930s. During the Second World War he had worked 
in troubled Lancashire pits. His early mining career as an `outsider' to the coalfield and the 
industry had greatly influenced his `political' education. He had witnessed an industry 
"strained to the limits"' and "starved of resources" about which he noted: "There can be no 
more creative crucible of political ideals". Personal experience of unemployment and work 
in a clapped out industry had shaped both the man and the politician. 109 His experiences 
led him to conclude that change should be achieved through the modernisation of the 
industry and the coalfield. These experiences were not unique. They were the common 
currency of a generation of NUMLA officials and Labour politicians overseeing industrial 
change. As Joe Gormley asserted, it was not the business of socialism whether or not 
miners remained inside the industry or left to work elsewhere. The objective was obtaining 
a "better standard of living" through modernisation. "" The collective experience of the 
past informed current sentiments in most profound way. There was a genuine desire for 
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modernisation of both the coal industry and the coalfield even though these desires 
appeared to be expressed through political self-interest. 
Was support for industrial diversification by the NUMLA leadership and Labour in the 
coalfield fully justified? At worst, too to great an emphasis on industrial diversification 
while avoiding challenging the contraction of coal was a grossly reckless act which 
shamelessly gambled with the future of the coalfield. At best, a fairer and more accurate 
judgement was that the policy arose from the limited space the NUMLA and Labour had 
created for themselves. They had accepted and colluded in industrial change out of 
conviction. Given the scale of closures which resulted they had no option other than to 
support industrial diversification through conviction tinged with expediency. 
The NUMLA leadership was able successfully to manage opposition to industrial change 
by improving the presentation of its arguments. It withstood successive waves of criticism 
and protest over its role in industrial change. The union's links with Labour were an 
important ingredient in ensuring success. This relationship fortified the leadership's case 
through the rising expectations which accompanied Labour's preparations for power. 
However, it was also the NUMLA leadership's ability to placate critics of industrial 
change which was important in ensuring success. Critics were persuaded that they were 
equally committed partners in the quest for industrial change. This revelation was twinned 
with the inability of those critics to establish a coherent, effective and united stand against 
NUMLA-Labour Party hegemony on industrial change. 
5.4 THE REACTION OF THE `RANK-AND-FILE' TO INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 
In this section attention focuses on the reaction to industrial change by mineworkers. A 
distinction must be made between general acceptance of industrial change by a majority of 
mineworkers with reaction to specific outcomes of the process. There was a high degree of 
acceptance of modernisation by the `rank-and-file'. However, the `rank-and-and-file' faced 
a dilemma when confronted with the negative outcomes of industrial change. 
Rationalisation gave rise to `rank-and-file' grievances resulting in frustration and 
resentment. The culpable relegation of these concerns by a NUMLA leadership, whose 
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priorities lay elsewhere, fuelled resentment. However, it was how the `rank-and-file' chose 
to interpret these grievances which determined the outcome of industrial change during the 
early 1960s. 
It could be argued that rationalisation was a relatively straightforward process because 
modernisation had been a longstanding objective for mineworkers. Equally, new economic 
and social perspectives within coalfield communities meant there were new opportunities 
for mineworkers outside of coal. Likewise, industrial change came on the back of a long 
period of economic and social change within in mining communities which helped 
facilitate acceptance of modernisation. In this way, proponents of modernisation were 
pushing at a half open door in convincing the `rank-and-file' of the need for industrial 
change. 
An important indicator of this trend was the declining attraction of coal as a career which 
created a chronic manpower crisis. There is evidence to support the view of a rejection of 
the industry as a career for younger men, developing from the inter-war period. 111 The 
Coal Board faced a two-fold problem. Firstly, there was a general manpower recruitment 
and retention crisis after the Second World War. Secondly, the crisis was worse in the 
recruitment of juveniles and youths. The scale of the crisis at a time when coal production 
was a priority contributed to the fuel crises of the immediate post-war period as workers 
found jobs in new peacetime industries. 112 It had hardly abated during the mid-1950s when 
the Government considered placing restrictions on new industrial development in 
coalfields to stem the drift away from the industry. 113 There were some successes in 
attracting and retaining younger men through measures aimed at improving prospects for 
young recruits because modernisation stressed the need to attract young miners with 
managerial and technical competencies. Some success in this area, combined with an 
improvement in the general manpower position during the early 1950s, helped stabilise the 
situation. 114 Still, for post-war governments and the NCB the manpower situation was one 
of near permanent crisis throughout the immediate post-war period. 
The conventional wisdom on the `manpower crisis' suggests a collapse in confidence in 
the industry caused by social rejection of coal as a result of inter-war experience and the 
attractions of new opportunities in the coalfields. This is at best a general picture. The main 
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problem facing both post-war governments and the NCB was not a `manpower crisis'. It 
was an inability to attract and retain what they termed "virile labour". As both admitted, 
the `manpower crisis' was not about `manpower drift' across all ages and grades but about 
a failure to attract and retain younger miners who were needed to maintain high production 
levels and from whose ranks future managers and technicians would come in the push for 
modernisation. lls As a result, both government and the NCB frenetically poured over every 
piece of evidence which suggested youth had turned its back on mining as a career. The 
`manpower crisis' was more about faltering priorities for government and the NCB than 
about `manpower drift'. 
Furthermore, `manpower drift' was not a uniform phenomenon throughout the coalfields. 
The decision to begin inter-divisional manpower transfers in 1954 was an 
acknowledgement of this reality. Inter-divisional transfers were intended to ensure that 
production in the expanding coalfields of Yorkshire and the Midlands did not stall from a 
lack of trained manpower. Policy was less concerned with the needs of the transferees 
made redundant by early rationalisation in the declining coalfields of central Scotland and 
West Durham. '16 It was thus about the maintenance of priorities for the industry. The 
Government and NCB conceded this point in 1956. They noted that only three of the eleven 
British coalfields had a "manpower deficiency". Significantly, two were expanding 
coalfields in which production was a priority. Even in Lancashire, which was believed to 
have a serious manpower problem, the situation was only described as "borderline" . 
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The `manpower crisis' was not even a uniform problem within coalfields, as Baldwin 
indicated in his study of the Cannock Chase and Warwickshire coalfields during the early 
1950s. The relative attraction of new industry and rejection of coal as mining career was 
dependant on a host of local factors such as the availability of new employment 
opportunities, public transport and the costs and distances involved in travelling to work. 118 
This was also the case in Lancashire. The intensity of `manpower drift' varied across the 
coalfield. The Manchester district suffered the greatest `manpower drift' because of better 
employment opportunities. On the other hand, the manpower situation was less critical in 
central areas of the South Lancashire coalfield particularly in Wigan district where 
occupational concentrations in mining were much greater while there were fewer 
opportunities outside of coal. 119 As a Youth Employment Service report in Wigan in 1956 
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showed, interest in a career in coal among boys leaving school was as healthy as ever. If 
there was a problem it was in fording enough placements in the pits. 120 
These trends reinforced existing intra-regional employment patterns which had developed 
since the inter-war period. 121 They did not indicate widespread rejection of coal as a career. 
At least until the late 1950s patterns of employment, manpower, and occupational mobility 
remained broadly unchanged. The main development in `manpower drift' was the huge 
upsurge from the late 1950s as coal demand fell and the closure programme was 
announced. 122 In Lancashire those who could - particularly younger men - left mining in 
much greater numbers for work in other sectors because of uncertainty and insecurity 
while prospective recruits were dissuaded from entry. This was the key development in 
manpower in Lancashire, as it was in other declining coalfields. The idea that economic 
and social change within mining communities produced an amenable atmosphere in which 
industrial change was more attractive to the `rank-and-file' is not supported by reference to 
the `manpower crisis'. The `crisis' arose from political and industrial concerns over the 
maintenance of production priorities. There was certainly a manpower problem from the 
late 1950s because of the impact of rationalisation. This was the most significant 
development in influencing manpower trends not the experience of longer-term economic 
and social change. 
Another way of assessing whether the `rank-and-file' was amenable to industrial change as 
a result of longer-term economic and social trends is by measuring the `morale' of the 
coalfield community by reference to the `health' of its cultural and social infrastructure. 
There is nothing in the experience of the coalfield during the late 1940s and most of the 
1950s to suggest rejection of traditional allegiances and ties to coal. Contemporary 
descriptions of coalfield life from the early 1950s could well have been from half a century 
before. The Haydock Gala of 1952 continued to be the well attended combination of 
mining and rustic tradition it had always been complete with its complement of colliery 
bands, floats, may and rose queens and morris dancers. It even continued to boast a parade 
of pit brow lasses. 123 During the mid-1950s confidence in attachments to the industry 
remained so high that the NUMLA initiated an annual Lancashire miners' gala for the first 
time in the history of the coalfield. These became well-patronised affirmations of the 
robustness of the coalfield's cultural and social life. The NUMLA saw no disintegration of 
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membership during the early 1950s. Its confidence was such that it switched its annual 
conference from its Bolton headquarters to an annual jamboree at Blackpool. Similarly, 
there was no reduction in demand from aspiring mining engineers and managers to train in 
Lancashire pits for a professional career in the industry. During the late 1940s Wigan 
College of Mining and Technology boasted a record number of mining pre-diplomates and 
undergraduates on placements in Lancashire collieries. 124 
These instances confirm that if there were was a process of economic and social change 
taking place within Lancashire mining communities it had not eroded traditional 
allegiances and ties to the industry. After all, these were relatively good times to be part of 
Lancashire coal, probably among the more propitious in the history of the Lancashire 
industry. There was a pervading mood of optimism. The advent of public ownership, 
together with a buoyant demand for coal that seemed to stretch into infinity underpinned 
this confidence. Miners saw improvements to life on many fronts: in pay, conditions and 
welfare. In Lancashire, they could see visible reminders of an industry undergoing renewal 
as new collieries and re-constructions sprouted in their midst. There were closures, 
concentrations and re-deployment to face during the ten years following vesting date, but 
collieries and underground workings had always had a finite life. This time though, the 
closures were seen as a necessary step toward the desired objective of the modernisation. 
Lancashire miners witnessed a coalfield which had been in decline since the end of the 
First World War bouncing back to life under a new regime. 
The major change which grievously shattered this mood of optimism was the fall in coal 
consumption and the closure programme from the late 1950s. This marked the beginning 
of the fragmentation of the industry and with it the destruction of the cultural and social 
life of the coalfield. This was the main factor undermining confidence in the future of the 
industry rather than a longer-term process of economic and social change. Rationalisation 
created conditions of malaise, uncertainty and insecurity within Lancashire mining society. 
Contraction, combined with the rush to leave hastened the process of fragmentation 
because it reduced the size of the mining community and gave out negative signals about 
the future of the industry. This produced a collapse in `morale' from the late 1950s. One 
indication came in 1961 from a NUMLA branch official in the Atherton and 
Westhoughton area. He reported a lack of interest in activities connected with the industry 
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and fall in attendance at major social events such as the annual Pretoria Day 
commemoration march and he mused that there were not even enough musicians for the 
colliery bands. 125 The welfare and social clubs, which had been important foci of mining 
culture, were being bulldozed along with the collieries which sustained them. Many had 
only been built or were re-constructed in more optimistic times only a few years previous. 
126 By the mid-1960s Lancashire miners' gala - only inaugurated a decade before - saw 
attendance sustained only through participation from groups and families with recent 
mining connections but whose collieries had closed. 127 Wigan Mining and Technical 
College reported a plummeting demand for its mining courses to an extent that this 
undermined its chances of attaining polytechnic status. 128 Rationalisation created an image 
of an industry without a future in spite of the modernisation rhetoric of the NUMLA 
leadership and Labour; it destroyed the cultural and social life of the coalfield and 
encouraged `manpower drift'. 
Having established that `rank-and-file' attitudes remained fundamentally unchanged until 
the late 1950s, why did a majority of the `rank-and-file' greet industrial change with such 
resignation, even insouciance. An important factor in inducing `rank-and-file' 
acquiescence was the absence of large-scale redundancies. As the divisional board noted, 
the avoidance of a "catastrophic impact on social welfare" was a crucial part of its strategy 
intended to pacify miners' concerns over industrial change. 129 As a result, the `rank-and- 
file' was prepared to accept the assurances given by the NUMLA leadership underwritten 
by commitments made by Labour for future government. For the majority of the `rank-and- 
file' there was never any question of opposing industrial change. Similarly, pitmen were 
under no illusions about the predicament facing coal from the late 1950s. This degree of 
pragmatism was reflected in an unsentimental assessment that an era of deep mining was 
coming to an end in many parts of the coalfield. As one miner, who served as a Labour 
councillor noted, as he retired from the industry after the Garswood Hall closure: they were 
witnessing the "end of that particular industry in the town" (Ashton-in-Makerfield). He 
noted the future would be determined by an ability to attract new industry. 130 
However, this level of agreement did not mean the `rank-and-file' were willing to accept 
every aspect of industrial change ordained by the NCB or NUM. Far from it. Where the 
`rank-and-file' faced the rub was when they were confronted with the injustices of the 
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process or its negative outcomes. These included the open cast and oil conversion issues 
already mentioned. Moreover, the increased tensions of the early 1960s were a response to 
negative outcomes seen through the rising toll of closures. 
What was also clear under rationalisation was that industrial change produced groups of 
`winners' and `losers' among mineworkers, though the lines of distinction were often 
blurred. There were many positive attractions for mineworkers in industrial change which 
persuaded them to remain inside the modernised industry. The new collieries and re- 
constructions offered the potential for higher earnings. However, the attraction of a job at 
one of these pits was not just about fatter pay packets. There were more fundamental 
attractions. As one Lancashire miner, given a tour of the new Parkside colliery before 
retirement, remarked: "this is a collar and tie job now". As this veteran of the Lancashire 
pits noted, the new pits and re-constructions were attractive places to work compared with 
the hell holes in which Lancashire miners had for generations toiled and died. It is too easy 
for outsiders to dismiss such basic aspects of improvement to life underground as walking 
upright in well-lit tunnels and the reduction of "back breaking work". These were positive 
developments for mineworkers. 131 There were "teething problems" at the two new 
collieries of Agecroft and Parkside. 132 Similarly, the situation inside many of the re- 
constructions was less than benign, while the problems suffered by Mosley Common 
clearly demonstrated that the modernised collieries offered no elixir. However, the early 
years at both Agecroft and Parkside were ones largely characterised by a highly motivated 
and contented workforce. 
Naturally, the divisional board and the NUMLA were keen to promote a positive image of 
miners in the two new collieries telling their mates what a splendid time they were 
having. 133 Still, this was one occasion when image and reality did match. It was not NCB 
or NUM propaganda because the excellent industrial relations record of Agecroft and 
Parkside indicates that `morale' was exceptionally high during the early 1960s. "4 One 
reason was the way the divisional board tried to keep groups of transferees, from the same 
pit, together as much as possible. An example was the closure of Newtown and 
Wheatsheaf collieries in Pendlebury which enabled mineworkers to stay together when 
they transferred to Agecroft. Another was the closure of Lyme colliery where a majority of 
miners were transferred en mass to nearby Parkside. The aim was to maintain familial and 
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social networks as much as possible. 135 This plan quickly unravelled from the early 1960s 
as closures mounted, receiving places dried up, and the geographical distances between 
closing and receiving pits widened. 
Other board strategies were aimed at sustaining `rank-and-file' cohesion and `morale'. 
Although the divisional board wished to maintain the relentless pace of modernisation in 
which a modem `pit culture' developed, it accepted that it was good practice not to be too 
pedantic in ending traditional customs and practices brought from various collieries to the 
new and re-constructed pits. The board was anxious to engender a seamless transition 
between "pick and shovel" pit traditions and those of the "push-button age". 136 
The Board further attempted to maintain `morale' by reducing the potential for trouble in 
the new collieries. For example, at one juncture during the Sandhole closure it was 
suggested that Brackley be closed earlier than anticipated as a substitute for Sandhole in 
order that the pristine pit at Agecroft was not exposed to the incubus of Sandhole. 137 It was 
felt that Brackley miners would be more pliable within the new environment. This practice 
extended to groups of activists, who were often split up on transfer. The events at Clock 
Face, described in the previous chapter, suggest NUMLA leadership collusion in these 
practices. 138 
The divisional board thus attempted to infuse a sense among transferees that they were 
pioneers in a new beginning for Lancashire coal. The leitmotiv was one of re-birth as a new 
industry emerged out of the old. To underline this sense of modernity, Bold colliery hosted 
a publicity stunt by Lord Robens in 1965. He operated underground coal-cutting 
machinery from a cinema 170 miles way in Cambridge where he addressed businessmen, 
scientists and technocrats on the theme of the new coal industry. The audience was treated 
to a light and sound extravaganza in which live television pictures were transmitted of 
underground operations with the slogan "Go-Ahead Bold Colliery". Underground, colliery 
officials and mineworkers glowed with pride as the remote controlled system `ELSIE' 
swung into operation controlling state of the art cutting machinery to make light work of 
the Wigan 6 feet seam. They had reached the promised land of the new coal industry. 139 
The transferees in the modernised pits were seen as the `winners' of industrial change. 
However, they were a minority. For the rest, the outcome of industrial change was more 
267 
problematic. Importantly, for both `winners' and `losers' there was a price to pay as they 
confronted the negative effects of industrial change. 
For the majority of mineworkers under rationalisation their experience was one haunted by 
the twin fears of insecurity and uncertainty. These fears were greater amongst certain 
categories than others. Even individual pit closures revealed groups of `winners' and 
`losers'. This differentiation was most marked across the age spectrum because industrial 
change had distinctive impacts on the generations. Take the example of the closure of 
Deane colliery, near Bolton, in 1960. The colliery was about as traditional a Lancashire 
colliery as one could find. '40 Age group determined reaction to closure. For the younger 
men and pit lads there was no feeling of regret. They were confident about the future. They 
looked forward to working at a new colliery. Most were destined for Agecroft, where, as 
the earliest entrants, they were eager to use the latest equipment after the physical exertions 
of Deane. A new modern colliery with better pay and conditions and a bright future 
awaited them. Others had made plans to leave the industry. A second group was older 
miners, at or nearing retirement. A number had worked at Deane since the First World 
War. For these older `lads' there was a feeling of sadness and nostalgia at the passing of 
the pit. It was like a bereavement for them. Still, they accepted closure with stoicism. They 
did not feel they belonged in the new industry. Their concerns were over insecurity in 
retirement. The third and most disconsolate group was `middle-career' miners, most with 
families. It was this group who expressed most anger at being uprooted and forced to 
accept a job at another colliery with lengthy travelling, re-training and the uncertainty that 
pay and status would be maintained at the receiving pits. Their only consolation was still 
having a job in coal. '4' 
It was the younger miners who were more amenable to change and most likely to benefit, 
both within the industry and from new industrial growth. The younger men were most in 
demand from new industries, while new economic opportunities were an attraction for 
younger miners seen against the contraction of coal. There was a certain `glamour' 
associated with work in a new or expanding industry. 142 Once having left the industry this 
group was difficult to tempt back. 143 This was evident by the divisional board's vain 
attempts to recruit younger re-entrants in its desperation to maintain a supply of `virile' 
labour. '44 
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For the remainder of the men at Deane colliery, and other closures, there were numerous 
problems to confront in the aftermath of closure. For the `middle-career' miners and older 
miners insecurity and uncertainty were writ large. Industrial change also had an inordinate 
impact on certain grades of mineworker. This tended to obscure distinctions between the 
`winners' and `losers' of industrial change. Ostensibly, the group best able to enjoy the 
benefits of the new industry were the highest grade experienced `face' workers because 
they were in demand in the modernised pits. Higher rates of pay made them more willing 
to travel further to work or move to retain a job in mining. On the other hand, other 
underground workers, and more particularly surface workers, were less in demand and had 
less incentive, resources or inclination to stay in the industry. They tended to be either 
younger workers or older men nearing retirement who had come off the `face'. They were 
more likely to seek opportunities outside the industry or take retirement. 
However, there was a downside for `face' workers. `Face' workers were not just being 
culled through colliery closures but also by new underground technology. Furthermore, 
prospects for `face' workers were equally as problematic if they stayed in coal or left. 
Remaining inside the industry meant competing for the best transfer placements. Failure 
meant reduced pay and status, travelling further to receiving pits and having to re-train 
with new equipment and methods including the new pit culture of multi-shift working. 
Outside of coal, `face' workers were less `attractive' to new employers because they were 
usually more mature men with `specialist' skills in coal and therefore less readily 
`transferable' or `re-trainable' in the new sectors than less skilled younger underground or. 
surface labouring grades. In any case, `face' workers who transferred within the industry 
endured the additional uncertainty of not knowing whether they had a long-term future at 
receiving pits. In these circumstances, the `victory' of retaining a job in coal was often 
pyrrhic. 145 
A sharper contrast between the `winners' and `losers' of industrial change was seen 
through the dichotomy within craft grades. This group was in relatively high demand and 
could offer `transferable skills' outside of coal. However, there was a distinction between 
those workers with `modern' in demand craft skills such as electricians who emerged as 
the `winners' of modernisation and those with `dying' pit skills such as the hundreds of 
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carpenters employed on timbering work. 146 Rationalisation produced two definite groups 
of `losers': `disabled' and older mineworkers. The consequence of industrial change for 
these groups is considered in the final chapter. 
Negative outcomes for the `rank-and-file' were a complex of problems rather than a single 
issue. For those transferred to the two new collieries at Agecroft and Parkside satisfaction 
levels remained relatively high. For the rest, including those transferred to the 
reconstructed collieries, it was a case of "last come, worst served". 147 The transferees 
were often forced to accept a lower grade job on less pay. The practice of 'downgrading' 
was the single greatest cause of dissatisfaction amongst British miners during the 1960s. A 
third of British miners were `downgraders' within the 20-40 age group. 148 In coalfields 
such as Lancashire, with large numbers of closures and transferees, this figure was higher. 
Crucially the `downgraders' included large numbers of `middle-career' miners who were 
most likely to remain in the industry. This group carried resentment with them into the 
`modernised' industry. Added to this was the uncertainty of knowing whether receiving 
pits would stay open. Transferees were shunted around the coalfield from pit-to-pit 
throughout the 1960s before final redundancy. The `industrial gypsies' had to endure 
insecurity in tandem with uncertainty in a most cruel manner. 149 Furthermore, the process 
of transfer was seldom a tidy affair as evidenced by the case studies in the previous 
chapter. The scope for managerial or union interference was enormous. Selectivity based 
on personal or work records or industrial and political activity was inevitable. NCBNWD 
acquiescence with NUMLA involvement in transfer arrangements did not lead to fairer 
treatment. 
Resentment over `downgrading' was compounded because transferees had to travel further 
to retain a job in mining. Significant numbers of Lancashire miners had traditionally 
travelled some distance to work. This trend increased as a result of inter-war depression 
and rationalisation. '5° After 1945 the numbers travelling increased while the distances 
involved became greater as industrial change reinforced inter-war trends. By the 1960s, 
with rationalisation in full swing, a majority of miners were forced to travel considerable 
distances to keep a job in mining. 151 Travelling long distances to work was only part of the 
problem. Indifferent public or private transport made life a misery for transferees. Bus 
services had not been improved to an adequate level to cater for the growing numbers of 
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commuting miners as the tramway system and railways were closed. Buses were inflexible, 
irregular, and unreliable while the transport provided by the NCB was often restricted by 
timetable, route and shift. The problem of an adequate bus service to take miners from the 
Wigan to the Manchester district was a major source of concern to the divisional board in 
`manning up' Agecroft. 152 Likewise, one of the chief gripes at Mosley Common was 
inadequate surface transport. There were not uncommon cases of miners having to use two 
public buses to get to a central pick-up point to catch a NCB bus to the pit. This was 
followed by time spent preparing to go underground and travelling to the face only to 
repeat the process in reverse at the end of each shift. Many miners spent more time 
travelling to and from the `face' than on the `face'. This situation was made more difficult 
by having to plan these journeys around newly introduced shift patterns. Miners 
complained they had no domestic or social life. 153 No wonder it was the introduction of 
multi-shift which did so much to close Mosley Common. 
Growing resentment over travelling was compounded by the extra costs involved. During 
the late 1940s travel-to-work costs were not excessive. By the early 1960s excessive costs 
had become an added source of discontent. Between 1947 and 1960 commuting costs in 
British coalfields had trebled but in Lancashire they increased twelve-fold. Miners in no 
other British coalfield had to bear anything near this level of increase. While the Coal 
Board subsidised some of the cost, miners were left substantially worse off through travel- 
to-work following transfer. Lancashire miners paid at least three times the cost paid by the. 
Coal Board. 154 Although car ownership and sharing amongst miners increased throughout 
the late 1950s and early 1960s it was the problem of costly, difficult and lengthy travel to 
work which forced many miners into car purchases they would not otherwise have made 
just to retain a job in coal. 155 
Within this complex of problems confronting those remaining in the modernised industry 
the most contentious was the introduction of double-shift and multi-shift work. Multi-shift 
was an integral part of the modernisation process necessary to facilitate technological 
change. As a major change in mining culture in Lancashire, it amplified all other 
grievances. The NUMLA leadership had agonised over this thorny problem realising it was 
the key to unlocking modernisation of the pits. They were also aware it was the buckle that 
fastened together a belt of grievances. In moving toward general acceptance of multi-shift 
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from the mid-1960s the NUMLA leadership failed to recognise the mounting difficulties it 
was creating. Likewise, the NUMLA leadership did not acknowledge other difficulties 
facing mineworkers resulting from industrial change. It saw issues like downgrading, 
travel-to-work and multi-shift as part of the inevitable landscape of the modern industry. 
Moreover, the NUMLA leadership failed to take account of the speed of change on pit life. 
Changes occurred in a few years which would normally have taken a generation. 156 
The outcome of these challenges for the `rank-and-file' was an increase in the rush to leave 
coal. A growing catalogue of problems for miners in the re-constructed collieries meant 
resentment over unresolved grievances was translated into increasing levels of 
dissatisfaction which forced them to leave. There were high levels of manpower `wastage' 
from the re-constructed collieries in Lancashire during the early 1960s. `Wastage' was not 
only at high levels among younger men and those nearing retirement. It was also high 
among `middle career' miners. Those leaving expressed dissatisfaction with the new 
arrangements. A substantial proportion of those who left did so because of unspecified 
`dissatisfaction' while travel-to-work and shiftwork rated highly as mono-causal 
reasons. 157 
It is clear that there were growing problems over specific aspects of industrial change 
during the early 1960s. What is also clear is that the divisional board and the NUMLA did 
not adequately address these issues. Gormley recognised that `downgrading' constituted 
"hidden redundancy". 158 However, diagnosing the problem was one thing but doing 
something about it was quite another. In one sense the travel-to-work problem grew 
because of a desire by the divisional board and the NUMLA to avoid large-scale 
redundancies. This was combined with the residential circumstances of miners and the 
peculiarities and patterns of labour mobility in the coalfield. Transferees had a disincentive 
to move house because of low cost private rented accommodation and low council house 
rents. 159 
Nevertheless, this did not excuse the relegation of issues such as travel-to-work simply 
because they had become embarrassing obstacles to the achievement of modernisation. The 
divisional board and the NUMLA loftily argued that there was an adequate framework of 
measures in place to cater for intra-coalfield job re-location. Inter-divisional transferees 
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suffered tremendous dislocation and privations. The Coal Board regarded inter-divisional 
transfers as a priority. This hardly said much for the quality of intra-divisional transfers. 
Both the divisional board and the NUMLA leadership used the avoidance of large-scale 
redundancies as an excuse to avoid tackling the grievances of transferees. Both argued that 
miners should celebrate the avoidance of mass redundancies made possible by a humane 
modem industry. The problems faced by transferees were compared favourably with the 
experience of closures under private ownership as a way of reinforcing this point. It only 
became an issue for the NUMLA leadership when its indifference to the grievances of a 
majority of transferees was compared with its dominant interest in the needs of a minority 
of `winners' of industrial change in the two new collieries and the few `successful' re- 
constructions. 
The question arising from these grievances was how the 'rank-and-file' interpreted them. It 
did not translate into growing solidarity or collective action. Quite the opposite. It led to 
divisiveness in the face of grievances set in train by closure and transfer. For example, 
when Ellerbeck colliery finally closed in 1965 anger was directed as much against fellow 
workers as it was against the divisional board or the NUMLA leadership. Ellerbeck miners 
believed their attempts to save a relatively productive and profitable pit had been 
jeopardised by the poor performance of miners in the modernised collieries. They argued 
that they had fought to save the pit only to be offered second best in the transfer stakes to 
workers already enjoying the fruits of work within the modernised industry. 
160 The 
reaction at Ellerbeck was not untypical. Consider the response to events following closure 
of Clock Face colliery described in the previous chapter. There was no clearer case where 
mineworkers had been unjustly treated at closure. Yet, there was an absence of solidarity 
from all but a handful of NUMLA branches. Under rationalisation Lancashire miners 
fought for the survival of their own individual colliery and jealously guarded transfer 
arrangements. 
This was an attitude the NUMLA leadership did not discourage because it made industrial 
change easier; indeed, it encouraged divisiveness. Competitive pit survival instincts were 
allowed to predominate over feelings of collective solidarity in the face of closure and 
transfer. These were fundamental and powerful instincts in a primary industry like mining 
where `survivability' was tied to individual and team effort combined with pit level 
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loyalties. 161 At Ellerbeck, Gormley used these sentiments to assuage protests over the 
closure threat in 1962. He became skilled at manipulating an individual pit survivalist 
mentality amongst the `rank-and-file'. When approached by miners facing closure he 
repeated his credo that they should save their own pit by co-operating with management, 
implement new technology and techniques and work to improve output and productivity. 162 
This tactic, combined with the divisional board's strategies on closure announcements, 
undermined the occasion for collective solidarity in the face of closures. These approaches 
tempered growing frustration over industrial change, as did the opportunity to leave the 
industry by sections of the workforce. This did not mean `rank-and-file' grievances were 
extinguished. While these grievances did not translate into protest they nevertheless 
continued to hang increasingly heavily throughout the early 1960s over the specific 
outcomes of industrial change. 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
It is evident from the preceding examination of reaction and response to industrial change 
that the NUMLA leadership sought to give the appearance of leading a challenge over 
industrial change. At worst, these challenges were subterfuges to escape censure on 
acceptance of closures. At best, they were an intrusion into the more general debate on the 
efficiency and future of the industry. The weakness and delusive nature of these challenges 
only served to reinforce acceptance of the priorities for industrial change. At the same 
time, the NUMLA leadership used these as a device to bolster Labour's fuel policy and 
electoral ambitions. This was evident too in the way in which the NUMLA leadership used 
its relationship with Labour to manage opposition to industrial change. The NUMLA 
leadership also demonstrated it was capable of responding to criticism of industrial change 
through a metamorphosis of the style and presentation of its case. 
As this chapter has indicated the task of managing opposition was made easier by the 
ineffectual opposition of `militant activists' at a number of collieries. These diverse and 
disparate minority groupings were destined to fail in their opposition to NUMLA-Labour 
Party hegemony. That they failed so miserably resulted from their inability to provide 
cohesive opposition. Weakness was fatally compounded by the hamstrung position they 
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adopted on industrial change. They heaped criticism on the NUMLA leadership over 
industrial change. Yet, they were all `modernisers' by virtue of their socialism whatever 
position on the political left they occupied. They were like an exotic specie which 
camouflaged its true identity until one day it discovered that it too wore the bright plumage 
of modernisation. 
It has been shown that the NUMLA leadership's ace card in managing opposition to 
industrial change was expectation of a Labour government. Supporting coalfield 
modernisation through industrial diversification utilised a concept of multi-faceted value. 
One of those facets was the way industrial diversification was linked to Labour's 
developing agenda for government through its industrial and regional policies. Again, it 
allowed the NUMLA to use this aspect of industrial change in aid of Labour's ambitions. 
It has been argued that for the majority of the `rank-and-file' in Lancashire there was no 
uprising against industrial change. Complex economic and social changes had been taking 
place in the coalfield since before the Second World War. However, it was the specific 
character of industrial change which was more influential in affecting `rank-and file' 
attitudes toward the industry. Modernisation was seen as a positive development which had 
been an objective for years. The defining moment for the `rank-and-file' only came when 
they experienced the negative effects of change. Industrial change brought tangible 
advantages to only a minority of mineworkers. Perceived groups of `winners' and `losers' 
emerged. In reality, there were few outright `winners'. For the rest there was a plethora of 
problems to confront, while the divisional board and the NUMLA leadership remained 
oblivious to the grievances which arose. The NUMLA leadership was too engrossed in 
pursuing partnership with the divisional board over industrial change, or sketching in the 
fine detail of the `modernised' industry, to worry about negative repercussions. 
Finally, as evidenced by the findings in this chapter, the character of industrial change and 
of `rank-and-file' responses was important in preventing grievances and resentment from 
becoming a more potent threat. There was no growth of solidarity or collective action. 
Rather, the result tended toward division among the `rank-and-file'. In this way, industrial 
change up to 1965 was a success for divisional board strategies and NUMLA co-operation. 
In another sense, industrial change was not without potential threats to the NUMLA 
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leadership. Its unwillingness to allay genuine `rank-and-file' fears produced a huge 
reservoir of resentment behind the dyke of optimism which the proclaimed `success' of 
industrial change represented. It was the NUMLA leadership who held a forger in the dyke 
supported by Labour. Not only was the reservoir full of resentment, it was also full of 
anticipation. The NUMLA leadership created a build-up of expectation of Labour in 
power. Lancashire miners were expecting much from Labour when it was returned to 
office in 1964. The list was headed by a national fuel policy which placed the coal industry 
at its centre. They were expecting the end of large-scale closures together with positive 
improvements for those remaining in the industry. They expected nothing less than the 
promised rejuvenation of the coalfield complete with modern industries, infrastructure, and 
social improvements to arrest the contraction of coal and to match the much heralded 
rhetoric of the "Speed up Sixties". 163 The NUMLA leadership and Labour had concocted a 
heady brew. They faced a tall order for the remainder of the 1960s. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
REACTION AND RESPONSE TO INDUSTRIAL CHANGE IN THE 
LANCASHIRE COALFIELD: THE ACCELERATED COLLIERY 
CLOSURE PROGRAMME 1965-1972 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is concerned with the second half of the 1960s which marked a complete 
change in the character of debate over industrial change in the Lancashire coalfield. Prior 
to 1965 coal industry rationalisation was seen as part of the long awaited modernisation of 
the industry. Post-1965 was different. Suddenly and dramatically the industry was faced 
with a new Labour Government with explicit ideas on the future of fuel and coal. Labour 
initiated a fuel policy for the first time linked to national economic planning. This brought 
two realisations for coal. Firstly, although rationalisation had produced some stabilisation 
for the industry, its financial situation was a source of concern to Government. Secondly, 
Labour in opposition had formulated its plans for economic modernisation in which it was 
believed the UK had fallen behind its competitors in economic performance. The outcome 
was a relegation of coal in favour of the new fuels. This brought a more rigorous 
programme of colliery closures including a number of closures not scheduled at the time of 
the original ACP announcement in 1965. Moreover, the ACP reached into areas of the 
coalfield previously largely unaffected by rationalisation up to 1965. This chapter will 
assess the reaction of the NUMNWA to these developments given its high expectations of 
a Labour Government. 
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6.2 `NEW REALISM': LABOUR'S FUEL POLICY AND FURTHER COAL 
CONTRACTION IN THE LANCASHIRE COALFIELD 
The announcement of further contraction in November 1965 following the Fuel White 
Paper was greeted in Lancashire with the gravest of concern. The NUMNWA called a 
weekend conference as an emergency response. ' The profile of those invited to speak 
indicated the level of concern. Two Labour cabinet ministers: Lee, at Power, and Brown, at 
Economic Affairs, attended as keynote speakers. Both had been closely involved with the 
new moves on fuel and the ACP. In addition, Lord Robens, Sid Ford, and two NUMNWA- 
sponsored MPs, Fitch and McGuire (the new MP for Ince), completed the panjandrum. Lee 
indicated that his main concern was the financial state of the industry. He re-iterated that 
there was no possibility of a subsidy. He asked participants to be "realistic" about coal's 
prospects in a `multi-fuel' economy. Lee raised anxieties still further amongst Lancashire 
miners when he told them that every colliery in Lancashire was expected to achieve 
profitability. Failure to do so would result in closure. This put the spotlight directly on 
many re-constructed collieries where it had been assumed there would be a long-term 
future. 2 
George Brown concentrated on the other aspect of Labour's strategy for coal: the 
modernisation of the economy and national planning. Brown told them: 
"We are falling behind in a highly competitive world because we have been failing 
to modernise or change as fast as we should, and each industry must be required to 
examine the consequences of a fast moving world for itself '. 3 
Brown extolled the benefits of the `new' fuels and national planning, showing how coal 
fitted within the framework of the national plan. Both men pledged to implement measures 
to prevent social hardship resulting from further contraction. Participants thus found 
themselves battered by a double assault of economic realism and modernity. 4 
The weekend conferences were devised to `educate' the `rank-and-file' in an informal 
setting. In practice they became arenas for expressions of dissent. Joe Ryan caused uproar 
by insulting Brown. He called Brown "a desiccated calculating machine" followed by a 
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clash during debates He argued that under the baldly chilling figures that Brown spouted 
were miner's lives and those of their families and communities. Ryan believed the 
Government should support the coal industry both morally and financially rather than 
helping the "capitalist-backed oil industry". The Brown-Ryan clash upstaged the 
conference and set the scene for debate over further contraction during the late 1960s. 6 
Ryan's assertions enjoyed a wide measure of support not exclusively from the regular band 
of `militants'. The 1965 announcement caused panic throughout the coalfield. Even the 
Parkside participant at the 1965 conference noted he would not find it easy to "pacify the 
men" with the Government's proposals. Others questioned the Government's commitment 
to the industry because it rejected a subsidy for coal but subsidised other sectors of the 
economy. This heightened suspicions that coal was being `dumped'. Furthermore, 
participants were stung by Brown's assertion that miners had an "intuitive resistance to 
change". Participants argued that `change' was fine for those implementing it, but it was 
quite a different matter for those on the receiving end. As Weaver pointedly told Brown, 
while Lancashire had absorbed a great deal of modernisation over a long period, the new 
fuel policy and ACP under Labour was a separate issue. It amounted to the substitution of 
oil for coal. He argued that no mineworker would readily accept this because it meant pits 
which had not been "previously scheduled" would now close. With the full backing of 
participants he asked the Government to re-consider its policy. Many could not accept that 
this was Labour policy, believing instead that the Government had been influenced by 
skewed advice. 7 
Both Government ministers rejected these interventions. Lee in particular was adamant the 
Government would stand firm in the face of opposition. He demanded participants "get 
away from sloganising and face reality". According to Lee there was no question of coal 
being `dumped' by the Government or of having "sold out" to the oil companies. It was a 
case of having to deal with the "realities facing the coal industry as Labour had found them 
in office". 8 Early reaction to Labour's policy was one of universal condemnation from 
branch officials and `rank-and-file', uniting a variety of opinion and political affiliation. 
The Government had explained its policy directly to Lancashire miners. It indicated that it 
would be pressing ahead regardless. The missing element from these early discussions was 
the attitude of the NUMNWA leadership and Labour in the coalfield. 
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There was no substantive reaction from the NUMNWA leadership or Labour in the 
coalfield until 1966. One reason was the intrusion of the general election in February 1966 
when minds were concentrated on securing a Labour victory with an increased majority. 
One indication of leadership opinion came in early 1966 just before the election. Gormley 
rejected a request by a number of NUMNWA branches - including many not usually 
associated with militant action - to send a delegation to an unofficial national lobby against 
Government policy in London on the grounds that it represented a "challenge to the 
Government". This was a strong hint that the leadership would be standing by Labour on 
fuel. 9 Thereafter, the reaction of the NUMNWA leadership and Labour in the coalfield 
was to offer a limited critique of policy combined with a view that although Labour was 
wrong, it was preferable to the Tories. It was argued that the NUMNWA should `fight for 
coal' within the new framework. To reinforce what amounted to tacit acceptance of fuel 
policy and further contraction it was felt that alleviation of economic and social hardship 
was better overseen by a Labour Government. '0 
The first indication of this view came in May 1966 when Hammond, as president, 
delivered the leadership's verdict. Hammond attacked Labour's fuel and further 
contraction policy. He singled out Labour's "pragmatism", broken promises and sell-out to 
capitalist oil interests. He noted that the Tories "would not have dared to introduce such a 
policy that had outraged even moderate opinion in Lancashire". So much for the rhetoric. 
Hammond nevertheless signalled it would be business as usual from the NUMNWA 
leadership. While he noted that Government was stretching Lancashire miners' loyalty to 
breaking point there was absolutely no danger of this loyalty breaking. Rather, as 
Hammond noted, they would be "fighting for our industry" by working with the 
Government to ensure it was represented in new fuel policy. Moreover, Hammond 
predicted that coal would remain "very sizeable" within the new regime thus confirming 
the leadership had accepted the prescribed place of coal within the new arrangements. " 
If there was any doubt that Labour's new initiative would provoke opposition from the 
NUMNWA then Hammond put paid to it. Whatever the leadership said it had accepted 
Labour's prescriptions on fuel and further contraction. Once again it was the familiar tale 
of going through the motions of opposition while accepting the thrust of policy. If there 
was any argument it would again be over the detail of fuel policy and coal contraction. The 
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remainder of the 1960s would be very much a case of old wine in new bottles for the 
NUMNWA leadership. 
Acceptance of Government policy was also apparent from Labour in the coalfield. There 
was no chance of loyal NUMNWA- sponsored MPs making a nuisance of themselves over 
fuel. Alan Fitch indicated he would use his influence as chair of the Mining Group of MPs 
to persuade the Government to amend its policy in favour of coal while working with the 
Government to bring economic and social amelioration to the coalfield. 12 What Fitch failed 
to point out was that the Mining Group was a weakened force at Westminster because of 
the decline of coal and its relegation in fuel policy. The Mining Group received a polite 
hearing from the Government in which they were offered promises on the alleviation of 
social hardship. Yet, this once powerful lobby was sidelined under Labour. Meetings with 
Government, including those with Harold Wilson, during Labour's first administration, 
revealed the fruitlessness of its position. Wilson told them that oil competition was likely 
to intensify, adding that Labour had no intention of interfering in the free market for fuel. 
According to Wilson, coal had to ensure it was more competitive. This meant building on 
the success of "vigorous modernisation and rationalisation plans" already completed, but 
with more fervour. The Mining Group was paralysed. They had to accept what was on 
offer while making the best for coal within fuel policy. It only remained for them to 
pressure Government on its ameliorative promises. 13 
One of the clearest indications it would be business as usual at the top in Lancashire came 
from Michael McGuire, the new NUMNWA- sponsored MP for Ince, who had taken over 
Tom Brown's stronghold at the 1964 general election. Although McGuire was a loyalist on 
the right who had risen through the St. Helens Labour Party `machine', he had shown he 
was unafraid of taking a stand at variance to the NUMNWA leadership when he was NUM 
branch secretary at Sutton Manor. 14 Any hope that McGuire was about to break the mould 
was dashed when he declared that he would not be opposing Government policy to the 
extent of "bringing down the temple of nationalisation". He contended that Labour having 
"a fair crack at power" after thirteen years in the "`wilderness" was more important than 
any differences over fuel policy. McGuire defended Government policy, noting that 
together with the NCB it would oversee further contraction in an effective and socially 
responsible way. 15 He became a vocal representative of the pro-coal lobby within the 
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Mining Group advancing the case for coal in fuel policy debate. 16 This only served to 
underline his acceptance of the terms of debate dictated by the Government. 
The NUMNWA had decided to sponsor another MP during the early 1960s outside the 
coalfield. Eric Ogden -a former miner at Bradford colliery - won Liverpool West Derby 
for Labour in 1964. Ogden's political career saw him become more involved with 
Merseyside issues than those of the coalfield. 17 However, it was clear that he was staunchly 
loyal to the Government over its fuel policy. Joe Ryan, who emerged as a leading critic of 
Labour policy, challenged the three NUMNWA- sponsored MPs to lead a rebellion of the 
Mining Group over fuel policy to bring down the Government operating with a slim 
majority. There was no chance of a `palace coup' against the Government but Ryan, by 
laying down the gauntlet, allowed Ogden to confirm the prevailing view of Government 
policy. Dismissing Ryan's intervention as "irresponsible" Ogden endorsed Labour policy 
by attacking the Government's critics in the coalfield, arguing that the survival of coal was 
not in the hands of the Government but was subject to the free market. Ogden told 
Lancashire miners that they had to learn the lexicon of the new fuel market to ensure 
viability rather than trying to scupper the Government's plans. '8 
The response of Labour in the coalfield reflected that of the NUMNWA leadership; it 
would argue coal's case within the fuel debate while accepting the tenets of policy. Both 
the NUMNWA leadership and Labour made a strong case for accepting the `realities' of 
the new fuel market as a defence against criticism of further coal contraction. In this they 
gave unstinting support to Government policies which they knew were unpopular in the 
coalfield. 
Acceptance of `new realism' was one aspect. However, there was more reticence on 
Labour's wider agenda for economic modernisation aside from George Brown's 
disquisition at the 1965 weekend conference. The wider modernisation agenda was kept in 
the background because it would have proved unpalatable. The NUMNWA leadership and 
Labour in the coalfield did not concede that coal was being sacrificed as part of Labour's 
modernisation agenda, even less that they supported such a policy. That would have been 
highly problematic. It would have undermined their case and led to a complete collapse in 
morale. Lancashire miners would have seen absolutely no chance of salvation. Rather, the 
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NUMNWA leadership and Labour concentrated all efforts on persuading miners to accept 
`new realism'. That way they could make a case for arguing for coal within Labour's new 
framework. As a result, Lancashire miners were induced to work enthusiastically to show 
that coal could compete with the other fuels in the `battle for coal'. `New Realism' 
provided a common bonding between the NUMNWA leadership, Labour and the `rank- 
and-file' in the coalfield; all working together to prove coal could compete in a free market 
for fuel. It ensured maximum co-operation on pit-level issues to improve performance, 
while it shaped the character of specific closure outcomes. Finally, it welded the 
NUMNWA leadership and divisional board ever closer together through common cause 
aimed at ensuring coal's survival. Early in Labour's second administration all the essential 
elements of NUMNWA-Labour acceptance of Government policy were in place combined 
with a strategy to ensure `rank-and-file' compliance. 
NUMNWA leadership and Labour reaction to the new fuel policy and the ACP during the 
late 1960s never wavered from fundamental acceptance of Government plans. In one sense 
this is unsurprising because of high levels of unity between the NUMNWA and Labour in 
the coalfield acting in support of the Government. It would have been an unprecedented act 
of defiance for them to challenge the Labour Government. Even so, it seems remarkable 
that there was a continuance of such a high level of acceptance which endured both the 
1967 Fuel White Paper and further contraction beyond that envisaged in the initial ACP 
announcement. 
There were two principal ways in which leadership strategy developed from 1967. The first 
was through pursuing `new realism'. The second, from 1968 onwards, was a strategy of 
stabilisation and consolidation for coal. After 1968, industrial change became a `non- 
issue'. This policy was prefigured during the closing days of Gormley's tenure as General 
Secretary and carried forward by Sid Vincent, his successor. There appeared to be an 
intensification of criticism of Government policy throughout 1967 and early 1968. 
However, criticism was limited within the boundaries of `new realism'. There were 
reasons for the NUMNWA leadership and Labour in the coalfield adopting a more 
aggressive posture at this time. One was increased tension over the 1967 Fuel White Paper. 
The other was the persona of Richard Marsh's incumbency as Minister of Power. Above 
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all, there was a need to be in tune with a growing mood of unrest in the coalfield over 
Government policy. 19 
Even as criticism and protest intensified there was no sign of a schism with the 
Government over fuel and further coal contraction. What sometimes appeared to be 
criticism of Government policy was nothing more than feisty defence of coal against the 
competition, combined with a need to accord with the `rank-and-file'. For example, during 
1967 Mining Group representations to Marsh over the Fuel White Paper included 
aggressive criticisms of Government policy. But, they had no choice other than to accept 
the next phase on fuel. As Marsh rightly contended, the Mining Group had already 
accepted the notion of a free market for fuel and thus further contraction of coal. The only 
issue for debate, as Marsh asserted, was the rate of contraction and economic and social 
amelioration required. The Mining Group was only pressing Marsh at this time because of 
growing `rank-and file' unrest. 20 
Marsh's assertions were borne out throughout 1967 as the NUMNWA digested further 
moves on fuel and coal contraction. These debates resulted in another mauling of 
Government policy, this time with the bete noire of Richard Marsh to act as the focus of 
the anger. For the NUMNWA leadership, Marsh became a convenient demonic instrument 
of Government policy. Despite the anger, these debates were conducted within the context 
of `new realism'. Moreover, the divisional board and the NUMNWA leadership agreed 
that the next stage of fuel policy should be met by re-doubling efforts aimed at persuading 
Government to maintain a viable coal industry by making coal more competitive against 
alternative fuels, including the new threat posed by natural gas. 21 
The language of debate in 1967 reflected the way Lancashire miners accepted `new 
realism'. Debate was significant for interventions by `militant' activists. Both Clarke and 
Woolley - spending their last year in the industry at Mosley Common - noted that although 
they did not accept the terms of the free market for fuel, they were prepared to concede the 
`reality' of the situation in which coal found itself. They called for "contraction to be 
properly phased and planned" highlighting the need for "a systematic building up of new 
industries with re-training and suitable guarantees of jobs" and the need to "protect older 
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workers" in a "humane contraction" - in fact, all the buzz phrases of Government policy 
and `new realism'. 
22 
These interventions marked an important milestone in industrial change under the ACP. 
The `militant' activists accepted the terms of debate established by Government, along 
with all levels of opinion within the NUMNWA. They had moved to this position by 1967 
because they were forced to accept the ineluctable nature of their position. In the same way 
as they had accepted the need for modernisation and rationalisation they were forced to 
accept the thrust of Labour's policy on fuel and further coal contraction. Furthermore, they 
concluded it was futile opposing industrial change in circumstances where it was supported 
by NUM-Labour hegemony. They believed they would be more effective moving the 
`fight' to tackle the Government on the outcomes of further contraction. 
Acceptance of the terms of debate established by Labour influenced the outcome of 
discussions within the NUMNWA even as the Government came under its most intense 
period of criticism during 1967-1968. The notion of `new realism' transcended these 
discussions. During late 1967 increasing anger within the coalfield led to a search for 
scapegoats as recriminations flew. Anger was directed at the NUMNWA- sponsored MPs 
because they had direct access to Government. The attacks centred on alleged inertia in the 
`fight for coal' within fuel policy. Criticism reached a crescendo in November 1967 after 
the publication of the Fuel White Paper. An assembly of sponsored, coalfield and North 
West Labour MPs was subjected to a roasting by the NUMNWA leadership and union 
delegates. 23 It amounted to an exercise in blame shifting because the NUMNWA 
leadership had, like Labour in the coalfield, already accepted Government policy. As one 
delegate admitted, the time for fighting the Government over fuel had been two years 
earlier. It was only now under the full impact of further contraction, with mounting `rank- 
and-file pressure, that they were forced to confront the issue. 
These were belated, half-hearted and self-illusory attempts to tackle issues which had 
reached a critical point. Caught between the need for continuing loyalty to the Labour 
Government and the need to appease a growing mood of `rank-and-file' unrest, the union 
leadership could do nothing more than channel anger into criticism of the MPs. There was 
little the MPs could or would do apart from operate within `new realism' in which, as Fitch 
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declared, they would "work behind the scenes with the Government to improve coal's 
prospects". 24 The NUMNWA leadership and Labour in the coalfield thus found it 
impossible to break the chains that lashed them to `new realism'. This was also the course 
set by the NUM leadership nationally. In 1968, Paynter outlined his continuing support for 
a strategy of `fighting for coal' within new fuel policy. 25 
By 1968, the scale of contraction in Lancashire meant the fight for the industry was a 
rearguard action. There were indications the debate was shifting. The scale of job losses in 
Lancashire fixed minds less on fuel policy and more on Labour's commitment to alleviate 
economic and social hardship. Consequently, while criticism of Government fuel policy 
continued, it was eclipsed by calls for dialogue with Government over new economic 
growth. There was a belief that the Government, despite what was widely seen as betrayal 
on coal, would honour its commitments on economic and social amelioration. This was a 
good indication that, in spite of the anger generated over fuel, there was still a great deal of 
faith in Labour in the coalfield. 26 
By the turn of the decade there was growing belief by the NUMNWA leadership that the 
industry in Lancashire should draw a line under the turmoil of the recent past to take 
advantage of the return of some stability for coal. After 1968 closures became less frequent 
while modernisation had been completed. It was time to move forward with what was left 
of the industry. Issues of industrial change became relegated to the margins of debate. This 
tendency was apparent as early as 1968 as the outcomes of industrial change were still 
being felt. NUMNWA weekend conferences had hitherto been important venues in which 
industrial change was debated. At a weekend conference in March 1968 the main items on 
the agenda were production and marketing with only a cursory discussion of the "situation 
in the industry" in a year when Lancashire coal lost nearly 6,000 jobs. A year later, in early 
1969, a similar gathering discussed only one issue: production. 27 
In one sense this shift of emphasis was inevitable because, with the bulk of closures 
completed by 1968 the industry could look forward to a period of consolidation. It was also 
an admission that the NUMNWA wanted to move on, and move on quickly, without 
looking over its shoulder as the last pits were closed. Why did the leadership want to 
reduce industrial change to a `non - issue'? One reason for the shift of emphasis was the 
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`changing of the guard' within the NUMNWA leadership. Hammond retired in September 
1967. Gormley was in the throes of manoeuvring himself into a winning bid for the 
national presidency of the NUM in 1971, preceded by an abortive attempt at the post of 
national General Secretary. 28 
The coming man of Lancashire mining unionism was Sid Vincent. Vincent was 
NUMNWA president during 1968-1970 before becoming General Secretary in 1971 
following Gormley's accession to the NUM national presidency. 29 Vincent came through 
the 1960s with relatively little blood on his hands. His good sense over the running sore of 
Mosley Common, in which he worked closely with Weaver - an ideological opponent - 
right down to last minute bids to save the pit, earned him many plaudits within the union. 
Vincent's style was what Howell describes as a "less abrasive variant" of Gormley, which 
combined with his "amiability" with `the lads', made him ideally suited to a period in 
which the NUMNWA attempted to re-define its purpose after industrial change. Although 
Vincent, politically, was very much out of the Gormley mould, he worked assiduously to 
create some distance between himself and the events of the recent past while at the same 
time defending Labour's record in Government on fuel. 30 
One outcome was the re-writing of the recent past by the leadership virtually before 
industrial change was completed. For example, Vincent perpetuated the myth that Labour's 
policy on fuel and further contraction had been imposed on it by what he described, in a 
homespun but highly persuasive way, as the "the back room boys in London! ". 31 The idea 
that dismantling Lancashire coal was the work of faceless civil servants and technocrats 
rather than the Labour Government was deliberately intended to play well with `the lads'. 
Furthermore, Vincent was unapologetic about Labour's record on coal. One the eve of the 
1970 general election he pointed only to the `positive' outcomes of Labour policy: re- 
structuring the Board's fmances; maintaining a fuel tax on oil; moves to assist 
consumption of coal by the power generators; and assistance to alleviate the social 
consequences of contraction. 32 In this respect, Gormley's successor was a most. apposite 
choice at this time. He was both loyal to Labour and saw his chief priority as the 
consolidation of what was left of the Lancashire industry in which the , strategy of co- 
operation with the Coal Board achieved new levels. 
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Vincent was a zealous disciple of `new realism' under whose leadership there developed a 
strategy to `fight for coal' and for Lancashire's part in a much-reduced National 
Production Target. To this end he chaired a NUMNWA body with the uninspiring title of 
the Production and Statistics Committee. The Committee was `new realism' taken to its 
logical conclusion. It was a joint committee of the NUMNWA and NCBLA which oversaw 
the nine remaining Lancashire pits. Because there were only nine pits left, direct control 
over routine pit level issues was much easier. The Committee deliberated on issues of 
production, productivity, and development and acted as a trouble-shooting forum. 
Undoubtedly, Vincent in utilising the Committee, was influenced by his experience of the 
relative success of the JIC at Mosley Common, in which he had participated. The 
Production and Statistics Committee was corporatism in miniature. It was evidence of new 
levels of dialogue and partnership which `new realism' had helped foster. 33 
Through the Committee, Vincent was, as he noted, able to "to keep an eye" on Lancashire 
pits. The work of the Committee subsumed democratic debate on pit-level issues. 
However, it allowed Vincent to exert direct access and control of pit performance through 
discussion of monthly progress reports. He was thus allowed to exhort each pit to improve 
its performance, compete with each other, and with other coalfields. In this, Vincent saw 
`new realism' as an opportunity for Lancashire miners to unleash their potential to 
demonstrate coal's ability to compete with other fuels. Vincent encouraged miners to 
"have a do at each pit" (attempt to achieve performance criteria) to show "that Lancashire 
lads are as good as any other Area". 34 
In addition to promoting a competitive spirit in the `battle for coal', Vincent saw another 
aspect of strategy in providing rewards for those whom made a success of `having a do'. 35 
This was vintage Gormley undertaken in a more deliberate and systematic way. Vincent's 
strategy was a success because although Lancashire pit performance never matched that of 
other leading coalfields it raised productivity in the remaining pits to previously unseen 
levels. These developments took place irrespective of a rising background of industrial 
militancy in Lancashire and elsewhere over matters of wages and conditions which led to 
confrontation with the Heath Government in the 1972 national strike. 36 A period of relative 
stability coincided with rising militancy. Vincent's strategy was facilitated by more stable 
conditions for coal during the early 1970s. Assessments of the Lancashire industry were 
309 
consistently more upbeat than at any time since the mid-1950s as fears over coal shortages 
and supply and price of oil once again put coal back centre stage, albeit as a much reduced 
entity. 37 By the early 1970s it would thus be inaccurate to use the term `new realism' to 
characterise the NUMNWA's response to changing perspectives for fuel. It had become 
the orthodoxy. 
6.3 COLLIERY CLOSURES IN THE LANCASHIRE COALFIELD UNDER THE 
ACCELERATED COLLIERY CLOSURE PROGRAMME AND 'RANK-AND- 
FILE' UNREST 
`Rank-and-file' unrest appeared to be a response to Labour's fuel and further coal 
contraction policy. This was at the root of grievances. However, `rank-and-file' responses 
were more expressions of anger over specific outcomes of policy seen through the 
particular incidence and pattern of closures, twinned with increasing tensions over the 
circumstances of closure. Not all closures were `controversial'. Large areas of the coalfield 
saw no discernible negative response. The closures of the late 1960s can be divided into 
four distinct groups. Firstly, those announced in November 1965 together with pits which 
had won reprieves under the 1959 Revised Plan. These were largely uncontroversial 
closures with the exception of Clock Face, 38 secondly, collieries in Manchester district 
which had been expected to have a long-term future, 39 thirdly, closures, partial closures 
and closure threats in North East Lancashire and St. Helens districts, 40 fourthly, the closure 
of Astley Green in 1970 which came as a surprise after the main group of closures had 
been completed. 
Protest was most pronounced in North East Lancashire and St. Helens districts which 
hitherto had been relatively unaffected by closures. Here, increased militancy over closures 
was a phenomenon which coincided with growing discontent with Government policy and 
publication of the 1967 Fuel White Paper. Unrest in the coalfield occurred over a twelve- 
month period between the autumn of 1967 and 1968. This period saw the most 
concentrated period of closures during industrial change. Seven collieries were closed with 
the loss of over 6,000 jobs. Of those seven, five were `controversial' because they were 
`long-life' collieries which had some expectation of remaining open for the foreseeable 
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future. These closures markedly increased the mood of `rank-and-file' unrest. They created 
widespread shock in the coalfield as the reverberations turned a mood of uncertainty and 
insecurity into one of panic. As one union delegate noted during early 1968, if rumours of 
closure were spreading around pits like Parkside it was time to panic because it meant the 
shutdown of the whole coalfield 41 
The situation was so critical that there was a widespread belief that Government policy on 
coal contraction was without limits. This climate of fear saw the first signs of more potent 
protest against industrial change. Strength of protest was constrained by the limits imposed 
by `new realism'. While reaction to these events was certainly intense it did not represent 
a united protest against industrial change across the coalfield. Rather, it could be 
characterised as a strong reaction to the incidence and pattern of closures in specific areas 
and at'specific pits during 1967-68. Reaction was important in the way it was manifested 
through spontaneous outbursts of `rank-and-file' action and because it marked the first 
time during industrial change that a previously united leadership front began to fragment. 
The incidence of closures during the late 1960s was influenced by re-structuring of the 
NCBNWD as much as it was by Government policy. The NCBNWD ceased to exist after 
the retirement of James Anderton in 1967. The scale of coalfield run-down in Cumberland, 
Lancashire and North Wales meant the size of the industry remaining did not justify the 
continued existence of a separate North Western Division. Within a new rationalised 
structure the Cumberland, Lancashire and North Wales coalfields became `super sub- 
regions' within a new Northern Division which included the Yorkshire coalfield headed by 
a new divisional chairman, John Brass, operating from a Yorkshire headquarters. The new 
National Coal Board Lancashire Area (NCBLA), headed by James Kimmins, was a 
glorified area management with a much reduced role and without the autonomy enjoyed by 
the NCBNWD. Both Brass and Kimmins were Coal Board technocratic management 
professionals. Kimmins, announced that the policies of his predecessor would continue 
under the new Lancashire management. Similarly, district and colliery management 
structures within Lancashire, already rationalised in 1961, were completely re-structured 
with the loss of many managers who had served since nationalisation or under private 
ownership. 42 The complexion of NCBLA management which remained was fully behind 
the impetus for further contraction. This was bad news for `borderline' collieries or 
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collieries previously unaffected by closure threats. It brought individual colliery 
performance under ever-greater scrutiny. 
These changes meant closure decisions were implemented with little input from district or 
colliery management. Questioning aspects of industrial change had often been more 
effective from within NCBNWD management than from the NUMLA. It meant too that 
the Government was given a more pliable structure with which to effect change as it 
became intent on pushing through an acceleration of contraction. Gradual closures, long 
reprieves and detailed reviews of closure decisions based on local advice no longer 
occurred. For Lancashire, this meant particular collieries and sub-regions with some hope 
of a long-term future in coal were now seen as legitimate targets for rationalisation under 
the demands of further contraction. 
Major closures in Manchester district included those at Astley Green, Bradford, Bedford 
and Mosley Common. The Astley Green closure is considered separately. The other three 
collieries were all closed during the twelve months between the autumn of 1967 and 1968. 
The significance of these closures was the way they increased `rank-and-file' criticism 
over further closures under the ACP. Although both the Bradford and Mosley Common 
closures were not scheduled in 1965, all three closures were not entirely unexpected. The 
issues at Mosley Common have already been discussed. Bradford colliery had problems 
with serious subsidence under the city of Manchester, while acute manpower recruitment 
and retention problems in an area isolated from the rest of the coalfield with a multiplicity 
of job alternatives dogged the colliery's operational viability for many years. The 
subsidence issue was the more serious. This was not just Coal Board flimflam. The Board 
was facing both legal and local political pressures not to extend workings further under the 
city of Manchester. Furthermore, the colliery faced an increasingly bleak sales outlook. 
The markets for the colliery had been inexorably tied to two developments: direct supply to 
the nearby coal-fired Stuart Street Power Station and to wholesale and domestic coal 
distribution networks in east Manchester. Both these markets had been a source of some 
optimism for the pit's future during its re-development from the early 1950s. By the 1960s 
both were looking decidedly shaky. 43 Bedford colliery was considered as a closure under 
the 1959 Revised Plan and again under the `Review of the Revised Plan' in 1962, but 
reprieved and subsequently re-developed. This was not enough to forestall its closure, 
312 
announced in 1965, under the second phase of the ACP with an anticipated closure date 
from 1969.44 
Given these facts, closures at Bradford and Bedford were not controversial in terms of the 
circumstances of contraction envisaged in the industry. Similarly, the `rank-and-file' would 
have been deluding themselves if they had expected these two collieries to remain open in 
the post-1965 atmosphere. Likewise, Mosley Common had diced with closure for much of 
the 1960s, aside from a short respite. On the other hand, closure of two large `showpiece' 
collieries at Bradford and Mosley Common produced problems with the `rank-and-file' 
because of the mood of demoralisation it set in train. The timing of the closures was most 
inopportune. The final two years at Mosley Common were particularly painful with 
conflict between, and within, Coal Board and NUM officialdom. As the colliery finally 
closed in the "acid fumes of acrimony" its passing produced huge problems for the `rank- 
and-file'. Closure left a big hole in the middle of the coalfield as nearly 3,000 desperate 
mineworkers scrambled for available transfers 45 The scale of the placement problem was 
so acute that in 1967, for the first time, the Coal Board resorted to inter-coalfield transfers 
for Lancashire miners. Even with the mollification of the `pick-your-pit' inter-divisional 
transfer scheme, the closure of a colliery of such symbolic importance to the modernisation 
46 of the coalfield saw a collapse in morale among the `rank-and-file' 
The manner of Mosley Common's departure also increased bitterness because of the short 
reprieve negotiated by Gormley and endorsed in Wilson's pit closure deferments for the 
winter of 1967-68. Gormley's belief that Mosley Common could survive by `proving 
itself' within the context of `new realism' was a source of misplaced expectation at the 
time of reprieve 47 At closure, efforts aimed at trying to save the colliery only increased the 
mood of anger. It engaged the creative talents of a `pit poet' in Lancashire who 
encapsulated the feelings of those involved in frantic last ditch attempts to save a colliery 
which was fated from the beginning - see Appendix to this chapter. It is difficult to 
appreciate the feelings of those who fought to save what pitmen referred to as "the 
Common". As one reporter noted, observing mineworkers leaving Mosley Common for 
last time: "You can't read a man's emotions through a mask of sweat-stained coal dust' 48 
This simmering anger was a common feature in early 1968 in the coalfield among those 
involved in closures. It helped inflame a growing mood of anger with the Coal Board, 
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Government and NUMNWA leadership. It was as much the manner of the colliery's 
closing which induced this mood as closure itself. 
If the closure of Mosley Common left a tide of bitterness in its wake then the closure of 
Bedford colliery during 1967 produced similar emotions. The state of affairs at Bedford 
colliery would have been such that closure might have passed without too much trouble. 
However, the Board decided to close the colliery at least two years before its agreed date. 
Because it had been twice reprieved a belief developed among the workforce that it could 
be permanently `turned around'. The `rank-and-file' at Bedford felt the colliery could have 
survived into the 1980s, with Gormley urging them on to produce a sterling effort to stave 
off closure. 49 Although the Board had brought forward closure on economic grounds, it 
argued that the reason for premature closure was subsidence under Leigh town centre; a 
issue contested by Bedford NUM branch committee. It was Gormley's support for the 
Board rather than branch committee which provoked conflict. A moderate branch 
committee was suddenly thrust at loggerheads with the union leadership, the Coal Board 
and the Government over closure. After nearly a year fighting closure, the branch secretary 
at Bedford, Tommy Whalley, was unsparing in his criticism. He accused all three of 
blaming the other for the "crisis". Significantly, he directed his wrath chiefly at 
Government, opining that it was the not as much the Board who were pushing closures on 
economic grounds as the Labour Government. As he suggested, it was one thing arguing 
with the Coal Board over a closure, it was quite another arguing with the Government. 50 
Whalley reflected a growing sense that closures under the ACP resulted from Government 
policy on further contraction without restriction in which the Coal Board acted under 
Government pressure to implement closures. The `rank-and-file' also believed the 
NUMNWA leadership was willing to co-operate with Government policy as part of the 
price of making the industry viable under `new realism'. `Rank-and-file' anger during 
1967-68 over closures, as exemplified at Bedford, was indicative of a growing critique 
directed at the Labour Government. Again, it was the circumstances of closure which 
fuelled `rank-and-file' anger. 
The closure of Bradford colliery again demonstrated that it was as much the circumstances 
of closure which increased tensions as closure itself. The Coal Board had been involved in 
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a near ten year battle with Manchester City Council and private businesses over subsidence 
damage to properties in east Manchester as a result of new tunnelling to modernise the 
colliery. 51 This culminated in a three-week public inquiry in 1966.52 At issue was whether 
or not the Coal Board could proceed with the exploitation of a vast new reserve of coal 
directly under east Manchester. This development was vital to continued development and 
modernisation. The Coal Board argued that if the colliery were not allowed to access these 
new reserves then its future would be in jeopardy. 53 In addition, because of manpower 
recruitment and retention problems the permanent shortage of labour reduced the colliery's 
operational viability. 54 As it transpired, the public inquiry was favourable to the Coal 
Board. The final decision went to the Housing and Local Government Minister, Richard 
Crossman, who decided that the Board could proceed to exploit the new reserves with the 
agreement of Manchester City Council on each of the four stages of extensions to 
workings. The Council could have them stopped but only with specific evidence of 
subsidence linked directly to the workings involved. This was as good as a green light to 
proceed . 
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However, the damage to the colliery had already been done. The delay of five years 
awaiting a decision to proceed "in principle" following the public inquiry, then a further 
delay of eighteen months awaiting a decision to proceed to work the first new `panel' of 
coal, fatally impaired the future of Bradford. In a test case legal ruling Manchester City 
Council had obtained a stay on new development until the public inquiry had taken place. 
The test case had been the reason for the intervention of Richard Crossman. He wanted to 
use the outcome as a guide for similar cases throughout Britain. 56 The financial costs 
incurred by the Coal Board during the interim were huge. There was provision for potential 
subsidence costs, legal and technical bills and the costs of underwriting manpower 
recruitment and retention, exacerbated by the uncertainty caused over the colliery's 
future. 57 
To make matters much worse the Coal Board began to raise doubts over the future of the 
Stuart Street Power Station to which 30-50 per cent of Bradford's output went. In October 
1967 both Lord Robens and Joe Gormley visited the colliery. They noted that the CEGB 
had indicated they could bring Yorkshire or East Midlands coal to the station at the same 
price as coal fed by conveyor from Bradford a few hundred yards away. This was, as the 
315 
CEGB added, assuming that they did not close Stuart Street in the near future as part of its 
review of coal-fired units. s$ 
What should have been a highly profitable and productive colliery with a future at least 
until the end of the century was bled dry by this enervating combination of factors, chief of 
which were continuing uncertainties over subsidence and long-term manpower difficulties. 
In the circumstances of the ACP the Coal Board had to assess whether it was worth 
retaining Bradford with a deteriorating financial situation at the colliery. 
The `rank-and-file' at Bradford appreciated the extent of the problems the colliery had 
faced. However, they felt that having been given the go-ahead "in principle" to exploit new 
reserves in late 1966 those problems were behind them. A number of factors intervened in 
the circumstances of closure which produced `rank-and-file' consternation. In January 
1968 both James Kimmins and Joe Gormley, on a joint visit to Bradford, told the 
workforce that unless the colliery improved performance it would close. This was in stark 
contrast to prospects less than two years earlier when both Gormley and Robens promised 
a long-term future for the colliery following the public inquiry outcome. 59 
Agreement to mine the first `panel' of new reserves was only given by the Coal Board in 
November 1967, a few months prior to first indications the colliery might close. This was 
eighteen months after the public inquiry into subsidence had been concluded and twelve 
months after a ministerial decision had endorsed the findings of the inquiry. The Coal 
Board suddenly decided not to proceed with opening up new reserves on the grounds that 
Manchester City Council still retained influence over mining decisions. The Council 
threatened to re-activate the subsidence issue even though the legal and political arguments 
for an extension of mining had been won. 60 
There was nothing in this new challenge which would have prevented the Board from 
proceeding at that stage. Importantly, the Board's embargo on new development went 
further. Miners were prevented from going anywhere near seams or faces other than those 
under current operation in existing workings. 61 This implied that a decision had been made 
to close the colliery. The view from the `rank-and-file' was that the Board were using the 
subsidence issue and new doubts over the future of Stuart Street as an excuse for closure, 
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the actual reason being accumulated financial and current operational losses resulting from 
manpower problems. 62 Manpower difficulties were increasing the colliery's costs because 
of high labour turnover and an inability to maximise machine running times. 63 There thus 
developed a belief among the Bradford workforce that closure was being masterminded by 
the Government through its need to push through the ACP with the Board under pressure 
to comply without sanction from local management. Those suspicions were heightened as 
a result of the delay in reaching a decision on the go-ahead from Government and the Coal 
Board to exploit new reserves. 64 
What infuriated Bradford miners was that after years of operating under fear of the 
subsidence issue they had been given hope of an assured future by a positive outcome from 
the inquiry. They were now seeing defeat snatched from the jaws of victory by 
manipulation of the issue to clear the way for closure on financial and operational grounds. 
This knowledge was more difficult to bear given that by the Board's own estimations 
Bradford could have become one of the most productive and profitable collieries in Britain 
had it solved its manpower problems and exploited new reserves in an unfettered manner. 
65 
There is circumstantial evidence to support the view that Bradford's closure was a 
deliberate scuttling exercise made in London. The future of the colliery seemed assured 
until as late as 1967, even taking account of the subsidence issue. Subsidence damage to 
property was very real indeed. Yet, the evidence at the public enquiry did not show 
conclusively that an extension of workings would have caused further substantive 
subsidence. In fact, the inquiry was very positive about Bradford continuing to expand 
without major subsidence difficulties with a weight of opinion in favour of the continued 
operation of this premier colliery. 66 Furthermore, because of manpower problems in east 
Manchester a new housing estate was built to receive miners and their families from other 
parts of Lancashire and other coalfields, such was the confidence in the colliery's future. 67 
Likewise, as late as 1967 the divisional board was specifically recruiting experienced 
mineworkers made redundant in the Durham and Northumberland coalfields to move to 
east Manchester to maintain production at Bradford and help spear-head the push on the 
new reserves when the call finally came. 68 In short these events suggested that Bradford 
colliery was on the verge of a major expansion into productive and profitable mining until 
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early 1967. However, during 1967 a decision was taken to abandon the colliery. The nature 
of the closure at Bradford was thus highly suspect and brought a vociferous `rank-and-file' 
reaction, although the cries that the colliery "would not become another Mosley Common" 
would not prevent a similar fate for Bradford. 69 
Another feature of the Bradford saga which increased `rank-and-file' hostility was the 
intervention of the NUMNWA leadership, along with local MPs, in attempts to save it. 
When the workforce at Bradford received the first warning of closure in January 1968 
Gormley delivered a personal call to the workforce to `fight' to save the colliery. This was 
to be achieved through maximising co-operation with management, implementing new 
technology, and improving performance and output levels. This was a call to save the 
colliery under `new realism'. It confirmed a `rank-and-file' suspicion that the closure threat 
was based on economic and operational grounds rather than the other reasons offered 
which were seen as elaborate excuses. 70 Being beaten by the effects of subsidence was one 
thing - Bradford miners had lived with that threat for years - but the suggestion that a 
modem productive and profitable colliery was about to be dumped because it was deemed 
uneconomic was the final straw for the `rank-and-file'. 
The final insult came with last gasp attempts to save the colliery. In the first instance, 
Gormley `challenged' the view that Bradford was uneconomic by commissioning a 
NUMNWA-inspired mining engineer's report after the Coal Board conceded that 
-economic and operational decisions had been influential in reaching its closure decision, 
officially announced in June 1968.71 The report concurred with the Board's view that 
Bradford was uneconomic. It was not surprising because integral to the engineer's 
estimations was a factor for the costs of subsidence and cumulative losses which Bradford 
NUM branch committee argued, should have been discounted by this juncture. Gormley, 
however, accepted the engineer's findings as the final word on closure. 72 The abortive 
intervention by Gormley was seen by the `rank-and-file' as a contrived exercise to justify 
closure while giving the impression that the NUMNWA leadership was attempting to save 
the colliery. 
This came on top of Gormley's iridescence throughout the progress of the closure. Firstly, 
telling the workforce that the colliery was safe after a positive public inquiry outcome; then 
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issuing a gloomy prognosis as he agreed with Robens over the future of Stuart Street, 
followed by encouragement to save the colliery in early 1968, and finally to an 
admonishment for the men at Bradford for their despondency and lack of effort in the 
`fight' to save the colliery near the end. On top of this Gormley initiated an engineer's 
report which could have had its findings written in advance. 73 Gormley, was widely 
perceived as doing the bidding for the Government and the Coal Board. 
The intervention of three Manchester Labour MPs and Eric Ogden - who had worked 
underground at Bradford - promised much until it was realised that their only interest was 
in obtaining a short-term reprieve for the colliery to alleviate the consequences of closure. 
This was in respect of jobs in industries in the vicinity of the colliery on whose future they 
directly depended. 4 These interventions did more harm than good by unnecessarily raising 
expectations of deliverance from closure among the `rank-and-file'. 
Given that Bradford had earned a reputation for militancy throughout the 1960s it seems 
surprising that there was not a stronger reaction to closure aside from expressions of 
resentment. Protest was enfeebled by a combination of the manpower situation; the impact 
of `new realism'; and political differences within the colliery. The uncertainty created over 
the future of Bradford over a long period of time allowed the Coal Board to let manpower 
drift away during closure because alternative employment prospects were relative good in 
east Manchester. Of the 1,500 mineworkers remaining in January 1968 at the first hint of 
closure, only 480 remained at final closure in September 1968. Only 200 Bradford miners 
retained a job in coal in Lancashire or other coalfields. This still left a `residual' workforce, 
many with families to support, in Coal Board tenanted houses on the `wrong' side of the 
coalfield with nowhere to go. 75 
Manpower `drift' during closure reduced the effectiveness of `rank-and-file' opposition. 
The workforce was either too busy fleeing the troubled colliery or answering the call to 
save it. A workforce melting away or pre-occupied in trying to keep the colliery open was 
unlikely to mount direct action. This factor was undoubtedly an estimation in the decision 
to proceed with closure in this manner. One outcome was the way in which those likely to 
become the focus of protest were neutralised. Joe Ryan, a longstanding `militant' activist at 
Bradford, was himself engaged in the `fight' to save the colliery. In addition, Ryan, as 
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chairman of the tenants group, was involved in representing Coal Board tenants on their 
rights after the colliery closed. 6 
The mood at the colliery during 1968 was certainly one of anger, which was mainly 
directed at Government policy, seen at the root of an unnecessary closure. One outcome 
was the way internal ideological differences within Bradford branch committee were set 
aside to attack the Government. It is notable that closure produced unity between NUM 
branch officials from the `left' and `right' united in their criticism of the Government 
throughout 1968. Previous paragons of moderation and leadership loyalty joined more 
militant voices for the first time. However, the advent of a common platform came much 
too late for branch officials to mount effective direct action. 
Increasingly the combined problems of the colliery informed another sentiment within the 
`rank-and-file': weary. resignation. As branch officials noted, many miners were "sick and 
tired of the industry" in which the intention was to "make it as uncomfortable as possible 
for the lads". 77 It was not only the decision to close Bradford which was deliberately 
manipulated, but also the manner of closure as a way of forcing out the remaining 
workforce. The final snap of dissension came as Coal Board tenants faced rent increases 
because they no longer qualified for Coal Board subsidies. This came as Sid Vincent 
personally delivered the final confirmation of closure. The dwindling band of miners still 
around to hear the colliery's death warrant being read out, ahead of the official 
announcement, heckled Vincent 78 
The circumstances of Bradford's closure were a complex affair. Ultimately, the subsidence 
issue or an adverse decision over the future of Stuart Street Power Station might have done 
for the colliery. These factors were more serious than the `rank-and-file' at Bradford 
appreciated or would admit. However, the fact that neither of these issues was directly 
responsible for closure, combined with the manipulation surrounding closure, led to 
friction with the `rank-and-file'. Also, as Bradford miners claimed, loss of local 
management autonomy was an important factor. They pointed the finger at the direct hand 
of Government over decisions affecting the future of the colliery during 1967. Evidence of 
direct Government involvement in closure beyond the circumstantial is not available. 
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Either way, the important point is that the `rank-and-file' believed that the Government 
was responsible. 
These suspicions, together with the anger generated, did not translate into significant 
protest. The location of the colliery and manpower factors proved inimical to the cohesion 
required for `rank-and-file' protest to flourish. Another factor was the persistence of 
internal ideological divisions at Bradford. Similarly, the pre-occupation with the fight to 
save the colliery prevented anger turning into direct action. What did emerge from this 
unhappy affair was a growing enthusiasm for direct criticism of the Government. This, in 
turn, reflected adversely on the NUMNWA leadership's continued adherence to 
Government policy. 
The strongest reaction to Government policy came over closures in North East Lancashire 
and St. Helens districts. In St. Helens district this was in response to the partial closure of 
Sutton Manor colliery. It prefaced a threat to the whole St. Helens district. The decision by 
the Coal Board to close one of the three pits at Sutton Manor in March 1968 was seen as a 
huge blow to a district which had been relatively untroubled by closures and where there 
was optimism for the future of mining. 79 The district had seen closures at Lea Green in 
1964 and Clock Face in 1965. Ravenhead colliery, closed in October 1968, had been on a 
long-term reprieve since the 1959 Plan. Its further reprieve until the second phase of the 
ACP was testament to the strength of the industry in the district and the value the Board 
placed on it. St. Helens miners accepted Ravenhead's closure as a genuine `exhaustion' 
case rather than an `economic' closure. Similarly, doubts over the long-term viability of 
Wood Colliery, at Haydock, had been expressed since the 1965 announcement. It was 
expected to close during the second phase of the ACP. 80 
The three remaining collieries in the district: Bold, Cronton and Sutton Manor were seen as 
modernised and productive collieries with an assured future into the late twentieth century. 
The NCBLA under pressure of further contraction needed to reduce costs and coal 
stockpiles in St. Helens. Gradual closure of the three pits at Sutton Manor offered the most 
obvious method of achieving this because it minimised the risk of confrontation with the 
`rank-and-file' at a difficult time. However, `rank-and-file' anger over Sutton Manor was 
aggravated because immediately prior to announcement of the pit closure the Coal Board 
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indicated that the colliery was well placed to receive new investment. The closure of 
number one pit thus came as a great surprise. It was seen as a harbinger of doom, 
undermining confidence in the whole district within a mood of fear pervading the whole 
coalfield in 1968.81 
The pit closure at Sutton Manor brought miners together in St. Helens district in common 
defence of their collieries. This unparalleled level of unity became more marked as 
redundancies were announced at Bold colliery - the previously unsinkable flagship of the 
district. Similarly, Cronton, was placed on a "jeopardy" list. An angry mood was inflamed, 
as it had been at Clock Face, by concerns over transfers within St. Helens. The decision by 
the Board to transfer displaced men from number one pit at Sutton Manor to Cronton, Bold 
and Wood rather than the two remaining pits at Sutton Manor raised fears that the colliery 
was about to close altogether. 82 
There were a number of notable features about reaction to the Sutton Manor situation. The 
forging of previously unseen levels of solidarity was one outcome. One influential factor 
was Jimmy Dowd's consolidation of the left's control of Bold colliery from where he was 
able to mount a highly effective critique of closure policy. 83 However, the most important 
development was the prominence of Joe McDermott in leading the protest. McDermott, as 
miners' agent for St. Helens, was the most senior NUM official in the district. He was 
dragged into the space created by a growing mood of militancy. McDermott was seen as a 
leadership loyalist, having the approval of the Labour `machine' in St. Helens, but his 
support for Gormley had never been unquestioning. Sutton Manor was McDermott's 
`home pit'. His brother, Michael, had been a leader of the 1965 `revolt' at Clock Face 
where Joe had worked before transferring to Sutton Manor. He had given tacit support 
then, emerging as a mediator to bring the dispute to a conclusion. Now the dire situation 
facing St. Helens led McDermott to become increasingly critical of both Gormley and his 
colleagues on the NUMNWA executive who were loyal to Gormley. Consequently, a 
majority of the St. Helens district fell in behind McDermott as spokesperson for the 
growing mood of dissent. 
McDermott clashed with Gormley over Sutton Manor. True to form, Gormley supported 
the Coal Board's decision to close number one pit. He was accused by Sutton Manor 
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branch committee of aiding closure and of "not giving a damn" what happened to them. 
Reflecting the growing mood of opposition, McDermott challenged Gormley's protege, 
Vincent, for the NUMNWA presidency in 1968 with only the backing of Bold, Sutton 
Manor and Wood colliery. Ravenhead colliery was in closure mode but backed Vincent. 
This was as much a case of self-interest in closure as it was the influence of a `moderate' 
branch committee. Virtually the entire Ravenhead workforce had been offered transfers 
because, as a scheduled closure, `places' had been prepared in advance at receiving 
collieries. 84 Cronton was divided because its vice-presidential contender, Bernard 
Donaghy, was with the leadership. 85 That McDermott failed in his bid to take the 
presidency with limited support was not the issue; that a challenge was issued at all, given 
the level of acceptance the ACP enjoyed within the NUMNWA leadership, was more 
significant. It tells us much about the extent to which support for the ACP was beginning 
to fragment within the higher echelons of the NUMNWA. 
The second feature of the Sutton Manor affair was the character of `rank-and-file' reaction. 
They were no longer prepared to wait and accept a decision on the colliery's future decided 
by the all too familiar `stitch up' between divisional management and the NUMNWA 
leadership. This was demonstrated when miners in St. Helens district `invaded' a meeting 
at Sutton Manor between Gormley, branch officials and local management at which 
Gormley was doing his best to persuade the branch committee to accept closure of number 
one pit. Gormley had a rough ride. 86 
However, the most important feature of the protest was the way it was strangulated almost 
as soon as it began by the rigid discipline imposed by `new realism'. McDermott wanted to 
lead a challenge to keep number one pit open, knowing that if he didn't, this would pave 
the way for further run-down in St. Helens. However, his enthusiasm for a fight was 
quenched by the knowledge that the NCBLA, together with Gormley, were attempting to 
lure the protest into a trap. Divisional management, supported by Gormley, wanted to 
initiate an inquiry into Sutton Manor to determine feasibility. McDermott decided that they 
were safer to accept the closure of number one pit than go to a full inquiry because he 
believed that management and Gormley would use the results to force the complete closure 
of Sutton Manor. While this could be dismissed as paranoia caused by the panicky 
atmosphere of the time, based on past evidence of such machinations, McDermott was well 
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advised not to trust Gormley with an inquiry. He knew Gormley would use it as a stunt to 
support the Coal Board's plans to close the whole colliery. 87 
The protest at Sutton Manor disintegrated as quickly as it began. Sutton Manor miners 
found themselves snagged on the spikes of `new realism'. Outmanoeuvred by McDermott, 
Gormley and the divisional management insisted on pressing ahead with further capacity 
reductions at Sutton Manor as a prelude to closure, even though they knew it might 
provoke an unprecedented `rank-and-file' backlash. The stage was therefore set for 
Gormley to issue his standard `battle cry' to Sutton Manor. He demanded maximum effort 
and co-operation to demonstrate the viability of the colliery. 88 This was the familiar `kiss 
of death' pretext to closure. Scared witless by the prospect of over 1,000 redundancies the 
Sutton Manor miners responded, as did the whole of St. Helens district, by undertaking a 
massive effort on production and performance for an eighteen month period between 1968 
and late 1969. This was enough to ensure the survival of the remaining two pits at Sutton 
Manor as the miners dug their way to more stable times for the industry. 
Both Gormley and Vincent paid tribute to the efforts of the Sutton Manor workers as 
exemplifying how a colliery in jeopardy could avoid closure through "determination, co- 
operation and through an effort to increase output". Both men saw Sutton Manor as an 
exemplar of `new realism' in which a threatened colliery proved "that Lancashire had a 
future". 89 Likewise, there were no further closures in the district, enabling Bold, Cronton 
and Sutton Manor to survive into the 1970s. St. Helens miners were pre-occupied in the 
`fight' to save their pits rather than challenge the NUMNWA leadership or divisional 
management, thus undermining unity of purpose among the `rank-and-file'. 
Antagonistic `rank-and-file' reaction to further contraction in St. Helens was matched in 
North East Lancashire. Prior to 1965 the North East Lancashire coalfield had been little 
affected by contraction compared to areas of South Lancashire. Between vesting date and 
the 1959 Revised Plan six collieries had closed plus one partial closure with the loss of 
around 750 jobs. 90 Between 1959 and 1965 there were a further eight closures with the 
loss of around 1,000 jobs. 91 However, all but five of those closures were of small moorland 
drift mines mainly in the Forests of Pendle and Rossendale, 92 which were significant for 
representing the end of a unique mining culture and tradition rather than for having a 
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serious impact on jobs. 93 Such pits had always faced a finite life. In addition, the divisional 
board opened new drifts in these upland areas during the immediate post-war period at a 
time of coal shortage. Although the drifts presented formidable operational difficulties they 
remained remarkably profitable, albeit, small producers of coal. These favourable 
conditions saw the opening of four new drift sites and the re-development of another 
during the early 1950s. 94 Two major projects, a new drift colliery at Thorney Bank, and a 
re-construction at Hapton Valley, including a drift extension, constituted the premier 
developments in the modernisation of the district during the 1950s, involving heavy capital 
investment. Later, as demand for coal fell, the attraction of the drifts waned as new and 
existing sites closed. 95 
Closures other than the drifts had been few. The most important was at Reedley in Burnley 
in 1959, which, together with the final closure of Salterford drift, provoked a one day token 
strike at both collieries over an alleged lack of consultation and warning of closure. 96 The 
excellent performance and profitability of collieries in North East Lancashire had 
combined with Coal Board reluctance to close collieries too rapidly, to produce a relatively 
stable position for coal up to 1965. Coal Board reticence resulted from local authority and 
political pressure arising from the severe contraction of textiles. The Coal Board did not 
wish gratuitously to add to the economic and social problems of the district. Even as late as 
the mid-1960s when contraction had all but reached completion in many parts of South 
Lancashire, the North East Lancashire coalfield was home to 3,000 mineworkers mainly 
living and working in the Burnley area operating some of the most profitable pits in 
Lancashire. 97 
This favourable outlook came to a dramatic end with the ACP. Estimations of the future 
viability of collieries in North East Lancashire were dependent on the market for coal in 
power generation. Traditionally, the coal market was in two main sectors: textiles and 
domestic consumption. Contraction of both these markets saw coal increasingly dependent 
on the power trade by the mid-1960s. North East Lancashire contained a concentration of 
four coal-fired power stations in the Calder Valley, and the CEGB planned to build the 
North West's second large new generation coal-fired station of 2,000 MW at Simonstone 
not far from the confluence of the Calder and Ribble rivers. The existing coal-fired 
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stations, along with the big Simonstone project, would have guaranteed not just the future 
of collieries in North East Lancashire but also those in South Lancashire too. 8 
As Lord Roberts noted on a visit to North East Lancashire in December 1965, the future of 
coal in the district would be determined by the CEGB not the Coal Board. His comments 
contained an air of grimace. 99 There were a number of factors in power generation which 
put the future of coal in the district in peril. The best power coal was reaching exhaustion 
to the extent that it was blended with power coal from the East Midlands and South 
Yorkshire. Cheaper power coal from these coalfields was itself threatening completely to 
displace the Lancashire variety. In addition, the CEGB was reviewing its coal-fired units in 
the area. The CEGB's decision to shelve the Simonstone project in 1967 was an enormous, 
but not entirely unexpected blow, because it was felt that the CEGB would opt for a new 
nuclear power station on the Lancashire coast at Heysham as the North West's next big 
power project. 10° However, the Simonstone decision greatly increased the threat facing 
coal in North East Lancashire during 1967-68 thus bringing the crisis in the district to a 
climax at a critical time for the industry in Lancashire. Removal of local management 
structures in the district increased the vulnerability of collieries to closure in the absence of 
local input into closure decisions. 
Four collieries, all drifts, were proposed for closure under the ACP announcement in 
November 1965: Fir Trees, Hill Top, Deerplay and Old Meadows. In addition to the drifts, 
Huncoat, was to close, though a much later date was expected. The biggest shock was the 
announcement that Bank Hall colliery - the remaining pit in Burnley and the largest in the 
area - was on a "doubtful list"lot Bank Hall was put on six-year rollercoaster ride in which 
it was in a state of near permanent threat until eventual closure in 1971. The central mining 
workshop in the district was also closed. Many feared that the closure of the workshop was 
the harbinger of a complete shutdown in North East Lancashire. The divisional board 
anticipated that only Hapton Valley and Thorney Bank would remain open beyond the 
early 1970s, putting over 2,000 jobs in the industry at risk. 102 
Doubts over the future of the power market and the costs of operating pits supplying this 
sector transformed a relatively optimistic outlook for coal in the district. In particular, the 
Bank Hall decision brought a clamour of protest while the closure of area workshops 
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provoked abortive interventions from the NUMNWA in the district, Burnley Council and 
the local Labour MP, Dan Jones. 103 NUM branches, through the auspices of Burnley 
Miners' Association, and the miners' agent for the area, Leo Crossley, criticised the 
decision to close the area workshops and downgrade Bank Hall. 104 Crossley, as miners' 
agent, was de facto leader of the NUMNWA in North East Lancashire. He was also a 
prominent Labour councillor on Burnley Council with a connection with both the NUM 
and Labour stretching back to the 1920s. 105 Crossley's influence extended beyond his 
Burnley redoubt. He was one of the senior full-time miners' agents in Lancashire. 
Furthermore, he had been NUMNWA president between 1958 and 1961 and again in 1967 
during his retirement year. He had also periodically held the vice-presidency. After 
Gormley and Hammond, he was effectively the `third man' of Lancashire mining unionism 
for much of the late 1950s and 1960s until his retirement in 1968. 
Coal contraction in North East Lancashire was conflated with the fate of textiles. In 
addition to Crossley, a number of prominent NUMNWA officials held office on Burnley 
Council. They were involved with other civic, business and union leaders sitting on the 
North East Lancashire Development Council (NELDC) through which they fought to save 
the coal and textile industries; attract new industrial development; and campaign for full 
development status for the sub-region. This led to tension with the Labour Government 
which was accused of not doing enough to help prevent the contraction of staple industries 
and matching promises on new industrial growth. Tensions spilled over into dealings with 
Dan Jones. The MP, who was by instinct a `moderniser', had at the same time to mediate 
the concerns of his constituency. He chided civic and union leaders connected with cotton 
and coal, demanding that they decide whether they wanted the Government to save these 
industries or let them decline and support industrial diversification, as they were not going 
to get both. He warned them that Labour was only interested in industrial diversification. '06 
The level of disquiet led to visits to North East Lancashire by prominent Labour 
politicians, including the most senior members of the Government. George Brown, Deputy 
Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, in April 1967 was followed by a high profile visit 
from Harold Wilson in January 1968 with the Queen appearing shortly after the premier. 
These were essentially politically motivated jaunts to the `hinterlands' to express solidarity 
with the dire economic situation facing North East Lancashire while attempting to raise the 
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Government's profile during a difficult period for Labour. For example, Wilson used the 
occasion to offer public endorsement to the "I'm backing Britain" campaign in support of 
British industry. 107 
Throughout 1967-68 the scale of contraction saw criticism of Labour gather momentum. 
The growing unpopularity of the Government was given sharper focus in North East 
Lancashire through the decline of staple industries. A measure of the storm brewing can be 
gauged by the emergence of breakaway militant factions from the textile unions which 
became prominent during 1967 when they organised vocal and agitated street protests 
including one to coincide with Brown's Visit . 
108 Despite these developments a formal 
alliance of organised labour in the staple industries against contraction at either senior or 
`rank-and-file' levels was never a serious proposition. Internecine political troubles on 
Burnley Council during the post-war period between the various sectional interests in 
organised labour had created too much bad blood. '09 Nonetheless, these interests had a 
common cause and worked together through the forum provided by the NELDC. Although 
a united front of `rank-and-file' workers never materialised, mineworkers were eager to 
take a cue from the tactics of textile workers, especially as matters came to a head in late 
1967 and during 1968 with a threat to close Bank Hall colliery; the bringing forward of 
closures at Deerplay and Huncoat; and an announcement that Thorney Bank was to 
close. l 0 
Imbued with a growing sense of grievance NUM branches sought immediate industrial and 
political action against the closures through the offices of Burnley Miners' Association. 
Bank Hall was the only remaining branch in the association following the disintegration of 
the once politically influential Prosperity Lodge of Burnley miners. "' The Association 
framed a resolution to go before the NUMNWA. It was one of the most radical in the 
history of mining unionism in Lancashire. It called for immediate strike action over 
closures and withdrawal of payment of the political levy to the Labour Party. The prime 
mover of the emergency resolution from Burnley was Albert Dugan, who became branch 
secretary at Bank Hall in 1968 having worked in coal since before the Second World War. 
The ageing and ailing Dugan was a most unlikely militant. He was a branch official of 
previously moderate views who represented Bank Hall on the NUMNWA executive. His 
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leader, Leo Crossley, had complete faith in Dugan as a supporter of the NUMNWA and 
Labour. 112 
That the Dugan resolution was not adopted is less important than the prioritisation and 
reception it received at the time. Far from being attacked, it was discussed as a serious 
proposal by delegates from across the coalfield including those with impeccable moderate 
credentials such as Parkside. Even ultra loyal executive members from the Gormley- 
Vincent clique were prepared to give the resolution a hearing. Under 'normal' conditions 
in the coalfield the resolution would have been as a good as a political suicide note for its 
mover. These were far from 'normal' times in Lancashire. The resolution was eventually 
rejected by the leadership and a majority of delegates in favour of continuing to apply 
pressure on the Government through Labour MPs in the hope of producing some change of 
policy. 113 
Dugan's resolution was important in two other respects. Unlike similar protests over 
closure, the resolution went beyond a debate framed by `new realism'. It opened an assault 
on Labour's policy of modernisation in which coal was seen as just one element. This was 
informed by the wider critique of policy on the staple industries emerging in North East 
Lancashire. Dugan noted in his speech to delegates and a gathering of eight coalfield and 
North West MPs, including his own Dan Jones, that the crux of the matter was a belief that 
"ve are unfashionable, outdated, and outmoded". Dugan went on to challenge this view 
within the notion of 'new realism' by comparing what coal could offer against the 
alternative fuels. However, it was Dugan's ability to take argument to a different level 
which proved so attractive to delegates in the ensuing debate. The realisation that it was 
Labour's modernisation agenda which was condemning coal, however hard miners fought 
to save the industry, raised the political pitch immeasurably against Labour during 1967- 
68.114 
The second aspect of Dugan's resolution was the reaction of his 'boss', Leo Crossley. 
While Crossley did not publicly support the resolution it was more notable that he did not 
move against Dugan. This is all the more pertinent given that Crossley was due to retire in 
August 1968 and the likely new leader in North East Lancashire would be Albert Dugan. 
115 Crossley's silence was indicative of his willingness to support the 'rank-and-file' 
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crusade in North East Lancashire throughout 1967-68. Like his fellow senior official, Joe 
McDermott, on the other side of the coalfield in St. Helens, he had been thrust into the 
space created by 'rank-and-file' action from where he was heading for a showdown with 
Gormley on closures in North East Lancashire. 
The showdown was precipitated by chronic redundancy and manpower transfer problems 
set in train by the pile up of closures in the district. In addition to the closure threat at Bank 
Hall there were two surprisingly early announcements at Deerplay and Huncoat. The 
NUMNWA in the district accepted that both had a finite life under current circumstances 
but closure was not expected before 1969. Divisional management demanded an early 
closure at Huncoat on economic and operational grounds based on its inability to supply 
power coal of the right quality at the right price. The intention was to use Yorkshire coal. 
The only chink of light was Huncoat's inclusion in Harold Wilson's closure deferment list 
in September 1967. At Deerplay there was an announcement that tunnelling teams had hit a 
massive rock fault. While both closures were conceded in principle by the union in North 
East Lancashire, they were challenged as premature closures. In addition, it was argued 
that in spite of geological impediments at Deerplay, mining activity could have continued 
for a least two years. However, the main reason for the union contesting closure was the 
build-up of closures in such a short space of time. Fears were compounded with the 
announcement that Thorney Sank was to close. The pit was expected to remain open, 
together with Hapton Valley, beyond the 1970s. 116 
The problem for Crossley was the manpower situation. He was faced with the prospect of 
over 1,000 mineworkers - nearer 2,000 if Bank Hall closed - with little chance of transfer. 
The majority lived in Burnley and surrounding villages. The only receiving pit was Hapton 
Valley, which was incapable of absorbing these numbers. Daily travel to pits in South 
Lancashire, themselves under chronic strain from closures, was not feasible because it 
would have involved over a 60-mile round trip each working day. The only option was the 
nightmare prospect of a mass exodus of 2,000 Burnley miners and their families to other 
coalfields. To complete this Gordian knot the divisional management announced it was 
transferring miners displaced from the Mosley Common closure to Burnley collieries, such 
was the parlous situation in South Lancashire. While Gormley did not officially support 
this madcap scheme he did not condemn it either, resulting in a spat with Crossley. 
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Crossley finally snapped, describing the decision as "out of this world". The manpower 
situation was reaching surreal proportions. The proposal was to transfer miners from South 
Lancashire to pits with a doubtful future in North East Lancashire involving a 60-mile 
daily round trip where up to 2,000 Burnley miners faced the imminent prospect of 
redundancy or of finding work at the one remaining colliery. 117 
Crossley thus spent the remainder of his union career fighting contraction in North East 
Lancashire with his 'rank-and-file' squarely behind him. In addition, he joined his 
colleagues on Burnley Council criticising the Labour Government over its policy on the 
staple industries through what was described as a `bring Wilson to heel" campaign. gis 
The position adopted by Crossley at this time was influenced by his impending retirement. 
In the twilight of his career in the NUM and Labour Party he contemplated the full 
implications of industrial change in the district. He had been associated with coal since just 
after the First World War when he joined as a pit lad. His retirement coincided with the 
disintegration of the industry in the district while his involvement with the NELDC made 
him acutely aware of what the process was doing to textiles. During his union career 
Crossley had been at one with leading officials who had supported industrial change in 
which closures were seen as an essential part of the process. But, as the full impact of 
contraction of the staple industries in North East Lancashire became apparent, particularly 
as the ACP cut deep into the sub-region, his views were transformed. ' 19 
Although Huncoat, Deerplay and Thorney Bank did close, pressure from both Crossley and 
a belligerent 'rank-and-file' ensured that the folly of the proposed transfer scheme was 
recognised while the big prize, a reprieve for Bank Hall, was secured, though doubts 
remained over its longer-term future. The 'rank-and-file' at Bank Hall had campaigned for 
the colliery to remain open through pleas to Cabinet Ministers on visits to the area and 
through Dan Jones who was PPS to the President of the Board of Trade. Divisional 
management were unnerved by the position taken by Burnley miners supported by the 
visible presence of a senior union official of the calibre of Leo Crossley. Bank Hall thus 
had the added fillip of substantial new investment. The colliery even witnessed a 
manpower recruitment drive during 1968-69 in which miners from closures in the district 
were absorbed. These moves ensured that it remained a viable proposition, together with 
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Hapton Valley, as the only two remaining collieries in the district after the last drift at Old 
Meadows closed in 1969.120 
For Bank Hall the exultation only lasted three years until March 1971 when it was 
unexpectedly closed. Such was the sensitivity attaching to closure that the official reason 
given was safety; the surest way of winning NUMNWA support. The NCBLA argued that 
continuing ignition flashes from faces constituted a safety hazard which risked a 
catastrophic explosion. Mineworkers in the district were mindful of an explosion at Hapton 
Valley in 1962 which killed nineteen miners and seriously injured thirteen more in the 
worst post-war pit disaster in the Lancashire coalfield. The NUMNWA, including the Bank 
Hall branch committee headed by Albert Dugan, had no option other than to concede 
closure since safety issues were sacrosanct. However, closure was disputed by the 'rank- 
and-file' on the basis that the NCBLA had been looking to close the colliery for six years 
and had now found its excuse after it had made a hasty retreat under 'rank-and-file' 
pressure during 1967-68.121 
The promising prognosis for the colliery after the events of 1967-68, together with new 
investment, ensured that the colliery survived until the return of stability for coal. This 
made closure seem less plausible. Similarly, there was a view on technical grounds that the 
safety issue was a pretext. As many miners attested, ignitions had been frequent and indeed 
much worse over many years. They could not understand why management suddenly 
wanted to make an issue of it. Likewise, it was alleged that management had promised to 
install new ignition suppression equipment, but had failed to do so. The accusation thus 
persisted among the 'rank-and-file' that, after their act of defiance during 1967-68, Bank 
Hall's closure was an act of retribution wreaked at a more opportune time. The 'black' 
humour of Burnley miners described the impending closure as the colliery having "gone in 
a flash" after years of enduring closure threats only punctuated by their stand in 1967-68. 
As one Bank Hall miner put it "the Board have held a loaded pistol to our heads for a 
number of years; it was only a matter of them pulling the trigger at a time of their 
choosing". 122 
The final closure for consideration was Astley Green, closed in 1970. It survived the main 
phase of closures during the late 1960s and was expected to survive much longer but 
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divisional management was still under pressure to reduce costs and Astley Green had made 
a financial loss in all but one of the five previous years. 123 The announcement in April 
1969 came as big a shock to the NUMNWA leadership as it did to the 'rank-and-file'. The 
leadership believed that closures were completed and were anticipating the return of 
stability. While the leadership wanted to reflect 'rank-and-file' anger at this surprise 
announcement, coming on the back of the unrest of the late 1960s, it also wished to avoid 
undermining an ever-closer co-operative relationship with the NCB in the 'fight for coal' 
at a time when the outlook for the industry was improving. The leadership therefore 
embarked on the well-worn strategy of maximising pressure on the Board and the 
Government while obviating more substantive protest. 
Astley Green had one of the more 'moderate' reputations in the Manchester district. It was 
Vincent's 'home' pit from where he had risen through the union ranks. The branch 
committee remained under his firm control. 'Rank-and-file' protest was not expected. 
Unlike North East Lancashire and St. Helens where the NUMNWA leadership had faced 
stiff opposition, it felt able to 'manage' the Astley Green closure on its terms. Vincent 
therefore used the occasion to take charge of what he euphemistically called a "campaign 
to save the Lancashire coalfield". The leadership decided at the eleventh hour that there 
was a potential threat to the whole coalfield if a colliery like Astley Green was closed at a 
time-when no further closures were expected. Vincent's use of the term "campaign" was 
misleading. He initiated an engineer's report from which a "survival plan" for the colliery 
was put to the Coal Board. Thereafter, Astley Green miners were encouraged to 'fight' to 
save their pit by invoking 'new realism'. 124 
Gormley seized on developments at Astley Green as a way of reinforcing his personal 
authority. Ile took up the cudgels of the Astley Green case with great enthusiasm. He 
launched an attack on the Coal Board over closure when he met Lord Roben, alleging a 
"breach of faith" and "management negligence" which threatened the whole Lancashire 
industry. 125 Only a year earlier Gormley had supported the Board over a similar set of 
circumstances at Sutton Manor. Talking tough on Astley Green at this time proved to be a 
smart move for both Gormley and Vincent. Vincent was cheered to the rafters when he 
threatened to draw a line in the coal dust over Astley Green at the 1969 NUMLA annual 
conference. He told delegates: "If we don't show our teeth now then woe betide us in the 
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future". 126 In November 1969 Gormley joined the fray by warning divisional management 
that "enough is enough".... " in Lancashire we have had enough of this torture". 127 
It was rather late in the day for these leadership interventions. As a result, they lacked 
credibility. There were personal reasons for Vincent becoming involved, because he had 
been associated with Astley Green all his working life. In addition, both Gormley and 
Vincent had self-interested reasons for talking tough at this time. Both were aiming for 
higher office in their respective ways, Gormley for the national presidency, and, if a 
vacancy resulted, Vincent for NUMNWA General Secretary. They were aware that they 
had to catch the current mood of the 'rank-and-file'. In fact, it was just the same rhetoric it 
had been for the whole of the 1960s. The NUMNWA leadership was ending the decade 
much as it had spent it. The tough talking amounted to nothing more than the familiar 
encouragement to the Astley Green miners to produce an unprecedented effort to avert 
closure. Vincent went as far as telling them that on their success depended the whole future 
of the Lancashire coalfield. 128 
Under threat of closure, with this heavy duty of responsibility ringing in their ears, Astley 
Green miners responded. Many gave up their annual holiday entitlement to join a twelve- 
month 'fight' to save the pit. 129. Alas, as was so often the case, all efforts failed. Vincent 
blamed both a 'higher' authority, exclaiming that the "gods were not with us" and those at 
Astley Green who had not pulled their weight because "they had one eye on redundancy 
payments". This declaration came against a backdrop of bewildered and heartbroken 
miners wandering around the pit bank as the colliery closed. Because closure was 
unscheduled so late in the programme transfer possibilities were limited. Of the 1,400 
mineworkers only 310 retained jobs in mining in Lancashire or elsewhere. 130 
Whether opposition to the Astlcy Green closure by the 'rank-and-file' would have made 
any difference to the outcome is doubtful, given previous cases of this kind. However, 
'rank-and-file' opposition to closures in North East Lancashire and St. Helens demonstrated 
that it was possible to influence events, particularly where this had the support of senior 
NUMNWA officials or where there was intervention from the political establishment, as 
seen in North East Lancashire. In this respect the 'rank-and-file' at Astley Green were at a 
distinct disadvantage having only Vincent as their 'champion' in a situation in which the 
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branch committee was in his 'pocket'. As shown on innumerable occasions throughout the 
period of industrial change, leaving closure questions to the mercy of the leadership in 
order to lead a `challenge' was courting an even more painful end. 
6.4 OPPOSITION TO THE ACCELERATED COLLIERY CLOSURE 
PROGRAMME: AN ASSESSMENT 
With regard to 'rank-and-file' unrest during 1967-68 a compelling case can be made that 
opposition to the ACP was held in check by a powerful range of factors. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that opposition was only a momentary event as the ACP impacted on 
specific collieries and sub-regions of the coalfield. On another level there is the question of 
the extent to which Lancashire's involvement in the rising militancy of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s in the industry was influenced by the impulses of industrial change. 
Furthermore, did the impact of industrial change have any influence on the political life of 
the coalfield? The seeds of these puzzles are raised by Howell. On the one hand he writes 
of a "corrosive legacy" and of "deep scars" left by industrial change. On the other, he 
notes that "lift off' into `militancy" occurred as the industry returned to stability, based on 
the prioritisation again of `bread and butter' industrial issues such as wages and conditions. 
131 This section seeks to unravel these questions in the belief that the experience of 
industrial change did leave a 'legacy' in the coalfield. 
Now was opposition to the ACP held in check? Circumstances proved unfavourable to 
'rank-and-file' opposition. The important factor was 'new realism'. An overriding belief in 
the need to 'fight' to save coal within the new situation for fuel was present at all levels 
throughout the coalfield. Hardly a closure occurred which was unaccompanied by the 
active participation of the workforce responding to a call from the NUMNWA leadership 
to save their colliery. The 'rank-and-file' were bitter and resentful with the Government, 
the Coal Board and the NUMNWA leadership but they responded to the call. 'New 
realism' facilitated the manipulation of 'survivalist' mentalities in coal. It was the 
NUMNWA Leadership's coup de grace under the ACP. It was a force for 'rank-and-file' 
co-operation like no other. This was exemplified on many occasions during the late 1960s. 
It was instrumental in undermining protest against the ACP when opposition collapsed in 
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St. Helens district in 1968. The NUMNWA leadership, having accepted Government policy 
on further contraction for political reasons, put every sinew of energy into exhortations to 
'fight' for coal within the new regime for fuel. 
The effect of 'new realism' was to undermine 'rank-and-file' solidarity. The divisive 
nature of closure was already clear under rationalisation up to 1965, it was more evident 
under the ACP. There was little chance of collective protest flourishing against further 
contraction as the priority was saving one's own pit and job. By the same token, one dog 
that did not bark, or perhaps did not bark quite as loudly as it might have done, was the 
question of coal's position within labour's plans for economic modernisation. It has 
already been suggested that the NUMNWA leadership and Labour in the coalfield avoided 
this question after Labour had assumed power in order to concentrate on 'new realism'. 
But, how did the 'rank-and-file' interpret the wider issue of modernisation under Labour? 
Did they not care about this? Did they experience industrial change in a state of blissful 
ignorance of the wider issues involved? The 'rank-and-file' were certainly aware of the 
wider issues because 'new realism' resulted from Labour's modernisation agenda for fuel. 
Mineworkers were thus aware of how modernisation had shaped 'new realism' as they 
digested and debated industrial change. 
The 'rank-and-file' participated in the promotion of 'new realism' as a means of 
articulating a response to the 'multi-fuel' economy. However, a substantive debate over 
wider economic modernisation never materialised. When issues of wider modernisation 
were pushed to the forefront of debate, as they were by the intervention from North East 
Lancashire during 1967-68 over the contraction of staple industries, they proved 
persuasive. These were infrequent happenings. For the most part the debate over the 
efficacy, direction and success of Labour's modernisation strategy was not a priority for 
the 'rank-and-file'. This did not arise from ignorance or indifference but from the strictures 
imposed by 'new realism'. For the majority of the 'rank-and-file' the priority was defence 
of the industry against the competition from the new fuels as directed by the NUMNWA 
leadership. This was why a wider debate over Labour's modernisation strategy never 
properly took hold. Economic modernisation was thus primarily interpreted as the defence 
of coal's sectional interests under 'new realism' in the same way as mineworkers sought to 
ensure the survival of their own job and pit. 
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Whether outcomes would have been different had there been a more substantial 
engagement with the wider debate is to speculate. However, the omens were not good 
Certainly, when there was an appreciation of the wider issues it increased the tempo of 
debate. But, this was a long way from turning into industrial or political action. This would 
have necessitated an unprecedented degree of cross sectional co-operation within organised 
labour in the staple industries, at the very least. Even from the limited evidence of the 
situation in North East Lancashire the chances of inter-sectional `rank-and-file' action 
taking place, let alone succeeding, would have been extremely unlikely. The run away 
success story of the late 1960s in the coalfield was the discourse of 'new realism' and 
mastery by which it was wielded by the NUMNWA leadership. 
Arising from this, one view of 'rank-and-file' unrest during 1967-68 was that it was not 
only a temporal affair, it was also restricted and weak. It was limited to specific collieries 
and districts which were unable to unite the whole of the coalfield in opposition to further 
contraction. Under the ACP, the twin fears of uncertainty and insecurity, so apparent under 
rationalisation, were visited on collieries and districts hitherto largely unaffected by 
closures. The duplicitous circumstances of a number of closures and the reverberations of 
Mosley Common's closure combined to raise tension still further. The scale of contraction 
during 1967-68 added to brooding 'rank-and-file' belligerence. 'Rank-and-file' reaction 
was strongest in St. Helens and North East Lancashire, with the latter unique because 
adverse reaction was part of a wider response to the decline of staple industries. This gave 
protests there an edge compared with other districts of the coalfield. 
Although 'rank-and-file' discord displayed variations there were some remarkable 
similarities in the character of protest in the two geographically separated districts. Both 
had been largely unaffected by contraction until the ACP. Both saw the emergence of 
spontaneous 'rank-and-file' protest. Significantly, both were considered likely to respond 
to leadership direction yet, in the event, senior officials emerged to lead aggressive 'rank- 
and-file' challenges. These instances had a historical resonance. The coalfield had a long 
history of factionalism - often territorially based - in which senior officials led 'rank-and- 
file' uprisings against the union leadership. The events of 1967-68 raised the spectre of 
factionalism that had haunted coalfield politics for generations. Historical levels of 
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virulence were not present to the same degree in 1967-68. Yet, the outbreak came 
dangerously close to producing the first major schism among senior officials during the 
whole period of industrial change, supported by substantial sections of the `rank-and-file'. 
In taking their stance, both Crossley and McDermott were influenced by the impact of 
industrial change on their respective districts. Although these events were short-lived and 
quickly subsided they were of such potency that they forced a measure of retreat from the 
NCBLA and NUMNWA leadership over further contraction. 
'Rank-and-file' agitation during 1967-68 was also important in the way it questioned the 
role of Government in further contraction. 'Rank-and-file' anger was not directed at 
Government over the initial announcements on fuel and coal but rather at the specific 
outcomes of contraction under the ACP. Hostility was also directed toward the Coal Board 
and NUMNWA leadership, but it was a preparedness to offer a critique of Government 
which was the most momentous aspect of 'rank-and-file' unrest. This made the situation 
particularly hazardous for the NUMNWA leadership during 1967-68. 
The events of 1967-68 were clearly profound. However, as intense as they were, they must 
be seen in context. The situation in the coalfield away from pits and districts convulsed by 
these events was quite different. A majority of collieries and other districts of the coalfield 
were untroubled by these developments. The unrest failed to make a connection to the rest 
of the coalfield which would have resulted in widespread political protest. Despite the 
similar characteristics of unrest, an effective linkage never even developed between the 
loci of protest in North East Lancashire and St. Helens because the concerns of these 
districts were particular to specific closures and closure threats. There was a great deal of 
sympathy and support for those involved in these protests from the rest of the coalfield. 
The unease and sense of panic over further contraction saw many NUA'INWA branches 
which would not ordinarily have become involved, such as Plank Lane (Bickershaw- 
Parsonage collieries) and Parkside, sustaining high levels of support when these issues 
were debated including joining the growing criticism of the Labour Government. The 
reaction to the Dugan resolution in November 1967 demonstrated the strength of feeling 
across the coalfield. 132 
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Nevertheless, despite the strength of support these protests failed to develop beyond their 
disparate and restricted origins. The reason for this was the weakness of the raison d'etre 
of protest. Protest had its beginnings in reaction to the incidence and pattern of closure 
under the ACP. This was a recipe for division not unity. While North East Lancashire and 
St. Helens miners protested, they had remained largely passive when Wigan district bore 
the brunt of closures during the early 1960s and when collieries were closed in Manchester 
district under rationalisation. In short they only felt obliged to respond when they were 
directly affected. -Mick Weaver predicted that the ACP marked such a fundamental 
development in industrial change that mineworkers would reject it. 333 He was wrong; 
reactions differed. A majority of mineworkers did not recognise the distinctive character of 
the ACP. For them, it was just another round of closures. Why should miners in collieries 
unaffected by the ACP join in sympathy action? Many had previously been involved in 
more than one closure, often spending most of the 1960s being shunted between collieries 
facing the prospect of redundancy, 'downgrading' and lost earnings while their colleagues, 
now feeling the pinch under the ACP, had not raised a voice in anger. These were potent 
reasons for eschewing involvement. The divisions created by the pattern and process of 
colliery closures undermined the occasion for a united stand against the ACP. 
The opportunity for collective action was dealt a further blow by the strategies developed 
by both Gormley and Vincent which ensured 'rank-and-file' cohesion amongst those 
unaffected by further contraction. Such strategies were linked to 'new realism'. One of the 
great enigmas was how Joe Gormley managed to attain such a high level of personal 
popularity. This is more puzzling given that Gormley played a far from noble role in 
industrial change. Under the ACP this reputation plumbed new depths. Many of the 
brickbats accompanying 'rank-and-file' unrest were directed at Gormley. 
The answer lies in Gormley's immense ability to operate a twin-track policy on industrial 
change. In 1970, reflecting on the events of the previous decade and looking forward to the 
challenges of the next he remained typically unapologetic: 
339 
"I have been involved in more pit closures percentage wise than any other Area 
Secretary in Britain, and I have not bled it. I don't like it all having to be placed 
in this position, but if acceptance of a high wage policy means pit closures, it 
means pit closures. We may have to pay the consequences. As long as we 
know that and back it to the hilt let's go for high wages 11134 
Gormley did not see industrial change in a declining coalfield like Lancashire as something 
approaching the Gottdanunerung that many felt it heralded. For Gormley, it represented 
not the end, but an opening in his ceaseless quest for opportunities. For him, pit closures 
were initially the stepping stone to a modernised industry. Thereafter, they became part of 
a strategy of ensuring the best deal for those who remained inside the modernised industry 
even if that meant more sacrificial closures on the altar that Gormley sought to label 
`progress'. 
Gormley saw 'new realism' as another opportunity to make the industry even fitter to 
compete, a continuum of his adherence to Coal Board business strategy, in which he 
accepted that coal was competing in a near free market for fuel well before the ACP. Post- 
1965, Gormley approved of the ACP with its intensification of closure of `under- 
performing' collieries. Gormley's twin-track approach was one of accepting pit closures, 
adopting all manner of tactical manoeuvres to ensure they succeeded and rebuffing the 
dissent they created. The other was genuinely and successfully piloting the industrial 
objectives of those who remained inside the industry at the two new collieries and 
surviving re-constructions where performance could be improved and rewarded. Vincent 
continued this strategy in a more effective and systematic way. Mineworkers remaining in 
the industry were thus left giving thanks for deliverance from the evils of the ACP while 
singing the praises of Gormley, and later Vincent, in bringing improved wages and 
conditions. This strategy became clearer as the industry settled back into stability after the 
events of 1967-68. 
One factor assisting this strategy was the character of the ACP. In contrast to pre-1965 
rationalisation, the ACP resulted in less intra-coalfield manpower transfer because of the 
higher rate of job attrition and reduction in the number of receiving `places'. Although 
transfers were problematic prior to 1965 the coalfield managed to absorb the majority of 
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those affected. Under the ACP the situation was reversed with only a small proportion of 
those involved in closure being absorbed by remaining collieries. Absorption possibilities 
were further reduced by the number of collieries which closed during the late 1960s and 
1970s which were not included in the 1965 announcement. These closures saw only 20 per 
cent of their workforces absorbed into the industry either in Lancashire or other coalfields. 
Prior to 1965 it was the reverse with 80 per cent absorption not untypicat135 The majority 
of miners affected by the `unscheduled' closures of the late 1960s left the industry 
altogether. Throughout the late 1960s there were thus smaller numbers of miners 
remaining inside the industry who had recent direct experience of closure. 
As a result there were fewer aggrieved mineworkers festering inside the industry and an 
increase in the relative size of Gormley's support at the remaining recently developed or 
re-constructed collieries which both Gormley and Vincent where able to control with the 
backing of the majority of mineworkers. These were branches at Agecroft, Astley Green 
(before closure), Golborne, Parkside and Plank Lane (Bickershaw-Parsonage). Both 
Gormley and Vincent could even point to some support in the St. Helens district, notably at 
Cronton, while Hapton Valley in North East Lancashire was not completely beyond their 
reach. The 1967-68 unrest saw branches unaffected by closure and closures threats offering 
succour to the protests, but remaining essentially under leadership control. It is important 
to note that Bickershaw-Parsonage was under closure threat for much of the late 1960s yet 
remained passive, save for a flicker of protest at the time of the ACP announcement in 
1965 in response to the Clock Face 'revolt'. 136 
The return of some stability to the industry, combined with the leadership's ability to 
deliver improved pay and conditions ensured that the authority and popularity of both 
Gormley and Vincent was maintained for the majority of the 'rank-and-file' at these 
collieries. The character of the ACP thus greatly perpetuated the distinctions between the 
'winners' and 'losers' of industrial change in which the 'winners' progressively occupied 
the majority. This polarisation was a powerful force for reinforcing a sense of division 
among the 'rank-and-file'. For those remaining in the industry, with a guaranteed future in 
the greater security that the 1970s promised, Gormley represented the most successful 
figure in the NUM for obtaining beneficial improvements to his members - or at least those 
who remained in the industry. 
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Finally, for the leadership, there was an added bonus from the ACP. It divested them of 
their pestilent priests. The majority of the coalfield's 'militant' activists were swept away 
by closures. Not that they had played a significant part in the response to the ACP, with the 
exception of Joe Ryan. All, including Ryan, had been pre-occupied with the 'battle for 
coal' in attempts to save their threatened collieries. The triumvirate of Clarke, Weaver and 
Woolley were holed-up at Mosley Common engaged in the bid to save the colliery until 
redundancy beckoned in 1968. A similar fate awaited Ryan at Bradford. These activists 
posed a potential threat to the NUMNWA leadership. They were neutralised by the ACP. 
Moreover, Clarke and Woolley signalled their tacit acceptance of the 'reality' of the new 
regime for fuel. Weaver became a much constrained and pre-occupied figure. In terms of 
the 'rank-and-file' protest of 1967-68 they were yesterday's heroes whose zenith of 
importance had passed. Factionalism in Lancashire based around territoriality and 
personality had once again proved a far more powerful influence on events than ideology 
as the 'militant' activists showed no inclination to link up with spontaneous 'rank-and-file' 
protest confined to specific collieries and districts fronted by senior union officials. The 
removal, at a stroke, of four leading activists left only Jimmy Dowd at Bold colliery as the 
coalfield's remaining 'militant' voice. As Howell notes, Dowd "stood virtually alone" "as 
an advocate of the left position". 137 The chastened position of the left stood in stark 
contrast to the impressive resilience of Labour hegemony during the late 1960s, despite the 
opprobrium heaped on Labour through 'rank-and-file' protest. 
Clearly, `rank-and-file' unrest produced a sharper critique of Labour policy, but how 
widespread was criticism of Labour in the coalfield? Had it the strength to overturn 
Government policy? The chances of this happening were extremely slim indeed. Support 
for Labour was effective in maintaining the passivity of those sections of the `rank-and- 
file' uninvolved in the events of 1967-68. From early on in the process the NUMNWA 
leadership had made it clear that whatever Labour did to coal it would remain loyal. This 
was a view echoed by delegates on numerous occasions even as criticism of Labour policy 
mounted. 178 The belief thus prevailed that the Government could have closed the coalfield 
completely but Lancashire miners would have remained loyal to Labour. Loyalty to 
Labour was a fundamental fact of political life. Labour's hegemony had been developed 
over half a century. It was so entrenched that industrial change was unlikely to wrest it 
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from the party's grip. Politically, the Lancashire miners would not shift their allegiance 
because there was nowhere else to go. 
A high level of continuing support was reinforced by a belief that Labour would honour its 
pledges on economic and social amelioration as further contraction took hold. In spite of 
growing disquiet over Labour's ability to deliver on this issue it continued to be seen as the 
party most Rely to bring industrial diversification. For all these reasons Labour's position 
was unassailable. The extent of Labour's clear political advantage undoubtedly influenced 
political decisions to embark upon further contraction along with the widespread 
acceptance it received from the NUMNWA leadership and Labour in the coalfield. 
The maintenance of Labour's integrity throughout the ACP was greatly assisted by the 
NUMNWA leadership muddying the waters. Personalised blame shifting to mining MPs 
and focusing on faceless bureaucrats and technocrats all served to help keep the 
Government clear of political fallout, as did the stout defence of Labour's record on coal. 
Having established how opposition to the ACP was contained the question is whether these 
events left a 'legacy'. There was a 'legacy' from the experience of the events of 1967-68 in 
the way it fed into rising industrial militancy. The 'legacy' also influenced coalfield 
politics from the end of the 1960s. Both these processes had unexpected twists. In terms of 
rising industrial militancy Lancashire's experience of industrial change influenced debates 
over its involvement in the big industrial struggles of the late 1960s and early 1970s. These 
had origins not in industrial change but questions of wages and conditions which had 
continued unabated, mainly as a result of the implementation of the National Power 
Loading Agreement (NPLA) in 1966. From the end of the 1960s growing militancy in the 
Yorkshire coalfield influenced these issues. 139 
It was the intervention of 'flying pickets' from Yorkshire, mainly from the Doncaster 
Panel, during the surface worker's dispute in the autumn of 1969 which indicated there 
was a hangover from the experience of the ACP which affected sentiment in Lancashire. 
There was a call for a national strike over shorter working hours and wage increases for 
surface workers. The NUMNEC voted to reject strike action. This resulted in mineworkers 
taking unofficial action in many coalfields with the lead coming from Yorkshire. The 
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Yorkshire miners `visited' pits in Lancashire to `persuade' Lancashire miners to join the 
unofficial action. Unsurprisingly, Vincent condemned the invaders from over the Pennines 
as "anarchists". 140 
However, it was the reaction of delegates which proved more interesting. Reaction in 
Lancashire was at best mixed with a general atmosphere of hostility toward Yorkshire 
intervention. Hostility arose because intervention from Yorkshire was traditionally 
resented in Lancashire pits. The mood of rejection stemmed, in part, from a belief that the 
modern productive Yorkshire coalfield had successfully challenged Lancashire for most of 
the twentieth century. This helped inflame hostility which Vincent adeptly manipulated. 
There were also objections to the direct methods of the Yorkshiremen in demanding an 
unofficial response from Lancashire rather than to entering into negotiations with the Coal 
Board. Above all, there was a widespread belief that a dispute, official or unofficial, would 
seriously compromise Lancashire's ability to compete in the market for coal. Arguments in 
favour of 'new realism' predominated in an overwhelming rejection of the Yorkshire 
intervention. This view prevailed among the 'rank-and-file' at a majority of collieries the 
'flying pickets' visited which were under NUMNWA leadership control or were under 
threat of closure such as Astley Green and Sutton Manor. The only measure of success for 
the Yorkshiremen came at Agecroft. 141 
Within the 'rejectionist' position there were a number of notable exceptions. There was too 
a more favourable response to Yorkshire intervention when this was discussed by union 
delegates in the calmer atmosphere of the miners' offices rather than the edgy and 
dangerous 'head-to-head' confrontations at the colliery gates. For example, there was 
'trouble' at Bold colliery not between Lancashire and Yorkshire miners but between those 
who supported the Yorkshire intervention and those who opposed it with many Bold men 
voting with their feet and joining the unofficial dispute. The Bold delegate noted that he 
might not be able to control those at the pit who wanted to support the dispute. Here, 
Jimmy Dowd was forging links with the left in other coalfields, particularly Yorkshire, 
through a 'rank-and-file' group known as the 'Miners Forum'. This loose gathering of the 
'rank-and-file' political left within the NUM was involved in criticism of the NUM 
leadership and calls for greater democracy within the union. At Bank Hall colliery the 
welcome mat was rolled out for Yorkshire miners because it was felt that it was only direct 
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action which would bring a quick and successful resolution of the issues. Bank Hall miners 
supported a national strike. Delegates from Cronton and Sutton Manor in the St. Helens 
district and Hapton Valley in North East Lancashire were more cautious. However, there 
were positive signs that they were prepared to give qualified support to the Yorkshiremen, 
subject to `proper channels" being used to initiate a national strike. Other delegates, 
including those under leadership control, echoed this view. 142 
There were indications that the mood was changing in favour of a willingness to break the 
shackles of 'new realism' and join the fray. The Yorkshire 'militants' were at least given a 
hearing from a wide audience, with tangible signs of positive backing. Significantly, there 
was growing support for leaving aside concerns over the damage that a dispute might have 
on 'new realism' especially in North East Lancashire and St. Helens districts. Miners here 
were in a volatile mood. They demonstrated that for the first time in Lancashire since the 
industrial unrest of the late 1940s they were prepared to throw caution to the wind. The 
unrest of 1967-68, caused by the bitter experience of closures and closure threats, was 
nourishing an ominous climate at collieries in these districts. It was as if the experience of 
1967-68 had helped them re-discover their voice of protest. It is not without coincidence 
that it was pits in these districts which were in the vanguard of protest again. Importantly, 
those involved in the protest of 1967-68 at pits in Burnley and St. Helens remained 
substantially inside the industry rather than having left it. 
To confirm that reaction to the 1969 surface worker's dispute was no aberration, the events 
of autumn 1970 once again saw Lancashire debating its response to impending large-scale 
industrial action. On this occasion it was an overtime ban: the situation was far more 
serious. Again, it was a demand for national strike action over the wages issue against the 
newly elected Conservative Government which precipitated events. An uncertain outcome 
to a strike ballot both nationally and in Lancashire led to industrial action in several 
coalfields. In Lancashire, the response was an unofficial overtime ban, which was under 
threat of removal by the NUMNWA leadership. The coalfield was pitched into confusion, 
chaos and turmoil. Again, St. Helens district was in the eye of the storm leading the counter 
attack on the NUMNWA leadership. Bold and Sutton Manor once again figured 
prominently as the epicentres of trouble as they became involved in the unofficial dispute. 
The situation was so grave that the majority of St. Helens district was operating virtually as 
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an autonomous body detached from the control of the NUMNWA with Joe McDermott as 
de facto leader. This dispute had produced the much-feared schism within the union with a 
situation on the verge of fragmentation. 143 
Another poisonous clash between Gormley and McDermott was a certainty after 
McDermott angrily told Gormley he had "a set of stooges" for an executive committee. 
The distance St. Helens district had moved from the central authority of the NUMNWA in 
the space of just two years can be measured by the judgement of Lawrence Cunliffe. 
Cunliffe was Walkden Craftman's delegate; a figure in the ascendancy on the right and a 
leadership loyalist who later became Labour MP for Leigh. He asserted "there were two 
official policy making bodies within the North Western Area - the Conference and 
St. Helens Miners' Central Panel". A complete break between St. Helens miners and the 
NUMNWA was only narrowly averted during this dispute as centripetal tendencies re- 
asserted themselves. 114 These events confirmed that the whole district had become a focus 
for militancy. This situation persisted beyond the period with which this study is concerned 
and included a more complete leftward lurch at Cronton. Similarly, in North East 
Lancashire, despite Bank Hall's closure in 1971, rising militancy at the remaining colliery 
of Hapton Valley was reinforced by the infusion of a small number of miners transferred 
from Bank Hall. '45 
Although rising industrial militancy did not threaten the overall control exercised by 
Gormley and Vincent and their supporters, these events served to confirm that the unrest of 
1967-68 had left permanent marks on the industrial politics of the coalfield. A hitherto 
vice-lice leadership grip was beginning to loosen with the most forceful expression of 
factionalist tendencies since the inter-war period. 
The twist in the industrial politics of the Lancashire miners during the late 1960s was not 
the role played by St. Nelens and North East Lancashire districts, but the reaction of more 
passive collieries in the coalfield. The 1970 overtime ban crisis began with an action 
involving Plank Lane branch (Bickershaw-Parsonage collieries) and quickly spread to 
collieries which had not been involved in the events of 1967-68 such as Agecroft and 
Parkside, ordinarily within the leadership yoke. The paths which led to this development 
were complex and varied. They were unrelated directly to industrial change. The rising 
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influence of the left outside the coalfield was clearly one factor. However, the experience 
of industrial change was important in the way it induced `rank-and-file' militancy 
throughout the coalfield. 146 
One aspect was how delegates justified their support for the rising tide of militancy. The 
language delegates used, as they tentatively contemplated involvement, related directly to 
their experience of industrial change. Phrases used in 1969 are suggestive: "we have come 
a long way"; "we have nothing to lose" and "after all we have been through in Lancashire" 
were typical. These were clear references to industrial change. 147 For those remaining in 
coal by the end of the 1960s there was recognition of the unique position they enjoyed. 
They were survivors who had survived to see stability return. Within calculations of what 
could be achieved through increased militancy to attain industrial objectives the `rank-and- 
file' inputted an incremental value-added as a bonus or recompense for their troubles. 
Experience of industrial change affected how they perceived support for industrial 
demands. Undeniably, this was only made possible with the return of stability for the 
industry. 
However, experience of industrial change had emboldened the `rank-and-file' at more 
quiescent collieries. Industrial contraction through closure and threat of closure would 
usually be seen as a force for passivity. It could be counter-productive if applied in 
profusion particularly if assurances appeared to be broken. There was a sense that the 
'rank-and-file' had seen so many closures and threats that this increased, rather than 
diminished, the confidence with which they approached industrial issues. The way in 
which they were beginning to shrug off dire warnings about the detrimental effects of 
industrial action on the coalfield was a good indication of this mood. The collective 
experience of industrial change was thus instrumental in reducing their fear of the bugbear 
of 'new realism'. There was a distinct feeling among the remaining 'rank-and-file' that 
they were 'fireproof by the end of the 1960s. There was an unprecedented recklessness 
abroad in Lancashire. From the late 1960s, for those remaining in coal, the mood of what 
Howell describes as one of "demoralisation" over industrial change was beginning to 
lift. l48 
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NUMNWA leadership attempts to quell rising militancy contributed to this mood. The 
leadership had accepted an unparalleled level of contraction while prioritising the needs of 
those remaining in the industry. The ACP saw more 'winners' remain within the rump of 
the industry than under modernisation and rationalisation up to 1965. The 'losers' had 
largely left the industry altogether. A sharper distinction between 'winners' and 'losers' 
under the ACP, combined with leadership eagerness to attend to the needs of 'winners' 
translated directly into rising 'rank-and-file' expectations. A sense of 'survivability', 
together with enhanced expectations, was a powerful force for increased militancy across 
the coalfield. When this was added to the return of stability for coal together with the 
growing influence of the left the result was an insatiable demand for more by the 
remaining 'rank-and-file'. The leadership found these demands difficult to keep in check 
as Lancashire joined the increasingly militant mood which led directly to the events of 
1972 and the first national strike since 1926. 
Increasing industrial militancy at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s was matched by the 
rise of new elements on the left in coalfield politics. The surprising feature of this 
development was the strength and scope enjoyed by a diverse gathering of left-wing 
interests. Again, the experience of industrial change was important. One memorable 
example was at Wigan. Throughout the late 1960s there was growing dissatisfaction with 
Alan Fitch which was prevented from becoming something more potent by internal 
political divisions within Wigan Trades Council and Labour Party. The trades council was 
dominated by the major unions in the area, chief of which had traditionally been the 
miners. The Labour Party in Wigan was an assembly of constituency socialist political 
interests. The party witnessed the growing influence of the left during the 1960s among 
members and through the influence of various left-wing groups. The Socialist Labour 
League had attempted to seize control of the youth section. Later, an assortment of left- 
wing interests including Communist and Trotskyist 'entrists' of the `old left' and a variety 
of individuals from the 'New Left' held a marginal, but vocal presence, on the fringes of 
the constituency Labour Party. 149 
Criticism of Fitch from these elements had been held in check by the trades council which 
held the key to the constituency and continuing support for Fitch. Two developments upset 
this balance. The influential position of the once powerful Wigan miners' panels was 
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receding. Other interests in organised labour were eclipsing the miners on the trades 
council, mainly the Amalgamated Union of Engineers and Foundrymen (AEF) who were 
to the left of the NUMNWA. The Wigan branches of the AEF included both members in 
engineering and iron and steel who worked locally and those who travelled to work 
elsewhere in the region. These growing sectional interests on the trades council were much 
more responsive to the left in Wigan than the NUMNWA. 15° 
The second development was Jimmy Dowd's accession to the chairmanship of Wigan 
Trades Council, supported by two Communist delegates. Though Dowd was branch 
secretary of Bold colliery in St. Helens he was a native of Wigan having contested local 
council seats for the CPGB during the 1950s and assisted Weaver's campaigns in the 
constituency. 151 Dowd was the leading figure on the left in the St. Helens and Wigan 
areas. During the late 1960s an alliance of political interests developed in these areas 
including former and working miners, militant engineers, other workers in organised 
labour and a diverse gathering of groups and individuals on the left. At its fulcrum was 
Jimmy Dowd. His ability to mobilise these diverse groups was partly testimony to his own 
political eclecticism typified by his willingness to talk to individuals or groups many of his 
colleagues, both in the NUM and CPGB, would have disavowed. 152 
This alliance embarked on a crusade against Alan Fitch with the object of unseating him. 
Criticism of Fitch included his stance on incomes policy, views on the Vietnam War, and 
more latterly, support for the industrial relations legislation. His pro-Common Market 
position and multilateralism had irritated the left since he took the Wigan seat in 1958. 
However, it was his alleged inaction on coal contraction which occupied centre stage. 
Criticism was as much over alleged failure to match promises on industrial diversification 
as it was over allegations of having ignored colliery closures. ' 53 
Matters reached a head in September 1969 at a meeting of Wigan Labour Party. The 
meeting came toward the end of a protracted and bitter dispute of engineering workers at 
British Leyland plants in Chorley and Leyland led by 'militant' convenor Len Brindle. 
Many of the workers at the plants came from the Wigan and St. Helens areas, having 
sought employment there due to lack of opportunities in the coalfield. Fitch was due to 
speak on his support for the Government's industrial relations legislation. The meeting was 
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thrown into pandemonium. Inside the Labour club where Fitch attempted to address the 
meeting he was barracked, while outside placard waving demonstrators were involved in 
scuffles and fist fights with pro-Fitch supporters and the police trying to keep the two 
groups apart. Fitch blamed the disruption on "Communists, Trotskyists and left-wing 
elements". That was only a part of it. Both inside the meeting and on the streets among the 
duffle-coated 'lefties' were engineers, working miners and ex-pit men, many whom now 
worked in engineering. Fitch asked "what had a strike at Leyland Motors to do with his 
meeting" ? ISa Many of those disrupting the meeting had voted for Fitch and been part of 
NUMNWA structures which had supported him for so long. The ex-pit men among the 
engineers owed their politicisation not to the pits of the Wigan area, where the NUMNWA 
and Labour had exercised its hegemony, but to the machine shops of central Lancashire. 
Criticism of Fitch and attempts to remove him continued into the 1970s. In 1970 there was 
an effort to prevent Fitch re-affirming his candidature ahead of the 1970 general election 
through a no confidence motion mounted by the anti-Fitch camp within the trades council 
and Labour Party. In 1971 Fitch's abstention from the Common Market vote provoked a 
resignation campaign headed by Dowd and the Bold branch committee. Accompanying the 
attacks on Fitch the question of coal contraction was writ large. He was accused of a lack 
of "personal commitment" to the area, having been inert when closures occurred, and of 
languor in attempts to bring new economic and social development to the coalfield because 
he had been too close to the Labour Government. He was condemned as a "high handed" 
Labour `lackey" and "traitor"; "the man who closed the coalfield". The significance of this 
campaign was its strength and the fact the NUMNWA leadership did not come directly to 
the aid of its besieged sponsored MP. The NUMNWA leadership were concerned, but 
Vincent remained steadfastly on the sidelines. The campaign, spear-headed from Bold 
colliery, claimed exclusive support in St. Helens district: from Bold, Cronton and Sutton 
Manor together with St. Helens craftsman's branch and importantly included Parkside 
within its ambit -a most serious development. 1" 
The campaign to remove Fitch eventually ran out of steam. It foundered because although 
mobilisation of the left around Dowd was some feat, it was inherently unstable because of 
the diverse composition of participants. The only objective which united them was 
removing Fitch. Moreover, the campaign was flawed because it concentrated too much on 
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Alan Fitch. It was an overtly personalised campaign of political vilification. The left's 
objective of taking a notable regional political scalp was misplaced because it descended 
into a political vendetta against Fitch. It was no secret that Dowd had been looking for an 
opportunity to `ambush' Fitch for years. As a `get Fitch' strategy it also failed because it 
allowed for the galvanisation of a pro-Fitch counter campaign which made a success of 
defending the MP. A majority pro-Fitch group managed to repulse handsomely the no 
confidence vote in 1970 and overturn a motion in 1971 from Wigan Trades Council and 
Labour Party to withdraw financial support for the Labour Party. '56 It was flawed too 
because it made the mistake off heaping blame on a mining MP in the same way as the 
NUMNWA leadership had done in 1967 during the blame shifting exercise. The 
composition and scale of the campaign worried Vincent, as did the attack on the 
NUMNWA's leading Labour spokesperson. However, Vincent knew that criticism of the 
MP diverted attention from an examination of the NUMNWA leadership's role in 
contraction. He could afford to let matters take their course in the expectation that Fitch 
would re-assert himself. 
The fact that the Dowd campaign failed is less important than what it said about how much 
coalfield politics was changing as a result of industrial change and what this might portend 
for the future. The campaign demonstrated that industrial change had begun to have 
implications for the previously unshakeable grip of the NUMNWA and Labour in the 
coalfield. Contraction meant the structures of mutual political support between the 
NUMNWA and Labour were being gradually eroded. Never again would the relationship 
exercise the same influence and power it had enjoyed for most of the twentieth century. In 
constituencies across the coalfield the influence of the NUMNWA was waning. With it 
came the rising importance of other groups in organised labour on the trades councils. 
Many were further to the left than the Lancashire miners. Above all, the declining 
influence of the NUMNWA, together with the decline of organised labour generally, saw 
the balance of power shift from the trades councils to the constituency Labour Parties. 
These developments presented opportunities for the left both within the Labour Party and 
outside it. 
It was not only the loosening of NUM-Labour hegemony through the disintegration of the 
institutional structures of the NUMNWA and declining numbers in mining which was 
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important. 1" It was an increasing willingness to question the validity of hegemony for the 
first time. The Dowd campaign contained elements of a critique developing across the 
coalfield. This was a retrospective analysis of industrial change and the role the 
NUMNWA-Labour edifice had played in it. It was retrospective because the full impact of 
industrial change was only becoming apparent from the late 1960s. The analysis extended 
to include the whole post-war 'settlement' for coal under public ownership of which the 
NUMNWA and Labour in the coalfield had been such devotees. The conclusion being 
drawn was that the 'settlement' had not delivered desired objectives for the coalfield 
through the industrial change it launched because of the role played by the NUMNWA and 
Labour in dispensing industrial change. This issue was also linked to issues of democracy 
within the NUMNWA and Labour in the coalfield which had been of rising prominence 
throughout the 1960s. '58 
Questioning the legitimacy of the relationship came from two main directions. The 
influence of a cogent 'New Left' analysis was gaining currency. This focused on the 
cohabitation and incestuous relationship enjoyed between the NUMNWA and the Coal 
Board, and the NUMNWA and Labour which were seen as squeezing the goodwill of 
mineworkers and coalfield community lice a pulpless orange. The relationships were seen 
as highly influential in effecting coal contraction. These arguments were not unattractive to 
the 'old left' who had been critics of the status quo or who saw themselves as the 'losers' 
of industrial change. The extent to which Ince, Wigan and other coalfield constituency 
Labour Parties had moved to the left by the 1980s was partly symptomatic of both the 
weakening of NUM-Labour hegemony and of the growing credibility of these arguments. 
This was witnessed by the prominence of selection and de-selection issues. 159 
Of equal importance to this developing analysis was a wider examination of the process of 
de-industrialisation. In the North West this introspection encompassed the gamut of staple 
industries. For instance, from the late 1960s, Dan Jones, the Labour MP for Burnley, was 
coming under intense constituency pressure over de-industrialisation in North East 
Lancashire, as indeed were many of his colleagues in the region as the full impact of de- 
industrialisation become clear. This wider examination brought within its remit de- 
industrialisation on Merseyside. The politics of de-industrialisation were beginning to have 
a more general application as the broader issues of modernisation were questioned. It is not 
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without some import that the CPGB chose Jack Kay to fight Alan Fitch for the Wigan seat 
at the 1970 general election. Kay was a Liverpool based Communist who made a strong 
connection between de-industrialisation in the coalfield and on Merseyside in an 
aggressive assault on the process in the region. Kay brought his experience of politics on 
Merseyside where modernisation had been central to reinforcing Labour's growing success 
in Liverpool during the 1960s. This process was undertaken by a city council dominated by 
the Labour right. It occurred against a backdrop of one of the severest episodes of localised 
de-industrialisation in Britain from the late 1960s which was the context in which rising 
militancy occurred on Merseyside. The politics of Liverpool and the coalfield were quite 
distinct. Yet, it is instructive to note there was convergence between the developing 
critique of Labour by the left in the two respective areas. Experience of de-industrialisation 
enabled both to identify common political elements. This process was with particular 
reference to developments on the left in the St. Helens and Wigan districts. 160 
The analysis gave more prominence to the consequences of de-industrialisation than to the 
causes, focusing on the growing economic and social problems produced by industrial 
change. In the harsher economic climate of the 1970s issues of social deprivation and 
unemployment were thrust to the fore again in the coalfield as de-industrialisation 
extended beyond the staple industries to manufacturing industry more generall y. 161 In this 
way, the analysis by the left was less one of linking modernisation to de-industrialisation. 
It was directed at failure to tackle the outcomes of de-industrialisation. This was because 
the priorities of the coalfield community were, and indeed had always been, those 
concerned with the outcomes, rather than the causes of industrial change. In fact, it was as 
much an argument over a lack of modernisation for the coalfield to tackle the negative 
outcomes of de-industrialisation than a debate over the destructive processes that 
modernisation had unleashed. It illustrated that the central dilemma faced by the left over 
modernisation persisted. 
Notwithstanding the continuing dilemmas of the left, it is clear that the terrain of political 
debate had been irrevocably altered as Labour in the coalfield faced a less certain and more 
uncomfortable time during the 1970s. Industrial change had thus some impact on political 
change. It is interesting to reflect how rapid this change had been. In the space of just over 
ten years the old certainties and verities that sustained NUM-Labour hegemony for over 
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half a century were now undergoing critical examination. It did not extend to a new 
dispensation for the coalfield. The strength and durability of Labour domination was 
enough to ensure it endured in spite of questioning. However, industrial change had 
initiated a loosening of this hegemony for the first time. 
6.5 CONCLUSION 
The response to the ACP was most important in the way all levels in the NUMNWA 
accepted the 'new realities' facing the industry. This level of acceptance did most to shape 
outcomes in the coalfield during the late 1960s. The character of the ACP was itself 
influential in limiting 'rank-and-file' protest. Discernible trends apparent during the period 
of modernisation and rationalisation up to 1965 continued under the ACP, but in a more 
distinctive way. The dimensions and dynamics of the ACP was a force for continued 
division rather than unity among the 'rank-and-file'. Similarly, 'rank-and-file' unrest arose 
out of the circumstances of specific closures and in certain districts. This came at a difficult 
juncture during 1967-68 when a large number of closures or closure threats took place 
within a short space of time raising anxieties over transfer and redundancy issues. The 
period marked the most perilous point for the cohesion of the NUMNWA during the 
prosecution of industrial change. The resultant factionalism threatened schism within the 
ranks of the Lancashire miners for the first time since before the Second World War. 
Threats to cohesion were limited because reaction to the specific impact of the ACP failed 
to resonate throughout the coalfield at unaffected collieries. There was implicit recognition 
by the 'rank-and-file' that closures under the ACP were not the occasion for a 
demonstration of collective solidarity. Furthermore, although criticism of the Labour 
Government was heightened by the specific impact of the ACP there was never any 
possibility that fuel policy or further contraction would pose a threat to Labour's political 
domination. In this respect, the strategies employed by the NUMNWA leadership were 
successful in confining and containing 'rank-and-file' unrest and protecting the 
Government from criticism. The notion of 'new realism' enabled the leadership to sharpen 
'rank-and-file' divisions through selective attention to the needs of those remaining in the 
industry. This strategy became more evident as stability began to return from the end of the 
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1960s. Similarly, a leadership strategy of relegating industrial change as an issue, 
combined with a renewed sense of partnership with the Coal Board, helped sustain `rank. 
and-file' passivity. 
However, there were permanent outcomes from these events. The experience of industrial 
change had an affect on rising industrial militancy from the late 1960s. These indelible 
marks altered the industrial politics of coal in Lancashire in a more profound way than at 
any time during the post-war period. Industrial change also began to manifest itself through 
political change. For the first time in the twentieth century NUM-Labour hegemony began 
to wane in the coalfield. Labour's previously unapproachable domination was 
compromised for the first time. For a coalfield whose industrial and political life had been 
set in stone for so long the 1960s marked a decade of extraordinary change. The events of 
the latter half of the decade were absolutely crucial in this process. 
6.6 APPENDIX: TWO POEMS BY PETER DICCONSON 
From the Colliery Guardian 29 September 1967 in response to the announcement 
that some pit closures would be delayed including Mosley Common following the 
intervention of Harold Wilson: 
They've got themselves their bit of cheer, 
And advertised their bit of a soul, 
But the cheering isn't in earshot here, 
Furlongs down in a useless hole. 
Slogging away at unwanted coal. 
If there'd been a couple of hundred thou, 
(Only that! ) on the bleeding dole, 
They'd have had me up in the queue by now. 
Too add my name to the hopeless roll, 
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Of buggers who used to mine for coal. 
They talk about our "short-sighted fears", 
But they can look at the problem whole- 
One eye on the votes in a couple of yrars, 
And one upon last week's GaUup Poll. 
And none of the buggers who dig the coal. 
At least I've a winter digging coal, 
I've much to be thankful for, think you, 
(And I was bred a human mole! ), 
I'd fccl more thankful if they'd a clue, 
About what, next winter, they're going to do. 
` Lancashire n' No 9na 1986 in of a-Ijoem from February 
1968 follo%vinr Me closure of Mosley Common Colliery: 
And so its true, Mosley Common did lall. 
Our proudest pit has faced the call. 
To stop the wheels, to end the losses, 
Who was to blame, the men or bosses? 
No more reprieves. targets or trials, 
To test the Board's and the union's wiles. 
Its finished now, the cnds in sight, 
No more the urge to sweat and fight. 
For increased output and other natters. 
The cost of coal, that's all that matters. 
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The cost of coal, aye, there's a figure, 
To be reckoned up, there's nonc that's bigger. 
In human cost, and men left lame, 
Who, some cried out, "Should play the game". 
What do they know. those who set the goal, 
For the Common to reach, of the real cost of coal 
It's not for those who can do their sums. 
Scribbling away at memorandums. 
Nor for those at the top, or those in the House, 
Who can add up figures, but haven't the nous. 
To measure costs in human lives. 
Not things like graphs with dives. 
Therc's an army of men down Tylicslcy way, 
Who don't talk too much, but could probably say. 
Why the millions spent on this showpiece pit, 
Went down the drain, they forecast it! 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF INDUSTRIAL CHANGE IN THE 
LANCASHIRE COALFIELD 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
An integral part of the modernisation of coal in Lancashire was the need to bring new 
investment to the coalfield to replace jobs lost in mining. This was an objective shared by 
government, the NUMLA, the Labour Party in the coalfield, local authorities and the 
coalfield community. It was based on an admission that coal would no longer play a central 
role. As industrial change proceeded so the desire for industrial diversification grew. This 
chapter examines the two obstacles which emerged to a successful transformation. The 
first was a failure by government to understand the specific context of the coalfield in its 
application of industrial and regional policies. The second was the dilemma faced by the 
NUMLA and Labour in the coalfield in reconciling coal industry modernisation and 
coalfield modernisation because the two required different approaches. As this chapter will 
show, a failure to reconcile these competing aims became a recipe for political impasse and 
diversion. These policy and political failures between them produced disastrous 
consequences for the coalfield. 
7.2 ASSUMPTIONS INFORMING INDUSTRIAL CHANGE 
IN THE LANCASHIRE COALFIELD: A CRITIQUE 
The necessity to modernise the coal industry had to take account of the contraction which 
resulted from rationalisation. This had been clear since the Second World War. It formed 
part of the 1950 Plan for Coal and subsequent amendments. These estimations had to 
assess not only the future reduced role for coal but also the capacity of the coalfield to 
absorb a high degree of contraction based on its urban morphology and economic, social 
and demographic characteristics. One assumption built into planning was that Lancashire 
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was able to undergo high levels of contraction without commensurate economic and social 
repercussions. Academic and government perceptions of the region in general, and the 
coalfield in particular, had informed these assumptions. These were based on official 
assessments of inter-war economic and social conditions and seen through the 
development of regional and industrial policy. These assumptions were crucially flawed. 
Importantly they endured throughout contraction of the coalfield from the late 1950s. They 
informed opinion on the scale of contraction and contributed to the coalfield's economic 
and social problems. 
Chief among the misplaced views on the region and the coalfield was the question of 
homogeneity. Government-informed opinion during the inter-war period considered that 
the North West could be treated as a single entity. This was particularly the case when the 
region was compared with other `depressed' regions. One criteria of economic and social 
deprivation was the degree of intra-regional industrial specialisation. It was believed that 
regional susceptibility to structural economic problems was a function of the degree of 
dependence on specialisation in declining industries. These estimations underscored the 
severity of economic and social problems within the region. It was argued that because 
only a relatively small proportion of the region's overall workforce were employed in coal 
mining compared with South Wales, for example, regional economic problems were less 
severe. Lancashire was only regarded as problematic in terms of its specialisation in textile 
weaving concentrated in North East Lancashire. It was believed that the North West was 
better placed than the other `depressed' regions such as North East England, with its over- 
reliance on coal and shipbuilding, or South Wales, dependent on coal and iron and steel. 1 
These assessments did not take account of the variegated situation in the North West. 
During the inter-war period there were large variations in experience of unemployment and 
underemployment not only between different parts of the North West but also within 
economic sub-regions, including the coalfield. 2 However, official interest rarely focused 
on these specific occurrences. Instead, it focused on inter-regional comparisons between 
`depressed' areas where inter-regional and inter-coalfield comparisons showed Lancashire 
in a relatively favourable light despite some early and accurate warnings that ignoring 
intra-regional experience was a mistake. 3 Despite a widespread acknowledgement that 
extensive areas of the region were `depressed' governments persisted in believing that 
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Lancashire was able to attract new industrial growth unlike other `depressed' regions. 
Although Lancashire did have a more diversified and vigorous industrial structure than 
other `special' areas, this was absent from large parts of the region. There was a 
concentration of specialisation in coal in the central area of the South Lancashire coalfield 
in the Wigan and Leigh districts. 5 The problem for the coalfield was that during the genesis 
of regional policy, and within the planning for post-war reconstruction, there was a failure 
to account adequately for sub-regional and industrial sectional variations. 6 
During the Second World War and its immediate aftermath planning for re-construction 
introduced additional considerations to relegate further the coalfield as an area requiring 
`special' assistance. While it was acknowledged that the coalfield experienced grave 
economic and social problems during the inter-war period, it was argued that these 
problems were now behind it. The unique features of the coalfield would contribute to its 
robustness relative to other declining coalfields. It was noted that the coalfield was within 
one of Britain's largest concentrations of industry with major markets and a large 
population. 7 
The coalfield was not initially `scheduled' under the Labour Government's 1945 
Distribution of Industry Act. In 1946, the St. Helens and Wigan districts were `scheduled' 
as development areas because it was conceded that each had highly specialised industrial 
structures - the St. Helens area in coal and glass and Wigan in coal. Most of the South 
Lancashire coalfield except the Atherton - Leigh - Tydesley area maintained development 
status as part of the South Lancashire Development Area (SLDA) until `descheduling' in 
1959. However, it was the specialised industrial structure of these sub-regions which 
influenced opinion rather than any conception of the specific problems of these areas. 
Paradoxically, St. Helens was the most buoyant coal mining district in Lancashire, yet it 
was offered development status in preference to other declining mining areas because of its 
high level of industrial specialisation. 8 
Government policy was based on misconceptions about the character of economic and 
social experience in the coalfield. Post-war governments were half-hearted about offering 
assistance for the reasons outlined. There was also a clear political imperative affecting 
policy. Post-war governments were haunted by the spectre of the 1930s. The consciousness 
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of British post-war political leadership, including the Labour leadership, was influenced 
more by images of inter-war coalfield depression in coalfields other than Lancashire. The 
coalfield was not seen as part of the political baggage carried into the decision-making 
process after 1945; it found itself relegated in post-war industrial and regional policy. 
Those sentiments were echoed in the treatment of Lancashire in the 1950 Plan for Coal. 
Although the coalfield was expected to contract it was felt that the `special' characteristics 
of the region would help absorb the impact of contraction with relatively little economic 
and social dislocation. 9 
Opinion in the region matched this confidence. When the Lancashire and Merseyside 
Development Association (LAMIDA) delivered its response to the 1950 Plan for Coal, it 
was optimistic about the coalfield's prospects based on differing perceptions of contraction 
between coal and cotton. Contraction in coal was seen as one of `transformation' rather 
than `decline' whereas cotton was seen in absolute decline. An optimistic outlook for coal 
during the early 1950s favourably influenced opinion in contrast to cotton. The key factor 
in estimations of the coalfield's ability to absorb high levels of contraction was a belief that 
decline in parts of the coalfield would be met by expansion in others. Likewise diversity of 
the labour market in the region would ensure absorption of workers displaced from coal. It 
also emphasised the proximity of new loci of economic growth to which former 
mineworkers would travel to work, such as central Lancashire. Emerging travel-to-work 
patterns combined with new house building in expanding areas of the coalfield would 
cushion the effects of industrial change. There was one caveat. It acknowledged that those 
areas of the coalfield facing severe decline would require special assistance. These 
included fifteen local authority districts in the Wigan area where existing levels of 
assistance were criticised as ad hoc. Nevertheless, it was believed that the size of markets 
in the region, proximity to two major population centres and advantages of infrastructure 
would ensure difficulties would be minimised. Emphasis was placed on the mobility of 
surplus labour to transfer within coal or to new industrial sectors. 1° It was felt that coal 
contraction in Lancashire would be easily managed based on positive factors of geography, 
regional economic health and labour mobility. 
Crucially, this benign view informed estimations for the coalfield accompanying the 1959 
Revised Plan involving extensive rationalisation in an altogether different climate for coal. 
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Following the 1950 Plan for Coal, government and NCB attention turned to the 
ameliorative measures required to meet contraction. As a number of commentators have 
noted, post-war regional policy continued to "reflect inter-war rather than post-war 
thinking". '1 Even as late as the 1960s, as Parsons notes, official conceptions of regional 
policy were influenced by notions of the "other England" in which "politicians and 
commentators perceptions of unemployment were fundamentally formed by the experience 
of the `depressed' areas' " . 
1Z Additional measures of assistance for the coalfield were 
dismissed on the grounds of industrial diversity in Lancashire. It was further argued that 
diversity had been widened in recent years and was set to continue. Even in the Wigan 
area, where extensive contraction was envisaged, it was felt that there would be "ample 
opportunities for redundant miners". 13 
It was believed that Lancashire was the least problematic of the coalfields. In particular, it 
was felt that three of its sub-regions: Burnley, Manchester and St. Helens were capable of 
absorbing contraction. The Manchester district was well placed because of the number of 
new and re-constructed pits able to absorb miners displaced by closures and high levels of 
alternative job availability for those leaving the industry. The St. Helens district was seen as 
an expanding district for coal, well capable of placing those displaced from the handful of 
closures and the large number in neighbouring Wigan. In Burnley, the small number of 
closures, mainly of moorland drifts, was not expected to cause dislocation. Only in Wigan 
district was it conceded there might be difficulties. However it was believed these would 
be minimised by travel-to-work or residential movement to Manchester and St. Helens 
districts. The only hint of concern was over the potential problems of accumulated pit 
closures in the Wigan district from the late 1960s. '4 
The Lancashire coalfield was thus was pushed to the margins. Even misgivings over the 
future of the Wigan district were dismissed. It was deleted from a schedule of specific 
localities requiring additional measures of assistance with a note to the effect that: 
"manpower in the Wigan area was excepted to fall by about 6,000 men by 
1970 but, being in an highly industrialised part of the country was in a rather 
different category from the others mentioned". 15 
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Thus rationalisation began during the late 1950s with every confidence that there would be 
minimal economic and social impact. This confidence was based on the durability of 
assumptions about the region and the coalfield carried forward through official 
assessments based on inter-war experience and political imperatives informing industrial 
and regional policy. This level of confidence permeated the NUMLA leadership and 
Labour in the coalfield. It was not just the case that they were enthused by the optimistic 
prognosis, they also had to believe in it simply because they wanted modernisation of coal 
to succeed at all costs. Consequently, the specific issues of the coalfield were never 
properly addressed. No special measures to cushion the impact of rationalisation were 
sought or offered during the late 1950s. The de-scheduling of the Wigan and St. Helens 
areas from development status in 1959 coincided with the Revised Plan for Coal. This 
further exposed the coalfield to the repercussions of rationalisation. 
Assumptions underlying the plans for contraction were flawed because they ignored the 
peculiarities of the coalfield. They informed estimates of employment contraction in the 
coalfield. Government projections following the Second World War envisaged that coal 
employment in Lancashire would fall from 50,000 in 1945 to 18,000 by 1975.16 However, 
both the Reid Report and the 1950 Plan for Coal indicated a more promising outlook for 
employment based on modernisation of the industry and favourable regional economic 
factors. 17 Furthermore, policy during the immediate post-war period was accompanied by 
overly optimistic forecasts of demand for coal that never materialised. Regional 
assessments reflected this degree of confidence. Thus the LAMIDA report in the early 
1950s estimated overall employment contraction as low as 10,000 up to 1965 with only the 
possibility of an acceleration thereafter. It was believed that continuing demand for coal 
and labour surplus absorption in modernised collieries would ensure that displacement 
would be minimised. 18 The earlier estimates proved to be remarkably accurate. Total 
employment contraction was well over 30,000 by the early 1970s; three times that of the 
more confident forecasts being bandied around during the early 1950s. 19 
The loss of over 30,000 mining jobs was not spread evenly across the coalfield. The two 
most seriously affected districts were Manchester and Wigan. It was only in the late 1960s 
that contraction reached into the North East Lancashire and St. Helens districts. The total 
displacement of workers between 1945 and 1972 was approximately 3,800 in North East 
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Lancashire and 2,200 in St. Helens, with most of the losses occurring post-1965. By 
contrast, the Manchester district lost 14,500 mining jobs while the Wigan district lost 
10,800. However, it was Wigan district which suffered inordinately. The majority of losses 
in Wigan were concentrated during the 1957-65 period. While losses in Manchester were 
numerically greater, 40 per cent came from the three big closures at Astley Green, Mosley 
Common and Bradford during the late 1960s. Many of the pit closures in Manchester 
district bordered Wigan in the Atherton-Leigh-Tyldesley area in contiguous localities to 
the `Wigan coalfield'. Furthermore, job losses in Manchester included many former Wigan 
miners who travelled to pits in Manchester between contiguous areas. 20-30 per cent of 
displacement in Manchester was of miners who lived in Wigan district. Consequently, 
around 50 per cent of total job losses in the coalfield were of mineworkers from Wigan 
district which, unlike Manchester, was less able to absorb them because of its undiversified 
economic structure. The scale of job losses in central areas of the South Lancashire 
coalfield was nearly three times the forecasts of the late 1950s. 2° Thus a combination of 
inadequate government assessments, an over-optimistic prognosis of coalfield prospects 
and the specific impact of contraction had far-reaching effects on the consequences of 
industrial change. However, it was flawed government assumptions which did most to 
make the ramifications of rationalisation that much more pronounced. 
There was clearly difficulty in coming to terms with sub-regional and local conditions 
based on official conceptions of homogeneity in the coalfield. One example was the 
question of local economic specialisation. The percentage of the male working population 
in coal varied considerably. Occupational concentration levels had shrunk from the peak of 
coal employment during the early twentieth century while geographical patterns had 
altered considerably. Yet, even by the 1950s concentration levels of nearly 50 per cent 
were not untypical in the Wigan and Leigh areas. 21 Consequently, the levels of localised 
concentration were as great as in many coalfields where industrial specialisation in coal 
was felt to be at uncomfortably high levels. Moreover, the areas of highest concentration, 
mainly in the Wigan and Leigh areas, were those which offered the least in the way of 
alternative employment. 
Failure to appreciate the significance of high concentration levels in parts of the coalfield 
was linked to assumptions of intra-coalfield labour mobility. Estimations of the effects of 
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contraction were based on unimpeded labour mobility with mineworkers able and willing 
to travel to other parts of the coalfield or to take jobs in other industries elsewhere in the 
region. In the early phases of contraction this depended on substantial movement out of the 
Wigan district to both Manchester and St. Helens based on assumptions about patterns of 
labour mobility which had developed since the inter-war period. These informed a view 
that regional `economic problems' could be solved based on putative assessments of labour 
mobility. 22 
It was assumed that approximately 30-40 per cent of mineworkers travelled more than a 
few miles to work in Lancashire from the inter-war period, while around 60-70 per cent 
lived and worked within the immediate vicinity of the pit. The bulk of this daily exodus 
involved miners travelling from Wigan and Leigh to collieries in the surrounding district 
and further out to collieries in St. Helens. 23 After the Second World War more miners were 
travelling and for longer distances from these areas. In addition, the modernisation of the 
Manchester district saw more daily travel to collieries in this area but to a much lesser 
degree because of transport impediments. It was assumed that because this travel-to-work 
culture was already well-established, with upwards of 40 per cent of miners travelling to 
work, there would be few problems proceeding with contraction which impacted most 
heavily in the Wigan and Leigh areas. 24 
The drawback with this assumption was that it did not take account of local conditions and 
impediments to movement. When rationalisation was being planned during the late 1950s 
Colonel Bolton voiced his concerns with the Coal Board about being handed a problem 
over contraction in Wigan district. As he accurately forecast, Wigan miners encountered 
difficulties transferring to Manchester district because of transport problems 25 More 
critically, as the divisional board discovered, there were huge disparities in the travel-to- 
work composition of individual collieries. By 1964 the divisional board conceded that in 
addition to transport problems, local variations in travel-to-work patterns had hampered 
rationalisation plans. While the divisional board found that travel-to-work/local residence 
ratios of miners were broadly in line with estimations there were significant intra-coalfield 
differences. Of the seven remaining collieries in the Wigan district in 1964 80 per cent of 
the workforce lived within 2.5 miles of the pithead. In three of those collieries the figure 
was over 85 per cent. By contrast in the two new collieries and four of the re-constructions 
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in the St. Helens and Manchester district the equivalent figure was less than 60 per cent. 
Thus the problem for the board was that although miners were travelling from the Wigan 
district to the modernised pits in Manchester and St. Helens many mineworkers who had a 
tradition of working at the local pit were concentrated at collieries in Wigan. There was 
reluctance by Wigan miners to travel outside their immediate vicinity particularly in view 
of the transport obstacles involved in a move to the Manchester district where the board 
faced its most acute manpower problems. 26 
If the board had problems then these were much more fundamental for local communities. 
The difficulty facing communities in Wigan district was that when pits closed they had a 
far greater impact because miners lived and worked within them. Moreover, the divisional 
board's figures from 1964 showed the situation in a better light because it only analysed 
the position at the seven remaining collieries, not at those which had already closed. 
Between 1945 and 1964 nineteen collieries closed in Wigan district, of which thirteen had 
closed since 1959. Although travel-to-work figures are unavailable for closures up to 1964 
it can be inferred that the values for those collieries would have been similar, if not higher, 
in terms of the percentage of mineworkers living and working locally. 
Ogden produced findings in line with this analysis. This allowed him to argue that there 
were three distinct paradigms of colliery/ socio-economic community. Ogden's first 
category was "collieries dependent on local labour associated with village settlements in 
largely undiversified economic settings". While it is possible to argue about the precise 
qualities of Ogden's paradigms they had, as Ogden noted, some relevance to the 
Lancashire case. Certainly, Wigan district contained a large number of collieries in 
Ogden's first category, quite unlike the rest of the coalfield. That, as Ogden argued, made 
the Wigan area especially vulnerable to closures 27 There was a mitigating factor which 
influenced the experience of more vulnerable communities in a more positive way. Pit 
closures forced mineworkers to move to collieries in other areas of the coalfield and retain 
a job in mining. Consequently, as Ogden suggested, by living in Wigan district but 
working elsewhere the `commuting miner' at least remained within the community to help 
sustain its economic and social infrastructure. This was as much a deliberate calculation by 
the Coal Board to legitimate its advocacy of industrial change. 28 However, aside from the 
limited influence of this `positive' factor, the aforementioned findings, together with those 
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adduced by Ogden indicate that rationalisation was most keenly felt in the more vulnerable 
areas of the coalfield, with the weakest industrial structure, and obstacles to labour 
mobility. 
Assumptions about the coalfield ignored two further factors. Firstly, many areas of the 
coalfield in which there was a higher degree of industrial diversity were witnessing decline 
in other staple industrial sectors. There was multi-sectional industrial decline in the 
region's staple industries from the 1950s, particularly in textiles where over 190,000 jobs 
were lost between 1951 and the late 1960s, dwarfing decline in coal. This had an impact 
on coalfield communities because many were mutually dependent on both coal and cotton. 
For example, localities in the South Lancashire coalfield such as Atherton, Leigh, Hindley, 
Tyldesley and Westhoughton - all within the cotton spinning `belt' - were heavily 
dependent on both trades. 29 
Secondly, the assumption that ex-mineworkers could find jobs outside of coal based on the 
size and fluidity of the labour market in the region was misplaced. It overlooked one 
disturbing indicator. The coalfield had one of the worst records of British coalfields for 
long-term unemployment. This was apparent during the inter-war period. However, 
duration of unemployment was of less importance in official policy than absolute figures 
and its concentration by geographical area or industrial sector. More worryingly, duration 
of unemployment in the SLDA between 1946 and 1959 was the greatest of any 
development area other than South Wales and the Wrexham area. 30 This underlined the 
inability of ex-miners to find work outside the industry even in relatively buoyant times in 
Lancashire. It also tells us much about lack of success of industrial re-location policies. 
The way in which detailed consideration of the experience of the coalfield was brushed 
aside was evident as industrial change progressed. Similarly, the rank deficiency of official 
conceptions of the coalfield became more apparent. This was witnessed by a continuing 
obsession with regional industrial `specialisation' and `concentration' as applied to 
individual pit closures based on assumptions about the spatial configuration of the 
coalfield. For example, rarely was the impact of a specific closure queried by NCBHQ or 
the Ministry of Power. On the infrequent occasions that it was the main consideration was 
the geographical `isolation' of a particular colliery. Thus during the late 1950s and early 
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1960s officials fussed unnecessarily over the impact of closing certain collieries which 
were `isolated' from other groups of collieries and pit communities. 31 This continued under 
the ACP. 32 
Government and NCB officials believed that `distance' and `isolation' made communities 
more vulnerable to closures. Measurements of `distance' and `isolation' were useless 
unless they made some sense of the context of the communities involved. They also 
believed closures were less likely to create economic and social problems in areas with 
high concentrations of mining activity because of the availability of alternative work in 
coal. This did not take into account the dimensions or dynamics of contraction within those 
areas or impediments to labour mobility nor local levels of industrial diversification. In this 
way, while official attention was focused on specific closure cases, the majority of closures 
proceeded without query in districts such as Wigan where it was clear there were serious 
issues emerging over the impact of closures. 33 
Throughout rationalisation government concerns over contraction highlighted coalfields 
other than Lancashire. This was exemplified during the 1962 recession which coincided 
with the `Review of the Revised Plan for Coal'. 34 Government anxiety focused on the 
repercussions in South Wales, Scotland, the North East and West Cumberland where both 
headline and localised rates of unemployment were seen as politically unacceptable. There 
was only an admission that there might be potential problems in parts of the Lancashire 
coalfield. 35 Sentiment toward Lancashire was also affected by manpower shortages in 
specific areas of the coalfield particularly the Manchester district where alternative job 
opportunities were most abundant. 36 Government opinion had not altered by the time of 
the ACP announcement. Despite Labour's promise to underwrite economic and social 
hardship in Lancashire, the Government explicitly ruled out special assistance maintaining 
the view that the coalfield was able to absorb further contraction without economic and 
social problems. The Government re-iterated the view that "continuing pressure of the 
labour market made the prognosis for the men affected by closure in Lancashire good". 37 
It was only by the late 1960s, as part of considerations for the 1967 Fuel White Paper, that 
the Government acknowledged incipient socio-economic problems in the Lancashire 
coalfield as a result of continued contraction. This admission came as a result of concerns 
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expressed over the scale of closures anticipated during 1967-68. The Government noted 
that displacement of miners in Lancashire would be accentuated. At the same time there 
were also more general fears about the possibility of industrial unrest and social hardship 
as a result of `unscheduled' closures. Even at this stage the Government failed to offer 
additional assistance. 38 
7.3 INDUSTRIAL CHANGE: SOME IMMEDIATE CONSEOUENCES 
Official confidence about the ability of the coalfield to absorb high levels of contraction 
was felt to have been justified. Unemployment throughout the late 1950s and 1960s 
remained at historically low levels. This was more remarkable given the decline of coal, 
textiles and other staple industries. In parts of the coalfield unemployment was so low it 
was not inaccurate to talk of the return of full employment. In Manchester district 
unemployment levels during the early 1960s were consistently below two per cent and 
frequently below one per cent. Only recession in 1962 saw unemployment levels 
temporarily reach 4 per cent. By the late 1960s these levels had increased slightly. Yet, the 
Mosley Common closure with its wave of redundancies only saw rates flicker above 3.4 
per cent. In St. Helens, although unemployment was consistently above national and 
regional averages, it rarely reached 3 per cent throughout the decade; a noteworthy 
achievement in an area with a limited range of employment possibilities. In North East 
Lancashire, with severe decline in textiles, rates varied with the scale of lay-offs from the 
mills and the impact of new industrial growth. There were periods during the 1960s when 
the rates were under 2 per cent. In 1963 the Youth Employment Service in Burnley boasted 
that of 700 school leavers only 20 had not found work. On the other hand, unemployment 
rates reached nearly 5 per cent during the late 1960s as textile contraction accumulated 
with the added effect of contraction in coal. Even so, for an economically `depressed' area 
the 1960s saw remarkably low unemployment with the bulk resulting from textile 
contraction. In Wigan district, where contraction was greatest, unemployment during the 
early 1960s rarely exceeded 3 per cent although it climbed during the late 1960s. Within 
this satisfactory situation there were warning signs with the occurrence of high levels of 
localised unemployment at certain periods. For instance, in Hindley unemployment 
reached 7 per cent in 1964 as a result of accumulated coal and cotton contraction. 39 
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Throughout the coalfield during the early 1960s, aside from the 1962-63 recession, the 
trend of unemployment was low until the 1967-68 period. Thereafter, it fell back again 
before beginning a more significant and steep rise to reach new post-war highs during the 
early 1970s. However, the most striking feature was the high level of unemployment 
among men relative to woman, with a widening gap throughout the late 1960s. By the early 
1970s a more general retrenchment in all industrial sectors saw some closing of the gap. 
During the mid-1960s, in the Wigan area, unemployment among men was four times 
higher than among woman. By the end of the decade it was nine times higher. There were 
wide gaps developing too in the Leigh and St. Helens areas throughout the 1960s although 
the high levels of displacement of woman in textiles in Burnley meant that the gap was 
closer there. The trend toward employment opportunities for woman in the coalfield during 
the 1960s saw a complete role reversal in an area with a traditional shortage of 
opportunities for woman. Finally, although the Manchester area enjoyed lower levels of 
unemployment than elsewhere in the coalfield, rates were above the national average and 
increasingly above the regional average from the late 1960s. 40 Nevertheless, if headline 
unemployment rates were the sole indicator of the impact of coal contraction then, as the 
Government argued, its confidence had been justified by any yardstick. 
It is not the purpose here to argue that coal contraction caused widespread misery through 
high levels of unemployment. Rather, the intention is to demonstrate that contraction left a 
legacy in the coalfield which persisted beyond the period with which this work is 
concerned, chiefly through a failure to provide effectively for substitute economic activity. 
Furthermore, there were immediate consequences of contraction beyond those revealed by 
reference to headline rates of unemployment. As was increasingly the case during the 
1960s commentators were turning their attention from measuring outcomes in terms of 
unemployment to multivariate analysis of the consequences of industrial change. This 
involved assessments of demographic trends, social and quality of life issues 41 
One important immediate consequence of contraction was the experience of sections of the 
mining community most acutely affected by industrial change. Two groups suffered the 
most grievous hardship: older miners and `disabled' miners - often one and the same. 
Numerically, they were not insignificant. Between ten and twenty per cent of 
`displacements' were mineworkers of retirement age or nearing retirement. The `disabled' 
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miners were known in the industry as `light work cases'. At least 10 per cent of Lancashire 
mineworkers fell into this category. These were men with various `disabilities' including 
pneumocotics and those who had lost, or lost the use of, limbs in pit accidents. They were 
employed on lighter jobs on the surface. The practice of keeping `light work men' on in the 
pits had arisen under private control as a socially responsible gesture from colliery owners. 
Most Lancashire pits carried a `light work' contingent. Thus a considerable percentage of 
42 Lancashire miners during the early 1960s were older or `disabled' miners 
The Government and NCB saw older and `disabled' miners as a manpower issue during 
the early stages of industrial change. The Coal Board liked to be seen as a progressive and 
empathetic employer. At the same time, it was under pressure to proceed with industrial 
change. The `disabled' miners were not what the Board had in mind when they talked of 
`virile labour' pioneering the modernised industry into the late twentieth century. 
Similarly, for government and the Coal Board under political pressure to avoid 
redundancies and ensure effective manpower transfer, this group was an obvious `target' 
when reducing numbers in the industry. Accordingly, it was argued that they should retire, 
take redundancy before retirement or be placed on the `disabled' register. 43 
In Lancashire, the `light work' issue was raised during discussion of the Maypole closure. 
Bolton told Hall that avoidance of redundancies would mean the NUMLA having to accept 
that older and `disabled' workers would be "first to go". Hall was outraged. He described 
plans to cull `disabled' miners as "a moral disgrace in order to get the industry out of its 
difficulties". The `disabled' were least likely to obtain work outside the industry. 
Furthermore, older miners and `light work' cases were inordinately concentrated in pits in 
Wigan district, a fact which complicated matters considerably. 44 Hall had taken an interest 
in the welfare of `disabled' miners by providing facilities for them at the Lancashire 
miners' convalescent home at Blackpool. He had been the leading figure in establishing a 
paraplegic miners' centre near Wigan providing medical, social and welfare facilities. 
After his death his ashes were spread on the paraplegic centre playing fields. 45 
There seems little doubt that Hall, backed by the NUMLA executive, were opposed to the 
divisional board taking the easy option on manpower reductions. Yet, for all his genuine 
work with `disabled' miners it seems astonishing that Hall settled for what amounted to 
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nothing more than a `gentlemen's agreement' on `light work' cases rather than a more 
formal guarantee in meetings with the divisional board in 1958 which established the 
union's position on closures. Again, it was some measure of the NUMLA's commitment to 
support industrial change that they accepted only a board pledge to work with the union to 
ensure a fair deal for the non-discriminatory treatment of `light work' cases in determining 
redundancy, transfer and retirement 46 
In the event, NUM branches and NCB management exercised sensitivity on the issue 
during the early stages of rationalisation. However, by 1963 the divisional board were 
coming under intense pressure on manpower. Similarly, the NUMLA, having committed 
itself to co-operation with the board, was equally anxious to ensure that modernisation and 
rationalisation succeeded. This resulted in the NUMLA allowing the divisional board 
unobstructed manoeuvre on the `light work' issue. The divisional board argued it was 
facing the loss of manpower in certain areas of the coalfield. At the same time, it faced an 
ageing labour profile with an increasing proportion of `light work' cases. Younger miners 
were leaving as uncertainty over the future of coal grew. The board was especially hit by 
the loss of young trained facemen whom it was anxious to retain. On the other hand, the 
board noted that older and `disabled' miners were "hanging on" at certain collieries. The 
board thus asserted that the "burden of `light work' cases" was "more properly the 
responsibility of the community" arguing that they were "incapacity retirements" which 
should be transferred to the disabled register and seek work with Remploy. 47 
The divisional board, with NUMLA acquiescence, transformed a manpower problem into a 
`social problem' in the name of modernisation. Remploy was unable to cope with the 
numbers of `disabled' miners leaving the pits. `Disabled' ex-miners faced a ghastly time 
throughout the 1960s. In 1967 the Coal Board's Disablement Advisory Committee drew 
attention to " `disabled' miners having suffered the worst effects of pit closures with no 
chance of re-employment" 48 In embarking on the 1967 Fuel White Paper the Labour 
Government conceded there was a problem with social hardship caused to older and 
`disabled' miners in all declining coalfield areas. It noted there was a large concentration in 
parts of the Lancashire coalfield. It further acknowledged that contraction would continue 
to "disturb or even destroy mining communities". Still, it was all part of what the 
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Government chillingly referred to as "social factors outside the pricing system" in its 
estimations of the costs of further contraction in coal. 49 
Regarding the experience of older miners more generally, government and the Coal Board 
saw them as a manpower obstruction in the same way as `disabled' miners. Mining custom 
and practice allowed miners to retire at 70 if they wished. This increased the age profile of 
the labour force and meant that the Coal Board had large numbers of older miners whom it 
believed were `non-productive'. They were not regarded as the type of labour needed in 
the modernised industry because it was felt they would not be amenable to new technology 
and work practices. Furthermore, like `disabled' miners, `displacing' them made the 
manpower problem much easier for the Coal Board. Many older miners accepted these 
assertions and took retirement. At national level, discussions during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s saw the Coal Board attempting to persuade the NUM to accept that retirement 
at 65 should be the norm in order to ease the manpower situation. 5° 
The NUMLA leadership approved the `principle' of retirement at 65 under pressure from 
the divisional board at the time of discussions over the Maypole closures' The `rank-and- 
file' did not raise objections. Both leadership and `rank-and-file' accepted that despite 
interference with mining custom the universal practice of retirement with pension at 65 
was a desirable social objective. However, there were two points at issue. The first was 
freedom of choice. A substantial number of miners wanted to work until they were ready to 
leave. They demanded that this freedom of choice be respected. The second and most 
contentious point was the question of compulsion. In its attempts to avoid large-scale 
redundancies the divisional board pressured miners over 50 to take redundancy or retire. 
For men over 65 this was not as much of an issue. The problem was faced by miners - 
many with `disabilities' - in the fifties and early sixties age group who were being harried 
to leave. They were coerced to take redundancy before they reached retirement age and 
qualified for a pension. This not inconsiderable group was faced with the prospect of 
waiting some years before they could draw a pension with little chance of fording work 
outside mining. In addition, these men had not been big earners within the industry because 
surface modernisation together with low piecework wages underground at the older pits 
had reduced both job opportunities and earning levels. 52 
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Coercion of older miners became a political issue at the time of the Maypole closure. 
Nearly 100 men in this category wanted to stay in the industry. The divisional board was 
accused of forcing them either to take redundancy or transfer to Manchester district. This 
was seen as a Hobson's choice. The board knew that older Wigan miners would not be 
happy moving to the new working environment of pits in Manchester district, aside from 
the transport obstacles they would face. The only `choice' was to take `forced' redundancy. 
This led to protest from affected miners at Maypole. The divisional board, already under 
pressure over more general problems involved in transferring men out from Maypole to 
Manchester district, asked Hall to intervene to persuade the affected miners to take 
redundancy. This led to conflict because Hall was accused by the `rank-and-file' of 
colluding with the board to dump them out of the industry. The case raised the profile of 
this issue throughout the coalfield. A dint of effort persuaded both management and 
NUMLA branches in Wigan district to agree to the miners involved being transferred en 
53 mass to Parsonage colliery in Wigan district. 
As this case demonstrated, even at the earliest stages of rationalisation older miners were 
not seen as having a place within the modern industry, still less of exercising choice over 
whether to stay. The divisional board wanted them out. The NUMLA leadership, while 
sympathetic to older miners, was committed to assisting the board's plans for industrial 
change. In the Maypole case there was a satisfactory outcome only because rationalisation 
was in its early stages and there were still enough receiving pits to accommodate these 
men. As industrial change proceeded throughout the 1960s pressures intensified on both 
the divisional board and the NUMLA, combined with decreasing opportunities for transfer 
of older miners. Like the `disabled miners' the position of older miners was increasingly 
difficult as they were pushed out of the industry and into the community. 
Reluctance to leave the industry by `disabled' and older miners was not just a case of 
difficulties in fording alternative work; it also resulted from fears over financial insecurity. 
As Goodman noted, although the Coal Board claimed that its redundancy scheme was "the 
most comprehensive attempt to tackle redundancy in a nationalised industry", it was hardly 
one "erring on the side of generosity" during the early 1960s. According to Goodman "A 
sense of insecurity" was "returning to many parts of Britain". It was contraction in staple 
industries which was contributing to new levels of insecurity. 54 
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New redundancy terms introduced by the Labour Government, such as the 1965 
Redundancy Payments Act, were not an effective remedy, as Bulmer noted in his study of 
the North East coalfield. During the late 1960s `rank-and-file' anger over further coal 
contraction was fuelled by poor redundancy provision. The Coal Board, under pressure 
from the Government, was accused of avoiding redundancy payments in Lancashire. The 
tactic was not summarily to dismiss miners ahead of closure to obviate qualification for 
redundancy under the Act. Instead, the Board persuaded miners to accept a `place' at 
another colliery on the basis that this constituted "an acceptance of reasonable 
employment" thus avoiding payment under the Act. Whether the offer of a `place' was 
credible or not given the dire labour situation in Lancashire during the late 1960s was 
immaterial. Even if it was a genuine `placement' it almost certainly resulted in 
ss `downgrading' on less pay with no protection of earnings. 
As Goodman suggested, the impact of redundancy in the staple industries was under- 
estimated by government during the 1960s. 56 Numerically, older and `disabled miners' 
displaced in the Lancashire coalfield ran into thousands. Most were concentrated in the 
Wigan and Leigh areas. From a political perspective there was no distinctive forum or 
voice to take up the specific issues of the older or `disabled' miners aside from the political 
left. For the left, claims for a better deal for the elderly formed part of its pitch for 
industrial and welfare improvements in the industry. This included inter alia a demand for 
statutory retirement at 60 with pension for all those employed in `heavy' industry. 57 But 
specific campaigns for such groups were still some years away. 
There was a more general `re-discovery' of poverty during the early 1960s which 
emphasised high levels of social injustice suffered by the elderly. It is clear that the 
ramifications of decline in the staple industries contributed to `hidden poverty' which stood 
in contrast to accounts of the `affluent sixties'. -58 In Lancashire, these portrayed a new 
coalfield emerging from the old through the creation of a modern regional identity. A 
description of Wigan from 1964 was typical: 
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"if George Formby senior could revisit Wigan today he would scarcely believe his 
eyes. The new schools, the shops selling salami and other foreign fiddle-faddles, 
the shining new Mini-Minors, and the girls in kinky boots and bouffant 
hairstyles would all convince him that he must have got off at the wrong station" 
59 
Undoubtedly, the coalfield of the 1960s was changing, but the image of modernity that 
`informed opinion' in the region liked to project, relegated pressing social issues. There 
was a widespread belief that public ownership of coal and the welfare state had ended 
hundreds of years of poverty. It was only by the late 1950s and early 1960s that poverty 
and social deprivation was beginning to be tackled. This provoked a retired miner from the 
pit township of Pendlebury to ask why he was living "in a down in the dump" place like 
Pendlebury because, as he added, "after all this is the 1960s". These concerns centred on 
poor housing and urban deprivation in pit areas. The specific link was made between low 
incomes, the elderly and enervated social conditions 60 
The coalfield which repelled generations of social commentators including Heinemann, 
Orwell and Ruskin was still in evidence. 61 Housing and urban squalor was a problem in 
the background of political debate, but of rising prominence throughout the 1960s as 
inroads were made to clear away the coalfield's urban eyesores through modernisation 
schemes. Deprivation persisted despite substantial public housing building during the inter- 
and post-war period to cater for the needs of the mining community. The course of coal 
contraction throughout the 1960s shifted `hidden poverty' from the slums of the main 
urban areas to the council estates. A report on social hardship in 1967 pointed to severe 
poverty and unemployment on the council estates of the coalfield in which life had 
returned to the "bleak forgotten days of nearly 40 years ago". It highlighted the 
circumstances of those `displaced' from jobs in coal and cotton in contrast to those with 
jobs in new economic sectors 62 There was a desperate hopelessness facing workers - 
particularly older workers - who were forced to leave coal without prospect of sharing in 
new economic opportunities. 
One option for those facing the ramifications of industrial change was to leave the coalfield 
to find work in other areas. Demographic trends since the inter-war depression indicated 
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that the coalfield was depopulating. In localities in the Wigan and Leigh areas 
depopulation was a marked feature during the late 1940s and 1950s in spite of coal 
modernisation. 63 Depopulation was an alarming indicator of economic and social decline in 
which those with the means and skills moved out leaving behind an ageing population. 
However, absolute depopulation failed to reveal the extent of the problem highlighted by 
other demographic trends. Another indicator was the level of population movement 
between the coalfield and other areas of the North West and other regions of Britain. 
Population movement into and out of the South Lancashire coalfield from other regions 
was the second lowest level of thirteen Board of Trade research areas in the North West. 
The only significant population movement was between the coalfield and other British 
coalfields. Inter-regional movement involving the South Lancashire coalfield was only half 
the regional average. Population movement was even less in the North East Lancashire 
coalfield which formed part of the depressed Lancashire `weaving belt'. M 
Similarly, on a measure of intra-regional movement both the South Lancashire and North 
East Lancashire coalfields recorded values at only half the regional average. Although 
population movement involving the coalfield increased during the post-war period both 
low inter-and intra-regional population movement confirmed that it was an area of 
population `stagnation' as well as depopulation. This said much about the socio-economic 
health of the coalfield. Low levels of population movement were determined less by 
employment prospects than by economic and social aspirations, social class, income and 
housing. 65 
Population stagnation underlined another feature of the coalfield which had become 
apparent since the inter-war period. There was reluctance to leave Lancashire by the 
mining population. This was confirmed by trends during the 1960s. Miners involved in 
closure had the choice of moving to other coalfields, yet few did so until the late 1960s 
when one of the few chances of keeping a job in mining was to undertake an inter- 
divisional transfer assisted by the Coal Board's `pick-your-pit' scheme. Even under this 
pressure miners were reluctant to leave Lancashire. Of 1,600 men `placed' in the industry 
after the major closures of the late 1960s only a few hundred opted for inter-divisional 
transfers, mainly from Astley Green, Bank Hall, Bedford and Mosley Common, of which 
Mosley Common saw the largest inter-divisional movement. Reluctance to leave 
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Lancashire mainly resulted from the economics of residence. Most Lancashire miners lived 
in low cost rented accommodation or council housing with few in colliery housing. They 
had a clear disincentive to leave. 66 
The reluctance to move to other coalfields went beyond the economics of residence. 
Findings from the inter-war period suggest that relatively few Lancashire miners made 
transfers to the expanding coalfields. Lancashire miners and their families found it 
exceedingly difficult to adapt to new environments as cultural and social factors 
intervened. 67 Gildart's observations of Lancashire miners in the North Wales coalfield in 
more recent times tends to substantiate this view. 68 
By complete contrast a small number of Lancashire miners found the move to a completely 
different environment more enticing. The 1960s saw mineworkers opt for a new life abroad 
either in mining jobs or in other industries. Australia was one popular destination. 
Economic factors were compelling in decisions to make these moves from Lancashire with 
its limited alternative job opportunities. As one confident Lea Green miner taking 
redundancy after 32 years underground quipped: "there are 370 factories in Freemantle 
alone" as he looked forward to taking his family `down under' to search for a new job. 69 
One positive development from the low level of outward movement was that coalfield 
communities remained largely intact much longer. The downside was that this left more 
mineworkers searching for opportunities in coal in the region or for the restricted range of 
opportunities outside mining. 
During the 1960s a picture was emerging in many parts of the coalfield of a mining 
population characterised by low incomes living in poor private rented or council housing. 
This population was one with an increasingly ageing profile suffering high levels of 
industrial disability and sickness and disinclined or unable to move to take advantage of 
economic opportunities either elsewhere in the region or in other parts of Britain. There 
was hardly any population movement into the coalfield of the economically active. It 
suffered from the contraction of both coal and cotton with little alternative economic 
activity, urban squalor and a derelict environment. Unemployment levels, while modest for 
most of the 1960s, revealed an upward trend towards the end of the decade and into the 
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1970s while some localities endured occasional high levels of unemployment during the 
1960s. 
The high level of male unemployment relative to female unemployment confirmed the lack 
of alternative economic openings for the `surplus' mining population as the effects of coal 
contraction accumulated. The demographics of `stagnation' epitomised the prevailing 
economic and social malaise of the coalfield. The 1960s saw the development of features 
of a declining mining or heavy industrial area that we have become familiar with since. 
Many socio-economic trends had been evident since the inter-war period. Contraction 
accentuated these trends. Finally, these characteristic were more prevalent in the Wigan 
district of the coalfield where economic and social depression had been most pronounced 
during the inter-war period and where rationalisation had its greatest impact during the late 
1950s and 1960s. 
7.4 INDUSTRIAL DIVERSIFICATION: RHETORIC AND REALITY 
There were mounting problems for the coalfield under the impact of contraction. This led 
to a desire for industrial diversification across a range of opinion. For the NUMLA and 
Labour in the coalfield the solution was two-fold: the introduction of new economic 
activity and the creation of an institutional and political framework in which this could be 
achieved. This meant campaigning for full development status for the coalfield. Industrial 
diversification was seen as an integral component of industrial change. It was argued that 
obtaining development status was the most effective way of achieving industrial 
diversification through government location of industry and regional policy. It was 
believed that government financial and political commitment would produce the 
momentum to make rapid progress in new coalfield investment. For the NUMLA and 
Labour in the coalfield obtaining development status was the Holy Grail of the 1960s. 
Industrial diversification and development status would ensure the future well-being of the 
coalfield after coal no longer played the leading role in economic life. 
The emphasis on these twin objectives increased as the negative implications of 
contraction became clearer throughout the 1960s. The NUMLA and Labour in the coalfield 
397 
laid great stress on the return of a Labour government committed to delivering these two 
objectives. However, it was clear from early on that industrial diversification would be 
ineffectual in Lancashire. Likewise, the granting of development status was unlikely to 
occur. Finally, policy on the regions and industry underwent a shift of emphasis during the 
1960s which added to the burdens of the coalfield and seriously undermined its ability to 
recover from the impact of industrial change. 
How effective was industrial diversification likely to be given that the success of industrial 
location and regional policy was substantially determined by private sector decisions? The 
omens were not propitious. The record of industrial movement into the St. Helens and 
Wigan areas (comprising the SLDA until 1959) between 1945 and 1967 was abysmal. 
Industrial movement created just over 20,000 new additional jobs. Of those, 3,000 were at 
one development: the Heinz plant at Kitt Green, Wigan. 26 per cent of the new jobs were 
in Skelmersdale new town. Most of the remainder - some 66 per cent of the total - were 
new jobs within the towns of Leigh, St. Helens and Wigan where coal mining activity had 
already ceased some years before or was of negligible importance by the 1960s. The bulk 
of new additional job creation by industrial movement was in Wigan borough and most of 
that was at Heinz. In the mining districts outside the three main towns of the South 
Lancashire coalfield, industrial movement had, in 22 years, created just 1,700 new 
additional jobs. 70 
There was worse news. Although new additional job creation through industrial movement 
was accelerating during the 1960s the new jobs were overwhelmingly concentrated in 
Skelmersdale new town. The paltry impact of new industrial growth in South Lancashire 
was appalling even by the poor experience of the North West as a whole in attracting new 
jobs in the secondary sector. 7' This was a dreadful indictment of industrial location policy 
and regional policy as it affected South Lancashire. For many localities in the South 
Lancashire coalfield suffering under the twin impact of contraction in coal and textiles this 
feeble record confirmed the worst fears that the coalfield was losing staple industry but not 
gaining commensurate levels of substitute economic activity. Failure to attract new 
economic activity was one issue. The character of new industry was another which did 
little to help those affected by industrial change in coal. 
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The growth of new economic activity was badly geared to meet the needs of ex- 
mineworkers. Expansion of employment opportunity in the coalfield was very much in 
favour of women during the 1950s and 1960s. This reflected national trends. In one sense 
this was a welcome development as employment opportunities for women had been limited 
for generations. Female unemployment and underemployment was a great unresolved 
issue. On the other hand, this expansion did nothing to help thousands of mineworkers 
seeking alternative work in areas of new economic growth. Growth in the employment of 
women in the coalfield was below the national average but was nevertheless spectacular in 
many localities where male pit jobs disappeared. 72 Private job creation in new economic 
sectors involving basic assembly work was almost exclusively of women. Industries in 
food processing, electrical assembly and textiles and garments (excluding cotton) were 
heavily dependent on female labour during the post-war period. 73 The scale of expansion 
of female employment opportunities was all the more impressive given that the cotton 
industry - the coalfield's only major employer of women - was in decline, displacing 
thousands of women workers. 
Growth in female employment highlighted another feature of industrial diversification in 
terms of the type of industrial expansion experienced. Most of the growth in secondary 
sector employment was in light manufacturing and assembly industries: artificial fibres and 
fashion wear, electrical components and food and drink. In addition, although growth of 
the tertiary sector in the coalfield did not match regional trends during the post-war period, 
there were the first signs of growth in the service sector which was a large employer of 
women. The growth mirrored both regional and national trends. 74 The major structural 
change in regional employment between 1945 and the 1960s was a shift from the primary 
and secondary sectors to the tertiary sector. However, this was confined to the major 
towns, particularly Wigan. In fact, service employment went into decline in many coalfield 
localities during the 1970s after significant post-war growth. 75 
One negative aspect of new employment growth was lacked of sustainability. New jobs 
were mainly in branches or subsidiaries of existing firms with headquarters located 
elsewhere in Britain. Firms took advantage of government assistance in areas of the 
coalfield covered by the SLDA up to 1959 to exploit the type of labour available. As 
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Massey rightly indicates, job creation in the British regions, including the coalfield, during 
this period was characterised by: 
"a response to the need to cut costs, often in the face of intensifying competition. 
Among those industries were clothing, parts of the service sector, electronics and 
even the central state. In each case, however, the new jobs in the regions were 
primarily in branch plants and the employment offered was low paid, of low 
skill status and quite often part-time. The attraction of the regions was a 
reserve of green labour (in this case mainly women) further cheapened by 
regional policy" 76 
This is an accurate description of the employment situation in the coalfield during the 
1950s and 1960s apart from the absence of central state direction of the public sector. The 
jobs created not only failed to address structural decline in coal they failed to bring 
sustainable high quality skilled jobs essential to the future economic well being of the 
coalfield. 
There was an absence of substantial growth in `large-scale industrial projects' throughout 
the 1950s and 1960s despite some high profile new industrial sites. There was a particular 
deficiency in the central area of the South Lancashire coalfield in urgent need of this type 
of investment 77 Given these deficiencies where did new employment opportunities for ex- 
miners arise? The answer reveals much about the inability of the coalfield to attract new 
industrial growth. Not only was there disjunction between job displacement and job 
creation there was a failure to share in growth of new industrial sectors which were 
creating new male jobs elsewhere in Britain and within the North West. The four main 
industrial growth sectors for male employment in the region were in engineering, motor 
vehicle and aircraft manufacture, metal industries and paper and publishing. However, 
within the SLDA there was little employment growth in these sectors resulting from 
industrial re-location compared to new jobs created in sectors mainly employing woman. 78 
The SLDA's record in the new sectors of male employment was well below regional 
levels. Re-location which did occur arose from firms establishing branches or depots in the 
coalfield, rather than production re-locations 79 The vast majority of new job creation in the 
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new growth sectors went to the Manchester conurbation, Merseyside and central 
Lancashire. Merseyside and Manchester were creating new jobs in these sectors at, 
respectively, twice and 50 per cent more than in the South Lancashire coalfield during the 
late 1950s either through re-location or expansion of existing firms. In the North West only 
North East Lancashire had a worse record than the South Lancashire coalfield in creating 
employment opportunities in the growth areas of the region's economy. 80 
One leading growth sector: engineering, highlighted lack of progress toward industrial 
diversification in the coalfield. Growth, either by re-location or expansion, was mainly 
taking place in areas of the North West with established engineering connections. While 
there were some major engineering developments in the coalfield, expansion mostly 
occurred in Manchester, Merseyside and central Lancashire. Firms demanded generic 
engineering skills from new recruits while re-locating businesses brought many of their 
key skilled workers and managers with them. 81 Furthermore, engineering in the region had 
a tradition of specialisation in a multiplicity of branches. This put the coalfield at a distinct 
disadvantage in attracting new engineering industry because, aside from specialisation in 
tools and implements in the Wigan area, existing engineering industries had a bias toward 
servicing the mining industry with its vulnerability to industrial change. 82 
From a labour mobility perspective former miners hoping to enter engineering faced 
formidable entry obstacles. Union-management agreements were guardians of skill, status 
and pay. Ex-miners could, and did, enter engineering, but only at the lowest level in a 
three-card system of skill demarcation. 83 In the growing motor vehicle and aircraft 
industries of the region ex-miners were unattractive because of the demand for engineering 
skills. For example, De Havilland's and Hawker Siddley's large aircraft factories near 
Bolton underwent major expansion during the 1950s and 1960s. Their preference was for 
recruits from men made redundant at the British Rail engineering works at Horwich which 
was undergoing re-structuring during the late 1950s as it stopped locomotive building and 
concentrated on repairs and servicing. 84 Similarly, on Merseyside, Ford's Halewood plant 
was the biggest single post-war industrial project in the North West. 85 Its location made it 
more accessible from parts of the coalfield than Liverpool or the Wirral, yet ex-miners 
hardly featured in the workforce. Recruits came from engineering backgrounds on 
Merseyside. 86 
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There were positive aspects for ex-miners hoping to transfer to new growth areas. The 
relative economic prosperity of the 1960s meant there was insatiable demand for workers 
in these sectors. Shortages of skilled labour meant that firms were willing to recruit and re- 
train ex-miners ensuring that they not only found employment but quickly gained 
promotion. 87 Another favourable development was the ability of ex-miners to take 
advantage of economic expansion in central Lancashire with its absence of the transport 
impediments which accompanied travel-to-work in the Manchester conurbation. Wartime 
demands arising from Lancashire's position on the strategically `soft side' of Britain saw a 
huge expansion in defence related industries in aircraft engineering and assembly, 
armaments production and support industries in engineering and rubber in Chorley, 
Leyland and Preston. The Cold War sustained this expansion. Peacetime conditions also 
brought expansion in bus and truck production, diesel locomotives and electrical and 
nuclear engineering. 88 These industries employed over 40,000 workers. Local workers 
including woman involved in assembly work filled many jobs. However, the scale of 
expansion meant that demand for labour extended into the coalfield as large numbers of 
former mineworkers swelled the growing workforce. The daily exodus northward from 
St. Helens and Wigan districts was a feature of life for many ex-miners from the 1950s. 89 
Economic expansion in central Lancashire was an employment safety valve for those 
displaced by coal contraction. It vindicated the notion of new areas of growth in the region 
to match decline in mining and other staple industries. However, it offered only a partial 
solution because by no means all ex-miners were in a position to enjoy these opportunities. 
Likewise, it only proved to be a medium-term solution to coalfield employment needs as 
more general contraction in manufacturing set in from the 1970s, followed by severe 
contraction during the 1980s subsequently followed by a collapse in defence-related 
employment with the end of the Cold War. 
Another factor which helped maintain employment for men leaving the pits was expansion 
of local firms. This highlighted the paucity of job creation through industrial re-location 
policies. As the LAMIDA noted in 1967, job creation was proceeding in spite of industrial 
re-location rather than as a result of it 90 It was "Lancashire's ability to produce and sustain 
independently owned firms" which was the main economic success story. 91 The continued 
ability of indigenous Lancashire business to absorb job losses in mining was in contrast to 
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the failure of industrial relocation policies. This was especially the case in growth sectors 
such as engineering. In the central areas of the South Lancashire coalfield the majority of 
new businesses established between 1945 and the 1970s were in the tertiary sector 
including many established under development status. Of those in existence prior to 1939 a 
number were major engineering employers founded during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. 92 Similarly, in Wigan borough post-war businesses expansion was substantially 
in the tertiary sector with most manufacturing firms, specifically in engineering, having 
origins before 1939 and much further back. 93 Apart from some limited success in 
manufacturing industrial expansion and diversification under development status the 
central area of the South Lancashire coalfield was heavily reliant on the continuing success 
of established manufacturing firms to create new jobs for men. 94 
Post-war expansion of the service sector in central areas of the South Lancashire coalfield - 
mainly concentrated in Wigan borough - offered few openings for ex-miners apart from 
jobs in construction, distribution, transport and motor services. For the most part, ex- 
miners faced a limited range of job opportunities if they were unable or unwilling to move 
or travel-to-work or re-train in the new industrial growth sectors. At best, it was a case of 
taking a low paid unskilled labouring job. Throughout the 1960s in the North West 
generally opportunities for skilled men improved while those for unskilled men 
deteriorated, as the skilled, or those able and willing to re-train, exploited a worsening 
skills shortage particularly in engineering while unskilled men chased decreasing numbers 
of labouring jobs. 95 
Furthermore, opportunities in the new sectors were almost exclusively restricted to ex-pit 
men under 45 years of age. For the thousands over 45 or with `disabilities' opportunities 
were virtually non-existent. Moreover, for those fortunate enough to secure a job locally in 
a growth sector there was no long-term future. The fact that Wigan district had a 
preponderance of expanding manufacturing firms of a certain vintage, enjoying the relative 
economic prosperity of the post-war period, did not provide a long-term solution to 
employment needs. The late twentieth century brought more turbulent economic conditions 
which swept many away for good. 
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Industrial diversification saw considerable intra-coalfield variation in experience. Outside 
the grave situation in the central areas of the South Lancashire coalfield ex-miners on the 
fringes of the Manchester conurbation took advantage of employment growth in the new 
sectors which helped reduce the impact of major closures in Manchester district. 96 It was 
only in the late 1960s that the impact of industrial change affected employment in 
St. Helens and North East Lancashire districts. The issue facing ex-miners here was single 
industry domination of the local economy, respectively in textiles and glass, together with 
structural and technological change in those industries. There was a further obstacle for ex- 
miners created by entry obstacles to the glass industry. 97 There were few opportunities 
other than in glass. Development status had been more favourable to St. Helens than 
Wigan, yet new industry was only small-scale with few openings for men. 98 
Coal contraction in North East Lancashire and St. Helens was light compared with Wigan 
district. However, miners struggled to fand employment from the late 1960s with the more 
general downturn in manufacturing industry. In North East Lancashire, where coal 
contraction was overshadowed by decline in textiles, limited opportunities were 
exacerbated by restricted travel-to-work possibilities in an area isolated from employment 
growth areas. The one favourable aspect was that the scale of economic decline provoked 
political action which ensured the sub-region was at the forefront of attention. As a result, 
new large-scale manufacturing projects were established between 1953 and 1959 when the 
area held development status. 99 But these only cushioned the effects of contraction in the 
staple industries and again represented medium-term solutions to employment growth. 
Industrial diversification did not deliver the necessary level of sustainable economic 
opportunities even when parts of the coalfield enjoyed developments status. Given these 
circumstances what did this say about NUMLA and Labour objectives? In one respect the 
poor record on industrial re-location resulted from a weak commitment to regional policy 
by post-war Conservative governments which under-funded and relegated it in policy 
considerations. 10° One commentator has gone as far as to suggest that there was "an 
absence of an active regional policy during the 1950s". 101 In the Lancashire coalfield 
failure was much more fundamental than the relatively limited importance political parties 
and governments attached to regional policy. Lancashire was not prominent in political 
concerns from the very beginning. The granting of development status to part of the 
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coalfield during the post-war period was a reluctant affair. The post-war Labour 
Government made it clear that the SLDA was not a priority. Likewise, the Board of Trade 
indicated that South Lancashire was peripheral to regional policy considerations. Two 
industrial estates in the Wigan area and one in St. Helens were as much as it ever amounted 
to. io2 
Although the 1950s saw some major industrial projects in the coalfield, employment 
creation was poor, given this was a period of economic expansion. Furthermore, expansion 
mostly took place within established firms. One could point to 45 new projects attracted 
through development status, but these were small-scale enterprises or branches of multi- 
plant concerns offering work mainly to women. There were big projects by Heinz, Reed 
Paper and TBA Industrial Products while Metal Box established two factories in the 
coalfield outside the SLDA. 103 However, the Heinz project illustrated the deficiency of 
industrial re-location policies. It was not a new development as such. The American 
parents had operated a food processing plant at Standish near Wigan since the 1920s. The 
Kitt Green plant was more of a major expansion than a re-location. Asked why he had 
chosen to expand, H. J. Heinz 2nd said it was because "he liked the area". 104 What he meant 
was that he liked the cheap labour on offer in an area with only limited opportunities for 
workers, particularly women. Private business re-located primarily because of the 
`availability' of labour. Moreover, firms only re-located during the 1950s and 1960s in 
response to increased demand prompted by the favourable economic situation, thus 
confirming the unsustainable nature of employment creation. 105 
These firms had high labour costs in assembly or production processes in multi-plant 
operations which could be closed and switched quickly. Government could offer as many 
incentives as it liked but outcomes were ultimately determined by private business 
decisions. The Lancashire coalfield was unattractive to private investment for the same 
reasons as coalfields in general, because of adverse features such as poor infrastructure and 
shortage of skilled workers. Private capital was only attracted because of government 
incentives, relative economic prosperity and cheap labour. 
De-scheduling of the SLDA brought a hue and cry from the NUMLA and Labour in the 
coalfield. This increased throughout the 1960s. They blamed the Conservative Government 
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for kicking away the economic lifeline of the coalfield. Given the scale of coal contraction 
in Lancashire it would be churlish to suggest that development status would not have at 
least offered some new employment opportunities. It was estimated that the Board of Trade 
had been important in 67 per cent of decisions to relocate under development status. 106 
However, the question must be asked just how effective development status would have 
been in alleviating contraction in coal during the 1960s when its record up to 1959 had 
been one of attracting opportunistic unsustainable employment with jobs irrelevant to the 
needs of those displaced from coal? 
The NUMLA and Labour in the coalfield pursued a political imperative in which industrial 
diversification and development status were legitimate objectives despite evidence that it 
brought only limited employment gains. There were a number of reasons for this. There 
was a political advantage in tying these issues to the return of a Labour government on a 
modernisation ticket. Both the NUM and Labour were ideologically committed to support 
a policy of `bringing work to the workers' as industrial re-location was a key aspect of 
post-war Labour policy. 
For the NUMLA leadership it helped facilitate industrial change by persuading 
mineworkers that it would absorb those displaced in coal. As the scale of contraction 
impacted throughout the 1960s pressure from the `rank-and-file' and the coalfield 
community increased on the NUMLA leadership and Labour to deliver on promises of 
coalfield modernisation. Adherence to political imperatives and pressure to deliver led both 
to mistakenly to over-emphasise the link between development status and industrial 
diversification. ' They pointed to the success of development status elsewhere as a "catalyst 
for accelerating and giving direction to the process of change". 107 For instance, they cast an 
envious eye on Merseyside where development status had been more successful in 
attracting large-scale employment projects in new growth sectors. Merseyside had been a 
government priority in the North West because of its `special' problems. It enjoyed 
development status from 1949 until 1969 when it was de-scheduled by the Hunt 
Committee. 108 In contrast to the SLDA, Merseyside attracted 70 per cent of the North 
West's share of new jobs through industrial re-location during this period. 109 There was a 
view that the South Lancashire coalfield should enjoy parity with Merseyside. 
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Granted that both the NUMLA and Labour in the coalfield remained committed to the re- 
scheduling of the whole South Lancashire coalfield, how effective were they in advancing 
the case during the 1960s? The main role fell to Labour MPs and Labour-controlled local 
authorities. One avenue was through the offices of both the South Lancashire Development 
Committee (SLDC) and the LAMIDA. 110 The NUMLA and Labour believed that the 
coalfield had suffered a great wrong in losing development status. Given too the desire for 
new economic growth, it might be supposed that the coalfield's political establishment 
would have pursued a vigorous campaign to secure both development status and new 
investment. In fact, the political campaign during the 1960s was notable for its lack of 
vigour. 
What was the' reason for this enigma bearing in mind these issues were critical supports for 
industrial change? The primary reason was the NUMLA's and Labour's interpretation of 
industrial change. The union's representative on the SLDC for many years was Sam 
Unsworth, the miners' agent for St. Helens. Labour was represented by all the Labour 
controlled local authorities, Lancashire County Council and by two MPs - Tom Price, 
Westhoughton, and Fred Lee, Newton. Later Fitch assumed the twin role as NUMLA and 
Labour representative on Unsworth's retirement in 1962 and as a result of Lee's elevation 
to higher office in Labour opposition and government. Fitch, the obvious choice for the 
SLDC, quickly established himself as its chairman and leading spokesperson. However, 
NUMLA and Labour representatives were hamstrung on the SLDC because of the 
contradictory messages they sent out about the future of coal in Lancashire. On the one 
hand, they demanded the reinstatement of development status and new investment, while 
on the other they refused to concede that coal in Lancashire was in decline, maintaining the 
process was one of `transformation' into a modernised industry. "' 
Not surprisingly neither the NUMLA nor Labour in the coalfield was taken seriously. It 
confirmed the view of government that contraction in coal in Lancashire was having only 
negligible consequences and that they were right not to offer additional assistance. In 1965, 
the new Labour Government was sanguine in its assessment that the effects of coal 
contraction in Lancashire "would be no more than marginal". It reiterated its confidence 
that the South Lancashire coalfield was capable of future economic prosperity based on 
industrial diversification and the growth of the tertiary sector. '12 There was only a slight 
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amendment to this view was in 1966 when the Government included an area of St. Helens 
district within the Merseyside Development Area. This was more of an administrative 
change than a shift in policy. 113 The NUMNWA and Labour in the coalfield never 
questioned the validity of these continuing claims. For all their rhetoric on coalfield 
modernisation, both were never fully engaged with challenging Government on the 
consequences of industrial change because they stuck rigidly to a view which denied that 
industrial change would have a major economic and social impact. 
This belief was informed, in part, by over optimistic assessments of industrial change 
carried forward from the immediate post-war period. This was perpetuated by the 
divisional board and enthusiastically supported by the NUMLA and Labour in self-denial 
over coal contraction. Colonel Bolton told the LAMIDA as late as 1959 that "the 
Lancashire coalfield will not suffer any radical or immediate contraction" believing the 
optimistic predictions of a loss of 10,000 jobs. 114 This statement might be seen as venial in 
terms of the optimistic scenario for coal contraction anticipated during the 1950s. 
However, this view predominated as late as 1967. Both the NUMLA and divisional board 
offered a perspective on contraction during the late 1960s which concluded that further 
contraction would be achieved "without any significant redundancy" in the face of clear 
evidence to the contrary. lis There was thus a persistent and damaging denial of the impact 
of contraction throughout industrial change even as it became obvious that the 
consequences were beginning to have a devastating effect. 
A state of denial was pivotal to the NUMLA's and Labour's belief in industrial change at 
all costs, to the extent of ignoring the consequences. They were trapped into adherence to a 
government view that the effects of contraction would be minimal simply because to have 
done otherwise might have jeopardised their commitment to coal industry modernisation. 
Conceding the implications of contraction or shouting too loudly at government might 
have undermined this commitment. Their dilemma only increased with the return of 
Labour in 1964. An unwillingness to come to terms with the effects of industrial change 
made the task of campaigning effectively for development status and industrial 
diversification virtually impossible. 
408 
It could be argued that the development associations were nothing more than toothless 
`corporatist' bodies with no effective influence on outcomes. Before they are dismissed in 
this way it is worth contrasting the work of the SLDC with that of the North East 
Lancashire Development Council (NELDC) in campaigning for development status and 
new investment. The main trade union input on the NELDC came from the textile unions. 
Unlike the NUMLA in South Lancashire, the textile unions, along with Labour controlled 
local authorities fought an aggressive campaign through the NELDC. In 1959 Burnley 
Textile Trades Federation formed the Cotton Crisis Action Group to fight to retain a viable 
textile industry in the area and co-ordinate action with other bodies and trades federations 
in textiles in the North West. 116 `Rank-and-file' calls for a more robust response to 
government by the textile unions added weight to the case in North East Lancashire rather 
than diminishing it. 117 The textile unions were unafraid of criticising the Labour 
Government over inaction. Levels of protest intensified in North East Lancashire during 
the late 1960s bringing some success in persuading the Government of the need for more 
assistance for the sub-region. 
There were some favourable factors operating in North East Lancashire. Dan Jones, the 
Labour MP for Burnley, was PPS to Douglas Jay at the Board of Trade for a spell. 118 North 
East Lancashire had been the focus of official attention over a long period of time, unlike 
South Lancashire. Although it was de-scheduled in 1960 after having held development 
status since 1953, it was `borderline' for re-inclusion. There was also a strong sense of sub- 
regional identity, distinctive not just from the rest of Britain but from the rest of 
Lancashire. It was argued that the problems of the area were of a different order from other 
areas of the North West. A sense of `otherness' fed directly into the political domain to 
help mobilise support across a spectrum of interests which made for such a powerful case. 
The sense of injustice was palpable. 119 One example was the outcry when the Government 
decided to proceed with the Central Lancashire new town project and the expansion of 
Skelmersdale new town in 1968 because it was believed they would divert resources from 
North East Lancashire. 12° 
However, there was another more important reason why the campaign in North East 
Lancashire was more effective than in South Lancashire. This was based on an 
interpretation of decline in textiles in contrast to coal. There was division within the textile 
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unions and Labour in North East Lancashire between those who demanded more support 
from the Government for textiles and those who accepted the finality of its decline. Those 
who argued that the campaign should concentrate on the modernisation of the area began 
to occupy the majority. This led to a more effective campaign in favour of new investment. 
It also meant that Dan Jones, who had been instrumental in arguing for economic 
modernisation, was in for a tough time as he was called upon to deliver. 121 This position 
should be compared with the South Lancashire coalfield. Here industrial change in coal 
was informed by a persistent belief that the industry was not in decline but in a state of 
`transformation' to a modernised and viable industry in which there would be little 
economic and social dislocation. North East Lancashire was thus able to free itself more 
quickly and more effectively from the contradictions that dogged progress in South 
Lancashire and make for a more coherent case. 
Negation of their own campaign by the NUMLA and Labour was a recipe for political 
inertia throughout the 1960s. Alan Fitch and Michael McGuire headed the political 
campaign for development status after Labour was returned to office in 1964, promising 
that the Government would reinstate it. This was a popular issue with the electorate who 
responded positively to a desire for new economic and social opportunities. The Labour 
Governments of the 1960s had no intention of granting development status based on the 
continuance of dominant views of the coalfield. Loyalty of both MPs to the Government 
prevented a challenge to alter policy. This was combined with prevailing views of 
industrial change in coal which the sponsored MPs continued to hold with the NUMLA 
leadership. The `campaign' waged by Fitch and McGuire on behalf of the NUMLA was a 
political smokescreen. They knew the Government would not budge but adopted a public 
pretence that they could persuade Government to change policy as a way of fending off 
criticism of inaction. At the same time, they sought to marginalise debate over the 
consequences of contraction in favour of extolling coal industry modernisation. 
The problem for both men was that by the late 1960s the `game' was up as siren voices 
grew louder over coal contraction. There was a realisation that new economic activity was 
not coming to South Lancashire to the extent required as the cost of nearly a decade of 
contraction was being counted. New industrial growth was even less than during the late 
1940s and 1950s. Furthermore, new investment during the 1960s confirmed the shift to 
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light industry with mainly low cost female employment engaged in assembly and process 
work. 122 Fitch, McGuire and other coalfield MPs took the flak from local authorities and 
the political left. Harold Boardman, the Labour MP for Leigh, received a public 
excoriation from Tyldesley council. 123 It was a cruel irony for Boardman that he, together 
with Les Spriggs, the Labour MP for St. Helens, had been the only two MPs to 
acknowledge the implications of contraction as they took up the plight of `disabled' 
miners. 124 
Growing pressure on sponsored and other coalfield Labour MPs bore fruit in prompting 
them to adopt a more pro-active posture in challenging the Labour Government on the 
outcomes of industrial change. By 1970, Fitch, under constituency pressure, was forced to 
concede that "new industry was not coming to Wigan". He admitted that a "one-time 
industrial town" had become a "dormitory". He formed a `council of action' comprising 
local business, organised labour and political parties to pressure the Government. Through 
this venture, Fitch headed an abortive deputation to see Eric Varley, the Minister of State 
for Technology, to demand more Government assistance for the South Lancashire 
coalfield. 125 McGuire, again under constituency pressure, questioned the Select Committee 
on Nationalised Industries in 1969 about the type of industry being established in declining 
pit areas such as Lancashire, arguing in favour of the "big structural industries, which will 
give a sounder base than the advance factory type of industry". 126 These interventions were 
belated and, in McGuire's case, desperate attempts to fend off criticism that coal 
contraction had occurred without adequate levels of new investment to replace jobs lost in 
coal. 
One result of pressure on the coalfield political establishment during the late 1960s was a 
move toward what were seen by Labour's critics as political diversions. Efforts were 
directed into coalfield modernisation through initiatives which had no direct bearing on job 
creation. One example was dalliance with environmental concerns in the quest to clear 
derelict land. There was a case for undertaking this task. Dereliction caused by coal mining 
added to the squalor of the coalfield. It was an environmental disgrace and robbed land 
which could be reclaimed for new residential, industrial or amenity use. It was also a 
hazard for children which claimed young lives. In South Lancashire, dereliction was 
substantial at three times the national average, covering ten per cent of the coalfield. In 
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Ince-in-Makerfield 40 per cent of land was derelict. The main area of dereliction was a 
large arc shape running from the west of Wigan into the central area of the South 
Lancashire. It had altered topography to produce the spectacular `Wigan Alps' or Oberland 
culminating in the `Three Sisters' spoil heaps interspersed by `flashes' (artificial lakes 
caused by mining subsidence). 127 
Initiatives to return derelict land to productive use from the late 1960s were right and 
proper. Fitch, in conjunction with local authorities, led initiatives to clear areas of 
despoilment. However, the problem with these environmental initiatives was two-fold. In 
the first instance they were seen by Labour's critics on the left as attempts to divert 
attention from policy and political failure. It was a very thin line indeed between a pressing 
need to rid hideous areas of dereliction and what were seen as exercises in cosmetic 
gentrification of the coalfield and its urban areas. For Labour's critics it was about giving a 
highly visible impression of action in the absence of doing something more positive to 
create new employment opportunities for ex-miners. For the left, the politics of land 
rehabilitation thus became indicative of failure on industrial diversification. 128 
The second point was that the level of political enthusiasm and resources poured into land 
rehabilitation pointed up Labour's difficulties with coalfield modernisation. At the heart of 
this was the inner conflict within the NUMLA and Labour in the coalfield over the 
consequences of industrial change witnessed by the ineffective campaign for industrial 
diversification. Both struggled to reconcile their interpretation of industrial change with 
demands to modernise the coalfield. Tackling dereliction emerged out of this struggle. 
Land rehabilitation thus represented a symbolic erasure of traces of an industry which had 
blighted not only the land but also countless generations. 129 
Inner conflict was manifested in other ways. McGuire's intervention on the Select 
Committee over the type of industry coming to the coalfield underlined another dilemma 
for Labour over coalfield modernisation. The move to `advance' type factories or `light' 
industry creating `modem' jobs in assembly and distribution was not just the result of 
structural economic change. Labour had been advocating this type of `replacement' 
industry for years. Socialists dreamed of the day when they would be unchained from the 
repression and rigours of heavy industry. Labour's post-war reconstruction plans involved 
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avoiding the `mistakes' of the past through reducing industrial specialisation and 
concentration, and breaking the "excesses" of monopoly power, mass production and the 
regimentation of workers. These were antecedents of an emphasis on decentralised, small- 
scale, modern light industries which Labour favoured and were affirmed in its post-war 
support for the industrial estates 'movement'. 130 The strength of these notions was seen in 
the coalfield as both the NUMLA and Labour celebrated the arrival of modern light 
industry. It was a key concept of industrial diversification. Heavy industry was something 
from the dark past to be avoided in the pursuit of modernity in new industrial growth. The 
problem for Labour was that while it carried before it a vision of modernity in this way it 
singularly failed to meet the demands of contraction in coal through new industrial growth 
of this type. 
There was one final act to play for the outcomes of industrial change. This too came to be 
seen as one primarily about seeking political diversions in the modernisation of the 
coalfield. The emphasis of policy during the 1960s shifted from one exclusively based on 
economic issues and industrial diversification to one focused on regional planning in the 
round. This resulted from internal policy debates within the Labour Party moving in favour 
of `regional' and `urban' planning rather than relying solely on `economic' planning. 131 
For the NUMNWA and Labour in the coalfield this shift was largely outside its control, yet 
its effects were most pronounced in the way the coalfield political establishment 
responded. Attention focused on regional and urban planning in the North West. This was 
modernisation writ large. It involved the wholesale planning and promotion of new foci of 
urban' growth through the building of new communities. The return of a Labour 
Government saw new institutional frameworks established for this purpose, such as the 
Regional Economic Councils working in conjunction with local authorities. 132 
The NUMNWA and Labour in the coalfield greeted these developments with great 
enthusiasm believing that they marked a big step in Labour's commitment to coalfield 
modernisation. New urban development, especially the new towns, spiced up Labour's 
modernisation agenda. 133 For NUMLA and Labour, attaching themselves to `planning' 
created another highly attractive and visible political diversion from engagement with 
failed policies of industrial diversification. In another sense, the shift of policy had a 
devastating affect on the ability of the coalfield to transform itself. Crucially, these 
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developments by-passed the coalfield leaving it as a run-down backwater as they diverted 
attention and resources. Moreover, as host to new urban growth, the coalfield was 
burdened by demands placed on local authorities and employment opportunities, already at 
a premium. By the late 1960s it was clear that the new urban communities were failing. By 
this time, it was also apparent that the deficiencies exposed, and burdens imposed, by new 
urban communities were being eclipsed by concerns over the effects of de-industrialisation 
in the North West's main urban centres which the new communities were intended to 
relieve. 
The new concept of coalfield modernisation which emerged during the early 1960s was 
"to scrap and re-build". It was argued that the coalfield was finished as a viable economic 
and social unit. The only way to improve its fortunes was to develop new communities 
within it or adjacent to it. 134 The planners hoped to tackle three issues simultaneously. The 
first was to "relieve congestion" in the main urban areas of the North West: Liverpool, 
Manchester and Salford by clearing urban squalor and creating new urban communities. 
The second was to ensure that the new communities acted as stimuli to new growth in the 
region. The third, was that in doing so they would re-invigorate declining areas such as the 
South Lancashire coalfield. 135 
There was a failure to proceed beyond the first objective. Fatally for the South Lancashire 
coalfield the exercise resulted in a multiplication of its problems. The North West saw new 
urban development during the late 1940s and 1950s through the creation of `overspill' 
communities. These projects portended the character and scale of problems associated with 
the new towns. There were a number of `overspill' developments throughout the South 
Lancashire coalfield. One of the largest was at Worsley, based on the former pit village of 
Little Hulton, taking families from slum clearance in Salford and Manchester. Another was 
the Wigan `crescent'; a vast swathe of public housing between Worsley Mesnes, west of 
Wigan, and Ashton-in-Makerfield, centred on two estates at Newtown and Norley Hall. 
These mainly took families from urban re-development schemes in Wigan and Liverpool. 
Another huge `overspill' at Westhoughton, which would have housed 42,000 people, was 
rejected after an inquiry. The `overspills' brought pre-existing social problems to an 
overburdened coalfield. They were residential barracks with few amenities. However, the 
main difficulty they created for the coalfield was to exacerbate the problems caused by 
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lack of local employment opportunities. Even in an area of relatively high industrial 
growth such as Worsley during the late 1950s, at a time of economic expansion, there were 
major employment deficiencies. The `overspills' gratuitously aggravated an already 
worsening outlook for employment in South Lancashire. 136 
1960s planning moved from the concept of the `overspills' to new towns. It was believed 
they would provide the stimulus to the growth in the coalfield by acting as employment 
`quasars', unlike the `overspills'. The three new towns were in central Lancashire based on 
the Chorley-Leyland-Preston axis, Skelmersdale and Warrington-Runcorn. Initially Central 
Lancashire New Town was the only success in creating employment for the coalfield based 
on travel-to-work opportunities because it developed an already growing travel-to-work 
culture between the coalfield and central Lancashire through the large-scale employment 
of ex-miners. 137 Later, during the 1970s and 1980s, Warrington new town provided similar, 
though more limited, `travel-to-work' opportunities. 
Although employment creation in Skelmersdale was primarily intended to cater for 
population migration from Liverpool it was also expected to act as a stimulus for growth in 
the coalfield. It was based on a former pit township to the west of Wigan. What little new 
employment growth there was in the coalfield during the 1960s was focused on 
Skelmersdale. However, it did little to improve permanently employment opportunities. It 
became a Mecca for light unsustainable employment as major employment projects 
collapsed or moved elsewhere. Skelmersdale rapidly became a by-word for failing new 
towns and `sixties' urban planning. `Life in Skein', as it is known locally, became 
synonymous with high rates of unemployment, empty and vandalised new houses as a lack 
of employment deterred families from moving there, and rising social tensions. 139 
Skelmersdale failed both as a focus for growth in its own right and as a stimulus for growth 
in the coalfield. 
One forlorn hope was that Skelmersdale would not only act as a foci of growth to revive 
the coalfield but that it would be a model for the revival of declining townships and urban 
areas in the coalfield by applying the same principles of urban modernisation and planning. 
The pit township of Abram was chosen for one such planning `experiment'. It was 
abundantly clear that tree planting, derelict land clearance, a new school and a couple of 
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small-scale light industries were totally insubstantial for the scale of economic and social 
problems faced by the coalfield. However, the coalfield political establishment supported 
these schemes as the way forward for coalfield modernisation. The schemes represented an 
illusion of modernisation in the absence of adequate and relevant job creation. One 
deficiency of these schemes, as the planners were at pains to point out, was a lack of 
resources to undertake the scale of economic and social `engineering' required to transform 
declining pit communities. 139 Creativity was certainly running ahead of funding. But, it 
seems implausible that these schemes could have been effective in creating large-scale 
employment opportunities. They were sticking plaster solutions for a patient requiring 
major heart surgery. 
Labour politicians in the coalfield shared a vision with the planners for coalfield 
modernisation. The growing problems of the coalfield were compounded by an 
unquestioning belief that modernisation of any kind represented `progress'. This increased 
as the need to provide answers to the failure of industrial diversification became ever more 
pressing. It remained undiminished until mounting political pressure saw Labour 
politicians turning on the planners as scapegoats. Alan Fitch, under pressure in Wigan, was 
notable for the increasing ferocity of his attacks on Skelmersdale new town for diverting 
investment from the coalfield as the industrial diversification strategy ran into the 
quicksand. 14° 
Another highly symbolic example of how modernity was perceived as the saviour of the 
coalfield came with motorway building. The motorways were seen as vital to regional 
planning by linking together the main urban areas and the new towns in order to encourage 
new investment. It was believed that the motorways would afford "a great opportunity to 
extend the frontiers of prosperity and modernity in the region". 141 Skelmersdale was 
dubbed the "motorway town". 142 The motorways did little to improve the fortunes of the 
coalfield because they were intended to cut through it to link other urban centres and new 
towns. '43 Their overall effect on growth in the coalfield remains doubtful. Significantly, 
they failed to solve the coalfield's infrastructure problems because they did not remove 
transport obstacles involved in latitudinal movement across the coalfield. Indeed 
modernisation of infrastructure arguably made the situation in the coalfield worse because 
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the railway and tramway networks were dismantled during the 1950s and 1960s. These 
problems remain unresolved today. 
The shift of policy toward regional and urban planning was a backward rather than 
progressive step for the South Lancashire coalfield because it ignored its immediate 
concerns and did little to alleviate its problems. By all accounts it made them worse. By the 
late 1960s and early 1970s attention was shifting in yet another direction. This time it was 
the growing problems of more general de-industrialisation in the region with the spotlight 
moving to inner city Manchester and LiverpooL144 By the 1970s the coalfield had become 
just one largely forgotten problem in the midst of calamitous economic and social collapse 
on four fronts: the declining industrial areas; the failing new towns and overspill 
communities; economic and social upheaval in the inner cities; and the effects of de- 
industrialisation in previously less blighted areas of the North West. 
The course of industrial change beyond the early 1970s had its own economic and political 
causes and consequences but it is worthwhile considering some outcomes immediately 
following industrial change in coal. By the 1970s large areas of the coalfield were areas of 
negligible economic activity well before the horrors of Thatcherism were visited upon 
them. Places such as Atherton saw half its jobs in coal and cotton disappear. Work which 
was available was elsewhere in the region. Previously vibrant industrial communities were 
beginning to fragment. '45 The re-scheduling of much of the South Lancashire coalfield as 
an `intermediate' development area in 1972, following the Hunt Report, brought little 
respite to the climate of decline. '46 
By the late 1970s both Fitch and McGuire had given up attempts to bring new investment 
to the coalfield. Both continued to come under constituency pressure as failure to attract 
new coalfield investment was twinned with disenchantment with the Labour Government 
of the late 1970s. On his retirement from politics Fitch admitted the failure to re-invigorate 
the coalfield had been the greatest disappointment of his political career. 147 McGuire 
attacked both Conservative and Labour Governments accusing them of giving South 
Lancashire "the dirty end of the stick" at every juncture as they prioritised other areas for 
assistance with lower levels of unemployment. 148 For both, the vision of coalfield 
modernisation lay in ruins. 
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Rising unemployment during the 1970s was testimony to failure. By the mid-1970s 
unemployment was averaging over 6 per cent; figures not seen on a permanent basis since 
the 1930s. By the turn of the decade rates of nearly 20 per cent were more typical, 
including those in Skelmersdale new town. lag During the late 1960s and 1970s the South 
Lancashire coalfield was a "relatively poor performer" in a region with "intractable" 
problems of attracting new investment "entrenched at the bottom of the employment 
table". What efforts had been made by government to turn the situation around had 
failed. 150 
On the question of the sustainability of new industrial growth during the 1950s and 1960s a 
number of high profile new projects remained. Both Heinz and Metal Box stayed, but at a 
price. The 1970s saw the attractions of cheap labour in labour intensive assembly and 
production turn in favour of cost-saving technological change to the extent that both these 
major employers halved their workforce. lsl It was clear by the 1980s that there was an 
absence of large-scale manufacturing employment save for the St. Helens glass industry 
and a few firms remaining in Skelmersdale. Many of these closed during the 1980s with 
little replacement industrial activity. Aside from the glass industry and engineering 
industries on the fringes of the Manchester conurbation the whole of the South Lancashire 
coalfield became an industrial desert. 152 
The price in unemployment and poverty was clear. By the 1980s unemployment among 
under 25s in Wigan Metropolitan district was 42 per cent with long-term unemployment 
(those out of work for six months of more) over 60 per cent. Average unemployment was 
over 20 per cent and among males above 25 per cent. In the seventeen worst 
unemployment 'blackspots' these figures were exceeded. In three of them unemployment 
rates were nearer 40 per cent. Fourteen of those localities had a recent history of mining 
activity. 73 per cent of families were on low incomes and nearly 70 per cent were 
dependent on some form of benefit or pension. '53 This was the tragic human legacy of 
years of coal contraction and failure to establish relevant substitute economic activity. 
For the wastelands of South Lancashire the question of industrial diversification was no 
longer relevant as the political question turned to one of regeneration. Mining areas or ex- 
mining areas are not attractive to private investors. This was true in South Lancashire, 
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which more than most had always suffered from an `image' problem. In an increasingly 
`image' conscious age this was perceived as an obstacle to private investment in the North 
West generally, and the coalfield in particular. As domestic investment dried up the 
Thatcher government turned to foreign investment as a source of new economic activity. 
The `image' question has been held responsible for dissuading foreign investment in the 
region. Aside from a few foreign firms and a concentration of American investment mainly 
in the St. Helens glass industry the coalfield has been a below average performer in 
attracting foreign investment against both national and regional criteria. 154 In 1979, Prime 
Minister, James Callaghan, referred to the `image' question as the biggest obstacle holding 
back the South Lancashire coalfield. lss `Image' masked the real reason for lack of 
investment by private capital. It was only attracted to the coalfield during the immediate 
post-war period by cheap and `available' labour but by the late twentieth century it was 
looking elsewhere for opportunities. In any case, private investment had become more 
demanding of its workforce in terms of skills and qualifications which the coalfield found 
difficult to match. 
The outcome saw misguided attempts by local government at `image' building initiatives. 
One aspect has been the growth of the `heritage industry' as local government assumed "a 
strategic role for urban economic development" after re-organisation in 1974. The hope 
was that promotion of the coalfield through `industrial tourism' would create direct jobs in 
leisure and help stimulate the profile of the area to attract new investment. These 
developments reflected similar initiatives in areas of Britain with a recent experience of de- 
industrialisation. 156 In South Lancashire this has seen the establishment of several 
`heritage' sites in the coalfield under local authority auspices, including a working museum 
at the former Astley Green colliery. 
Doubts have been expressed about the effectiveness and propriety of this trend. In South 
Lancashire it is interesting that Labour controlled authorities have been in the vanguard of 
promoting `heritage'. Again, like the pre-occupation with land rehabilitation and 
`planning' during the 1960s and 1970s it is another element of failure to attract relevant 
employment opportunities. In addition, local government re-organisation contributed to 
civic aggrandisement and `image promotion' within the new metropolitan authorities. One 
example has been the way Wigan Metropolitan authority successfully oversaw the 
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transformation of Wigan into a commercial, leisure and retailing centre in contrast to 
districts of the borough with a recent history of coal mining which remain backwoods for 
employment with high levels of social deprivation. 
In another sense, the yearning for modernity has produced a grasp for a past that 
disappeared so quickly and re-produced it as nostalgia in the `heritage industry'. As one 
leading critic of the `heritage industry' as noted "the past has been summoned to the 
rescue of the present". 157 The growth of the `heritage industry' is thus both a substitute for 
economic regeneration in the absence of something more substantive and an emotional 
catharsis. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has indicated that the consequences of industrial change in the coalfield 
amounted to a catalogue of failure. This was a failure of modernisation. From the inter-war 
period the coalfield did not feature prominently in regional or industrial policy. Mistaken 
assumptions and misconceptions evident from the inter-war years continued into the post- 
war period. Industrial re-location policy failed the coalfield even as parts of it were 
reluctantly scheduled for development status. Failure continued as the requisite level and 
type of investment did not materialise during the late 1950s and 1960s to arrest the effects 
of contraction in coal. The shift toward regional and urban planning during the 1960s 
brought an unmitigated disaster as the modernisation of the 1960s compounded and 
complicated the problems of decline. The main import of demographic and labour trends 
discernible from the inter-war period went unheeded. The key lessons of labour mobility 
were not read thoroughly enough. Contraction occurred against this backdrop in a highly 
damaging way thus hastening the pace of decline. The loss of over 30,000 jobs in coal 
during the 1950s and 1960s created the context of economic and social decline which 
modernisation failed to relieve. 
The time delay of accumulated contraction during a period of relative economic prosperity 
pushed the full effects into the late 1960s and early 1970s. This helped conceal the fault 
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lines opening up in the coalfield during the 1960s. The words of Sir Joseph Hunt are most 
apposite. Speaking of the `intermediate areas' he noted that: 
"The absence of large-scale unemployment has masked the difficulties of these 
areas and the relative deprivation of their economic position, but it cannot be 
assumed that time is on their side" 158 
By the late 1960s the fault lines were opening up into huge fissures. Specific sections of 
the coalfield community and specific areas felt contraction most keenly. The `losers' of 
industrial change were many, but it was `disabled' and older mineworkers who suffered 
most. They were direct victims of modernisation. Loss of mining jobs affected all parts of 
the coalfield at various times. In many areas this was twinned with decline in other staple 
industries. However, the consequences of industrial change in coal were most heavily 
visited upon central areas of the South Lancashire coalfield which revealed characteristics 
of a declining mining area well before the pit closures and de-industrialisation of the later 
twentieth century. 
Other declining coalfields had similar experiences. Lancashire's experience during the 
1960s was not unique. 159 However, this chapter has identified the broader failings of 
industrial and regional policy over a long period of time in its impact on-the coalfield. It 
has also identified sections of the coalfield community worst affected by the prioritisation 
of industrial change in coal over consideration of its consequences. The most important 
contribution of this chapter has been to shed light on the role played by Labour in the 
coalfield and its allies in the NUMLA in contraction and modernisation. Admittedly, many 
developments described were outside their direct control or remit. Of more importance 
were attitudes and sentiments. They continued to support a failed policy of industrial 
diversification linked to re-scheduling of development status in the belief that this was the 
way forward for coalfield modernisation. At the same time, commitment to coal industry 
modernisation prevented them from pursuing a credible and effective campaign to secure 
these objectives. A commitment to coal industry modernisation thus encroached on a 
desire for coalfield modernisation in a most unhelpful way. 
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It has been argued in this chapter that this fundamental contradiction meant that the 
NUMLA and Labour ignored the consequences of industrial change until it was too late. 
Failure to become fully engaged combined with the continuing refusal of government to 
offer assistance. The campaign for development status became a red herring. Other 
diversions followed to cover failure over industrial diversification. These included 
flirtations with land rehabilitation and regional and urban planning. More recently, they 
have turned to re-generation schemes which have included the promotion of `industrial 
tourism' -a doubtful venture which smacked of desperation over failure to raise 
employment levels. 
It has been suggested in this chapter that attitudes toward coalfield modernisation by its 
political establishment resulted in a deficit between job displacement and job creation 
because support for the growth of modem light industry did not translate into tangible 
economic growth. In one sense Labour had no choice because this was all that was on offer 
from private capital, while structural economic change pushed light industry to the fore. 
However, both the NUMLA and Labour in the coalfield gave their blessing to this type of 
investment. They marvelled at is arrival during the 1950s as part of a socialist vision of 
post-war modernity involving industrial expansion of this kind but it remained just a 
vision. 
There were benefits from coalfield modernisation which were demanded and enjoyed by 
the coalfield community. Land rehabilitation was of benefit to all. Younger workers and 
women were given new opportunities in new industrial sectors. The motorways and urban 
planning brought a better standard of living for some. Even the `heritage industry' brought 
new opportunities for education and fulfilment. But, on the key test of creating new 
economic activity and employment there was failure during the post-war period. Failure 
has continued since. This must remain the most damning indictment. The NUMLA and 
Labour in the coalfield ignored the consequences of industrial change because of their 
attachment to coal industry modernisation and did little to prevent coalfield enervation 
through the attitudes they adopted towards its modernisation. 
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CONCLUSION 
As this thesis has shown industrial change in the Lancashire coalfield during the post-war 
period was impelled by the notion of modernity. This, above all else, influenced 
government economic and political priorities. The desire for modernity was affected by 
two sentiments. Firstly, a socialist interpretation of Britain's industrial dispensation 
prioritised the need to modernise and rationalise the economy through the application of 
science, technology and planning. This was manifested in ideas on post-war re- 
construction. Later it informed Labour's preparations for government through the role it 
assigned to economic modernisation and planning in its political agenda for the 1960s. In 
government from 1964 Labour initiated a fuel policy and further coal contraction through 
the accelerated colliery closure programme - conceived and planned at the highest level of 
government. Secondly, the post-war debate over Britain's putative `decline' adversely 
affected perspectives against coal because the industry was perceived as central to the 
notion of British economic obsolescence. For coal these twin developments brought a 
requirement to transform itself into a modem industry and also play a key role in wider 
economic modernisation. The collapse in coal consumption taking place from the late 
1950s hastened this process. Critically for coal both the economic and political imperatives 
of post-war governments, which these sentiment informed, brought the challenge of 
alternative fuels and the emergence of a `multi-fuel' economy supported by both the main 
political parties. 
It has been demonstrated in this thesis that modernisation of the coal industry had the 
overwhelming support of a wide spectrum of industrial and political opinion both 
nationally and in the Lancashire coalfield. Importantly, the position adopted by the NUM 
in endorsing industrial change was crucial to the successful delivery of a modernised coal 
industry. Indeed, Lord Robens paid tribute to the "statesmanship and foresight of the union 
leadership" in ensuring the transition of the industry. ' Significantly, in Lancashire, both the 
NUMLA and Labour Party sustained high levels of support for industrial change in coal 
through the twin processes of modernisation and rationalisation. Industrial change was also 
underpinned in Lancashire by an understanding between both sides of the industry that 
modernisation was the key to ensuring the future viability of coal and the success of public 
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ownership. The NUMLA leadership demonstrated through the position it adopted on many 
aspects of industrial change that it supported the process. These leaders were fixated by 
industrial change to the extent that the two senior, and ideologically opposed, officials 
came to epitomise this obsession: Joe Gormley and Jim Hammond. They were the 
principal NUMLA figures most closely associated with industrial change from the late 
1950s. Gormley saw industrial change as a way of bringing improvement to those union 
members remaining in the industry, while Hammond's ideological prescriptions meant that 
he saw in modernity a method of improving economy and society in the service of 
`working class' `progress'. In their different ways both were implacably devoted to 
industrial change. Throughout the 1960s this was evidenced through their actions 
particularly seen in Gormley's sophism and Hammond's caution and judiciousness 
alongside his bluster. 
Findings from this thesis have demonstrated that in Lancashire, NUMLA-Labour Party 
hegemony was influential in that their strategies facilitated the successful management of 
scepticism about industrial change. Both the NUMLA and Labour Party were able to 
convincingly show that only through a programme of modernisation and rationalisation 
was the transition to a viable industry attainable. Moreover, it was the Labour Party - 
traditional political custodians of the coalfield - who it was argued should oversee the task. 
However, to a large degree modernisation of both the coal industry and the coalfield was 
deployed during the early 1960s in order to underpin Labour's political ambitions. 
Industrial change was thus accompanied by a high degree of manipulation of opinion in 
order to ensure the success of industrial change and underpin electoral support for Labour. 
Manipulation resulted from the strength of the desire to see modernisation succeed. 
Modernity was itself of value in achieving this task as both the discourse and symbolism of 
modernisation were deployed to powerful effect as were the more substantive benefits of 
working in a modernised coal industry. 
T 
The degree of success was facilitated by the inherent weakness of opposition to industrial 
change. While it was clear that industrial change had its opponents among a small but 
assertive group of union branches and officials on the left, they were completely 
overwhelmed by the strength of NUMLA-Labour Party hegemony. They were unable to 
mobilise widespread support against industrial change. However, more importantly, the 
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main source of weakness of opposition was the inability of the left to reconcile its vocal 
opposition to the outcomes of industrial change with its ideological commitment to the 
modernisation of coal. 
In any case, it is clear from the examination of reaction and response to industrial change 
that for a vast majority of mineworkers in Lancashire there was little likelihood that 
industrial change would meet with opposition. On the contrary, during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s the `rank-and-file' welcomed both the modernisation of the coal industry and 
the coalfield as part of the delivery of a longer-term commitment by the NUM and the 
Labour Party. Industrial change only emerged as an issue for the `rank-and-file' where it 
was confronted with the negative outcomes of rationalisation. During the early 1960s these 
included an increase in the tempo of colliery closures and issues relating to specific 
closures. Similarly, `rank-and-file' patience was tested by the negative consequences of 
colliery closures such as transfers, loss of status and travel-to-work issues or from the 
modernisation of work practices such as the introduction of more widespread shiftwork. 
However, the grievances and tensions produced by industrial change did not translate into 
significant industrial or political protest largely because of the intervention of 
countervailing processes which nullified the potential for collective action. 
It has been argued in this thesis that industrial change was a force for division amongst the 
`rank-and-file not for unity. For example, colliery closures and the outcomes which 
resulted undermined the cohesion of the `rank-and-file' because grievances, as typically 
articulated, were specific to place and time. The NUMLA leadership skilfully exploited 
this? Similarly, industrial change was marked by the way in which the leadership exploited 
the divergent experiences of mineworkers by attaining beneficial outcomes for the 
minority who remained at successful modernised collieries in contrast to those at 
threatened collieries or forced to the leave the industry. Clearly, Joe Gormley will be 
remembered for his selective attention to the needs of his members in this way. Gormley 
thus became adept at appropriating the opportunities which accrued from industrial change. 
Occasions for the development of collection action became even more limited after 1965 
under the ACP as the `new realities' facing coal tended to accentuate divisions within the 
`rank-and-file'. It translated into a `fight' for coal's survival which pre-occupied all those 
connected with the industry in Lancashire. Furthermore, loyalty to Labour and the 
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NUMLA leadership's need to proclaim its loyalty to a Labour Government worked against 
the articulation of significant criticism. 
However, as the analysis of the experience of industrial change has shown, the process in 
the Lancashire coalfield did have a considerable impact in the way it influenced the 
growing mood of industrial militancy during the late 1960s. It also brought about a degree 
of political change. Events in the Lancashire coalfield during 1967-68 were the most 
significant during the progress of industrial change. They reflected rising tensions in the 
industry. Indeed, Lord Robens used dramatic language to characterise the atmosphere of 
the time describing this as an "unnerving experience" and of having "walked a dangerous 
path" such was the anger over further coal contraction. 3 It was certainly the return of 
Labour to government and its fuel and further coal contraction policy which were the 
catalysts for this climate of hostility. However, in Lancashire it was the specific character 
of industrial change which was influential in producing such a profound reaction amongst 
the `rank-and-file'. Again, it was the manner of contraction which did most to produce 
anger. This was seen through the circumstances accompanying the closure of specific 
`high-profile' collieries, premature closures and the rapid collapse in the absorption 
possibilities for `displaced' mineworkers in Lancashire. However, it was the belated 
experience of contraction in the North East Lancashire and St. Helens districts of the 
coalfield which witnessed the strongest reaction against industrial change. Later, reaction 
to industrial change was evident in a more general shift of sentiment in the coalfield in 
support of militant industrial action based on an retrospective assessment of the experience 
of the process combined with the prospect of the return of more settled conditions for the 
industry. Similarly, the events of the late 1960s saw divisions occurring for the first time in 
the consensus on industrial change among leading NUMLA officials raising the spectre of 
factionalism. Furthermore, the experience fostered a growing critique of the Labour Party 
in the coalfield from the 1960s over its stewardship of public ownership in coal and its 
attitude towards industrial change. This presaged a new decade in which NUMLA-Labour 
Party hegemony came under greater critical gaze. Industrial change thus left indelible 
marks on the industrial and political life of the coalfield. 
The changes also produced a legacy for the coalfield through the consequential economic 
and social enervation. Longstanding and entrenched government and official 
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misconceptions about the Lancashire coalfield gratuitously contributed to this outcome. 
However, again, it was attitudes and sentiments toward modernity which were significant 
in producing negative consequences. One important sentiment was how the NUMLA and 
the Labour in the coalfield sought to interpret industrial change. The overriding 
commitment of both to modernisation of coal obviated their full engagement with the 
urgent need to tackle a rapidly deteriorating situation. Another was Labour's position on 
industrial diversification also supported by the NUMLA. It could be plausibly argued that 
although putting into practice notions of modernity through industrial diversification was 
inadequate and poorly conceived it was nevertheless genuinely held. But, during the 1960s 
this gave way to a fashioning of the modernisation agenda to meet Labour's political 
objectives. In the same way, policies on coalfield rejuvenation and urban planning came to 
be seen by Labour's detractors as attempts to camouflage policy failures because of an 
absence of tangible progress in bringing new investment to meet contraction in coal. 
Certainly in the way in which modernity came to be practised criticism of Labour was 
justified because for all its rhetoric of modernity the desire for new and relevant economic 
and social opportunities in the coalfield remained unfulfilled. 
As a concept modernity had a long pedigree amongst all shades of the British left as a 
elixir of working class misery brought about by the industrial dispensation. Industrial 
change in coal was a process which held the genuine and longstanding commitment of both 
the Labour Party and organised labour in the industry. In fact, industrial change in coal was 
distinctive for the way in which it actively engaged coal industry trade unions. In as much 
as it transformed the coal industry into an efficient and modern industry it was a great 
success. Yet, it did so much harm to a majority of union members. For the Labour Party it 
proclaimed a better tomorrow but instead brought the seeds of economic and social 
impoverishment. The durability of the notion of modernity was accompanied by a 
consistent and fundamental incongruity between the vision, its implications and deleterious 
outcomes which resulted. That remained the central dilemma for the left. Modernity was 
intended to re-create but in the final analysis it gave birth to so many orphans. 
1 NUM, Annual Conference Report, 1969: Address by Lord Robens 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX ONE: BIOGRAPHICAL 
TAMES ANDERTON OBE 
Born in 1904 at Platt Bridge near Wigan Lancashire. Came from a mining family. Studied 
mining engineering at Wigan Mining and Technical College. Joined Pearson Knowles Coal 
Company which became part of Wigan Coal Corporation after statutory re-organisation in 
1930. Assistant manager, then manager at Maypole colliery. Later became manager of 
Mains colliery and Ince Moss colliery becoming agent-manager of Clock Face colliery, 
St. Helens, in 1942. At nationalisation in 1947 became assistant agent, then agent, for a 
group of collieries in the St. Helens district. Became Production Manager then Area 
General Manager for St. Helens district in 1952. Celebrated inventor of the Anderton 
Shearer-Loader, a coal-getting and loading machine in 1952; the most important 
technological development in post-war coal mining. Joined the NCB Scottish Division as 
manager-agent with special responsibility for colliery production. Appointed deputy 
chairman of the Scottish Division in 1958. Returned to Lancashire in 1961 to take over as 
divisional chairman following the retirement of Colonel Bolton, a post he held until 
retirement in 1967. One of Britain's leading mining technologists. Holder of the highest 
order in mining engineering - The medal of the Institute of Mining Engineers - only one of 
23 ever struck and one of only four living holders during the 1960s. New NCBNWD 
headquarters at Lowton, near Warrington, named in his honour. 
Sources: Colliery Guardian 20 October 1960,6 January 1967,10 February 1967,3 March 
1967,5 May 1967. Manchester Guardian 5 February 1963. St. Helens and 
District Reporter 22 August 1964. Wigan Evening Post 31 March 1988. Jackson, 
M. P., The Price of Coal, 1974, Croom Helm Ltd, p. 74. 
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COLONEL G. G. H. BOLTON MBE CBE MC 
Born in 1896 at Burnley, Lancashire. Scion of the North-East Lancashire coal owning 
family of George Hargreaves. Joined the family business in 1912. Studied mining 
engineering at Wigan Mining and Technical College. During the First World War was a 
2°a Lieutenant in the East Lancashire Regiment. Decorated with the Military Cross in 1916. 
Later regimental adjutant and colonel at the age of 25. Pursued a military career after the 
end of the war as commander of territorial units 1920-1928. Returned to the family 
business in 1928 as its managing director. Oversaw compulsory re-organisation and merger 
of the company in 1932 to form the largest mining operation in North-East Lancashire - 
George Hargreaves and Co Ltd. In 1935 became an executive officer with Lancashire 
Associated Collieries Ltd. At nationalisation in 1947 became NCBNWD marketing 
director and in 1949 deputy chairman. Became divisional chairman in 1951, a post he held 
until retirement in 1961. Held various high offices in Lancashire including Deputy 
Lieutenant. Involved with the scout movement and Knights of St. John. MBE in 1945 and 
CBE in 1960. 
Sources: Colliery Guardian 20 October 1960. Wigan Examiner 6 January 1960,18 
June 1960. 
JAMES. `JIMMY', DOWD 
Born 21 September 1921 at Wigan, Lancashire into a mining family. Discouraged by 
family from going into the coal industry. Unable to find work after leaving school at 14. 
Spent most of the 1930s on the dole including spells on direct work schemes. Eventually 
obtained a job in a shop then later in a cotton mill. Father was a miner, trade unionist and 
ILP member who encouraged him to join the ILP and despise the Labour Party. Served in 
the army during the Second World War where he came under the influence of Marxists 
who had fought in the Spanish Civil War. Joined the CPGB in 1943. After demobilisation 
returned to his job in the mill. Due to marriage and having a large family saw mining as a 
more lucrative job. Started in the coal industry at Bickershaw colliery in 1951 where he 
eventually found work on the `face'. Became involved with the union at Bickershaw where 
he unsuccessfully contested the post of branch secretary in an attempt to remove a 
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leadership he believed was "too close to management". At one point sacked then reinstated 
over an issue of job demarcation. Moved to Bold colliery in 1955 as he saw better 
prospects in the St. Helens district of the coalfield. Continued to live in Wigan and travel to 
work at Bold where he took an interest in trade union affairs becoming a member of the 
union branch committee. Led a number of successful disputes against management during 
the late 1950s. Opposed Gormley at Bold. Achieved some prominence during the 1960-61 
ballot-rigging affair as a staunch supporter of Jim Hammond against Joe Gormley. 
Involved in confrontations with Gormley supporters. An interview with the Daily Express 
in 1961, in which he denounced Gormley as corrupt, nearly resulted in his expulsion from 
the NUMLA. Continuing activism with the CPGB included support for Mick Weaver at 
by-elections and general elections in Wigan. An increasingly influential figure on the left 
of the NUMLA throughout the 1960s. Elected branch secretary at Bold in 1963. By the late 
1960s and early 1970s recognised as the leading figure on the left within the NUMLA able 
to enjoy widespread support at union branches in the St. Helens and Wigan districts. 
Associated with the Miners' Forum during the late 1960s -a left wing caucus designed to 
increase democracy within the NUM and make it more accountable to members. The 
Forum was opposed by the NUM leadership. Consolidated his power base in the St. Helens 
and Wigan districts through his chairmanship of Wigan Trades Council with CPGB 
support. Constantly at loggerheads with the NUMNWA leadership. Mobilised support for 
Mick McGahey against Gormley in the 1972 campaign for the NUM presidency. Chairman 
of the strike liaison committee in Lancashire 1972 in which he was involved in leading 
mass picketing and demonstrations. Advocate of direct action against the Conservative 
Government. Delegate to the Lancashire Federation of Trade Councils. 
Sources: NUMNWA Week-End Conference Report 7- 8 December 1963. 
NUMNWA, Special Conference Report, 22 October 1969. Evening Post and 
Chronicle 22 February 1970,3 March 1970,9 April 1970,16 November 1971. Wig a 
Examiner 6 June 1958. Wigan Observer 30 May 1969,10 April 1970. Brown, D, 
`The Labour Movement in Wigan', 1969, pp. 171,181,189. Taped Interview with 
Jimmy Dowd, Reference C/14/85, St. Helens Oral History Collection, St. Helens 
Metropolitan Archives and Local Studies, Gamble Institute, Victoria Square, St. Helens. 
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EARNEST ALAN FITCH 
Born 10 March 1915 in South Wales. Son of a Methodist minister. Spent early childhood 
moving from parish to parish with his father. At 11 sent to Kingswood School, Bath, for 
the sons of Methodist ministers. In 1932 returned to live with his family, then resident in 
Rochdale, Lancashire. An interest in politics at school led to early political activity in local 
Labour Party politics. A youthful first secretary of Wardle Labour Party in 1935 then vice- 
chairman of the former Royton constituency Labour Party from 1936. Encountered 
difficulty finding work but eventually found a job as a shipping clerk with the Manchester 
Shipping Company. Increasing involvement in local politics led to his sacking by the 
Managing Director of Manchester Shipping. Spent some years on the dole. Unsuccessfully 
contested local council seats at Wardle in 1936 and Rochdale central in 1938. During the 
Second World War left Rochdale for work in the Lancashire coalfield. Worked 
underground at Golborne colliery and later Astley Green colliery. Continued as a Labour 
Party activist. Also became a NUMLA official with a seat on the union executive 
representing Atherton and Tyldesley panel of branches. Member of Leigh Co-operative 
Society. Member of Newton Labour Party. Secretary of Culcheth Trades and Labour 
Council. Nominated as NUMLA-sponsored candidate for Wigan at the 1958 by-election 
which he won with a large majority. Subsequently held the seat for Labour at the 1959, 
1964,1966 and 1970 general elections with handsome majorities. A Labour Party 
moderate from the right and a `revisionist'. Strong multilateralist in the disarmament 
debate. One of 45 signatories to the Campaign for Democratic Socialism in 1961. Keenly 
pro-Common Market. A Gaitskellite who was said to have been highly regarded by Hugh 
Gaitskell. Widely tipped for a post in a future Labour government headed by Gaitskell. 
Hopes of high political office effectively ended with the death of Gaitskell. Did not feature 
in Harold Wilson's plans but still seen as a trusted party loyalist. Given the post of 
assistant Labour whip (1964-1966) and junior minister as Lord Commissioner of the 
Treasury (1966-1969). Vice-Chamberlain HM Household (1969-1970). An opposition 
whip (1970-197 1) but resigned over Labour's position on the Common Market. Member of 
the Speaker's Panel of Chairmen (1971-1978). A senior Labour MP at Westminster and in 
the North-West chairing the Mining Parliamentary Group of Labour MPs and executive 
member and later chairman of the Lancashire and Cheshire Regional Council of Labour 
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(later styled the North West Regional Council of Labour). Served on the Select Committee 
on the Nationalised Industries for all five sessions (1959-1964). Also served on three other 
parliamentary committees: Children and Young Persons Bill; Criminal Justice Bill; 
Libraries and Museums Bill. Chairman of the SELDA. Member of the Fabian Society. 
Continued association with the Methodist Church. Friend and associate of Jack and Bessie 
Braddock. 
Sources: NUMLA, ECM, 15 July 1963,16 November 1963. Evenin2 Post and 
Chronicle 14 August 1963,5 October 1964,9 April 1970,13 May 1983. Rochdale 
Observer 30 May 1959. Wigan Observer 16 May 1958,16 August 1985. The Times: 
House of Commons. 1959, The Times, p. 107. Braddock, J and B, The Braddocks, 1963, 
McDonald. Who Was Who 1981-1990,1991, A and C Black. Haseler, S, The 
Gaitskellites: Revisionism in the British Labour Party 1951-1964,1983, Macmillan and 
Co, pp. 216-217,228-229. Howell, D, British Social Democracy: A Study in Decay 
and Development, 1980, Croom Helm Ltd, pp. 234-235. Pimlott, B, Harold Wilson. 
Harper Collins, 1992, p. 262. Muller, W. D. The `Kept Men'? The First Century of 
Trade Union Representation in the British House of Commons, 1977, Harvester Press Ltd, 
Sussex, p. 111. 
JOSEPH 'JOE' GORMLEY BARON OBE 
Born 5 July 1917 at Ashton - in- Makerfield, Lancashire, into a mining family. Entered the 
coal industry aged 14 in 1932 at Wood colliery, Haydock. Later moved to Stones colliery, 
Garswood (a village between St. Helens and Wigan) and then to Old Boston colliery, 
Haydock in 1938. In 1946 moved to Lyme colliery, Haydock. Worked in various grades in 
the collieries and involved with the union at branch level. Completed mining qualifications 
on a part-time basis during the early 1950s becoming a qualified deputy. Considered 
emigration to Australia but left Lancashire in 1953 to work at Glebe colliery, Fenton, in the 
North Staffordshire coalfield as a deputy. Also served on the union branch committee. 
Returned to Lancashire in 1954 to work at Bold colliery, St. Helens where in 1956 he was 
elected to represent the colliery on the NUMLA executive. Thereafter, made rapid progress 
within the NUM being elected to the NUMNEC in 1957 and to the post of NUMLA 
General Secretary in 1961 after a bitterly fought contest with Jim Hammond. Briefly held 
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the presidency of Bold colliery branch in 1960-61. Took an early interest in Labour politics 
through the local Labour Clubs. Became chairman of Ashton-in-Makerfield Labour Party 
and Secretary of Ashton Central Labour Club. Elected as a ward Labour councillor in 
Ashton-in-Makerfield in 1951 and again in 1954, serving until 1961, including leadership 
of the council Labour group. Also served as a Justice of the Peace. Unsuccessfully 
contested the Labour Party candidature for the Burnley constituency to fight the 1959 by- 
election. Elected to the Labour Party NEC in 1963 serving until 1973. Member and former 
chairman of the International and Organisation Committees of the Labour Party. 
Unsuccessfully contested the post of NUM General Secretary in 1968. Elected NUM 
president in 1971. Awarded OBE in 1969. Created Baron Gormley of Ashton-in- 
Makerfield in 1982. 
Sources: NUMLA, Special Conference Report, 1 September 1959. NUMLA, ACM, 
15 October 1960,10 November 1960,12 November 1960. NUMLA, ECM, 22 
September 1960,22 October 1960,10 November 1960. Bolton Evening News 24 
October 1960,28 October 1960,12 November 1960. Burnley Express 16 September 
1959,19 September 1959,23 September 1959. Gormley, J, Battered Cherub: The 
Autobiography of Joe Gormley, 1982, Hamish Hamilton, passim. The Annual 
Obituary 1992,1993, St. James Press, Detroit, pp. 398-402. Who Was Who 1991-95, 
1996, A and C Black. Files on Individuals: Joe Gormley, Press Cuttings, National 
Museum of Labour History Archive, Manchester. 
EDWIN. `TEDDY'. HALL 
Born at Hindley Green, Lancashire, in 1895 into a mining family. Youngest of eight 
children. Father died while still a child. In 1908, aged 13, went to work as a surface 
haulage lad then later underground at Abram Coal Company. Worked in every grade in a 
number of collieries. In 1921, aged 26, became secretary of Leigh Trades and Labour 
Council. In 1932 appointed checkweighman and in 1935 branch secretary at Bedford 
colliery. Appointed to the joint (with Lancashire coal owners) Lancashire District Wages 
Board. Became a LCMF delegate to the MFGB. In 1942 elected full-time miners' agent for 
St. Helens and in the same year vice-president of the LCMF. Became the youngest 
president of the LCMF in 1944. Emerged as a leading figure on the right opposed to the 
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growing influence of Communism within the LCMF. In 1945 elected to post of NUMLA 
General Secretary as Peter Pemberton's successor. In 1947 nominated to serve on the 
NUMNEC. Elected to NUM Business Committee in 1948. His vigour, strong personality 
and diminutive size earned him the sobriquet "the pocket dynamo". His authoritarian style 
brought fear and respect from many but loathing from others. Sought a strategy of co- 
operation and partnership with the NCBNWD under public ownership. First Lancashire 
miner to hold a seat on the TUC General Council 1957-1960. Active involvement with 
disabled miners. Provided an extension of the Lancashire miners' convalescent home at 
Blackpool to include bungalows to cater for paraplegic miners and a new paraplegic centre 
at Platt Bridge near Wigan. Later career dogged by ill health. Retired in September 1960 
but worked on a part-time basis on disablement and welfare issues. One of his retirement 
gifts was a Bermuda cruise paid for by the NUMLA from which he was recalled to answer 
and arbitrate in the ballot-rigging affair of 1960-61. Attended the NUMLA annual 
conference in Blackpool in May 1961 but taken ill during the conference and died 7 July 
1961. Member of Social Insurance Committee of the TUC. Worked with the International 
Labour Organisation 1954-1960. Member of the Railway Staff National Tribunal (The 
Guillebaud Committee), the Cotton Council and Mining Qualifications Board. Strong 
connections with the Labour Party. Contemporary and associate of Tom Brown, miner, 
LCMF official and Labour MP for Ince 1942-1964. 
Sources: NUM Annual Conference Reports 1947,1948,1957. NUMLA, ACM, 17 
September 1960,15 July 1961. LCMF Monthly Conference Report 11 May 1935. 
Coal News: North Western Edition and Pit Prop August 1961. The Times 10 July 
1961. Bolton Journal and Guardian 14 January 1944. Bolton Evening News 8 
July 1961. Manchester Guardian 19 September 1960. Howell, D, The Politics 
of the NUM: A Lancashire View, 1989, Manchester University Press, Manchester, pp. 10- 
11. 
JAMES. `. TIM'. HAMMOND 
Born 7 August 1907 at Wigan, Lancashire. Went to work in coal mining at 14 years of age 
at Victoria colliery, Standish near Wigan. Sacked and `blacklisted' by Wigan Coal 
Corporation in 1933 because of industrial and political activism. Worked briefly in a 
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factory where he was again dismissed for activism. After a spell on the dole travelled 
widely abroad as an itinerant worker. Lived for a time in the Soviet Union. Returned to 
Lancashire on the outbreak of war. Taken on again in coal mining during the Second 
World War working underground at Garswood Hall colliery. Quickly became involved 
again with industrial and political activity. Earned a reputation as a formidable and 
respected negotiator through the LCMF branch production committee. Joined the CPGB in 
1942. In the same year he was elected full-time miners' agent for Wigan registering a vote 
twice as high as either of his rivals on the right: Edwin Hall and Laurence Plover. Held the 
vice-presidency of the NUMLA in 1944. In 1945 unsuccessfully contested the post of 
General Secretary of the NUMLA following the retirement of Peter Pemberton losing to 
Edwin Hall. Held the NUMLA presidency for two years between 1946 and 1948 and again 
in 1952-53. NUMNEC member 1945-1947. Emerged as the key figure in the NUMLA after 
the General Secretary during the late 1940s and 1950s. Standard-bearer for the left in the 
NUMLA. Instrumental in settling a serious and protracted dispute in the early years of 
public ownership in the Lancashire coalfield over concessionary coal. Representative of 
NUMNEC mission to the Dutch Trade Union Congress. Visited Dutch state mines to 
obtain information and ideas on colliery modernisation, working conditions and practices. 
Rising prominence in the NUMLA matched by his growing influence in the CPGB both 
nationally and within the North West. A major influence, together with his wife Phyllis, in 
re-organising the CPGB in Lancashire during the late 1940s and early 1950s during a 
relatively fruitful period for the party in the North West. Unexpectedly left the CPGB in 
1954 (disputed) and thereafter worked for the return of a Labour government although 
maintaining left wing principles. NUMLA nomination for NUM national presidency in 
1959 which he unsuccessfully contested coming a poor seventh, being knocked out in the 
first round of voting. Again, in 1960 he unsuccessfully contested the post of General 
Secretary against Joe Gormley. Continued to play a leading role in NUMLA affairs during 
the 1960s as the senior full-time miners' agent through ad hoc responsibilities and special 
assignments. Retired in September 1967 having held the NUMLA presidency from 1962 
until 1966. Interested in `working class' education. Gave his name to a university 
scholarship offered to the best A Level student in the Wigan local authority area from a 
deep mining family. 
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Sources: CPGB, Lancashire and Cheshire News: Bulletin of the Lancashire Division of 
the CPGB, 5 September 1942,10 October 1942,26 December 1942, Call No 
CP/LOC/NW/3/3: 1942. The Bulletin (incorporating Lancashire and Cheshire News), 8 
March 1952,27 September 1952, Call No CP/LOC/NW/3/13: 1952, National Museum of 
Labour History, Manchester. NUM Annual Conference Report, 1947. NUMNEC 
Minutes 13 April 1959,1 July 1960. NUMLA, Special Conference Reports 7 
February 1952,29 October 1960. NUMLA, ACM, 15 October 1960,10 November 
1960,12 November 1960. NUMLA, ECM, 22 September 1952,22 September 1960, 
22 October 1960,10 November 1960. NUMNWA, ACM, 16 September 1967. 
LCMF, ECM, 11 April 1942,25 April 1942. Bolton Evening News 24 October 1960, 
28 October 1960,12 November 1960. Liverpool Echo 9 August 1967. Wigan 
Examiner 11 December 1959. Wigan Observer 4 April 1980,17 April 1986. 
MICHAEL THOMAS FRANCIS McGUIRE 
Born in Ireland 3 May 1926 but emigrated with parents to Lancashire when only four 
months old. Brought up in Eccleston Park between St. Helens and Prescot. Went to work 
underground age 14. Worked through the grades to become `face' worker. Rose to 
prominence in the NUMLA through the branch committee at Sutton Manor colliery. Also 
rising prominence within St. Helens Labour Party and Trades Council having joined the 
Labour Party in 1951. Supported Labour candidates at general and municipal elections. 
Gained a reputation within the NUMLA for his robustness on pit level and industrial issues 
but associated with the right of the Labour Party where he obtained the support of the party 
`machine' in St. Helens. Strong opponent of unilateralists within NUMLA on the 
disarmament issue. Full-time NUMLA branch secretary at Sutton Manor 1957-1964. 
NUMLA Executive Committee member for Sutton Manor colliery. Nominated by the 
NUMLA to fight the Ince seat at the 1964 general election on the retirement of Tom 
Brown. Held the seat for Labour at the 1964,1966 and 1970 general elections. Prominent 
pro-Common Market MP. During early 1970s became Labour vice-chairman of the Inter- 
Parliamentary Union British Group and member of the Council of Europe. 
Sources: NUMNEC Minutes, 17 September 1964: General Election. NUMLA, Annual 
Conference Report, 1959. NUMLA, ACM, 21 March 1959,18 July 1959. 
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NUMLA, ECM, 18 July 1960. Evening Post and Chronicle 1 June 1983,3 February 
1984. Wigan Evening Post 14 June 1985,17 June 1985. Wigan Observer 27 
March 1987. Who's Who 1970,1970, A and C Black Ltd. Who's Who 2001, 
2001, A and C Black Ltd. 
MICK WEAVER 
Born in County Mayo, Ireland, in 1918. Family emigrated to England and settled in 
Bolton, Lancashire. Went to work in the Lancashire coalfield at Mosley Common colliery 
eventually securing a job as a chargeman. Joined CPGB in 1942 becoming a member of 
the party's Lancashire and Cheshire Division Executive Committee and NEC in 1959. 
Member of CPGB Mining Advisory Committee. Unsuccessfully contested the Wigan 
parliamentary seat for the CPGB at the 1958 by-election and 1959,1964 and 1966 general 
elections. NUMLA branch secretary at Mosley Common then joint secretary of Mosley 
Common and Boothstown branch from 1961. A NUMLA executive committee member 
representing the Boothstown and Mosley Common panel of branches. Delegate to the 
Farnworth and Walkden Trades Council. Unsuccessfully contested the vice-presidency of 
the NUMLA in 1960 and the post of full-time miners' agent in 1965. Involved in 
unsuccessful attempts to save Mosley Common colliery from closure. Left the coal 
industry in 1968 following closure and employed as a bus driver. 
Sources: The Times: House of Commons. 1959, The Times. Mick Weaver: 
Nomination for National School, CPGB, 1950, Uncatalogued Papers, National Museum of 
Labour History, Manchester. Evening Post and Chronicle 5 October 1964,25 
March 1966. Leigh Journal 18 February 1965. Wigan Examiner 9 October 1959. 
Wigan Observer 3 June 1958. CPGB Prospographical Database (under development), 
Gidon Cohen, Research Assistant, Department of Government, Manchester University. 
Conversations with Mr. W. Kelly, current NUMLA General Secretary. 
SYDNEY GEORGE. `SID'. VINCENT 
Born 11 May 1921 at Leigh, Lancashire. Went to work underground aged 14 as a haulage 
lad for Manchester Collieries Ltd at its Astley Green colliery. Rather unusually for a 
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Lancashire miner spent all his working life at the same colliery. Raised in a devout Roman 
Catholic household. Lived in Leigh until he was married when he moved to Tyldesley. 
Began his union career at Astley Green colliery in 1952 as a part-time, then later, full-time 
branch official. From 1957 he represented the Atherton and Tyldesley panel on the 
Executive Committee of the NUMLA. Seen as rising figure in the NUMLA throughout the 
1960s taking an increasingly prominent role in union affairs. Represented the NUMLA on 
the Conciliation Board and Disputes and Concessionary Coal Committees. In 1964 
unsuccessfully contested the presidency of the NUMLA and the post of full-time miners' 
agent. A year later he was successfully elected full-time miners' agent. Close associate of 
Joe Gormley who groomed him as is successor. Widely seen as a Gormley protege. 
Gormley's campaign manager in 1968 for his unsuccessful bid for the post of NUM 
General Secretary and again in 1971 for his successful bid for the NUM presidency. 
President of the NUMNWA 1968-1971. Elected as Joe Gormley's successor to the post of 
NUMLA General Secretary in September 1971 defeating Bernard Donaghy after three 
months as acting General Secretary following Gormley's successful accession to the NUM 
presidency. 
Sources: NUMNWA, Annual Conference Reports, 1970,1971,1972. NUMNWA, 
ACM, 18 September 1971. Coal News: North Western Edition October 1971. 
Guardian 15 February 1992. Leigh Reporter 18 February 1965. Leigh Journ al6 
February 1992. Taped Interview with Sid Vincent, University of Wales Swansea, 
Library and Information Services, South Wales Miners' Library, Tape I. D. No AUD/148. 
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APPENDIX TWO: NEW COLLIERIES, MAJOR 
COLLIERY RE-CONSTRUCTIONS AND COLLIERY CLOSURES 
IN THE LANCASHIRE COALFIELD, 1945-1972. 
New Collieries (2 in total) 
COLLIERY LOCATION DISTRICT 
Agecroft Pendlebury Manchester 
Parkide Newton-le-Willows St. Helens 
Major Re-construction Schemes (13 in total) 
COLLIERY LOCATION DISTRICT 
Astley Green Tyldesley Manchester 
Bank Hall Burnley North East Lancashire 
Bickershaw* Abram Wigan 
Bold St. Helens St. Helens 
Clock Face St. Helens St. Helens 
Cronton Whiston St. Helens 
Golborne Golborne St. Helens 
Ha ton Valley Padiham North East Lancashire 
Mosley Common Boothstown Manchester 
Parsonage* Leigh Wigan 
Sutton Manor St. Helens St. Helens 
" Thorney Bank Accrington North East Lancashire 
Bradford East Manchester Manchester 
*Bickershaw and Parsonage were developed as one joint re-construction project. 
" Thorney Bank was a new drift development 
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Colliery Closures between vesting date and the 1958 `Special Colliery Review' / 1959 
Revised Plan for Coal, 1947-1958 in the Lancashire coalfield (NCB operated collieries 
only and excluding licensed collieries) (17 in total) 
COLLIERY LOCATION DISTRICT WORKFORCE AT MONTH 
CLOSURE AND YEAR 
OF 
CLOSURE 
Emelay Bacup North East 5 Oct 1947 
Lancashire 
Moorheld Accrington North East 326 Jan 1949 
Lancashire 
Townley Burnley North East Not Known March 1948 
Demesne* Lancashire 
Lad shore Farnworth Manchester 236 June 1949 
Moston Moston, Manchester 658 June 1950 
Manchester 
" Old Boston Haydock Wigan 746 June 1952 
Nabb Bacup North East 27 March 1954 
Lancashire 
John Standish Wigan 374 April 1954 
Clifton Burnley North East 219 Dec 1955 
Lancashire 
Long Lane Ashton-in- Wigan 539 April 1955 
Makerfield 
Wood ark Oldham Manchester 385 March 1955 
Gin Tyldesley Manchester 502 Set 1955 
Alexandra Wigan Wigan 189 June 1955 
Oak Oldham Manchester 384 July 1956 
Victoria Standish Wigan 434 June 1958 
Calder Padiham North East 166 July 1958 
Lancashire 
Garswood Hall Ashton-in- Wigan 910 August 1958 
Makerfield 
The majority of closures detailed during this period resulted from `exhaustion' 
according to the Coal Board's definition. 
*Townley Demesne was later re-developed as part of Salterford 
" Old Boston was closed on safety grounds following an underground fire 
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Collieries closed between 1959 and 1965 as scheduled under the 1959 Revised Plan for 
Coal (24 in total) 
COLLIERY LOCATION DISTRICT WORKFORCE 
AT CLOSURE 
MONTH 
AND YEAR 
OF 
CLOSURE 
Maypole* Abram Wigan 1,337 March 1959 
Howe Bridge Atherton Wigan 357 Set 1959 
Wood End Burnley North East 
Lancashire 
80 April 1959 
Ashton Moss Ashton-under- 
Lyne 
Manchester 503 Sept 1959 
" Salterford Burnley North East 
Lancashire 
226 Dec 1959 
Welch Whittle Chorley Wigan 485 Dec 1959 
Deane Bolton Manchester 134 Oct 1960 
Fence Brierfield North East 
Lancashire 
85 July 1960 
Landgate Ashton-in- 
Makerfield 
Wigan 250 Sept 1960 
Park Ashton-in- 
Makerfield 
Wigan 750 June 1960 
Reedley Burnley North East 
Lancashire 
245 May 1960 
Giants Hall Standish Wigan 445 Jan 1961 
Hoddlesden Darwen North East 
Lancashire 
99 Sept 1961 
Standish Hall Standish Wigan 402 July 1961 
Wheatsheaf Pendlebury Manchester 505 June 1961 
Newtown Pendlebury Manchester 476 March 1961 
Ince Moss Ince-in- 
Makerfield 
Wigan 503 Nov 1962 
Scaitcliffe Accrington North East 
Lancashire 
64 June 1962 
Wigan 
Junction 
Abram Wigan 302 May 1962 
Grime Bridge Waterford North East 
Lancashire 
63 Nov 1963 
Brackley Little Hulton Manchester 715 May 1964 
Lyme Ha dock Wigan 482 March 1964 
Lea Green St. Helens St. Helens 632 Aug 1964 
Copy Burnley North East 
Lancashire 
157 March 1964 
Nook Idesle Manchester 1,091 Aug 1965 
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* Maypole was a closure under the 1958 `Special Colliery Review' but included in the 
1959 Revised Plan for Coal. 
" Salterford was a new drift development which was closed in a two-stage 
abandonment of its two pits with the first closed in 1956 with the loss of 205 jobs. 
The second pit closed in December 1959 as noted above. The colliery incorporated 
the workings of Townley Demesne closed in March 1948. 
Collieries closed under the `Review of the Revised Plan' 1961-1963 (5 in total) 
COLLIERY LOCATION DISTRICT WORKFORCE 
AT CLOSURE 
MONTH 
AND YEAR 
OF 
CLOSURE 
Dairy As pull Wigan 363 Set 1962 
Sandhole Walkden Manchester 1 043 Set 1962 
Gibfield Atherton Manchester 654 Aug 1963 
Robin Hill Standish Wigan 430 Nov 1963 
Cleworth Hall Tyldesley Manchester 535 Jan 1963 
Other Colliery Closures during the 1959-1965 period (1 in total) 
COLLIERY LOCATION DISTRICT WORKFORCE MONTH 
AT CLOSURE AND YEAR 
OF 
CLOSURE 
Mains Abram Wigan 581 June 1960 
Collieries scheduled for closure under the 1959 Revised Plan but reprieved until 
closure under the ACP (4 in total). 
COLLIERY LOCATION DISTRICT WORKFORCEAT MONTH 
CLOSURE AND YEAR 
OF 
CLOSURE 
Fir Trees Padiham North East 42 March 1966 
Lancashire 
Bedford Leigh Wigan 436 Oct 1967 
Ravenhead St. Helens St. Helens 506 Oct 1968 
Old Meadows Bacup North East 49 -March 1969 
Lancashire 
Fir Trees was closed as a Phase one ACP closure while Ravenhead and Old Meadows 
were closed under Phase two. Bedford was originally a Phase two closure but brought 
forward to Phase one. 
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Collieries closed as scheduled under the ACP announcement November 1965 (9 in 
total) 
COLLIERY LOCATION DISTRICT WORK- 
FORCE AT 
CLOSURE 
MONTH AND 
YEAR OF 
CLOSURE 
Ellerbeck* Chorley Wigan 269 Aug 1965 
Albert* Abram Wigan 436 Nov 1965 
Clock Face St. Helens St. Helens 638 March 1966 
Chanters Atherton Manchester 693 June 1966 
Chisnall Hall Chorley Wigan 617 March 1967 
Summersales Wigan Wigan 197 March 1966 
Hill Top Bacup North East 
Lancashire 
136 Jan 1966 
Dee la Bacup North East 212 April 1968 
Wood Ha dock St. Helens 505 June 1971 
* Ellerbeck was more accurately a closure under the `Review of the Revised Plan' 
1961-1963 which won a reprieve until August 1965. Similarly Albert colliery was 
closed in August 1965 but both were included as part of the ACP announcement in 
November 1965. 
With the exception of Deerplay and Wood all closures were scheduled for Phase one. 
Deerplay and Wood were Phase two closures although Deerplay was closed 
prematurely. 
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Collieries closed between 1965 and 1972 not scheduled for closure in the ACP 
announcement in November 1965 (6 in total) 
COLLIERY LOCATION DISTRICT WORKFORCE MONTH 
AT CLOSURE AND YEAR 
OF 
CLOSURE 
Bradford East Manchester 1,556 Sept 1968 
Manchester 
Huncoat Accrington North East 508 Feb 1968 
Lancashire 
Mosley Boothstown Manchester 2,781 Feb 1968 
Common 
Thorney Bank Accrington North East 387 July 1968 
Lancashire 
Astley Green Tyldesley Manchester 1,382 April 1970 
Bank Hall Burnley North East 722 March 1971 
Lancashire 
Collieries still in operation 1 January 1972 (9 in total) 
COLLIERY LOCATION DISTRICT 
Agecroft Pendlebury Manchester 
Parkside Newton-le-Willows St. Helens 
Bold St. Helens St. Helens 
Cronton Whiston St. Helens 
Golborne Golborne St. Helens 
Sutton Manor St. Helens St. Helens 
Bickershaw Leigh Wigan 
Parsons e Leigh Wigan 
Ha ton Valley Padiham North East Lancashire 
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Notes and Sources 
1. Notes 
(a) It should be noted that the figures shown for the workforce at collieries after 1959 are 
less than the post-war peak of their workforces. In many cases this is considerably less 
since the peak figure was often as high as 30 per cent above the workforce at closure. 
Final closure often followed a period of pit-level concentration or phased closure with 
transfers to receiving pits and workers leaving the industry altogether. 
(b) The NCBNWD areas underwent considerable change between 1945 and 1972 
consequently districts in which individual collieries were located often altered. 
Similarly, contiguous districts within the coalfield meant that many locations had 
collieries in one or more district. 
2. Sources 
PRO, File COAL 30/85: NCB: Closure of Collieries 1958 December-1960 August: 
General Purposes Committee: Colliery Closures: North Western Division. PRO, File 
POWE 37/544: Programme of Closures 1961: North Western Division. PRO, File 
No POWE 52/72: Lives of Individual Collieries: Accelerated Colliery Closures, Lord 
Roberts to Ministry of Power 27 August 1965. PRO, File POWE 52/73: Closure 
Programme Covering 1965/66,1966/67 and 1967/68: NCB to Ministry of Power 8 
February 1965: Notes on the North Western Colliery Closure Programme: Lancashire 
Coalfield for Ministry of Power: Brief prior to meeting 29 April 1966. LRO, Deposit 
No NC. acc. 7950 No 5: NCBHQ to NCBNWD 6 March 1959 re: National Plan Review 
1959 and reply NCBNWD to NCBHQ Colonel Bolton, NCBNWD Chairman to Sir James 
Bowman, NCB Chairman. LRO, No NC. acc. 7950 No 203: NCBNWD: Report: The 
Manpower Implications of Possible Closures of Certain Collieries 29 April 1962. 
LRO, No 223: 1963 Jan: National Plan: Sept 1962 Review. LRO, No NC. acc. 7950 
No 264: Area 3 (St. Helens) Area General Manager: 1958: Report on the results of the 
following collieries: Clock Face, Cronton, Garswood Hall, Lea Green. NCB Report 
and Accounts for 1959 Vol II: Accounts and Statistical Tables, Summary of Major Capital 
Schemes: 1959: North Western Division, HMSO. The Decline of the Cotton and 
Coal Mining Industries of Lancashire, Lancashire and Merseyside Development 
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Association (LAMIDA), April 1967, Manchester pp. 40-44: Tables 9-11. Iron and 
Coal Trades Review 28 July 1960: Article: Re-construction Projects in North East 
Lancashire. Lancashire Evening Post 14 March 1994: Death of the Lancashire 
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Lancashire Miner No 9, January 1986: Lancashire Coalfield. Guide to the 
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P, St. Helens Metropolitan Archives and Local Studies, Le Mans Crescent, Bolton Call No 
B. 622.33 Lan. 
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APPENDIX THREE: MAPS 
MAP A: GENERAL COALFIELD AREA MAP 
Legend: NEL - North East Lancashire Coalfield 
SL - South Lancashire Coalfield 
MAP B: MANCHESTER 
Legend: Collieries (in red) 
AG - Agecroft 
BR - Bradford 
NE - Newtown 
WH-Wheatsheaf 
Legend: Locations (in blue) 
MA - Manchester 
MO - Moston 
RO - Royton 
PE - Pendlebury 
SAL - Salford 
SW - Swinton 
Man C: CENTRAL AREAS OF THE SOUTH LANCASHIRE COALFIELD 
INCLUDING PARTS OF THE'WIGAN COALFIELD' 
Collieries (in red) 
AG - Astley Green 
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BE - Bedford 
BI - Bickershaw 
BRA - Brackley 
DE - Deane 
CH - Cleworth Hall 
GO - Golborne 
MA - Maypole 
MAI - Mains 
MC - Mosley Common 
PA - Parsonage 
SA - Sandhole 
Locations (in blue) 
AB - Abram 
AT - Atherton 
BO - Bolton 
BOO - Boothstown 
CU - Culcheth 
ELL - Ellenbrook 
FA - Farnworth 
GO - Golborne 
HI - Hindley 
HG - Hindley Green 
LE - Leigh 
LH - Little Hutton 
PL - Plank Lane 
PB - Platt Bridge 
TY - Tyldesley 
WA - Walkden 
WE -Westhoughton 
WO - Worsley 
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MAP D: ST. HELENS AND AREAS BORDERING THE `WIGAN COALFIELD' 
Collieries (in red) 
BOL - Bold 
CF - Clock Face 
CR - Cronton 
LG - Lea Green 
LY - Lyme 
OB - Old Boston 
PA - Parkside 
RA - Ravenhead 
SM - Sutton Manor 
STO - Stones 
WO - Wood 
Locations (in blue) 
EP - Eccleston Park 
HA - Halewood 
HAY - Haydock 
NW - Newton or Newton -Le-Willows 
PR - Prescot 
ST - St. Helens 
WA - Warrington 
MAP E: WIGAN AND PARTS OF THE 'WIGAN COALFIELD' 
Collieries (in red) 
CHA - Chisnall Hall 
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EL - Ellerbeck 
GH - Garswood Hall 
IM - Ince Moss 
VI - Victoria 
WW - Welch Whittle 
Locations (in blue) 
AM - Ashton - in - Makerfield 
CH - Chorley 
GA - Garswood 
IM - Ince - in - Makerfield 
KG - Kitt Green 
NH - Norley Hall 
SK - Skelmersdale 
ST - Standish 
WI - Wigan 
WM - Worsley Mesnes 
MAP F: NORTH EAST LANCASHIRE 
Collieries (in red) 
BH - Bank Hall 
DER - Deerplay 
FT - Fir Trees 
HY - Hapton Valley (at two points on the map) 
HI - Hill Top 
HU - Huncoat 
OM - Old Meadows 
RE - Reedley 
SALT - Salterford 
TB - Thorney Bank 
470 
Locations (in blue) 
AC - Accrington 
BU - Burnley 
FP - Forest of Pendle 
FR - Forest of Rossendale 
SI - Simonstone 
Notes and References: 
1. Notes 
(a) Collieries and locations detailed are only those quoted in the main text of the thesis and 
appendices. 
(b) Copying of these maps was undertaken on Friday 20 April 2001 under the supervision 
of Ken Harrison, map librarian, Lancaster University library in accordance with the 
library's copyright agreement. In particular, it should be noted that two different maps, 
as detailed above, were used for the two segments of the coalfield in respect of the 
Liverpool and Manchester maps. 
2. References 
Guide to the Coalfields, Colliery Guardian, 1968. 
Ordnance Survey Maps: 
Blackburn and Burnley, Fully revised 1958, Published 1961. 
Liverpool, June 1963 and September 1963, Fully Revised 1964. 
Liverpool, Fully Revised 1964,1966 and Re-issued 1968. 
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Manchester, Fully Revised 1958-59, Major Roads Revised 1964. 
Manchester, Fully Revised 1966, Major Roads Revised 1968. 
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TEXTUAL CONVENTIONS 
Coalfield Areas. Districts and Divisions - This thesis is concerned with the Lancashire 
coalfield which formed part of the North Western Division of the National Coal Board 
(NCBNWD) following nationalisation' of the coal industry in 1947. In 1967 after re- 
organisation of the National Coal Board, the NCBNWD ceased to exist and the Lancashire 
coalfield henceforth came under the control of the Northern Division of the National Coal 
Board with a sub-divisional management team responsible for the Lancashire coalfield 
styled as the National Coal Board Lancashire Area (NCBLA). 
Following nationalisation in 1947 the Lancashire coalfield was divided into four 
administrative/geographical areas each with its own management structure: No 1 
(Manchester), No 2 (Wigan), No 3 (St. Helens) and No 4 (Burnley) together with 
respective management teams responsible for sub-areas covering groups of collieries. In 
1961 the four Areas were re-organised into two: East and West Lancashire together with 
revised sub-areas. The Burnley Area was often more accurately known as the North East 
Lancashire Area (denoting the spatial extent of the exposed coalfield in the area) and is the 
style preferred in this thesis. 
The terms `Area' and `District' are used interchangeably throughout the thesis. However, 
in terms of the post-nationalisation administrative structure of the coalfield the term `Area' 
had a specific meaning as noted above whereas the term `district' has a less specific 
intention meaning simply `in the vicinity of. 
Colliery. Mine. Pits - Both the term `colliery' and `pit' are used interchangeably 
throughout the thesis. However, it should be noted that a `colliery' frequently consisted on 
a number of `pits' or shafts at each colliery site. In Lancashire the term `mine' does not 
mean a colliery or pit, it denotes a seam of coal or an underground district where coal was 
mined. 
Miner. Mineworker. Pitman - These terms are used interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
The term `pitman' is used because this was common parlance in the Lancashire coalfield. 
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Ministry of Fuel and Power - From 1959 this department was known as the Ministry of 
Power 
Names of Individuals - Informal names are used throughout for union officials as this was 
the norm in discourse between officials and mineworkers except when reported in printed 
minutes of conferences and meetings. 
National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) and the National Union of Mineworkers 
Lancashire Area (NUMLA) - The NUM in the Lancashire coalfield was known as the 
National Union of Mineworkers Lancashire Area (NUMLA) from its formation in 1944 
until September 1963. It superseded the Lancashire and Cheshire Miners' Federation 
(LCMF). From September 1963 the NUMLA adopted the style National Union of 
Mineworkers North Western Area (NUMNWA) although it remained colloquially known 
as the `Lancashire Area'. 
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GLOSSARY 
Black-Face Meeting - An underground meeting of union officials, miners and frequently 
management typically to discuss specific pit level or wider industrial or political issues. 
Chargeman -A leading miner or foreman in charge of a team of miners and responsible for 
a section of operations underground. 
Checkweighman - An official elected by miners charged with the task of checking the 
weight of coal produced by miners to ensure proper payment of piecework wages for the 
tonnage of coal produced. Because this job frequently involved negotiation with colliery 
owners and management the checkweighman came to wield considerable authority and 
power as did the Checkweigh and Pick Sharpening Societies at collieries. The 
checkweighman and checkweigh societies were thus closely associated with the 
development of trade unionism in coal. 
Concentration - 1. In a wider sense the process of transforming coal into a smaller more 
efficient industry with operations `concentrated' in new or re-constructed collieries 2. In a 
more specific sense a form of colliery level rationalisation in which the least productive 
and more costly working faces, seams or underground districts are abandoned in favour of 
`concentrating' resources (human, material and technical) on the potentially more 
productive underground operations. 
Deputy - An overseer in a colliery with particular responsibility for discipline and safety 
and the preparation and clearance of working sections before and after coal getting. 
Fillers - Underground mineworker, usually a younger miner engaged in filling tubs of coal 
at the face. 
Green Labour - School leavers or adults without previous coalmining experience recruited 
into the industry. 
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Haulage Lad -A pit lad responsible for the movement of tubs of coal away from the `face' 
underground or on the surface 
National Power Loading Agreement (NPLA), 1966 - An agreement signed within the coal 
industry which introduced wages re-structuring. Seen as one of the most significant 
milestones in the history of the industry because it ended centuries of traditional piecework 
payments for hundreds of grades of mineworkers replacing it with "re-categorised grades 
based on skills and responsibilities". 1 
Panel - 1. A section or `panel' of coal underground. 2. A group of union branches. in a 
specific geographical area or a branch representing a large colliery with a representative on 
the NUMLA executive and under the authority of a miners' agent e. g., the Atherton and 
Tyldesley panel representing a group of colliery branches or the Mosley Common panel 
representing a large colliery. 
Pit-bank - Specifically the area surrounding the top of a mine shaft. In its broader context 
denotes the location where important mass meetings of miners often took place. 
Pit-Brow Lass -A woman or girl surface worker. 
Pit Lad -A young mineworker recruited from school at the age of 14, later 15, before 
upgrading, usually at 21. 
Power-loading - An integrated method of coal-cutting, loading and conveying. Equipment 
and working methods designed for this purpose. 
Remploy - Government employment agency established after the Second World War with 
the task of re-training ex-servicemen. Later its remit was extended to include the training 
and re-training of `disabled' workers. 
`Spencerism' -A term associated with George Spencer, a right-wing Labour MP during the 
1920s who enunciated ideas on industrial co-operation rather than confrontation in the coal 
482 
industry. Spencer formed a `non-political' union initially in the Nottinghamshire coalfield 
and the model was followed in a number of coalfields during the late 1920s and 1930s. 
Vesting Date - The date when the coal industry was nationalised -1 January 1947. 
Wakes - Annual holidays taken in June/July (two weeks) and September (one week) by 
industrial workers in northern England. 
1 Allen, V, The Militancy of British Miners, The Moor Press, Shipley, p. 87. 
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ABBREVIATIONS USED 
ACM - Area Conference Minutes. 
ACP (ACCP) - Accelerated Colliery Closure Programme 
AEF - Amalgamated Union of Engineers and Foundrymen 
UKAEA - United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority 
BEA - British Electricity Authority 
BP - British Petroleum 
CEB - Central Electricity Board 
CEBNW - Central Electricity Board: North West 
CEGB - Central Electricity Generating Board 
CPGB - Communist Party of Great Britain 
ECM - Executive Committee Minutes 
HMSO - Her Majesty's Stationery Office 
JIC - Joint Investigation Committee 
ILP - Independent Labour Party 
LCMF- Lancashire and Cheshire Miners' Federation 
LRO - Lancashire Record Office 
MFGB - Miners' Federation of Great Britain 
NACODS - National Association of Colliery Overmen Deputies and Shotfirers 
NCB - National Coal Board 
NCBLA - National Coal Board Lancashire Area 
NCBNWD - National Coal Board North Western Division 
NCBHQ - National Coal Board Headquarters 
NEC - National Executive Committee 
NELDA - North East Lancashire Development Association 
NWIDA - North West Industrial Development Association 
NWIDC - North West Industrial Development Committee 
NPLA - National Power Loading Agreement 
NUM - National Union of Mineworkers 
NUMNEC - National Union of Mineworkers National Executive Committee 
NUMLA - National Union of Mineworkers Lancashire Area 
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NUMNWA - National Union of Mineworkers North Western Area 
NUR - National Union of Railwaymen 
PPS - Parliamentary Private Secretary 
PRO - Public Record Office 
SELDA - South Lancashire Development Association 
SELDC - South Lancashire Development Committee 
TGWU - Transport and General Workers 
TUC - Trade Union Congress 
UDC - Urban District Council 
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File COAL 30/85: NCB: Closure of Collieries 1958 December-1960 August. 
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No 258: Area 3 (St. Helens) Area General Manager: 1960 May-1961 March: Re- 
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